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Windows Analysis Report
526142.pdf

Overview

General Information

Sample name:	526142.pdf
Analysis ID:	1561508
MD5:	bcea5bd8718053f4699a0c6b17481ca7
SHA1:	7e037add42f3ec8835feadd9852c4550646bee7e
SHA256:	d21711f4372dc7ac5aa7d124dbff9382cb3b35cb38d5a1b3c807bd2d414e46a1
Infos:

Detection

Score:	2
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	80%

Signatures

IP address seen in connection with other malware

Potential document exploit detected (performs DNS queries)

Potential document exploit detected (performs HTTP gets)

Potential document exploit detected (unknown TCP traffic)

Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication

Classification

Process Tree

System is w10x64

Acrobat.exe (PID: 3788 cmdline: "C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\Acrobat.exe" "C:\Users\user\Desktop\526142.pdf" MD5: 24EAD1C46A47022347DC0F05F6EFBB8C)

AcroCEF.exe (PID: 1672 cmdline: "C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\acrocef_1\AcroCEF.exe" --backgroundcolor=16777215 MD5: 9B38E8E8B6DD9622D24B53E095C5D9BE)

AcroCEF.exe (PID: 7228 cmdline: "C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\acrocef_1\AcroCEF.exe" --type=utility --utility-sub-type=network.mojom.NetworkService --lang=en-US --service-sandbox-type=none --log-severity=disable --user-agent-product="ReaderServices/23.6.20320 Chrome/105.0.0.0" --lang=en-US --user-data-dir="C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\CEF\User Data" --log-file="C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\acrocef_1\debug.log" --mojo-platform-channel-handle=2124 --field-trial-handle=1604,i,2889311111756859078,1169954142003541719,131072 --disable-features=BackForwardCache,CalculateNativeWinOcclusion,WinUseBrowserSpellChecker /prefetch:8 MD5: 9B38E8E8B6DD9622D24B53E095C5D9BE)

cleanup

Joe Sandbox Signatures

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Show All Signature Results

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Source: global traffic

DNS query: name: x1.i.lencr.org

Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.5:49715 -> 52.5.13.197:443
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.5:49715 -> 52.5.13.197:443
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.5:49715 -> 52.5.13.197:443
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.5:49715 -> 52.5.13.197:443
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.5:49715 -> 52.5.13.197:443
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.5:49715 -> 52.5.13.197:443
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.5:49715 -> 52.5.13.197:443
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.5:49715 -> 52.5.13.197:443
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.5:49715 -> 52.5.13.197:443
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.5:49715 -> 52.5.13.197:443
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.5:49715 -> 52.5.13.197:443
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.5:49715 -> 52.5.13.197:443
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.5:49715 -> 52.5.13.197:443

Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.5:49715 -> 52.5.13.197:443
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 52.5.13.197:443 -> 192.168.2.5:49715
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.5:49715 -> 52.5.13.197:443
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.5:49715 -> 52.5.13.197:443
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 52.5.13.197:443 -> 192.168.2.5:49715
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 52.5.13.197:443 -> 192.168.2.5:49715
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.5:49715 -> 52.5.13.197:443
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 52.5.13.197:443 -> 192.168.2.5:49715
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 52.5.13.197:443 -> 192.168.2.5:49715
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.5:49715 -> 52.5.13.197:443
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 52.5.13.197:443 -> 192.168.2.5:49715
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.5:49715 -> 52.5.13.197:443
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.5:49715 -> 52.5.13.197:443
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 52.5.13.197:443 -> 192.168.2.5:49715
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.5:49715 -> 52.5.13.197:443
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 52.5.13.197:443 -> 192.168.2.5:49715
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.5:49715 -> 52.5.13.197:443
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 52.5.13.197:443 -> 192.168.2.5:49715
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 52.5.13.197:443 -> 192.168.2.5:49715
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.5:49715 -> 52.5.13.197:443
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 52.5.13.197:443 -> 192.168.2.5:49715
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 52.5.13.197:443 -> 192.168.2.5:49715
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.5:49715 -> 52.5.13.197:443
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.5:49715 -> 52.5.13.197:443
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 52.5.13.197:443 -> 192.168.2.5:49715

