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Windows Analysis Report
new.vbs

Overview

General Information

Sample name:	new.vbs
Analysis ID:	1542732
MD5:	d7fd02c1482e25c91d2fc834ab9e6ca1
SHA1:	885ca369bd7d39116135f6f7cd84d73755b9bed7
SHA256:	073ec02ce81a5ebf05309b2355f99de426e8ee731e4989a6a178063014668f3b
Tags:	CloudflareTunnelsRATvbsuser-JAMESWT_MHT
Infos:

Detection

Score:	21
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	80%

Signatures

Sigma detected: WScript or CScript Dropper

Found WSH timer for Javascript or VBS script (likely evasive script)

Program does not show much activity (idle)

Sigma detected: WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution Via Cscript/Wscript

Classification

Process Tree

System is w10x64

wscript.exe (PID: 8180 cmdline: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\new.vbs" MD5: A47CBE969EA935BDD3AB568BB126BC80)

cleanup

Sigma Signatures

System Summary

Sigma detected: WScript or CScript Dropper

Source: Process started

Author: Margaritis Dimitrios (idea), Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), oscd.community: Data: Command: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\new.vbs", CommandLine: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\new.vbs", CommandLine|base64offset|contains: , Image: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe, ParentCommandLine: , ParentImage: , ParentProcessId: 3968, ProcessCommandLine: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\new.vbs", ProcessId: 8180, ProcessName: wscript.exe

Sigma detected: WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution Via Cscript/Wscript

Source: Process started

Author: Michael Haag: Data: Command: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\new.vbs", CommandLine: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\new.vbs", CommandLine|base64offset|contains: , Image: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe, ParentCommandLine: , ParentImage: , ParentProcessId: 3968, ProcessCommandLine: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\new.vbs", ProcessId: 8180, ProcessName: wscript.exe

Suricata Signatures

⊘No Suricata rule has matched

Joe Sandbox Signatures

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

Source: classification engine

Classification label: sus21.winVBS@1/0@0/0

Source: unknown

Process created: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\new.vbs"

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

Key opened: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: version.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: kernel.appcore.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: uxtheme.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: sxs.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: vbscript.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: amsi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: userenv.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: profapi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: wldp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: msasn1.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: cryptsp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: rsaenh.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: cryptbase.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: msisip.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: wshext.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: scrobj.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: textshaping.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: textinputframework.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: coreuicomponents.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: coremessaging.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: ntmarta.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: coremessaging.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: wintypes.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: wintypes.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: wintypes.dll	Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{B54F3741-5B07-11cf-A4B0-00AA004A55E8}\InprocServer32

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX			Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX			Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

Window found: window name: WSH-Timer

Jump to behavior

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography MachineGuid

Jump to behavior

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Reconnaissance	Resource Development	Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Command and Control	Exfiltration	Impact
Gather Victim Identity Information	11 Scripting	Valid Accounts	Windows Management Instrumentation	11 Scripting	1 DLL Side-Loading	1 DLL Side-Loading	OS Credential Dumping	2 System Information Discovery	Remote Services	Data from Local System	Data Obfuscation	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Abuse Accessibility Features
Credentials	Domains	Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	1 DLL Side-Loading	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Rootkit	LSASS Memory	Application Window Discovery	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	Junk Data	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Network Denial of Service

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
new.vbs	0%	ReversingLabs
new.vbs	0%	Virustotal		Browse

Name	IP	Active	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
s-part-0017.t-0009.t-msedge.net	13.107.246.45	true	false		unknown

World Map of Contacted IPs

⊘No contacted IP infos

General Information

Joe Sandbox version:	41.0.0 Charoite
Analysis ID:	1542732
Start date and time:	2024-10-26 08:50:28 +02:00
Joe Sandbox product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 1m 54s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	full
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 x64 22H2 with Office Professional Plus 2019, Chrome 117, Firefox 118, Adobe Reader DC 23, Java 8 Update 381, 7zip 23.01
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	2
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Sample name:	new.vbs
Detection:	SUS
Classification:	sus21.winVBS@1/0@0/0
EGA Information:	Failed
HCA Information:	Successful, ratio: 100% Number of executed functions: 0 Number of non-executed functions: 0
Cookbook Comments:	Found application associated with file extension: .vbs Stop behavior analysis, all processes terminated

Warnings

Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): dllhost.exe
Excluded IPs from analysis (whitelisted): 172.202.163.200
Excluded domains from analysis (whitelisted): otelrules.azureedge.net, slscr.update.microsoft.com, otelrules.afd.azureedge.net, sls.update.microsoft.com, azureedge-t-prod.trafficmanager.net, glb.sls.prod.dcat.dsp.trafficmanager.net

