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Windows Analysis Report
PROCEXP152.dll

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:	PROCEXP152.dll (renamed file extension from SYS to dll)
Analysis ID:	804127
MD5:	210134d1c25645324d4881fee5151324
SHA1:	17d9200843fe0eb224644a61f0d1982fac54d844
SHA256:	d76c74fc7a00a939985ae515991b80afa0524bf0a4feaec3e5e58e52630bd717
Infos:

Detection

Score:	2
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info

Program does not show much activity (idle)

Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)

Checks if the current process is being debugged

Classification

Process Tree

System is w7x64

loaddll64.exe (PID: 2024 cmdline: loaddll64.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROCEXP152.dll" MD5: C676FC0263EDD17D4CE7D644B8F3FCD6)

cmd.exe (PID: 1184 cmdline: cmd.exe /C rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROCEXP152.dll",#1 MD5: 5746BD7E255DD6A8AFA06F7C42C1BA41)

rundll32.exe (PID: 1216 cmdline: rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROCEXP152.dll",#1 MD5: DD81D91FF3B0763C392422865C9AC12E)

cleanup

Joe Sandbox Signatures

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

There are no malicious signatures, click here to show all signatures.

Source: PROCEXP152.dll

Static PE information: certificate valid

Source: PROCEXP152.dll

Static PE information: HIGH_ENTROPY_VA, DYNAMIC_BASE, FORCE_INTEGRITY, NX_COMPAT

Source:

Binary string: D:\a\1\s\sys\x64\Release\ProcExpDriver.pdb source: PROCEXP152.dll

Source: PROCEXP152.dll

String found in binary or memory: https://www.sysinternals.com0

Source: PROCEXP152.dll

Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameprocexp.SysB vs PROCEXP152.dll

Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll64.exe

Key opened: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Jump to behavior

Source: PROCEXP152.dll

Binary string: \DosDevices\PROCEXP152\ObjectTypes\\Device\PROCEXP152PsAcquireProcessExitSynchronizationPsReleaseProcessExitSynchronizationMmGetMaximumNonPagedPoolInBytesObGetObjectTypePsIsProtectedProcessMutantIoCreateDeviceSecureIoValidateDeviceIoControlAccessD:P(A;;GA;;;SY)(A;;GA;;;BA)68

Source: classification engine

Classification label: clean2.winDLL@5/0@0/0

Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe

Process created: C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROCEXP152.dll",#1

Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll64.exe loaddll64.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROCEXP152.dll"
Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll64.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe cmd.exe /C rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROCEXP152.dll",#1
Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROCEXP152.dll",#1
Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll64.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe cmd.exe /C rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROCEXP152.dll",#1	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROCEXP152.dll",#1	Jump to behavior

Source: initial sample

Static PE information: Valid certificate with Microsoft Issuer

Source: PROCEXP152.dll

Static PE information: Image base 0x180000000 > 0x60000000

Source: PROCEXP152.dll

Static PE information: certificate valid

Source: PROCEXP152.dll	Static PE information: data directory type: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT
Source: PROCEXP152.dll	Static PE information: data directory type: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE
Source: PROCEXP152.dll	Static PE information: data directory type: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC
Source: PROCEXP152.dll	Static PE information: data directory type: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG
Source: PROCEXP152.dll	Static PE information: data directory type: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG
Source: PROCEXP152.dll	Static PE information: data directory type: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT

Source: PROCEXP152.dll

Static PE information: HIGH_ENTROPY_VA, DYNAMIC_BASE, FORCE_INTEGRITY, NX_COMPAT

Source: PROCEXP152.dll

Static PE information: data directory type: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG

Source:

Binary string: D:\a\1\s\sys\x64\Release\ProcExpDriver.pdb source: PROCEXP152.dll

Source: C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe

Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX

Jump to behavior

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll64.exe

Process queried: DebugPort

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll64.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe cmd.exe /C rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROCEXP152.dll",#1			Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROCEXP152.dll",#1			Jump to behavior