Source: Joe Sandbox View

IP Address: 52.5.13.197 52.5.13.197

Source: global traffic

HTTP traffic detected: GET /psdk/v2/content?surfaceId=ACROBAT_READER_MASTER_SURFACEID&surfaceId=DC_READER_LAUNCH_CARD&surfaceId=DC_Reader_RHP_Banner&surfaceId=DC_Reader_RHP_Retention&surfaceId=Edit_InApp_Aug2020&surfaceId=DC_FirstMile_Right_Sec_Surface&surfaceId=DC_Reader_Upsell_Cards&surfaceId=DC_FirstMile_Home_View_Surface&surfaceId=DC_Reader_RHP_Intent_Banner&surfaceId=DC_Reader_Disc_LHP_Banner&surfaceId=DC_Reader_Edit_LHP_Banner&surfaceId=DC_Reader_Convert_LHP_Banner&surfaceId=DC_Reader_Sign_LHP_Banner&surfaceId=DC_Reader_More_LHP_Banner&surfaceId=DC_Reader_Disc_LHP_Retention&surfaceId=DC_Reader_Home_LHP_Trial_Banner&adcProductLanguage=en-us&adcVersion=23.6.20320&adcProductType=SingleClientMini&adcOSType=WIN&adcCountryCode=US&adcXAPIClientID=api_reader_desktop_win_23.6.20320&encodingScheme=BASE_64 HTTP/1.1Host: p13n.adobe.ioConnection: keep-alivesec-ch-ua: "Chromium";v="105"sec-ch-ua-mobile: ?0User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) ReaderServices/23.6.20320 Chrome/105.0.0.0 Safari/537.36Accept: application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01x-adobe-uuid: 89d789c4-e7e5-4f75-95a4-57139ab6811fx-adobe-uuid-type: visitorIdx-api-key: AdobeReader9sec-ch-ua-platform: "Windows"Origin: https://rna-resource.acrobat.comAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-siteSec-Fetch-Mode: corsSec-Fetch-Dest: emptyReferer: https://rna-resource.acrobat.com/Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br

Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 52.5.13.197
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 52.5.13.197
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 52.5.13.197
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 52.5.13.197
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 52.5.13.197
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 52.5.13.197
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 52.5.13.197
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 52.5.13.197
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 52.5.13.197
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 52.5.13.197
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 52.5.13.197
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 52.5.13.197
Source: unknown	UDP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 1.1.1.1

Source: 77EC63BDA74BD0D0E0426DC8F80085060.2.dr	String found in binary or memory: http://ctldl.windowsupdate.com/msdownload/update/v3/static/trustedr/en/authrootstl.cab
Source: 2D85F72862B55C4EADD9E66E06947F3D0.2.dr	String found in binary or memory: http://x1.i.lencr.org/

Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 49715 -> 443
Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 443 -> 49715

Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\Acrobat.exe "C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\Acrobat.exe" "C:\Users\user\Desktop\526142.pdf"
Source: C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\Acrobat.exe	Process created: C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\acrocef_1\AcroCEF.exe "C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\acrocef_1\AcroCEF.exe" --backgroundcolor=16777215
Source: C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\acrocef_1\AcroCEF.exe	Process created: C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\acrocef_1\AcroCEF.exe "C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\acrocef_1\AcroCEF.exe" --type=utility --utility-sub-type=network.mojom.NetworkService --lang=en-US --service-sandbox-type=none --log-severity=disable --user-agent-product="ReaderServices/23.6.20320 Chrome/105.0.0.0" --lang=en-US --user-data-dir="C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\CEF\User Data" --log-file="C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\acrocef_1\debug.log" --mojo-platform-channel-handle=2124 --field-trial-handle=1604,i,2889311111756859078,1169954142003541719,131072 --disable-features=BackForwardCache,CalculateNativeWinOcclusion,WinUseBrowserSpellChecker /prefetch:8
Source: C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\Acrobat.exe	Process created: unknown unknown	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\Acrobat.exe	Process created: C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\acrocef_1\AcroCEF.exe "C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\acrocef_1\AcroCEF.exe" --backgroundcolor=16777215	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\acrocef_1\AcroCEF.exe	Process created: unknown unknown	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\acrocef_1\AcroCEF.exe	Process created: unknown unknown	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\acrocef_1\AcroCEF.exe	Process created: C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\acrocef_1\AcroCEF.exe "C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\acrocef_1\AcroCEF.exe" --type=utility --utility-sub-type=network.mojom.NetworkService --lang=en-US --service-sandbox-type=none --log-severity=disable --user-agent-product="ReaderServices/23.6.20320 Chrome/105.0.0.0" --lang=en-US --user-data-dir="C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\CEF\User Data" --log-file="C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\acrocef_1\debug.log" --mojo-platform-channel-handle=2124 --field-trial-handle=1604,i,2889311111756859078,1169954142003541719,131072 --disable-features=BackForwardCache,CalculateNativeWinOcclusion,WinUseBrowserSpellChecker /prefetch:8	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\acrocef_1\AcroCEF.exe	Process created: unknown unknown	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\acrocef_1\AcroCEF.exe	Process created: unknown unknown	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\acrocef_1\AcroCEF.exe	Process created: unknown unknown	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\acrocef_1\AcroCEF.exe	Process created: unknown unknown	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\acrocef_1\AcroCEF.exe	Process created: unknown unknown	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\acrocef_1\AcroCEF.exe	Process created: unknown unknown	Jump to behavior

