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Windows
Analysis Report
X9d3758tok.exe
Overview
General Information
Sample name: | X9d3758tok.exerenamed because original name is a hash value |
Original sample name: | 5b198b1cb3177bc50c15f147238d6c49.exe |
Analysis ID: | 1544227 |
MD5: | 5b198b1cb3177bc50c15f147238d6c49 |
SHA1: | 1f5ea6645a41198e7d060fa147b98aabf14600d1 |
SHA256: | 52ce96aeb7d4062ffcce2a92bd41012f4198bc8d1fe7242b3de84434c6eb4c84 |
Tags: | exeStealcuser-abuse_ch |
Infos: | |
Detection
Stealc, Vidar
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Whitelisted: | false |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample
Antivirus detection for dropped file
Detected unpacking (changes PE section rights)
Detected unpacking (overwrites its own PE header)
Found malware configuration
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for domain / URL
Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Sigma detected: Disable power options
Sigma detected: Stop EventLog
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
Yara detected Powershell download and execute
Yara detected Stealc
Yara detected Vidar stealer
AI detected suspicious sample
Adds a directory exclusion to Windows Defender
C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration
Found direct / indirect Syscall (likely to bypass EDR)
Found evasive API chain (may stop execution after checking locale)
Found many strings related to Crypto-Wallets (likely being stolen)
Hides threads from debuggers
Loading BitLocker PowerShell Module
Machine Learning detection for sample
Modifies power options to not sleep / hibernate
Modifies the hosts file
PE file contains section with special chars
Query firmware table information (likely to detect VMs)
Searches for specific processes (likely to inject)
Sigma detected: Powershell Base64 Encoded MpPreference Cmdlet
Tries to detect process monitoring tools (Task Manager, Process Explorer etc.)
Tries to detect sandboxes / dynamic malware analysis system (registry check)
Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (window names)
Tries to harvest and steal Bitcoin Wallet information
Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)
Tries to harvest and steal ftp login credentials
Tries to steal Crypto Currency Wallets
Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file / registry access)
Uses powercfg.exe to modify the power settings
Checks if the current process is being debugged
Contains capabilities to detect virtual machines
Contains functionality to call native functions
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (IsDebuggerPresent)
Contains functionality to create guard pages, often used to hinder reverse engineering and debugging
Contains functionality to dynamically determine API calls
Contains functionality to open a port and listen for incoming connection (possibly a backdoor)
Contains functionality to query CPU information (cpuid)
Contains functionality to query locales information (e.g. system language)
Contains functionality to read the PEB
Contains functionality which may be used to detect a debugger (GetProcessHeap)
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Creates files inside the system directory
Detected potential crypto function
Downloads executable code via HTTP
Dropped file seen in connection with other malware
Drops PE files
Drops PE files to the application program directory (C:\ProgramData)
Enables debug privileges
Entry point lies outside standard sections
Extensive use of GetProcAddress (often used to hide API calls)
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found dropped PE file which has not been started or loaded
Found large amount of non-executed APIs
Found potential string decryption / allocating functions
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
IP address seen in connection with other malware
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
One or more processes crash
PE file contains more sections than normal
PE file contains sections with non-standard names
Queries disk information (often used to detect virtual machines)
Queries information about the installed CPU (vendor, model number etc)
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info
Sigma detected: Browser Started with Remote Debugging
Sigma detected: Powershell Defender Exclusion
Suricata IDS alerts with low severity for network traffic
Uses 32bit PE files
Uses Microsoft's Enhanced Cryptographic Provider
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Yara detected Credential Stealer
Yara signature match
Classification
- System is w10x64
- X9d3758tok.exe (PID: 7484 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\Deskt op\X9d3758 tok.exe" MD5: 5B198B1CB3177BC50C15F147238D6C49) - chrome.exe (PID: 7592 cmdline:
"C:\\Progr am Files\\ Google\\Ch rome\\Appl ication\\c hrome.exe" --remote- debugging- port=9229 --profile- directory= "Default" MD5: 45DE480806D1B5D462A7DDE4DCEFC4E4) - chrome.exe (PID: 7844 cmdline:
"C:\Progra m Files\Go ogle\Chrom e\Applicat ion\chrome .exe" --ty pe=utility --utility -sub-type= network.mo jom.Networ kService - -lang=en-U S --servic e-sandbox- type=none --mojo-pla tform-chan nel-handle =2556 --fi eld-trial- handle=227 2,i,120780 5866524720 8728,26686 3921294736 5791,26214 4 /prefetc h:8 MD5: 45DE480806D1B5D462A7DDE4DCEFC4E4) - cmd.exe (PID: 4504 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\system32 \cmd.exe" /c start " " "C:\Prog ramData\BA AEHDBFID.e xe" MD5: D0FCE3AFA6AA1D58CE9FA336CC2B675B) - conhost.exe (PID: 5312 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - BAAEHDBFID.exe (PID: 1028 cmdline:
"C:\Progra mData\BAAE HDBFID.exe " MD5: 880C9E3235130A6AAAA3EC25BE18BDB4) - powershell.exe (PID: 7640 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ WindowsPow erShell\v1 .0\powersh ell.exe Ad d-MpPrefer ence -Excl usionPath @($env:Use rProfile, $env:Progr amData) -E xclusionEx tension '. exe' -Forc e MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - conhost.exe (PID: 7612 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - WmiPrvSE.exe (PID: 7912 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ wbem\wmipr vse.exe -s ecured -Em bedding MD5: 60FF40CFD7FB8FE41EE4FE9AE5FE1C51) - cmd.exe (PID: 7996 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ cmd.exe /c wusa /uni nstall /kb :890830 /q uiet /nore start MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - conhost.exe (PID: 7180 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - wusa.exe (PID: 1432 cmdline:
wusa /unin stall /kb: 890830 /qu iet /nores tart MD5: FBDA2B8987895780375FE0E6254F6198) - sc.exe (PID: 8132 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ sc.exe sto p UsoSvc MD5: 3FB5CF71F7E7EB49790CB0E663434D80) - conhost.exe (PID: 4080 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - sc.exe (PID: 7684 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ sc.exe sto p WaaSMedi cSvc MD5: 3FB5CF71F7E7EB49790CB0E663434D80) - conhost.exe (PID: 7724 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - sc.exe (PID: 7664 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ sc.exe sto p wuauserv MD5: 3FB5CF71F7E7EB49790CB0E663434D80) - conhost.exe (PID: 7764 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - sc.exe (PID: 7872 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ sc.exe sto p bits MD5: 3FB5CF71F7E7EB49790CB0E663434D80) - conhost.exe (PID: 7880 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - sc.exe (PID: 8012 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ sc.exe sto p dosvc MD5: 3FB5CF71F7E7EB49790CB0E663434D80) - conhost.exe (PID: 8004 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - powercfg.exe (PID: 2488 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ powercfg.e xe /x -hib ernate-tim eout-ac 0 MD5: 9CA38BE255FFF57A92BD6FBF8052B705) - conhost.exe (PID: 3312 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - powercfg.exe (PID: 2648 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ powercfg.e xe /x -hib ernate-tim eout-dc 0 MD5: 9CA38BE255FFF57A92BD6FBF8052B705) - conhost.exe (PID: 1360 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - powercfg.exe (PID: 4584 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ powercfg.e xe /x -sta ndby-timeo ut-ac 0 MD5: 9CA38BE255FFF57A92BD6FBF8052B705) - conhost.exe (PID: 7404 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - powercfg.exe (PID: 1836 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ powercfg.e xe /x -sta ndby-timeo ut-dc 0 MD5: 9CA38BE255FFF57A92BD6FBF8052B705) - conhost.exe (PID: 5332 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - sc.exe (PID: 7476 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ sc.exe del ete "Googl eUpdateTas kMachineQC " MD5: 3FB5CF71F7E7EB49790CB0E663434D80) - conhost.exe (PID: 6024 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - sc.exe (PID: 1732 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ sc.exe cre ate "Googl eUpdateTas kMachineQC " binpath= "C:\Progr amData\Goo gle\Chrome \updater.e xe" start= "auto" MD5: 3FB5CF71F7E7EB49790CB0E663434D80) - conhost.exe (PID: 2128 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - sc.exe (PID: 6388 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ sc.exe sto p eventlog MD5: 3FB5CF71F7E7EB49790CB0E663434D80) - conhost.exe (PID: 6384 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - sc.exe (PID: 6432 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ sc.exe sta rt "Google UpdateTask MachineQC" MD5: 3FB5CF71F7E7EB49790CB0E663434D80) - conhost.exe (PID: 6480 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - WerFault.exe (PID: 4908 cmdline:
C:\Windows \SysWOW64\ WerFault.e xe -u -p 7 484 -s 309 6 MD5: C31336C1EFC2CCB44B4326EA793040F2)
- svchost.exe (PID: 7704 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ svchost.ex e -k netsv cs -p -s B ITS MD5: B7F884C1B74A263F746EE12A5F7C9F6A)
- svchost.exe (PID: 8152 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ svchost.ex e -k WerSv cGroup MD5: B7F884C1B74A263F746EE12A5F7C9F6A) - WerFault.exe (PID: 7272 cmdline:
C:\Windows \SysWOW64\ WerFault.e xe -pss -s 464 -p 74 84 -ip 748 4 MD5: C31336C1EFC2CCB44B4326EA793040F2)
- svchost.exe (PID: 4960 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ svchost.ex e -k Local Service -p -s Licens eManager MD5: B7F884C1B74A263F746EE12A5F7C9F6A)
- updater.exe (PID: 7008 cmdline:
C:\Program Data\Googl e\Chrome\u pdater.exe MD5: 880C9E3235130A6AAAA3EC25BE18BDB4)
- cleanup
Name | Description | Attribution | Blogpost URLs | Link |
---|---|---|---|---|
