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Windows Analysis Report
Original Invoice.vbs

Overview

General Information

Sample name:	Original Invoice.vbs
Analysis ID:	1526386
MD5:	e3e90f978c63dc690a08e21a6596ab0c
SHA1:	87a02a70a0f4a2a0aac762761d0696b29c78db82
SHA256:	abc82a87fbfa9bbe5f327379027c9a2a047344fcfe61ff0707ce64f677ca35e9
Tags:	AgentTeslavbsuser-abuse_ch
Infos:

Detection

Score:	64
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

AI detected suspicious sample

Creates processes via WMI

Sigma detected: WScript or CScript Dropper

Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage)

Drops PE files

Found WSH timer for Javascript or VBS script (likely evasive script)

Found dropped PE file which has not been started or loaded

Java / VBScript file with very long strings (likely obfuscated code)

Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)

Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info

Sigma detected: Suspicious Copy From or To System Directory

Sigma detected: WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution Via Cscript/Wscript

Classification

Process Tree

System is w10x64

wscript.exe (PID: 7336 cmdline: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\Original Invoice.vbs" MD5: A47CBE969EA935BDD3AB568BB126BC80)

cmd.exe (PID: 7728 cmdline: cmd /c copy "C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" "C:\Users\user\Desktop\Original Invoice.vbs.exe" /Y MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE)

conhost.exe (PID: 1624 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D)

cleanup

Sigma Signatures

System Summary

Sigma detected: WScript or CScript Dropper

Source: Process started

Author: Margaritis Dimitrios (idea), Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), oscd.community: Data: Command: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\Original Invoice.vbs", CommandLine: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\Original Invoice.vbs", CommandLine|base64offset|contains: , Image: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe, ParentCommandLine: , ParentImage: , ParentProcessId: 3968, ProcessCommandLine: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\Original Invoice.vbs", ProcessId: 7336, ProcessName: wscript.exe

Sigma detected: Suspicious Copy From or To System Directory

Source: Process started

Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Markus Neis, Tim Shelton (HAWK.IO), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems): Data: Command: cmd /c copy "C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" "C:\Users\user\Desktop\Original Invoice.vbs.exe" /Y, CommandLine: cmd /c copy "C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" "C:\Users\user\Desktop\Original Invoice.vbs.exe" /Y, CommandLine|base64offset|contains: rg, Image: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe, ParentCommandLine: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\Original Invoice.vbs", ParentImage: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe, ParentProcessId: 7336, ParentProcessName: wscript.exe, ProcessCommandLine: cmd /c copy "C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" "C:\Users\user\Desktop\Original Invoice.vbs.exe" /Y, ProcessId: 7728, ProcessName: cmd.exe

Sigma detected: WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution Via Cscript/Wscript

Source: Process started

Author: Michael Haag: Data: Command: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\Original Invoice.vbs", CommandLine: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\Original Invoice.vbs", CommandLine|base64offset|contains: , Image: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe, ParentCommandLine: , ParentImage: , ParentProcessId: 3968, ProcessCommandLine: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\Original Invoice.vbs", ProcessId: 7336, ProcessName: wscript.exe

Suricata Signatures

⊘No Suricata rule has matched

Joe Sandbox Signatures

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Source: Original Invoice.vbs

Virustotal: Detection: 11%

Perma Link

AI detected suspicious sample

Source: Submited Sample

Integrated Neural Analysis Model: Matched 98.8% probability

Source:	Binary string: powershell.pdbUGP source: Original Invoice.vbs.exe.8.dr
Source:	Binary string: powershell.pdb source: Original Invoice.vbs.exe.8.dr

System Summary

Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage)

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	COM Object queried: Windows Script Host Shell Object HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{72C24DD5-D70A-438B-8A42-98424B88AFB8}	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	COM Object queried: WBEM Locator HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{4590F811-1D3A-11D0-891F-00AA004B2E24}	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	COM Object queried: Windows Management and Instrumentation HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{8BC3F05E-D86B-11D0-A075-00C04FB68820}	Jump to behavior

Source: Original Invoice.vbs

Initial sample: Strings found which are bigger than 50

Source: Original Invoice.vbs.exe.8.dr

Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamePowerShell.EXEj% vs Original Invoice.vbs

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal64.winVBS@3/1@0/0

Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Original Invoice.vbs.exe

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe

Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Local\SM0:1624:120:WilError_03

Source: unknown

Process created: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\Original Invoice.vbs"