Source: 526142.pdf	Initial sample: PDF keyword /JS count = 0
Source: 526142.pdf	Initial sample: PDF keyword /JavaScript count = 0

Source: C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\Acrobat.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\Acrobat.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\acrocef_1\AcroCEF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\acrocef_1\AcroCEF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\acrocef_1\AcroCEF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\acrocef_1\AcroCEF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\acrocef_1\AcroCEF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\acrocef_1\AcroCEF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior

Reconnaissance	Resource Development	Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Command and Control	Exfiltration	Impact
Gather Victim Identity Information	Acquire Infrastructure	Valid Accounts	3 Exploitation for Client Execution	Path Interception	1 Process Injection	1 Masquerading	OS Credential Dumping	1 System Information Discovery	Remote Services	Data from Local System	1 Encrypted Channel	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Abuse Accessibility Features
Credentials	Domains	Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	1 Process Injection	LSASS Memory	Application Window Discovery	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	2 Non-Application Layer Protocol	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Network Denial of Service
Email Addresses	DNS Server	Domain Accounts	At	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	Obfuscated Files or Information	Security Account Manager	Query Registry	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	13 Application Layer Protocol	Automated Exfiltration	Data Encrypted for Impact
Employee Names	Virtual Private Server	Local Accounts	Cron	Login Hook	Login Hook	Binary Padding	NTDS	System Network Configuration Discovery	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	1 Ingress Tool Transfer	Traffic Duplication	Data Destruction

Name	IP	Active	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
bg.microsoft.map.fastly.net	199.232.214.172	true	false		high
x1.i.lencr.org	unknown	unknown	false		high

Joe Sandbox version:	41.0.0 Charoite
Analysis ID:	1561508
Start date and time:	2024-11-23 16:07:47 +01:00
Joe Sandbox product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 4m 13s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	full
Cookbook file name:	defaultwindowspdfcookbook.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 x64 22H2 with Office Professional Plus 2019, Chrome 117, Firefox 118, Adobe Reader DC 23, Java 8 Update 381, 7zip 23.01
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	9
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Sample name:	526142.pdf
Detection:	CLEAN
Classification:	clean2.winPDF@14/51@1/1
EGA Information:	Failed
HCA Information:	Successful, ratio: 100% Number of executed functions: 0 Number of non-executed functions: 0
Cookbook Comments:	Found application associated with file extension: .pdf Found PDF document Close Viewer

Input	Output
URL: PDF document Model: Joe Sandbox AI	{ "contains_trigger_text": false, "trigger_text": "unknown", "prominent_button_name": "unknown", "text_input_field_labels": "unknown", "pdf_icon_visible": false, "has_visible_captcha": false, "has_urgent_text": false, "has_visible_qrcode": false }

URL: PDF document Model: Joe Sandbox AI	{ "brands": [ " " ] }
	{ "brands": [ " " ] }