Stealc | Stealc is an information stealer advertised by its presumed developer Plymouth on Russian-speaking underground forums and sold as a Malware-as-a-Service since January 9, 2023. According to Plymouth's statement, stealc is a non-resident stealer with flexible data collection settings and its development is relied on other prominent stealers: Vidar, Raccoon, Mars and Redline.Stealc is written in C and uses WinAPI functions. It mainly targets date from web browsers, extensions and Desktop application of cryptocurrency wallets, and from other applications (messengers, email clients, etc.). The malware downloads 7 legitimate third-party DLLs to collect sensitive data from web browsers, including sqlite3.dll, nss3.dll, vcruntime140.dll, mozglue.dll, freebl3.dll, softokn3.dll and msvcp140.dll. It then exfiltrates the collected information file by file to its C2 server using HTTP POST requests. | No Attribution |
Name | Description | Attribution | Blogpost URLs | Link |
---|---|---|---|---|
Vidar | Vidar is a forked malware based on Arkei. It seems this stealer is one of the first that is grabbing information on 2FA Software and Tor Browser. | No Attribution |
{"C2 url": "http://77.83.175.105/18a9a962225b1ffb.php", "Botnet": "LogsDiller"}
{"C2 url": "http://77.83.175.105/18a9a962225b1ffb.php", "Botnet": "LogsDiller"}
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_Stealc_1 | Yara detected Stealc | Joe Security |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_Stealc | Yara detected Stealc | Joe Security | ||
Windows_Trojan_RedLineStealer_ed346e4c | unknown | unknown |
| |
JoeSecurity_Stealc | Yara detected Stealc | Joe Security | ||
Windows_Trojan_Smokeloader_3687686f | unknown | unknown |
| |
JoeSecurity_Stealc | Yara detected Stealc | Joe Security | ||
Click to see the 5 entries |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_Stealc | Yara detected Stealc | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Stealc | Yara detected Stealc | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Stealc | Yara detected Stealc | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Stealc | Yara detected Stealc | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Stealc | Yara detected Stealc | Joe Security | ||
Click to see the 1 entries |
Change of critical system settings |
---|
Source: | Author: Joe Security: |
System Summary |
---|
Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems): |
Source: | Author: pH-T (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems): |
Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems): |
Source: | Author: Timur Zinniatullin, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community: |
Source: | Author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g (rule), oscd.community (improvements): |
Source: | Author: vburov: |
HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion |
---|
Source: | Author: Joe Security: |
Timestamp | SID | Severity | Classtype | Source IP | Source Port | Destination IP | Destination Port | Protocol |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2024-10-29T04:16:58.063008+0100 | 2044245 | 1 | Malware Command and Control Activity Detected | 77.83.175.105 | 80 | 192.168.2.4 | 49730 | TCP |
Timestamp | SID | Severity | Classtype | Source IP | Source Port | Destination IP | Destination Port | Protocol |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2024-10-29T04:16:58.047297+0100 | 2044244 | 1 | Malware Command and Control Activity Detected | 192.168.2.4 | 49730 | 77.83.175.105 | 80 | TCP |
Timestamp | SID | Severity | Classtype | Source IP | Source Port | Destination IP | Destination Port | Protocol |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2024-10-29T04:16:58.296262+0100 | 2044246 | 1 | Malware Command and Control Activity Detected | 192.168.2.4 | 49730 | 77.83.175.105 | 80 | TCP |
Timestamp | SID | Severity | Classtype | Source IP | Source Port | Destination IP | Destination Port | Protocol |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2024-10-29T04:17:25.982936+0100 | 2044249 | 1 | Malware Command and Control Activity Detected | 192.168.2.4 | 49755 | 77.83.175.105 | 80 | TCP |
Timestamp | SID | Severity | Classtype | Source IP | Source Port | Destination IP | Destination Port | Protocol |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2024-10-29T04:16:58.992074+0100 | 2044248 | 1 | Malware Command and Control Activity Detected | 192.168.2.4 | 49730 | 77.83.175.105 | 80 | TCP |
Timestamp | SID | Severity | Classtype | Source IP | Source Port | Destination IP | Destination Port | Protocol |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2024-10-29T04:16:58.306295+0100 | 2044247 | 1 | Malware Command and Control Activity Detected | 77.83.175.105 | 80 | 192.168.2.4 | 49730 | TCP |
Timestamp | SID | Severity | Classtype | Source IP | Source Port | Destination IP | Destination Port | Protocol |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2024-10-29T04:16:57.795817+0100 | 2044243 | 1 | Malware Command and Control Activity Detected | 192.168.2.4 | 49730 | 77.83.175.105 | 80 | TCP |
Timestamp | SID | Severity | Classtype | Source IP | Source Port | Destination IP | Destination Port | Protocol |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2024-10-29T04:16:59.502797+0100 | 2803304 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.4 | 49730 | 77.83.175.105 | 80 | TCP |
