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Windows Analysis Report
weird.dll

Overview

General Information

Sample name:	weird.dll (renamed file extension from none to dll)
Original sample name:	weird
Analysis ID:	1540387
MD5:	34a7856b9671389544a4a9c37a037250
SHA1:	a6a04e0372c58624758fda199c3f1e8180048422
SHA256:	e36a6367c6b8b7fa9f2f5b059c5df919d9ec2106e6ae5e8177bc2203e8553ef8
Infos:

Detection

Score:	23
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	60%

Signatures

AI detected suspicious sample

Binary contains a suspicious time stamp

Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)

May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis

PE file does not import any functions

Program does not show much activity (idle)

Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)

Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info

Classification

Process Tree

System is w10x64

loaddll64.exe (PID: 6944 cmdline: loaddll64.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\weird.dll" MD5: 763455F9DCB24DFEECC2B9D9F8D46D52)

conhost.exe (PID: 6968 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D)

cmd.exe (PID: 7084 cmdline: cmd.exe /C rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\weird.dll",#1 MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE)

rundll32.exe (PID: 7140 cmdline: rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\weird.dll",#1 MD5: EF3179D498793BF4234F708D3BE28633)

cleanup

Malware Configuration

⊘No configs have been found

Yara Signatures

⊘No yara matches

Sigma Signatures

⊘No Sigma rule has matched

Suricata Signatures

⊘No Suricata rule has matched

Joe Sandbox Signatures

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection

AI detected suspicious sample

Source: Submited Sample

Integrated Neural Analysis Model: Matched 97.1% probability

Source: weird.dll

Static PE information: HIGH_ENTROPY_VA, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE

Source:	Binary string: Microsoft.VisualStudio.TeamFoundation.InitializationPackage.ni.pdbRSDS source: weird.dll
Source:	Binary string: Microsoft.VisualStudio.TeamFoundation.InitializationPackage.ni.pdb source: weird.dll
Source:	Binary string: D:\a\_work\1\obj\Release.AnyCPU\VSIntegration.Client\MS.VS.TeamFoundation.InitializationPackage\net472\Microsoft.VisualStudio.TeamFoundation.InitializationPackage.pdb source: weird.dll

Source: weird.dll

Static PE information: No import functions for PE file found

Source: weird.dll

Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameMicrosoft.VisualStudio.TeamFoundation.InitializationPackageT vs weird.dll

Source: classification engine

Classification label: sus23.winDLL@6/0@0/0

Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe

Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Local\SM0:6968:120:WilError_03

Source: weird.dll

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll64.exe

Key opened: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe

Process created: C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\weird.dll",#1

Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll64.exe loaddll64.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\weird.dll"
Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll64.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll64.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe cmd.exe /C rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\weird.dll",#1
Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\weird.dll",#1
Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll64.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe cmd.exe /C rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\weird.dll",#1	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\weird.dll",#1	Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll64.exe	Section loaded: apphelp.dll			Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll64.exe	Section loaded: kernel.appcore.dll			Jump to behavior

Source: weird.dll

Static PE information: data directory type: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR

Source: weird.dll

Static PE information: Image base 0x644a0000000 > 0x60000000

Source: weird.dll

Static PE information: HIGH_ENTROPY_VA, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE

Source: weird.dll

Static PE information: data directory type: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG

Source:	Binary string: Microsoft.VisualStudio.TeamFoundation.InitializationPackage.ni.pdbRSDS source: weird.dll
Source:	Binary string: Microsoft.VisualStudio.TeamFoundation.InitializationPackage.ni.pdb source: weird.dll
Source:	Binary string: D:\a\_work\1\obj\Release.AnyCPU\VSIntegration.Client\MS.VS.TeamFoundation.InitializationPackage\net472\Microsoft.VisualStudio.TeamFoundation.InitializationPackage.pdb source: weird.dll

Source: weird.dll

Static PE information: 0x9AD6A36B [Fri Apr 26 15:23:23 2052 UTC]

Source: C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe

Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll64.exe TID: 6940

Thread sleep time: -120000s >= -30000s

Jump to behavior

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe

Last function: Thread delayed

Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll64.exe

Thread delayed: delay time: 120000

Jump to behavior

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe

Process created: C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\weird.dll",#1