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Threat Name	Link
52.5.13.197	f5dc5302-022c-8bef-7a8e-e20ea821f59b.eml	Get hash	malicious	HTMLPhisher	Browse
	new.bat	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse
	scan3762399_arleen@wcctxlaw.com.pdf	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse
	EERNI7eIS7.lnk	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse
	Camilla.Chua_Review_Salary147d1c0f-8d0d-4d8d-9d2d-d7e26c541d67_Vliio.pdf	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse
	Oakville_Service_Update_d76b33a1-3420-40be-babd-e82e253ad25c.pdf	Get hash	malicious	HTMLPhisher	Browse
	Demande de proposition du CPE Les Coquins.pdf	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse
	roba.txt	Get hash	malicious	Meterpreter, ReflectiveLoader	Browse
	brayton HR Bulletin_270852_3BU4-ZSJO2U-JMY3.pdf	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse
	original.eml	Get hash	malicious	HtmlDropper	Browse

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Threat Name	Link	Context
bg.microsoft.map.fastly.net	download.ps1	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	199.232.210.172
	download.ps1	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	146.75.30.172
	download.ps1	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	199.232.210.172
	download.ps1	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	199.232.214.172
	download.ps1	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	199.232.210.172
	file.exe	Get hash	malicious	Credential Flusher	Browse	199.232.214.172
	LRkZCtzQ3.ps1	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	199.232.210.172
	file.exe	Get hash	malicious	RedLine, SectopRAT	Browse	199.232.214.172
	filepdf.pdf.lnk.download.lnk	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	199.232.214.172
	VKXD1NsFdC.exe	Get hash	malicious	ScreenConnect Tool	Browse	199.232.210.172

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Threat Name	Link	Context
AMAZON-AESUS	yakuza.sh.elf	Get hash	malicious	Mirai	Browse	34.199.29.152
	8347392490280.pdf	Get hash	malicious	KnowBe4, PDFPhish	Browse	3.228.211.141
	PO #09465610_GQ 003745_SO-242000846.exe	Get hash	malicious	MassLogger RAT, PureLog Stealer	Browse	44.221.84.105
	https://www.cinehub.click/anus	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	35.168.187.42
	sparc.nn.elf	Get hash	malicious	Mirai, Okiru	Browse	54.152.206.119
	mpsl.elf	Get hash	malicious	Mirai, Moobot	Browse	54.157.73.127
	m68k.elf	Get hash	malicious	Mirai, Moobot	Browse	54.60.193.181
	arm7.elf	Get hash	malicious	Mirai, Moobot	Browse	54.209.182.232
	x86.elf	Get hash	malicious	Mirai, Moobot	Browse	44.198.89.203
	http://cdn.prod.website-files.com/65dccdc21b806b929439370e/66e00f5491860971b9b9ef25_80703488528.pdf	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	52.202.204.11

Process:	C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\acrocef_1\AcroCEF.exe
File Type:	ASCII text
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	291
Entropy (8bit):	5.212341398023492
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	6:HGbYgon+q2P92nKuAl9OmbnIFUt8YGbYgFWZmw+YGbYgoVkwO92nKuAl9OmbjLJ:N+v4HAahFUt87W/+eV5LHAaSJ
MD5:	F771E855085585BE5E837E12EDAF1D47
SHA1:	31E4FAF5976B5A73FCD99E54FED0E1EDA7518555
SHA-256:	702B19D65B88E6D197A10592A320506DC61621E3FEE3EC4D98D9628654D3A57A
SHA-512:	B403877BFAD5E3C2156BCB51DD9AC51D9BCC9DB617731DC93E6CC173C86E54ABCD650647FD126FB76BFADE48E3CF1CA7681F8CCEC4C72CA1A906E6A2A5DB098D
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	low
Preview:	2024/11/23-10:08:43.161 65c Reusing MANIFEST C:\Users\user\AppData\LocalLow\Adobe\AcroCef\DC\Acrobat\Cache/MANIFEST-000001.2024/11/23-10:08:43.170 65c Recovering log #3.2024/11/23-10:08:43.170 65c Reusing old log C:\Users\user\AppData\LocalLow\Adobe\AcroCef\DC\Acrobat\Cache/000003.log .