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control	Network Effects	Remote Service Effects	Impact
Valid Accounts	Windows Management Instrumentation	Path Interception	11 Process Injection	1 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	OS Credential Dumping	1 Security Software Discovery	Remote Services	Data from Local System	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Data Obfuscation	Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication	Remotely Track Device Without Authorization	Modify System Partition
Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	1 Rundll32	LSASS Memory	1 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Junk Data	Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS	Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization	Device Lockout
Domain Accounts	At (Linux)	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	11 Process Injection	Security Account Manager	1 System Information Discovery	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	Automated Exfiltration	Steganography	Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location	Obtain Device Cloud Backups	Delete Device Data

Behavior Graph

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Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Screenshots

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Thumbnails

This section contains all screenshots as thumbnails, including those not shown in the slideshow.

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
PROCEXP152.dll	0%	ReversingLabs
PROCEXP152.dll	0%	Virustotal		Browse

Dropped Files

⊘No Antivirus matches

Unpacked PE Files

⊘No Antivirus matches

Domains

⊘No Antivirus matches

URLs

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
https://www.sysinternals.com0	0%	URL Reputation	safe
https://www.sysinternals.com0	0%	URL Reputation	safe

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

⊘No contacted domains info

URLs from Memory and Binaries

Name	Source	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
https://www.sysinternals.com0	PROCEXP152.dll	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown

World Map of Contacted IPs

⊘No contacted IP infos

General Information

Joe Sandbox Version:	36.0.0 Rainbow Opal
Analysis ID:	804127
Start date and time:	2023-02-10 17:51:17 +01:00
Joe Sandbox Product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 2m 17s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	full
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 7 x64 SP1 with Office 2010 SP1 (IE 11, FF52, Chrome 57, Adobe Reader DC 15, Flash 25.0.0.127, Java 8 Update 121, .NET 4.6.2)
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	5
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled HDC enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Sample file name:	PROCEXP152.dll (renamed file extension from SYS to dll)
Detection:	CLEAN
Classification:	clean2.winDLL@5/0@0/0
EGA Information:	Failed
HDC Information:	Failed
HCA Information:	Successful, ratio: 100% Number of executed functions: 0 Number of non-executed functions: 0
Cookbook Comments:	Stop behavior analysis, all processes terminated

Warnings

Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): dllhost.exe, conhost.exe
Not all processes where analyzed, report is missing behavior information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

⊘No simulations

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

⊘No context

Domains

⊘No context

ASNs

⊘No context

JA3 Fingerprints

⊘No context

Dropped Files

⊘No context

Created / dropped Files

⊘No created / dropped files found

Static File Info

General

File type:	PE32+ executable (DLL) (native) x86-64, for MS Windows
Entropy (8bit):	6.299134222165699
TrID:	Win64 Dynamic Link Library (generic) (102004/3) 86.43% Win64 Device Driver (generic) (12004/3) 10.17% Generic Win/DOS Executable (2004/3) 1.70% DOS Executable Generic (2002/1) 1.70% Autodesk FLIC Image File (extensions: flc, fli, cel) (7/3) 0.01%
File name:	PROCEXP152.dll
File size:	37288
MD5:	210134d1c25645324d4881fee5151324
SHA1:	17d9200843fe0eb224644a61f0d1982fac54d844
SHA256:	d76c74fc7a00a939985ae515991b80afa0524bf0a4feaec3e5e58e52630bd717
SHA512:	f51e426d2f90a862940e68d883b4c73f79a613cfb4943ce425f4709840840f48d55f8071c51ab7bdab818d332732844a86269a2dd3a1fe5c0c45d20315ec173b
SSDEEP:	768:OyVQcSGXgiRHT4cTNVTC1pua2Nul+brKtZ9puD8Uk9z:OyIuPHfn7NulWQ9z
TLSH:	C4F26C8593D855C6E6A7D53082B8CAD7FD303A036711A7DF02A4C4792E63FD4EA38B19
File Content Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$........-.NML..ML..ML..ML..LL...4..JL...4..JL...4..NL..ML...L...4..JL...7..LL...7_.LL...7..LL..RichML..................PE..d...VMmc...