Jump to behavior

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Reconnaissance	Resource Development	Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Command and Control	Exfiltration	Impact
Gather Victim Identity Information	Acquire Infrastructure	Valid Accounts	Windows Management Instrumentation	1 DLL Side-Loading	11 Process Injection	1 Rundll32	OS Credential Dumping	11 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	Remote Services	Data from Local System	Data Obfuscation	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Abuse Accessibility Features
Credentials	Domains	Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	1 DLL Side-Loading	11 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	LSASS Memory	1 System Information Discovery	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	Junk Data	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Network Denial of Service
Email Addresses	DNS Server	Domain Accounts	At	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	11 Process Injection	Security Account Manager	Query Registry	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	Steganography	Automated Exfiltration	Data Encrypted for Impact
Employee Names	Virtual Private Server	Local Accounts	Cron	Login Hook	Login Hook	1 Timestomp	NTDS	System Network Configuration Discovery	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Protocol Impersonation	Traffic Duplication	Data Destruction
Gather Victim Network Information	Server	Cloud Accounts	Launchd	Network Logon Script	Network Logon Script	1 DLL Side-Loading	LSA Secrets	Internet Connection Discovery	SSH	Keylogging	Fallback Channels	Scheduled Transfer	Data Encrypted for Impact

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Screenshots

Thumbnails

This section contains all screenshots as thumbnails, including those not shown in the slideshow.

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
weird.dll	0%	ReversingLabs

Dropped Files

⊘No Antivirus matches

Unpacked PE Files

⊘No Antivirus matches

Domains

⊘No Antivirus matches

URLs

⊘No Antivirus matches

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

⊘No contacted domains info

World Map of Contacted IPs

⊘No contacted IP infos

General Information

Joe Sandbox version:	41.0.0 Charoite
Analysis ID:	1540387
Start date and time:	2024-10-23 17:58:18 +02:00
Joe Sandbox product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 1m 54s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	full
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 x64 22H2 with Office Professional Plus 2019, Chrome 117, Firefox 118, Adobe Reader DC 23, Java 8 Update 381, 7zip 23.01
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	4
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Sample name:	weird.dll (renamed file extension from none to dll)
Original Sample Name:	weird
Detection:	SUS
Classification:	sus23.winDLL@6/0@0/0
EGA Information:	Failed
HCA Information:	Successful, ratio: 100% Number of executed functions: 0 Number of non-executed functions: 0
Cookbook Comments:	Stop behavior analysis, all processes terminated

Warnings

Not all processes where analyzed, report is missing behavior information
VT rate limit hit for: weird.dll

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Time	Type	Description
11:59:17	API Interceptor	1x Sleep call for process: loaddll64.exe modified

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

⊘No context

Domains

⊘No context

ASNs

⊘No context

JA3 Fingerprints

⊘No context

Dropped Files

⊘No context

Created / dropped Files

⊘No created / dropped files found

Static File Info

General

File type:	PE32+ executable (DLL) (console) x86-64 Mono/.Net assembly, for MS Windows
Entropy (8bit):	5.09498958727029
TrID:	Win64 Dynamic Link Library (generic) (102004/3) 84.96% Win64 Executable (generic) (12005/4) 10.00% DOS Executable Borland Pascal 7.0x (2037/25) 1.70% Generic Win/DOS Executable (2004/3) 1.67% DOS Executable Generic (2002/1) 1.67%
File name:	weird.dll
File size:	24'064 bytes
MD5:	34a7856b9671389544a4a9c37a037250
SHA1:	a6a04e0372c58624758fda199c3f1e8180048422
SHA256:	e36a6367c6b8b7fa9f2f5b059c5df919d9ec2106e6ae5e8177bc2203e8553ef8
SHA512:	559f7896e82b811a039a63a379da8f02a5fe03e409af2ad52a5635fadcec6a396bda08924fd35967be40188722baf667aa29663f50f92864a4fdbbc30780b43c
SSDEEP:	384:MTZHuW4xt1EBWYNwWNZ9lrJrPZRwDJX33nLN4+Q6PNaHnu8:M1Hkt1EvNwAvJLrgNXLNa
TLSH:	73B2D510D7D98A36D86B86351CA35A00993BFDD6FA30ABDF1441A31F5C623D09AB2B71
File Content Preview:	MZ......................@.......................................................................................................PE..d...k............." ............................D.........................................`................................

File Icon


Icon Hash:	7ae282899bbab082

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint:	0x644a0000000
Entrypoint Section:
Digitally signed:	false
Imagebase:	0x644a0000000
Subsystem:	windows cui
Image File Characteristics:	EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LARGE_ADDRESS_AWARE, DLL
DLL Characteristics:	HIGH_ENTROPY_VA, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE
Time Stamp:	0x9AD6A36B [Fri Apr 26 15:23:23 2052 UTC]
TLS Callbacks:
CLR (.Net) Version:
OS Version Major:	5
OS Version Minor:	2
File Version Major:	5
File Version Minor:	2
Subsystem Version Major:	5
Subsystem Version Minor:	2
Import Hash:

Entrypoint Preview

Instruction
dec ebp
pop edx
add byte ptr [eax], al
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inc eax
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add byte ptr [eax+00000000h], al
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add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax+45h], dl
add byte ptr [eax], al
xchg byte ptr fs:[ebx], al
add byte ptr [ebx-5Dh], ch
salc
call far 0000h : 00000000h
add byte ptr [eax], al
lock add byte ptr [edx], ah
and byte ptr [ebx], cl
add cl, byte ptr [ebx]
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
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add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
mov al, byte ptr [00000644h]
add byte ptr [eax], dl
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [edx], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add eax, 00000200h
add byte ptr [eax], al