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecMethod - root\cimv2 : Win32_Process::Create

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

File read: C:\Users\desktop.ini

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

Key opened: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Jump to behavior

Source: Original Invoice.vbs

Virustotal: Detection: 11%

Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\Original Invoice.vbs"
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe cmd /c copy "C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" "C:\Users\user\Desktop\Original Invoice.vbs.exe" /Y
Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: version.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: kernel.appcore.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: uxtheme.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: sxs.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: vbscript.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: amsi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: userenv.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: profapi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: wldp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: msasn1.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: cryptsp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: rsaenh.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: cryptbase.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: msisip.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: wshext.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: scrobj.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: scrrun.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: mpr.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: wbemcomn.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: windows.storage.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: propsys.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: textshaping.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: textinputframework.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: coreuicomponents.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: coremessaging.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: ntmarta.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: coremessaging.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: wintypes.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: wintypes.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: wintypes.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Section loaded: ntmarta.dll	Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{B54F3741-5B07-11cf-A4B0-00AA004A55E8}\InprocServer32

Jump to behavior

Source: Original Invoice.vbs

Static file information: File size 3936548 > 1048576

Source:	Binary string: powershell.pdbUGP source: Original Invoice.vbs.exe.8.dr
Source:	Binary string: powershell.pdb source: Original Invoice.vbs.exe.8.dr

Persistence and Installation Behavior

Creates processes via WMI

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecMethod - root\cimv2 : Win32_Process::Create

Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Original Invoice.vbs.exe

Jump to dropped file

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX			Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX			Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

Window found: window name: WSH-Timer

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe

Dropped PE file which has not been started: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Original Invoice.vbs.exe

Jump to dropped file

Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe

Last function: Thread delayed

Source: wscript.exe, 00000006.00000003.1389157749.0000025CFA0D6000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: \??\SCSI#CdRom&Ven_NECVMWar&Prod_VMware_SATA_CD00#4&224f42ef&0&000000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}\;
Source: wscript.exe, 00000006.00000003.1389157749.0000025CFA0D6000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: \??\SCSI#CdRom&Ven_NECVMWar&Prod_VMware_SATA_CD00#4&224f42ef&0&000000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}\Device\CdRom0\??\Volume{a33c736e-61ca-11ee-8c18-806e6f6e6963}\DosDevices\D:b

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography MachineGuid

Jump to behavior

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Reconnaissance	Resource Development	Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Command and Control	Exfiltration	Impact
Gather Victim Identity Information	21 Scripting	Valid Accounts	11 Windows Management Instrumentation	21 Scripting	1 Process Injection	1 Masquerading	OS Credential Dumping	1 Security Software Discovery	Remote Services	Data from Local System	Data Obfuscation	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Abuse Accessibility Features
Credentials	Domains	Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	1 DLL Side-Loading	1 DLL Side-Loading	1 Process Injection	LSASS Memory	1 File and Directory Discovery	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	Junk Data	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Network Denial of Service
Email Addresses	DNS Server	Domain Accounts	At	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	1 DLL Side-Loading	Security Account Manager	3 System Information Discovery	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	Steganography	Automated Exfiltration	Data Encrypted for Impact
Employee Names	Virtual Private Server	Local Accounts	Cron	Login Hook	Login Hook	1 Obfuscated Files or Information	NTDS	System Network Configuration Discovery	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Protocol Impersonation	Traffic Duplication	Data Destruction

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
Original Invoice.vbs	8%	ReversingLabs
Original Invoice.vbs	11%	Virustotal		Browse

Dropped Files

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
C:\Users\user\Desktop\Original Invoice.vbs.exe	0%	ReversingLabs
C:\Users\user\Desktop\Original Invoice.vbs.exe	0%	Virustotal		Browse

Joe Sandbox version:	41.0.0 Charoite
Analysis ID:	1526386
Start date and time:	2024-10-05 14:44:26 +02:00
Joe Sandbox product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 4m 37s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	full
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 x64 22H2 with Office Professional Plus 2019, Chrome 117, Firefox 118, Adobe Reader DC 23, Java 8 Update 381, 7zip 23.01
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	15
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Sample name:	Original Invoice.vbs
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal64.winVBS@3/1@0/0
EGA Information:	Failed
HCA Information:	Successful, ratio: 100% Number of executed functions: 0 Number of non-executed functions: 0
Cookbook Comments:	Found application associated with file extension: .vbs

Warnings

Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): MpCmdRun.exe, dllhost.exe, WMIADAP.exe, SIHClient.exe, Sgrmuserer.exe, conhost.exe, svchost.exe
Excluded domains from analysis (whitelisted): otelrules.azureedge.net, slscr.update.microsoft.com, ctldl.windowsupdate.com, fe3cr.delivery.mp.microsoft.com
Not all processes where analyzed, report is missing behavior information
Report size getting too big, too many NtOpenKeyEx calls found.
Report size getting too big, too many NtProtectVirtualMemory calls found.