File Icon


Icon Hash:	3074e4d6ded4d0e4

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint:	0x180009000
Entrypoint Section:	INIT
Digitally signed:	true
Imagebase:	0x180000000
Subsystem:	native
Image File Characteristics:	EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LARGE_ADDRESS_AWARE, DLL
DLL Characteristics:	HIGH_ENTROPY_VA, DYNAMIC_BASE, FORCE_INTEGRITY, NX_COMPAT
Time Stamp:	0x636D4D56 [Thu Nov 10 19:13:26 2022 UTC]
TLS Callbacks:
CLR (.Net) Version:
OS Version Major:	6
OS Version Minor:	0
File Version Major:	6
File Version Minor:	0
Subsystem Version Major:	6
Subsystem Version Minor:	0
Import Hash:	192407b9613ece36cb3e3bc2b2ad984c

Authenticode Signature

Signature Valid:	true
Signature Issuer:	CN=Microsoft Windows Third Party Component CA 2012, O=Microsoft Corporation, L=Redmond, S=Washington, C=US
Signature Validation Error:	The operation completed successfully
Error Number:	0
Not Before, Not After	5/5/2022 3:02:14 PM 5/4/2023 3:02:14 PM
Subject Chain	CN=Microsoft Windows Hardware Compatibility Publisher, O=Microsoft Corporation, L=Redmond, S=Washington, C=US
Version:	3
Thumbprint MD5:	EE55069CA921D4713375F7580243622C
Thumbprint SHA-1:	C1BB01FACA93B0293E172B2015600AB4391F3AD4
Thumbprint SHA-256:	DCE4EAA2521F1773FB5E1A8D343EDB967AEC583CBE2CC74B872ABCE78C451153
Serial:	33000000DF8C239890E546903D0000000000DF

Entrypoint Preview

Instruction
dec eax
mov dword ptr [esp+08h], ebx
push edi
dec eax
sub esp, 20h
dec eax
mov ebx, edx
dec eax
mov edi, ecx
call 00007F5244765CFCh
dec eax
mov edx, ebx
dec eax
mov ecx, edi
call 00007F524475DCC5h
dec eax
mov ebx, dword ptr [esp+30h]
dec eax
add esp, 20h
pop edi
ret
int3
dec eax
mov eax, dword ptr [FFFFC1DDh]
inc ebp
xor ecx, ecx
dec ecx
mov eax, 2DDFA232h
cdq
sub eax, dword ptr [eax]
add byte ptr [eax-7Bh], cl
sal byte ptr [ebp+eax+49h], 0000003Bh
sal byte ptr [ebp+38h], 0000000Fh
xor dword ptr [eax-3Fh], ecx
loop 00007F5244765D02h
dec eax
lea ecx, dword ptr [FFFFC1B9h]
dec eax
or eax, edx
dec eax
xor eax, ecx
dec eax
mov dword ptr [FFFFC1ACh], eax
inc sp
mov dword ptr [FFFFC1AAh], ecx
dec eax
mov eax, dword ptr [FFFFC19Dh]
dec eax
test eax, eax
jne 00007F5244765CECh
dec ecx
mov eax, eax
dec eax
mov dword ptr [FFFFC18Eh], eax
dec eax
not eax
dec eax
mov dword ptr [FFFFC18Ch], eax
ret
int3
int3
int3
mov eax, 00000090h
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [edx-6Ah], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax+00h], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add al, dl
xchg eax, edx
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
ficom dword ptr [edx+00000000h]
add byte ptr [eax], al