Data Directories

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Is in Section
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE	0x3000	0x57c	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION	0x3e1c	0x6c	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC	0x8000	0x1b0	.reloc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG	0x7060	0x54	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BOUND_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR	0x3580	0x48	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESERVED	0x0	0x0

Sections

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	MD5	Xored PE	ZLIB Complexity	File Type	Entropy	Characteristics
.data	0x1000	0x1580	0x1600	256866013fbfa471814f579466446cc4	False	0.19176136363636365	data	2.1533367024494297	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE
.text	0x3000	0x428f	0x4400	7db6b7201674b4a993763a4c4a500a93	False	0.5068359375	data	5.780313058378867	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.reloc	0x8000	0x1b0	0x200	00f9ac86fd9ddadb2971baf4b7a54e15	False	0.638671875	data	4.6077544975514835	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_DISCARDABLE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Resources

Name	RVA	Size	Type	Language	Country	ZLIB Complexity
RT_VERSION	0x3058	0x524	data			0.3882978723404255

Network Behavior

⊘No network behavior found

Statistics

CPU Usage

Click to jump to process

Memory Usage

Click to jump to process

Behavior

Click to jump to process

System Behavior

Analysis Process: loaddll64.exePID: 6944, Parent PID: 2580

General

Target ID:	0
Start time:	11:59:16
Start date:	23/10/2024
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\loaddll64.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	loaddll64.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\weird.dll"
Imagebase:	0x7ff727250000
File size:	165'888 bytes
MD5 hash:	763455F9DCB24DFEECC2B9D9F8D46D52
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Chronological Activities

Analysis Process: conhost.exePID: 6968, Parent PID: 6944

General

Target ID:	1
Start time:	11:59:16
Start date:	23/10/2024
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Imagebase:	0x7ff7699e0000
File size:	862'208 bytes
MD5 hash:	0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Chronological Activities

Analysis Process: cmd.exePID: 7084, Parent PID: 6944

General

Target ID:	2
Start time:	11:59:17
Start date:	23/10/2024
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	cmd.exe /C rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\weird.dll",#1
Imagebase:	0x7ff7f2050000
File size:	289'792 bytes
MD5 hash:	8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Chronological Activities

Analysis Process: rundll32.exePID: 7140, Parent PID: 7084

General

Target ID:	3
Start time:	11:59:17
Start date:	23/10/2024
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\weird.dll",#1
Imagebase:	0x7ff78b230000
File size:	71'680 bytes
MD5 hash:	EF3179D498793BF4234F708D3BE28633
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Chronological Activities

Disassembly

⊘No disassembly

Description:	Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by side-loading DLLs. Similar to DLL Search Order Hijacking , side-loading involves hijacking which DLL a program loads. But rather than just planting the DLL within the search order of a program then waiting for the victim application to be invoked, adversaries may directly side-load their payloads by planting then invoking a legitimate application that executes their payload(s).
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File: File Creation, File: File Modification, Module: Module Load, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File: File Metadata, File: File Modification, Module: Module Load, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Access, Process: Process Metadata, Process: Process Modification
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i.e. Shared Modules ), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is commonly associated with executing DLL payloads (ex: `rundll32.exe {DLLname, DLLfunction}` ).
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, File: File Metadata, Module: Module Load, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may modify file time attributes to hide new or changes to existing files. Timestomping is a technique that modifies the timestamps of a file (the modify, access, create, and change times), often to mimic files that are in the same folder. This is done, for example, on files that have been modified or created by the adversary so that they do not appear conspicuous to forensic investigators or file analysis tools.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File: File Metadata, File: File Modification
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

Loading Joe Sandbox Report ...

Warning!

Windows Analysis Report weird.dll

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Process Tree

Malware Configuration

Yara Signatures

Sigma Signatures

Suricata Signatures

Joe Sandbox Signatures

AV Detection

Compliance

System Summary

Data Obfuscation

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection

Malware Analysis System Evasion

Anti Debugging

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

World Map of Contacted IPs

General Information

Warnings

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASNs

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint Preview

Data Directories

Sections

Resources

Network Behavior

Statistics

CPU Usage

Memory Usage

Behavior

System Behavior

Analysis Process: loaddll64.exePID: 6944, Parent PID: 2580

General

Chronological Activities

Analysis Process: conhost.exePID: 6968, Parent PID: 6944

General

Chronological Activities

Analysis Process: cmd.exePID: 7084, Parent PID: 6944

General

Chronological Activities

Analysis Process: rundll32.exePID: 7140, Parent PID: 7084

General

Chronological Activities

Disassembly

Windows Analysis Report
weird.dll