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Threat Name	Link	Context
s-part-0017.t-0009.t-msedge.net	https://www.google.co.uk/url?q=38pQvvq6xRyj7Y00xDjnlx9kIHOSozurMOiaAkImPuQJnOIWtJjqJLi6stjtDz3yh&rct=tTPSrMOiaAkImPuQJnOIWtJjqJLi6stjtFX08pQvvq6xRyj7Y00xDjnlx9kIjusucT&sa=t&url=amp/taxigiarebienhoa.vn/nini/ybmex/captcha/Z3VsYW1yYXN1bC5jaGVwdXdhbGFAY2V2YWxvZ2lzdGljcy5jb20	Get hash	malicious	HTMLPhisher, Mamba2FA	Browse	13.107.246.45
	vxx3VTJziN.exe	Get hash	malicious	XWorm	Browse	13.107.246.45
	Us051y7j25.exe	Get hash	malicious	Phorpiex, Xmrig	Browse	13.107.246.45
	Ondso1o6Yz.exe	Get hash	malicious	Stealc	Browse	13.107.246.45
	gEP8SOoakR.exe	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	13.107.246.45
	file.exe	Get hash	malicious	Stealc	Browse	13.107.246.45
	https://load.aberegg-immobilien.ch/	Get hash	malicious	HTMLPhisher	Browse	13.107.246.45
	file.exe	Get hash	malicious	Stealc	Browse	13.107.246.45
	http://mychronictravel.eu.org/	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	13.107.246.45
	https://docs.google.com/drawings/d/1igp9x84Q_2r8qSa1YDSk9dpVvjHGWjRjQMSbSGGfj2M/preview?pli=1VKXX1Bv689W8l3mkPZmP2UR2g0HlFBjRUIoZvJzUgEXisf43J0VKXX1Bv689W8l3mkPZmP2UR2g0HlFBjRUIoZvJzUgEXisf43J0VKXX1Bv689W8l3mkPZmP2UR2g0HlFBjRUIoZvJzUgEXisf43J0VKXX1Bv689W8l3mkPZmP2UR2g0HlFBjRUIoZvJzUgEXisf43J0VKXX1Bv689W8l3mkPZmP2UR2g0HlFBjRUIoZvJzUgEXisf43J0VKXX1Bv689W8l3mkPZmP2UR2g0HlFBjRUIoZvJzUgEXisf43J0VKXX1Bv689W8l3mkPZmP2UR2g0HlFBjRUIoZvJzUgEXisf43J0VKXX1Bv689W8l3mkPZmP2UR2g0HlFBjRUIoZvJzUgEXisf43J0VKXX1Bv689W8l3mkPZmP2UR2g0HlFBjRUIoZvJzUgEXisf43J0VKXX1Bv689W8l3mkPZmP2UR2g0HlFBjRUIoZvJzUgEXisf43J0VKXX1Bv689W8l3mkPZmP2UR2g0HlFBjRUIoZvJzUgEXisf43J0VKXX1Bv689W8l3mkPZmP2UR2g0HlFBjRUIoZvJzUgEXisf43J0VKXX1Bv689W8l3mkPZmP2UR2g0HlFBjRUIoZvJzUgEXisf43J0VKXX1Bv689W8l3mkPZmP2UR2g0HlFBjRUIoZvJzUgEXisf43J0VKXX1Bv689W8l3mkPZmP2UR2g0HlFBjRUIoZvJzUgEXisf43J0VKXX1Bv689W8l3mkPZmP2UR2g0HlFBjRUIoZvJzUgEXisf43J0VKXX1Bv689W8l3mkPZmP2UR2g0HlFBjRUIoZvJzUgEXisf43J0VKXX1Bv689W8l3mkPZmP2UR2g0HlFBjRUIoZvJzUgEXisf43J0VKXX1Bv689W8l3mkPZmP2UR2g0HlFBjRUIoZvJzUgEXisf43J0VKXX1Bv689W8l3mkPZmP2UR2g0HlFBjRUIoZvJzUgEXisf43J0VKXX1Bv689W8l3mkPZmP2UR2g0HlFBjRUIoZvJzUgEXisf43J0VKXX1Bv689W8l3mkPZmP2UR2g0HlFBjRUIoZvJzUgEXisf43J0VKXX1Bv689W8l3mkPZmP2UR2g0HlFBjRUIoZvJzUgEXisf43J0VKXX1Bv689W8l3mkPZmP2UR2g0HlFBjRUIoZvJzUgEXisf43J0VKXX1Bv689W8l3mkPZmP2UR2g0HlFBjRUIoZvJzUgEXisf43J0VKXX1Bv689W8l3mkPZmP2UR2g0HlFBjRUIoZvJzUgEXisf43J0VKXX1Bv689W8l3mkPZmP2UR2g0HlFBjRUIoZvJzUgEXisf43J0VKXX1Bv689W8l3mkPZmP2UR2g0HlFBjRUIoZvJzUgEXisf43J0VKXX1Bv689W8l3mkPZmP2UR2g0HlFBjRUIoZvJzUgEXisf43J0VKXX1Bv689W8l3mkPZmP2UR2g0HlFBjRUIoZvJzUgEXisf43J0VKXX1Bv689W8l3mkPZmP2UR2g0HlFBjRUIoZvJzUgEXisf43J0VKXX1Bv689W8l3mkPZmP2UR2g0HlFBjRUIoZvJzUgEXisf43J0VKXX1Bv689W8l3mkPZmP2UR2g0HlFBjRUIoZvJzUgEXisf43J0VKXX1Bv689W8l3mkPZmP2UR2g0HlFBjRUIoZvJzUgEXisf43J0VKXX1Bv689W8l3mkPZmP2UR2g0HlFBjRUIoZvJzUgEXisf43J0VKXX1Bv689W8l3mkPZmP2UR2g0HlFBjRUIoZvJzUgEXisf43J0VKXX1Bv689W8l3mkPZmP2UR2g0HlFBjRUIoZvJzUgEXisf43J0VKXX1Bv689W8l3mkPZmP2UR2g0HlFBjRUIoZvJzUgEXisf43J0VKXX1Bv	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	13.107.246.45