File type:	PDF document, version 1.4, 1 pages
Entropy (8bit):	7.9930522189190025
TrID:	Adobe Portable Document Format (5005/1) 100.00%
File name:	526142.pdf
File size:	517'896 bytes
MD5:	bcea5bd8718053f4699a0c6b17481ca7
SHA1:	7e037add42f3ec8835feadd9852c4550646bee7e
SHA256:	d21711f4372dc7ac5aa7d124dbff9382cb3b35cb38d5a1b3c807bd2d414e46a1
SHA512:	ad78418beb783ea09a4143376b9caf96e55b6e943dd403b8d3ca9de72063656f04eee815f4407202232ac404b01ba19493dcf1b1d32df6ee62a6336669364ca0
SSDEEP:	12288:JeyLu1gV/5Ey3WPiTLoo5/cq3UKPxBZeWy73KaM/4faHN:IKEIWYB5kq3fxBQWq4N
TLSH:	B6B42382FA68BC29CD454120BA2D3DCA642AB34F0EC509E77F5DD5A815B3E60F8751E3
File Content Preview:	%PDF-1.4.%.....1 0 obj.<< /Creator <feff0050007200610077006e>./Producer <feff0050007200610077006e>.>>.endobj.2 0 obj.<< /Type /Catalog./Pages 3 0 R.>>.endobj.3 0 obj.<< /Type /Pages./Count 1./Kids [5 0 R].>>.endobj.4 0 obj.<< /Length 1746.>>.stream.q..q.8

General
Header:	%PDF-1.4
Total Entropy:	7.993052
Total Bytes:	517896
Stream Entropy:	7.998443
Stream Bytes:	508098
Entropy outside Streams:	4.413110
Bytes outside Streams:	9798
Number of EOF found:	1
Bytes after EOF:

Name	Count
obj	35
endobj	34
stream	15
endstream	15
xref	1
trailer	1
startxref	1
/Page	1
/Encrypt	0
/ObjStm	0
/URI	0
/JS	0
/JavaScript	0
/AA	0
/OpenAction	0
/AcroForm	0
/JBIG2Decode	0
/RichMedia	0
/Launch	0
/EmbeddedFile	0

ID	DHASH	MD5
6	c4ce9b8343416332	752494e32d41e6bbbea7403c6d1af1c7
7	e46765a0d2c864c7	f4f4928361d8dbbec9e3f02db33ba970
13	0874666361331b26	c51a0e265ffd07eeb6fba8e8718600d5
14	8c3819d866231162	f15ed62b9837a9b9de258229d1aaf689

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Nov 23, 2024 16:08:52.136378050 CET	49715	443	192.168.2.5	52.5.13.197
Nov 23, 2024 16:08:52.136481047 CET	443	49715	52.5.13.197	192.168.2.5
Nov 23, 2024 16:08:52.136555910 CET	49715	443	192.168.2.5	52.5.13.197
Nov 23, 2024 16:08:52.136781931 CET	49715	443	192.168.2.5	52.5.13.197
Nov 23, 2024 16:08:52.136816978 CET	443	49715	52.5.13.197	192.168.2.5
Nov 23, 2024 16:08:53.657406092 CET	443	49715	52.5.13.197	192.168.2.5
Nov 23, 2024 16:08:53.657735109 CET	49715	443	192.168.2.5	52.5.13.197
Nov 23, 2024 16:08:53.657762051 CET	443	49715	52.5.13.197	192.168.2.5
Nov 23, 2024 16:08:53.659296989 CET	443	49715	52.5.13.197	192.168.2.5
Nov 23, 2024 16:08:53.659367085 CET	49715	443	192.168.2.5	52.5.13.197
Nov 23, 2024 16:08:53.659377098 CET	443	49715	52.5.13.197	192.168.2.5
Nov 23, 2024 16:08:53.659698963 CET	49715	443	192.168.2.5	52.5.13.197
Nov 23, 2024 16:08:53.659917116 CET	49715	443	192.168.2.5	52.5.13.197
Nov 23, 2024 16:08:53.659995079 CET	443	49715	52.5.13.197	192.168.2.5
Nov 23, 2024 16:08:53.660284042 CET	49715	443	192.168.2.5	52.5.13.197
Nov 23, 2024 16:08:53.660300970 CET	443	49715	52.5.13.197	192.168.2.5
Nov 23, 2024 16:08:53.703516006 CET	49715	443	192.168.2.5	52.5.13.197
Nov 23, 2024 16:08:54.192043066 CET	443	49715	52.5.13.197	192.168.2.5
Nov 23, 2024 16:08:54.192071915 CET	443	49715	52.5.13.197	192.168.2.5
Nov 23, 2024 16:08:54.192130089 CET	49715	443	192.168.2.5	52.5.13.197
Nov 23, 2024 16:08:54.192157984 CET	443	49715	52.5.13.197	192.168.2.5
Nov 23, 2024 16:08:54.192177057 CET	443	49715	52.5.13.197	192.168.2.5
Nov 23, 2024 16:08:54.192225933 CET	49715	443	192.168.2.5	52.5.13.197
Nov 23, 2024 16:08:54.194392920 CET	49715	443	192.168.2.5	52.5.13.197
Nov 23, 2024 16:08:54.194405079 CET	443	49715	52.5.13.197	192.168.2.5