2024-10-29T04:17:15.553126+0100 | 2803304 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.4 | 49755 | 77.83.175.105 | 80 | TCP |
2024-10-29T04:17:18.812636+0100 | 2803304 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.4 | 49755 | 77.83.175.105 | 80 | TCP |
2024-10-29T04:17:20.417317+0100 | 2803304 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.4 | 49755 | 77.83.175.105 | 80 | TCP |
2024-10-29T04:17:21.300535+0100 | 2803304 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.4 | 49755 | 77.83.175.105 | 80 | TCP |
2024-10-29T04:17:23.312542+0100 | 2803304 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.4 | 49755 | 77.83.175.105 | 80 | TCP |
2024-10-29T04:17:23.821665+0100 | 2803304 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.4 | 49755 | 77.83.175.105 | 80 | TCP |
2024-10-29T04:17:28.299849+0100 | 2803304 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.4 | 49761 | 87.106.236.48 | 443 | TCP |
Click to jump to signature section
Show All Signature Results
AV Detection |
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Source: | Avira: |
Source: | Avira: | ||
Source: | Avira: | ||
Source: | Avira: |
Source: | Malware Configuration Extractor: | ||
Source: | Malware Configuration Extractor: |
Source: | Virustotal: | Perma Link |
Source: | ReversingLabs: | ||
Source: | ReversingLabs: | ||
Source: | ReversingLabs: |
Source: | ReversingLabs: | |||
Source: | Virustotal: | Perma Link |
Source: | Integrated Neural Analysis Model: |
Source: | Joe Sandbox ML: |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_00419030 | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_0040A2B0 | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_0040C920 | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_0040A210 | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_004072A0 | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_6C76A9A0 | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_6C764440 | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_6C734420 | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_6C7644C0 | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_6C7B25B0 | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_6C748670 | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_6C76A650 | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_6C74E6E0 | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_6C78A730 | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_6C790180 | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_6C7643B0 | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_6C787C00 | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_6C747D60 | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_6C78BD30 | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_6C789EC0 | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_6C763FF0 | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_6C763850 | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_6C769840 | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_6C78DA40 | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_6C797410 | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_6C763560 |
Compliance |
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Source: | Unpacked PE file: |
Source: | Static PE information: |
Source: | File opened: | Jump to behavior |
Source: | HTTPS traffic detected: | ||
Source: | HTTPS traffic detected: | ||
Source: | HTTPS traffic detected: | ||
Source: | HTTPS traffic detected: | ||
Source: | HTTPS traffic detected: | ||
Source: | HTTPS traffic detected: |
Source: | Binary string: | ||
Source: | Binary string: | ||
Source: | Binary string: | ||
Source: | Binary string: | ||
Source: | Binary string: | ||
Source: | Binary string: | ||
Source: | Binary string: | ||
Source: | Binary string: |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_004140F0 | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_0040E530 | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_0040BE40 | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_00414B60 | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_00401710 | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_0040DB80 | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_0040F7B0 | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_0040EE20 | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_00413B00 | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_0040DF10 | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_004147C0 |
Source: | File opened: | Jump to behavior | ||
Source: | File opened: | Jump to behavior | ||
Source: | File opened: | Jump to behavior | ||
Source: | File opened: | Jump to behavior | ||
Source: | File opened: | Jump to behavior | ||
Source: | File opened: | Jump to behavior |
Source: | Memory has grown: |
Networking |
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Source: | Suricata IDS: | ||
Source: | Suricata IDS: | ||
Source: | Suricata IDS: | ||
Source: | Suricata IDS: | ||
Source: | Suricata IDS: | ||
Source: | Suricata IDS: | ||
Source: | Suricata IDS: |
Source: | URLs: | ||
Source: | URLs: |
Source: | HTTP traffic detected: |