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Threat Name	Link
C:\Users\user\Desktop\Original Invoice.vbs.exe	FQ____RM quotation_JPEG IMAGE.img_WhatsApp.BZ2.vbs	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse
	Adjunto factura.vbs	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse
	DHL-AWB#TRACKING907853880911.bat	Get hash	malicious	AgentTesla	Browse
	rLegalOpinionCopy_doc.cmd	Get hash	malicious	VIP Keylogger	Browse
	SKM_590813660442.bat	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse
	Uydsrpq.cmd	Get hash	malicious	PureLog Stealer	Browse
	uUY8turU3x.exe	Get hash	malicious	AsyncRAT, XWorm	Browse
	Drawings_DIT120924120924120924120924^^.bat	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse
	ad7268943386108805516_48334621196_24110768413395_847727572987992881.pdf.vbs	Get hash	malicious	Remcos	Browse
	DOCUMENTS.vbs	Get hash	malicious	AgentTesla	Browse

Created / dropped Files

C:\Users\user\Desktop\Original Invoice.vbs.exe

Download File

Process:	C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
File Type:	PE32 executable (console) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	433152
Entropy (8bit):	5.502549953174867
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	6144:MF45pGVc4sqEoWwO9sV1yZywi/PzNKXzJ7BapCK5d3klRzULOnWyjLsPhAQzqO:95pGVcwW2KXzJ4pdd3klnnWosPhnzq
MD5:	C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC
SHA1:	F5EE89BB1E4A0B1C3C7F1E8D05D0677F2B2B5919
SHA-256:	73A3C4AEF5DE385875339FC2EB7E58A9E8A47B6161BDC6436BF78A763537BE70
SHA-512:	6E43DCA1B92FAACE0C910CBF9308CF082A38DD39DA32375FAD72D6517DEA93E944B5E5464CF3C69A61EABF47B2A3E5AA014D6F24EFA1A379D4C81C32FA39DDBC
Malicious:	false
Antivirus:	Antivirus: ReversingLabs, Detection: 0% Antivirus: Virustotal, Detection: 0%, Browse
Joe Sandbox View:	Filename: FQ____RM quotation_JPEG IMAGE.img_WhatsApp.BZ2.vbs, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: Adjunto factura.vbs, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: DHL-AWB#TRACKING907853880911.bat, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: rLegalOpinionCopy_doc.cmd, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: SKM_590813660442.bat, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: Uydsrpq.cmd, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: uUY8turU3x.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: Drawings_DIT120924120924120924120924^^.bat, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: ad7268943386108805516_48334621196_24110768413395_847727572987992881.pdf.vbs, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: DOCUMENTS.vbs, Detection: malicious, Browse
Reputation:	moderate, very likely benign file
Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$.......".z.fg..fg..fg..x5..dg..o...lg..r...eg..r...}g..fg...g..r...cg..r...og..r...ng..r..gg..r...gg..Richfg..........................PE..L...s/.0..........................................@......................................@...... ...........................".......0...}......................\|....I..T............................................ ...............................text...\........................... ..`.data...8...........................@....idata....... ......................@..@.rsrc....}...0...~..................@..@.reloc..\|...........................@..B........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