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	Reply Code	Name	CName	Address	Type	Class	DNS over HTTPS
Nov 23, 2024 16:08:52.782982111 CET	1.1.1.1	192.168.2.5	0x8b4c	No error (0)	x1.i.lencr.org	crl.root-x1.letsencrypt.org.edgekey.net		CNAME (Canonical name)	IN (0x0001)	false
Nov 23, 2024 16:08:54.559946060 CET	1.1.1.1	192.168.2.5	0x7def	No error (0)	bg.microsoft.map.fastly.net		199.232.214.172	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)	false
Nov 23, 2024 16:08:54.559946060 CET	1.1.1.1	192.168.2.5	0x7def	No error (0)	bg.microsoft.map.fastly.net		199.232.210.172	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)	false

Timestamp	Bytes transferred	Direction	Data
2024-11-23 15:08:53 UTC	1473	OUT	GET /psdk/v2/content?surfaceId=ACROBAT_READER_MASTER_SURFACEID&surfaceId=DC_READER_LAUNCH_CARD&surfaceId=DC_Reader_RHP_Banner&surfaceId=DC_Reader_RHP_Retention&surfaceId=Edit_InApp_Aug2020&surfaceId=DC_FirstMile_Right_Sec_Surface&surfaceId=DC_Reader_Upsell_Cards&surfaceId=DC_FirstMile_Home_View_Surface&surfaceId=DC_Reader_RHP_Intent_Banner&surfaceId=DC_Reader_Disc_LHP_Banner&surfaceId=DC_Reader_Edit_LHP_Banner&surfaceId=DC_Reader_Convert_LHP_Banner&surfaceId=DC_Reader_Sign_LHP_Banner&surfaceId=DC_Reader_More_LHP_Banner&surfaceId=DC_Reader_Disc_LHP_Retention&surfaceId=DC_Reader_Home_LHP_Trial_Banner&adcProductLanguage=en-us&adcVersion=23.6.20320&adcProductType=SingleClientMini&adcOSType=WIN&adcCountryCode=US&adcXAPIClientID=api_reader_desktop_win_23.6.20320&encodingScheme=BASE_64 HTTP/1.1 Host: p13n.adobe.io Connection: keep-alive sec-ch-ua: "Chromium";v="105" sec-ch-ua-mobile: ?0 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) ReaderServices/23.6.20320 Chrome/105.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 Accept: application/json, text/javascript, /; q=0.01 x-adobe-uuid: 89d789c4-e7e5-4f75-95a4-57139ab6811f x-adobe-uuid-type: visitorId x-api-key: AdobeReader9 sec-ch-ua-platform: "Windows" Origin: https://rna-resource.acrobat.com Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9 Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-site Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty Referer: https://rna-resource.acrobat.com/ Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
2024-11-23 15:08:54 UTC	608	IN	HTTP/1.1 200 Server: openresty Date: Sat, 23 Nov 2024 15:08:54 GMT Content-Type: application/json;charset=UTF-8 Content-Length: 5339 Connection: close x-request-id: q5zrS9nheZCn96P0kRcm27uV0MuzS0QK vary: accept-encoding Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * Access-Control-Allow-Methods: GET, OPTIONS Access-Control-Allow-Headers: Authorization,Content-Type,X-Api-Key,cache-control,User-Agent,If-None-Match,x-adobe-uuid,x-adobe-uuid-type, X-Request-Id Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true Access-Control-Expose-Headers: x-request-id Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=15552000; includeSubDomains
2024-11-23 15:08:54 UTC	5339	IN	Data Raw: 7b 22 73 75 72 66 61 63 65 73 22 3a 7b 22 44 43 5f 52 65 61 64 65 72 5f 48 6f 6d 65 5f 4c 48 50 5f 54 72 69 61 6c 5f 42 61 6e 6e 65 72 22 3a 7b 22 63 6f 6e 74 61 69 6e 65 72 73 22 3a 5b 7b 22 63 6f 6e 74 61 69 6e 65 72 49 64 22 3a 31 2c 22 63 6f 6e 74 61 69 6e 65 72 4c 61 62 65 6c 22 3a 22 4a 53 4f 4e 20 66 6f 72 20 44 43 5f 52 65 61 64 65 72 5f 48 6f 6d 65 5f 4c 48 50 5f 54 72 69 61 6c 5f 42 61 6e 6e 65 72 22 2c 22 64 61 74 61 54 79 70 65 22 3a 22 61 70 70 6c 69 63 61 74 69 6f 6e 2f 6a 73 6f 6e 22 2c 22 64 61 74 61 22 3a 22 65 79 4a 6a 64 47 45 69 4f 6e 73 69 64 47 56 34 64 43 49 36 49 6c 52 79 65 53 42 42 59 33 4a 76 59 6d 46 30 49 46 42 79 62 79 4a 39 4c 43 4a 31 61 53 49 36 65 79 4a 30 61 58 52 73 5a 56 39 7a 64 48 6c 73 61 57 35 6e 49 6a 70 37 49 6d Data Ascii: {"surfaces":{"DC_Reader_Home_LHP_Trial_Banner":{"containers":[{"containerId":1,"containerLabel":"JSON for DC_Reader_Home_LHP_Trial_Banner","dataType":"application/json","data":"eyJjdGEiOnsidGV4dCI6IlRyeSBBY3JvYmF0IFBybyJ9LCJ1aSI6eyJ0aXRsZV9zdHlsaW5nIjp7Im