Data Directories

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Is in Section
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT	0x9090	0x28	INIT
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE	0xa000	0x380	.rsrc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION	0x6000	0x2e8	.pdata
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY	0x6c00	0x25a8
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC	0xb000	0x3c	.reloc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG	0x4880	0x54	.rdata
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG	0x4740	0x140	.rdata
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BOUND_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT	0x4000	0x218	.rdata
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESERVED	0x0	0x0

Sections

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	Xored PE	ZLIB Complexity	File Type	Entropy	Characteristics
.text	0x1000	0x2140	0x2200	False	0.5900735294117647	data	6.065228952504458	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_NOT_PAGED, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.rdata	0x4000	0xfc4	0x1000	False	0.43408203125	data	4.079795933507306	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_NOT_PAGED, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.data	0x5000	0x26c	0x400	False	0.1962890625	data	1.267499269275798	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_NOT_PAGED, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE
.pdata	0x6000	0x2e8	0x400	False	0.4208984375	data	3.2239429693679105	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_NOT_PAGED, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
PAGE	0x7000	0x1c53	0x1e00	False	0.57890625	data	6.067395582736787	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
INIT	0x9000	0x87e	0xa00	False	0.43828125	zlib compressed data	4.747563608444487	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_DISCARDABLE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.rsrc	0xa000	0x380	0x400	False	0.3984375	data	2.9759006749433174	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_DISCARDABLE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.reloc	0xb000	0x3c	0x200	False	0.142578125	data	0.8067669562396371	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_DISCARDABLE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Resources

Name	RVA	Size	Type	Language	Country
RT_VERSION	0xa060	0x320	data	English	United States

Imports

DLL	Import
ntoskrnl.exe	strncpy, RtlInitUnicodeString, MmGetSystemRoutineAddress, RtlUnicodeStringToAnsiString, RtlFreeAnsiString, KeLowerIrql, KfRaiseIrql, KeWaitForSingleObject, ExAllocatePoolWithTag, ExFreePoolWithTag, ExGetPreviousMode, SeCaptureSubjectContext, SeReleaseSubjectContext, PsGetVersion, IofCompleteRequest, IoCreateSymbolicLink, IoDeleteDevice, IoDeleteSymbolicLink, ObReferenceObjectByHandle, ObCloseHandle, ObfDereferenceObject, ZwClose, MmIsAddressValid, ZwOpenProcess, KeStackAttachProcess, KeUnstackDetachProcess, SePrivilegeCheck, PsLookupProcessByProcessId, ObOpenObjectByPointer, ObQueryNameString, ZwQueryObject, ZwDuplicateObject, ZwOpenProcessToken, ZwQueryInformationProcess, ZwQuerySystemInformation, ObOpenObjectByName, __C_specific_handler, IoFileObjectType, PsProcessType, PsThreadType, PsInitialSystemProcess, RtlFreeUnicodeString, ZwSetSecurityObject, IoDeviceObjectType, IoCreateDevice, RtlGetDaclSecurityDescriptor, RtlGetGroupSecurityDescriptor, RtlGetOwnerSecurityDescriptor, RtlGetSaclSecurityDescriptor, SeCaptureSecurityDescriptor, _snwprintf, RtlLengthSecurityDescriptor, SeExports, RtlCreateSecurityDescriptor, _wcsnicmp, wcschr, RtlAbsoluteToSelfRelativeSD, RtlAddAccessAllowedAce, RtlLengthSid, IoIsWdmVersionAvailable, RtlSetDaclSecurityDescriptor, ZwOpenKey, ZwSetValueKey, ZwQueryValueKey, ZwCreateKey, KeBugCheckEx