Static File Info

General

File type:	ASCII text, with very long lines (65536), with no line terminators
Entropy (8bit):	6.176955992195806
TrID:
File name:	Original Invoice.vbs
File size:	3'936'548 bytes
MD5:	e3e90f978c63dc690a08e21a6596ab0c
SHA1:	87a02a70a0f4a2a0aac762761d0696b29c78db82
SHA256:	abc82a87fbfa9bbe5f327379027c9a2a047344fcfe61ff0707ce64f677ca35e9
SHA512:	79c382acc570d6a088c236f6740e1429367b93d6c2e7b17c76f74efe5c69c23d392b0ce2f61dee228a157e01bb04af6115fb5ee39000f4439c7b63037daf1985
SSDEEP:	49152:oF3v9ONsZ50fx+BditwRIuGlRCKb+OSwzrZvNvtQrJlTOYOXGqn+85:XQU
TLSH:	920622515E38DD8837986539BEBC7A14D3E0DE7B2DBBEA905193FB4A1B26A001301F71
File Content Preview:	' p00h6auC5+4wifn23IzLMDlLYOjIb7nhY7xVY44Zj3eFyMIjrB7wFQHQonz+rCVKziYIFQ5/YTiTQIbuLYNfFvmBcRTKqIQaWkrm+Mw947eXCpRoEXloBWaKj2yYAeh+cIyCfDoQgCah7brEmWhrVlzPVyLu9wR/GWuuQBgYgllhZ4g/umZ8holuxyS/pGz9HjkPyKnFj3mIAmPPYkAOiGphYjHgK5v2UtGYgC/gwHT+sCLfCbmvnNcOt7gDr

File Icon


Icon Hash:	68d69b8f86ab9a86

Target ID:	6
Start time:	08:45:17
Start date:	05/10/2024
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\Original Invoice.vbs"
Imagebase:	0x7ff612050000
File size:	170'496 bytes
MD5 hash:	A47CBE969EA935BDD3AB568BB126BC80
Has elevated privileges:	false
Has administrator privileges:	false
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Target ID:	8
Start time:	08:45:18
Start date:	05/10/2024
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	cmd /c copy "C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" "C:\Users\user\Desktop\Original Invoice.vbs.exe" /Y
Imagebase:	0x7ff794930000
File size:	289'792 bytes
MD5 hash:	8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE
Has elevated privileges:	false
Has administrator privileges:	false
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Target ID:	9
Start time:	08:45:18
Start date:	05/10/2024
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Imagebase:	0x7ff620390000
File size:	862'208 bytes
MD5 hash:	0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D
Has elevated privileges:	false
Has administrator privileges:	false
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Chronological Activities

Disassembly

⊘No disassembly

Description:	This technique has been deprecated. Please use Command and Scripting Interpreter where appropriate.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Execution
Data Sources:
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may abuse Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to execute malicious commands and payloads. WMI is an administration feature that provides a uniform environment to access Windows system components. The WMI service enables both local and remote access, though the latter is facilitated by Remote Services such as Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM) and Windows Remote Management (WinRM).Remote WMI over DCOM operates using port 135, whereas WMI over WinRM operates over port 5985 when using HTTP and 5986 for HTTPS.
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Process: Process Creation, WMI: WMI Creation
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by side-loading DLLs. Similar to DLL Search Order Hijacking , side-loading involves hijacking which DLL a program loads. But rather than just planting the DLL within the search order of a program then waiting for the victim application to be invoked, adversaries may directly side-load their payloads by planting then invoking a legitimate application that executes their payload(s).
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File: File Creation, File: File Modification, Module: Module Load, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File: File Metadata, File: File Modification, Module: Module Load, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Access, Process: Process Metadata, Process: Process Modification
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, File: File Metadata, File: File Modification, Image: Image Metadata, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation, Process: Process Metadata, Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Metadata, Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Modification, Service: Service Creation, Service: Service Metadata
Platforms:	Containers, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, File: File Creation, File: File Metadata, Module: Module Load, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation, Script: Script Execution, WMI: WMI Creation, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Firewall: Firewall Enumeration, Firewall: Firewall Metadata, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Azure AD, Google Workspace, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from File and Directory Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

Loading Joe Sandbox Report ...

Warning!

Windows Analysis Report Original Invoice.vbs

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Process Tree

Malware Configuration

Yara Signatures

Sigma Signatures

System Summary

Suricata Signatures

Joe Sandbox Signatures

AV Detection

Compliance

System Summary

Persistence and Installation Behavior

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection

Malware Analysis System Evasion

Language, Device and Operating System Detection

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

World Map of Contacted IPs

General Information

Warnings

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASNs

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

C:\Users\user\Desktop\Original Invoice.vbs.exe

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Network Behavior

Statistics

CPU Usage

Memory Usage

High Level Behavior Distribution

back

Behavior

System Behavior

Analysis Process: wscript.exePID: 7336, Parent PID: 3968

General

Chronological Activities

Analysis Process: cmd.exePID: 7728, Parent PID: 6752

General

Chronological Activities

Analysis Process: conhost.exePID: 1624, Parent PID: 7728

General

Chronological Activities

Disassembly

Windows Analysis Report
Original Invoice.vbs