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Windows Analysis Report
Untitled attachment 00017.png

Overview

General Information

Sample name:	Untitled attachment 00017.png
Analysis ID:	1542359
MD5:	a5ae88ce86c2802110a6545a760046d6
SHA1:	1d3290372241f3cfb1b78cedc556a85c4e4e55a7
SHA256:	fab70f07af72b91a154b4cc18276d7cbe9e3429bada3a3f0a93ddf99e37d3dc2
Infos:

Detection

Score:	1
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	20%

Signatures

Creates files inside the system directory

Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device

Tries to resolve domain names, but no domain seems valid (expired dropper behavior)

Classification

Process Tree

System is w10x64

mspaint.exe (PID: 5784 cmdline: mspaint.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\Untitled attachment 00017.png" MD5: 986A191E95952C9E3FE6BE112FB92026)

cleanup

Malware Configuration

⊘No configs have been found

Yara Signatures

⊘No yara matches

Sigma Signatures

⊘No Sigma rule has matched

Suricata Signatures

⊘No Suricata rule has matched

Joe Sandbox Signatures

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

There are no malicious signatures, click here to show all signatures.

Source: unknown	DNS traffic detected: query: 198.187.3.20.in-addr.arpa replaycode: Name error (3)
Source: unknown	DNS traffic detected: query: 50.23.12.20.in-addr.arpa replaycode: Name error (3)

Source: unknown	UDP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 1.1.1.1
Source: unknown	UDP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 1.1.1.1

Source: global traffic	DNS traffic detected: DNS query: 198.187.3.20.in-addr.arpa
Source: global traffic	DNS traffic detected: DNS query: 50.23.12.20.in-addr.arpa

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\mspaint.exe	File created: C:\Windows\Debug\WIA			Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\mspaint.exe	File created: C:\Windows\Debug\WIA\wiatrace.log			Jump to behavior

Source: classification engine

Classification label: clean1.winPNG@1/1@2/0

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\mspaint.exe

File read: C:\Users\desktop.ini

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\mspaint.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\mspaint.exe	Section loaded: mfc42u.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\mspaint.exe	Section loaded: propsys.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\mspaint.exe	Section loaded: winmm.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\mspaint.exe	Section loaded: uxtheme.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\mspaint.exe	Section loaded: msftedit.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\mspaint.exe	Section loaded: kernel.appcore.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\mspaint.exe	Section loaded: uiribbon.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\mspaint.exe	Section loaded: xmllite.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\mspaint.exe	Section loaded: windows.storage.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\mspaint.exe	Section loaded: wldp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\mspaint.exe	Section loaded: efswrt.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\mspaint.exe	Section loaded: mpr.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\mspaint.exe	Section loaded: wintypes.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\mspaint.exe	Section loaded: twinapi.appcore.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\mspaint.exe	Section loaded: sti.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\mspaint.exe	Section loaded: wiatrace.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\mspaint.exe	Section loaded: atlthunk.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\mspaint.exe	Section loaded: dwmapi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\mspaint.exe	Section loaded: windowscodecs.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\mspaint.exe	Section loaded: textshaping.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\mspaint.exe	Section loaded: oleacc.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\mspaint.exe	Section loaded: windows.staterepositoryps.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\mspaint.exe	Section loaded: apphelp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\mspaint.exe	Section loaded: photometadatahandler.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\mspaint.exe	Section loaded: textinputframework.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\mspaint.exe	Section loaded: coreuicomponents.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\mspaint.exe	Section loaded: coremessaging.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\mspaint.exe	Section loaded: ntmarta.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\mspaint.exe	Section loaded: coremessaging.dll	Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\mspaint.exe

File opened: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\MSFTEDIT.DLL

Jump to behavior

Source: Window Recorder

Window detected: More than 3 window changes detected

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\mspaint.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\mspaint.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\mspaint.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\mspaint.exe	Process information set: FAILCRITICALERRORS \| NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\mspaint.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\mspaint.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior

Source: mspaint.exe, 00000000.00000002.3266345789.000000000054C000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp

Binary or memory string: \??\SCSI#CdRom&Ven_NECVMWar&Prod_VMware_SATA_CD00#4&224f42ef&0&000000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}\m

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\mspaint.exe

Process information queried: ProcessInformation

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\mspaint.exe

Queries volume information: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Untitled attachment 00017.png VolumeInformation

Jump to behavior

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Reconnaissance	Resource Development	Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Command and Control	Exfiltration	Impact
Gather Victim Identity Information	Acquire Infrastructure	Valid Accounts	Windows Management Instrumentation	1 DLL Side-Loading	1 DLL Side-Loading	1 Masquerading	OS Credential Dumping	1 Security Software Discovery	Remote Services	Data from Local System	1 Non-Application Layer Protocol	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Abuse Accessibility Features
Credentials	Domains	Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	1 DLL Side-Loading	LSASS Memory	1 Process Discovery	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	1 Application Layer Protocol	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Network Denial of Service
Email Addresses	DNS Server	Domain Accounts	At	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	Obfuscated Files or Information	Security Account Manager	1 File and Directory Discovery	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	Steganography	Automated Exfiltration	Data Encrypted for Impact
Employee Names	Virtual Private Server	Local Accounts	Cron	Login Hook	Login Hook	Binary Padding	NTDS	11 System Information Discovery	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Protocol Impersonation	Traffic Duplication	Data Destruction

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Screenshots

Thumbnails

This section contains all screenshots as thumbnails, including those not shown in the slideshow.