File type:	ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
Entropy (8bit):	4.527681138773587
TrID:
File name:	new.vbs
File size:	47 bytes
MD5:	d7fd02c1482e25c91d2fc834ab9e6ca1
SHA1:	885ca369bd7d39116135f6f7cd84d73755b9bed7
SHA256:	073ec02ce81a5ebf05309b2355f99de426e8ee731e4989a6a178063014668f3b
SHA512:	31f42f93190fb6bd8b4774eefe961be266cf387de5ea149c6bdcac225c5bc5b439061ad82e874db1913ca3099b3bb4d9c5d27b32891ecdcf6f8da0b884cc068f
SSDEEP:	3:L5sJKdX8HHqRI0ay:yNqW0ay
TLSH:
File Content Preview:	MsgBox "Hello, World!", vbOKOnly, "Greetings"..

File Icon


Icon Hash:	68d69b8f86ab9a86

Network Behavior

DNS Answers

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	Reply Code	Name	CName	Address	Type	Class	DNS over HTTPS
Oct 26, 2024 08:51:22.959148884 CEST	1.1.1.1	192.168.2.10	0x456a	No error (0)	shed.dual-low.s-part-0017.t-0009.t-msedge.net	s-part-0017.t-0009.t-msedge.net		CNAME (Canonical name)	IN (0x0001)	false
Oct 26, 2024 08:51:22.959148884 CEST	1.1.1.1	192.168.2.10	0x456a	No error (0)	s-part-0017.t-0009.t-msedge.net		13.107.246.45	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)	false

Target ID:	0
Start time:	02:51:25
Start date:	26/10/2024
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\new.vbs"
Imagebase:	0x7ff77ff20000
File size:	170'496 bytes
MD5 hash:	A47CBE969EA935BDD3AB568BB126BC80
Has elevated privileges:	false
Has administrator privileges:	false
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Chronological Activities

Disassembly

⊘No disassembly

Description:	This technique has been deprecated. Please use Command and Scripting Interpreter where appropriate.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Execution
Data Sources:
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by side-loading DLLs. Similar to DLL Search Order Hijacking , side-loading involves hijacking which DLL a program loads. But rather than just planting the DLL within the search order of a program then waiting for the victim application to be invoked, adversaries may directly side-load their payloads by planting then invoking a legitimate application that executes their payload(s).
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File: File Creation, File: File Modification, Module: Module Load, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

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Windows Analysis Report new.vbs

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Process Tree

Malware Configuration

Yara Signatures

Sigma Signatures

System Summary

Suricata Signatures

Joe Sandbox Signatures

System Summary

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection

Malware Analysis System Evasion

Anti Debugging

Language, Device and Operating System Detection

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

World Map of Contacted IPs

General Information

Warnings

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASNs

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Network Behavior

DNS Answers

Statistics

CPU Usage

Memory Usage

High Level Behavior Distribution

back

System Behavior

Analysis Process: wscript.exePID: 8180, Parent PID: 3968

General

Chronological Activities

Disassembly

Windows Analysis Report
new.vbs