DLL

Import

ntoskrnl.exe

strncpy, RtlInitUnicodeString, MmGetSystemRoutineAddress, RtlUnicodeStringToAnsiString, RtlFreeAnsiString, KeLowerIrql, KfRaiseIrql, KeWaitForSingleObject, ExAllocatePoolWithTag, ExFreePoolWithTag, ExGetPreviousMode, SeCaptureSubjectContext, SeReleaseSubjectContext, PsGetVersion, IofCompleteRequest, IoCreateSymbolicLink, IoDeleteDevice, IoDeleteSymbolicLink, ObReferenceObjectByHandle, ObCloseHandle, ObfDereferenceObject, ZwClose, MmIsAddressValid, ZwOpenProcess, KeStackAttachProcess, KeUnstackDetachProcess, SePrivilegeCheck, PsLookupProcessByProcessId, ObOpenObjectByPointer, ObQueryNameString, ZwQueryObject, ZwDuplicateObject, ZwOpenProcessToken, ZwQueryInformationProcess, ZwQuerySystemInformation, ObOpenObjectByName, __C_specific_handler, IoFileObjectType, PsProcessType, PsThreadType, PsInitialSystemProcess, RtlFreeUnicodeString, ZwSetSecurityObject, IoDeviceObjectType, IoCreateDevice, RtlGetDaclSecurityDescriptor, RtlGetGroupSecurityDescriptor, RtlGetOwnerSecurityDescriptor, RtlGetSaclSecurityDescriptor, SeCaptureSecurityDescriptor, _snwprintf, RtlLengthSecurityDescriptor, SeExports, RtlCreateSecurityDescriptor, _wcsnicmp, wcschr, RtlAbsoluteToSelfRelativeSD, RtlAddAccessAllowedAce, RtlLengthSid, IoIsWdmVersionAvailable, RtlSetDaclSecurityDescriptor, ZwOpenKey, ZwSetValueKey, ZwQueryValueKey, ZwCreateKey, KeBugCheckEx

Possible Origin

Language of compilation system	Country where language is spoken	Map
English	United States

• loaddll64.exe
• cmd.exe
• rundll32.exe

Click to jump to process

Memory Usage

• loaddll64.exe
• cmd.exe
• rundll32.exe

Click to jump to process

Click to jump to process

Target ID:	1
Start time:	17:51:15
Start date:	10/02/2023
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\loaddll64.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	loaddll64.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROCEXP152.dll"
Imagebase:	0x13f7c0000
File size:	139776 bytes
MD5 hash:	C676FC0263EDD17D4CE7D644B8F3FCD6
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Show Windows behavior

Target ID:	3
Start time:	17:51:16
Start date:	10/02/2023
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	cmd.exe /C rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROCEXP152.dll",#1
Imagebase:	0x4a3b0000
File size:	345088 bytes
MD5 hash:	5746BD7E255DD6A8AFA06F7C42C1BA41
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Show Windows behavior

Target ID:	4
Start time:	17:51:16
Start date:	10/02/2023
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROCEXP152.dll",#1
Imagebase:	0xffba0000
File size:	45568 bytes
MD5 hash:	DD81D91FF3B0763C392422865C9AC12E
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Show Windows behavior

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Named Pipes, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i.e. Shared Modules ), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is commonly associated with executing DLL payloads.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	DLL monitoring, Loaded DLLs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

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Warning!

Windows Analysis Report PROCEXP152.dll

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Process Tree

Malware Configuration

Yara Signatures

Sigma Signatures

Snort Signatures

Joe Sandbox Signatures

Compliance

Networking

System Summary

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection

Malware Analysis System Evasion

Anti Debugging

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

URLs from Memory and Binaries

World Map of Contacted IPs

General Information

Warnings

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASNs

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static PE Info

General

Authenticode Signature

Entrypoint Preview

Data Directories

Sections

Resources

Imports

Possible Origin

Network Behavior

Statistics

CPU Usage

Memory Usage

Behavior

System Behavior

Analysis Process: loaddll64.exePID: 2024, Parent PID: 1860

General

File Activities

File Opened

File Attributes Queried

Volume Information Queried

Section Activities

Sections loaded by Windows

Sections loaded by Program

Registry Activities

Key Opened

Windows Analysis Report
PROCEXP152.dll