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

⊘No Antivirus matches

Dropped Files

⊘No Antivirus matches

Unpacked PE Files

⊘No Antivirus matches

Domains

⊘No Antivirus matches

URLs

⊘No Antivirus matches

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Name	IP	Active	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
198.187.3.20.in-addr.arpa	unknown	unknown	false		unknown
50.23.12.20.in-addr.arpa	unknown	unknown	false		unknown

World Map of Contacted IPs

⊘No contacted IP infos

General Information

Joe Sandbox version:	41.0.0 Charoite
Analysis ID:	1542359
Start date and time:	2024-10-25 20:28:41 +02:00
Joe Sandbox product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 4m 1s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	full
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 x64 22H2 with Office Professional Plus 2019, Chrome 117, Firefox 118, Adobe Reader DC 23, Java 8 Update 381, 7zip 23.01
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	4
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Sample name:	Untitled attachment 00017.png
Detection:	CLEAN
Classification:	clean1.winPNG@1/1@2/0
EGA Information:	Failed
HCA Information:	Successful, ratio: 100% Number of executed functions: 0 Number of non-executed functions: 0

Warnings

Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): WMIADAP.exe, SIHClient.exe, svchost.exe
Excluded domains from analysis (whitelisted): ocsp.digicert.com, slscr.update.microsoft.com, otelrules.azureedge.net, ctldl.windowsupdate.com, fe3cr.delivery.mp.microsoft.com
Report size getting too big, too many NtOpenKeyEx calls found.
Report size getting too big, too many NtProtectVirtualMemory calls found.
Report size getting too big, too many NtQueryValueKey calls found.
VT rate limit hit for: Untitled attachment 00017.png

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Time	Type	Description
14:29:37	API Interceptor	795x Sleep call for process: mspaint.exe modified

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

⊘No context

Domains

⊘No context

ASNs

⊘No context

JA3 Fingerprints

⊘No context

Dropped Files

⊘No context

Created / dropped Files

C:\Windows\debug\WIA\wiatrace.log

Download File

Process:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\mspaint.exe
File Type:	ASCII text, with CRLF, LF line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	1525
Entropy (8bit):	5.300580991704298
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	24:0uh0d3VF02k9YXCZF0q2F0kuqeF0w3ODF0HXd/bXE343Xd/TzNgNYxeerOF0HXdV:0uh0dlSmX2SxSkupSw30S3RzE34nRTzr
MD5:	9BB8ECFE9612CB65DEB9CB71D5F44EFA
SHA1:	6BC742C9EB5317556EB124CA77082BDF810D9864
SHA-256:	5744A860332334D12E6914F1BBF5F4A0A3143D998187E6112CAF486F74581C5B
SHA-512:	19AE67EF76C56C6CB1C0B84DCC4C1218CAA6A755C7C3F8E3501170AEC96653D5C323D39FFA9E8CE1548D7EEE49D4AD2B80CFCD93E730727421CA9DCF19AAF08B
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	low
Preview:	..************** Started trace for Module: [sti.dll] in Executable [mspaint.exe] ProcessID: [5784] at 2024/10/25 14:29:31:430 **************..WIA: 5784.4284 0 0 0 [sti.dll] AsyncRPCEventTransport::OpenConnectionToServer, AsyncRPC Connection established to server..WIA: 5784.4284 15 0 0 [sti.dll] AsyncRPCEventTransport::OpenConnectionToServer, Got my context 004F5358 from server...WIA: 5784.4284 15 0 0 [sti.dll] WiaEventReceiver::Start, WiaEventReceiver Started.....WIA: 5784.3712 15 0 0 [sti.dll] AsyncRPCEventTransport::CloseNotificationChannel, Closing the async notification channel.....WIA: 5784.3712 15 0 0 [sti.dll] AsyncRPCEventTransport::OpenNotificationChannel, Opening the async notification channel.....WIA: 5784.4284 15 0 0 [sti.dll] AsyncRPCEventTransport::SendRegisterUnregisterInfo, Sent RPC Register/Unregister information...WIA: 5784.4284 15 0 0 [sti.dll] WiaEventReceiver::SendRegisterUnregisterInfo, Added new registration:..WIA: 5784.4284 15 0 0 [sti.dll] EventRegistration