Target ID:	0
Start time:	10:08:42
Start date:	23/11/2024
Path:	C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\Acrobat.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	"C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\Acrobat.exe" "C:\Users\user\Desktop\526142.pdf"
Imagebase:	0x7ff686a00000
File size:	5'641'176 bytes
MD5 hash:	24EAD1C46A47022347DC0F05F6EFBB8C
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Target ID:	4
Start time:	10:08:43
Start date:	23/11/2024
Path:	C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\acrocef_1\AcroCEF.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	"C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\acrocef_1\AcroCEF.exe" --type=utility --utility-sub-type=network.mojom.NetworkService --lang=en-US --service-sandbox-type=none --log-severity=disable --user-agent-product="ReaderServices/23.6.20320 Chrome/105.0.0.0" --lang=en-US --user-data-dir="C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\CEF\User Data" --log-file="C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\acrocef_1\debug.log" --mojo-platform-channel-handle=2124 --field-trial-handle=1604,i,2889311111756859078,1169954142003541719,131072 --disable-features=BackForwardCache,CalculateNativeWinOcclusion,WinUseBrowserSpellChecker /prefetch:8
Imagebase:	0x7ff6413e0000
File size:	3'581'912 bytes
MD5 hash:	9B38E8E8B6DD9622D24B53E095C5D9BE
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Description:	Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in client applications to execute code. Vulnerabilities can exist in software due to unsecure coding practices that can lead to unanticipated behavior. Adversaries can take advantage of certain vulnerabilities through targeted exploitation for the purpose of arbitrary code execution. Oftentimes the most valuable exploits to an offensive toolkit are those that can be used to obtain code execution on a remote system because they can be used to gain access to that system. Users will expect to see files related to the applications they commonly used to do work, so they are a useful target for exploit research and development because of their high utility.
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	Application Log: Application Log Content, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

Loading Joe Sandbox Report ...

Warning!