Static File Info

General

File type:	PNG image data, 1294 x 666, 8-bit/color RGB, non-interlaced
Entropy (8bit):	7.720068217392425
TrID:	Portable Network Graphics (16016/1) 100.00%
File name:	Untitled attachment 00017.png
File size:	33'857 bytes
MD5:	a5ae88ce86c2802110a6545a760046d6
SHA1:	1d3290372241f3cfb1b78cedc556a85c4e4e55a7
SHA256:	fab70f07af72b91a154b4cc18276d7cbe9e3429bada3a3f0a93ddf99e37d3dc2
SHA512:	e8cfca9cf34f2f5972d729b31f4672cbf660c81e16947830f41cf00242b2e36873379e76f4dc800dee9c40010ae2d2d8cec8e04ffde1eac6781851ef445832ed
SSDEEP:	768:58SvmWM7oAMwxkCd6+1BaIIGNcz/714nZvxwW6y5aB:5fvhixkC4uaHGNy71oH6y8B
TLSH:	DDE25AC493C7F922FF9C96704C57ECA91CD216C9E1083A0B47B19B22EEB2819F58D995
File Content Preview:	.PNG........IHDR...............S.....pHYs...%...%.IR$... .IDATx...y\|.......H.dY.d..\|...'..#...........c.....t).>...v....[z=[....e.%......!...9l'N...}I.e..-...?.i&8.c[..\|...........c..F.D".......GN........-.2......2......2......2......2......2......2

Network Behavior

Network Port Distribution

UDP Packets

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Oct 25, 2024 20:30:06.353930950 CEST	53	50932	162.159.36.2	192.168.2.5
Oct 25, 2024 20:30:06.979620934 CEST	54991	53	192.168.2.5	1.1.1.1
Oct 25, 2024 20:30:06.990451097 CEST	53	54991	1.1.1.1	192.168.2.5
Oct 25, 2024 20:30:09.909578085 CEST	65086	53	192.168.2.5	1.1.1.1
Oct 25, 2024 20:30:09.920933008 CEST	53	65086	1.1.1.1	192.168.2.5

DNS Queries

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	OP Code	Name	Type	Class	DNS over HTTPS
Oct 25, 2024 20:30:06.979620934 CEST	192.168.2.5	1.1.1.1	0x6cb1	Standard query (0)	198.187.3.20.in-addr.arpa	PTR (Pointer record)	IN (0x0001)	false
Oct 25, 2024 20:30:09.909578085 CEST	192.168.2.5	1.1.1.1	0xe2b7	Standard query (0)	50.23.12.20.in-addr.arpa	PTR (Pointer record)	IN (0x0001)	false

DNS Answers

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	Reply Code	Name	CName	Address	Type	Class	DNS over HTTPS
Oct 25, 2024 20:30:06.990451097 CEST	1.1.1.1	192.168.2.5	0x6cb1	Name error (3)	198.187.3.20.in-addr.arpa	none	none	PTR (Pointer record)	IN (0x0001)	false
Oct 25, 2024 20:30:09.920933008 CEST	1.1.1.1	192.168.2.5	0xe2b7	Name error (3)	50.23.12.20.in-addr.arpa	none	none	PTR (Pointer record)	IN (0x0001)	false

Statistics

CPU Usage

Click to jump to process

Memory Usage

Click to jump to process

High Level Behavior Distribution

Click to dive into process behavior distribution

System Behavior

Analysis Process: mspaint.exePID: 5784, Parent PID: 5540

General

Target ID:	0
Start time:	14:29:30
Start date:	25/10/2024
Path:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\mspaint.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	mspaint.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\Untitled attachment 00017.png"
Imagebase:	0xe80000
File size:	743'424 bytes
MD5 hash:	986A191E95952C9E3FE6BE112FB92026
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	moderate
Has exited:	false

Show Windows behavior

Chronological Activities

Disassembly

⊘No disassembly

Description:	Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by side-loading DLLs. Similar to DLL Search Order Hijacking , side-loading involves hijacking which DLL a program loads. But rather than just planting the DLL within the search order of a program then waiting for the victim application to be invoked, adversaries may directly side-load their payloads by planting then invoking a legitimate application that executes their payload(s).
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File: File Creation, File: File Modification, Module: Module Load, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, File: File Metadata, File: File Modification, Image: Image Metadata, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation, Process: Process Metadata, Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Metadata, Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Modification, Service: Service Creation, Service: Service Metadata
Platforms:	Containers, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Firewall: Firewall Enumeration, Firewall: Firewall Metadata, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Azure AD, Google Workspace, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from File and Directory Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use an OSI non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive.Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL).
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using OSI application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

Loading Joe Sandbox Report ...

Warning!

Windows Analysis Report Untitled attachment 00017.png

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Process Tree

Malware Configuration

Yara Signatures

Sigma Signatures

Suricata Signatures

Joe Sandbox Signatures

Networking

System Summary

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection

Malware Analysis System Evasion

Language, Device and Operating System Detection

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

World Map of Contacted IPs

General Information

Warnings

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASNs

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

C:\Windows\debug\WIA\wiatrace.log

Static File Info

General

Network Behavior

Network Port Distribution

UDP Packets

DNS Queries

DNS Answers

Statistics

CPU Usage

Memory Usage

High Level Behavior Distribution

back

System Behavior

Analysis Process: mspaint.exePID: 5784, Parent PID: 5540

General

Chronological Activities

Disassembly

Windows Analysis Report
Untitled attachment 00017.png