Windows Analysis Report 526142.pdf

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Process Tree

Malware Configuration

Yara Signatures

Sigma Signatures

Suricata Signatures

Joe Sandbox Signatures

Software Vulnerabilities

Networking

System Summary

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

URLs from Memory and Binaries

World Map of Contacted IPs

Public IPs

General Information

Warnings

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

LLM Input / Output

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASNs

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

C:\Users\user\AppData\LocalLow\Adobe\AcroCef\DC\Acrobat\Cache\LOG

C:\Users\user\AppData\LocalLow\Adobe\AcroCef\DC\Acrobat\Cache\LOG.old (copy)

C:\Users\user\AppData\LocalLow\Adobe\AcroCef\DC\Acrobat\Cache\Local Storage\leveldb\LOG

C:\Users\user\AppData\LocalLow\Adobe\AcroCef\DC\Acrobat\Cache\Local Storage\leveldb\LOG.old (copy)

C:\Users\user\AppData\LocalLow\Adobe\AcroCef\DC\Acrobat\Cache\Network\2dac56fe-de7c-4089-82fd-e04d92c88755.tmp

C:\Users\user\AppData\LocalLow\Adobe\AcroCef\DC\Acrobat\Cache\Network\Network Persistent State (copy)

C:\Users\user\AppData\LocalLow\Adobe\AcroCef\DC\Acrobat\Cache\Network\Network Persistent State~RF53e57a.TMP (copy)

C:\Users\user\AppData\LocalLow\Adobe\AcroCef\DC\Acrobat\Cache\Network\f4a8553e-0452-4de3-b017-d600c776dc1b.tmp

C:\Users\user\AppData\LocalLow\Adobe\AcroCef\DC\Acrobat\Cache\Session Storage\000003.log

C:\Users\user\AppData\LocalLow\Adobe\AcroCef\DC\Acrobat\Cache\Session Storage\LOG

C:\Users\user\AppData\LocalLow\Adobe\AcroCef\DC\Acrobat\Cache\Session Storage\LOG.old (copy)

C:\Users\user\AppData\LocalLow\Adobe\Acrobat\DC\ConnectorIcons\icon-241123150847Z-164.bmp

C:\Users\user\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\Content\2D85F72862B55C4EADD9E66E06947F3D

C:\Users\user\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\Content\77EC63BDA74BD0D0E0426DC8F8008506

C:\Users\user\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\2D85F72862B55C4EADD9E66E06947F3D

C:\Users\user\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\77EC63BDA74BD0D0E0426DC8F8008506

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Adobe\Acrobat\DC\AdobeCMapFnt23.lst (copy)

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Adobe\Acrobat\DC\AdobeFnt23.lst.2276

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Adobe\Acrobat\DC\AdobeSysFnt23.lst (copy)

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Adobe\Acrobat\DC\Cache\AcroFnt23.lst (copy)

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Adobe\Acrobat\DC\Cache\AdobeFnt23.lst.2276

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Adobe\Acrobat\DC\IconCacheAcro65536.dat

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Adobe\Acrobat\DC\SOPHIA\Acrobat\Files\ACROBAT_READER_MASTER_SURFACEID

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Adobe\Acrobat\DC\SOPHIA\Acrobat\Files\DC_FirstMile_Home_View_Surface

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Adobe\Acrobat\DC\SOPHIA\Acrobat\Files\DC_FirstMile_Right_Sec_Surface

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Adobe\Acrobat\DC\SOPHIA\Acrobat\Files\DC_READER_LAUNCH_CARD

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Adobe\Acrobat\DC\SOPHIA\Acrobat\Files\DC_Reader_Convert_LHP_Banner

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Adobe\Acrobat\DC\SOPHIA\Acrobat\Files\DC_Reader_Disc_LHP_Banner

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Adobe\Acrobat\DC\SOPHIA\Acrobat\Files\DC_Reader_Disc_LHP_Retention

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Adobe\Acrobat\DC\SOPHIA\Acrobat\Files\DC_Reader_Edit_LHP_Banner

Windows Analysis Report
526142.pdf

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File: File Metadata, File: File Modification, Module: Module Load, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Access, Process: Process Metadata, Process: Process Modification
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, File: File Metadata, File: File Modification, Image: Image Metadata, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation, Process: Process Metadata, Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Metadata, Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Modification, Service: Service Creation, Service: Service Metadata
Platforms:	Containers, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use an OSI non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive.Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL).
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using OSI application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Tools or files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system to the victim network through the command and control channel or through alternate protocols such as ftp . Once present, adversaries may also transfer/spread tools between victim devices within a compromised environment (i.e. Lateral Tool Transfer ).
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, File: File Creation, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre