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Windows Analysis Report
FpDGxxu5mz.exe

Overview

General Information

Sample name:	FpDGxxu5mz.exe renamed because original name is a hash value
Original sample name:	58ea56177cf0e8a863d6e9f11570a3e61239e21e1d0b5667537b7223d4131c42.exe
Analysis ID:	1670867
MD5:	28103f745f58a2af71d327012846c022
SHA1:	a2aac68296750c9299123611e4801b3e91b0747d
SHA256:	58ea56177cf0e8a863d6e9f11570a3e61239e21e1d0b5667537b7223d4131c42
Tags:	cactusexeransomwareuser-TheRavenFile
Infos:

Detection

Babuk

Score:	64
Range:	0 - 100
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Yara detected Babuk Ransomware

Deletes shadow drive data (may be related to ransomware)

Found Tor onion address

May use bcdedit to modify the Windows boot settings

PE file contains more sections than normal

PE file contains sections with non-standard names

Program does not show much activity (idle)

Classification

Process Tree

System is w10x64

FpDGxxu5mz.exe (PID: 7156 cmdline: "C:\Users\user\Desktop\FpDGxxu5mz.exe" dumpChromeCache MD5: 28103F745F58A2AF71D327012846C022)

conhost.exe (PID: 2352 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D)

cleanup

Malware Threat Intel

Provided by

Name	Description	Attribution	Blogpost URLs	Link
Babuk	Babuk Ransomware is a sophisticated ransomware compiled for several platforms. Windows and ARM for Linux are the most used compiled versions, but ESX and a 32bit old PE executable were observed over time. as well It uses an Elliptic Curve Algorithm (Montgomery Algorithm) to build the encryption keys.	No Attribution	http://chuongdong.com/reverse%20engineering/2021/01/03/BabukRansomware/ https://blog.cyble.com/2022/05/06/rebranded-babuk-ransomware-in-action-darkangels-ransomware-performs-targeted-attack/ https://blog.morphisec.com/babuk-ransomware-variant-major-attack https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2021/11/babuk-exploits-exchange.html https://chuongdong.com/reverse%20engineering/2021/01/16/BabukRansomware-v3/	https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.babuk

Yara Signatures

Memory Dumps

Source	Rule	Description	Author
00000000.00000002.914397519.00007FF60E9AA000.00000002.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmp	JoeSecurity_babuk	Yara detected Babuk Ransomware	Joe Security
00000000.00000000.912235057.00007FF60E9AA000.00000002.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmp	JoeSecurity_babuk	Yara detected Babuk Ransomware	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: FpDGxxu5mz.exe PID: 7156	JoeSecurity_babuk	Yara detected Babuk Ransomware	Joe Security

Unpacked PEs

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
0.2.FpDGxxu5mz.exe.7ff60e5a0000.0.unpack	JoeSecurity_babuk	Yara detected Babuk Ransomware	Joe Security
0.0.FpDGxxu5mz.exe.7ff60e5a0000.0.unpack	JoeSecurity_babuk	Yara detected Babuk Ransomware	Joe Security

Binary or memory string: steam.exethebat.exemsftesql.exesqlagent.exesqlbrowser.exesqlwriter.exeoracle.exeocssd.exedbsnmp.exesynctime.exexfssvccon.exesqlservr.exemydesktopservice.exeocautoupds.exeagntsvc.exeencsvc.exefirefoxconfig.exetbirdconfig.exemydesktopqos.exeocomm.exemysqld.exemysqld-nt.exemysqld-opt.exedbeng5o.exesqbcoreservice.exeexcel.exeinfopath.exemsaccess.exemspub.exeonenote.exeoutlook.exepowerpnt.exethunderbird.exevisio.exewinword.exewordpad.exesql.exeagntsvc.exeisqlplussvc.exeencsvc.exefirefox.exedbeng50.exenotepad.exephonesvcveeammemtassqlbackupvsssophossvc$mepocsmsexchangegxvssgxblrgxfwdgxcvdgxcimgrCLOSEDvssadmin delete shadows /all /quietC:\Windows\System32\vssadmin.exeWMIC shadowcopy deleteC:\Windows\System32\wbem\WMIC.exebcdedit /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailuresC:\Windows\System32\bcdedit.exebcdedit /set {default} recoveryenabled nobasic_string: construction from null is not valid

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Reconnaissance	Resource Development	Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Command and Control	Exfiltration	Impact
Gather Victim Identity Information	Acquire Infrastructure	Valid Accounts	2 Command and Scripting Interpreter	1 Bootkit	1 Process Injection	1 Bootkit	OS Credential Dumping	1 System Information Discovery	Remote Services	Data from Local System	1 Proxy	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Abuse Accessibility Features
Credentials	Domains	Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	1 DLL Side-Loading	1 DLL Side-Loading	1 Process Injection	LSASS Memory	Application Window Discovery	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	Junk Data	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Network Denial of Service
Email Addresses	DNS Server	Domain Accounts	At	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	1 DLL Side-Loading	Security Account Manager	Query Registry	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	Steganography	Automated Exfiltration	Data Encrypted for Impact
Employee Names	Virtual Private Server	Local Accounts	Cron	Login Hook	Login Hook	1 File Deletion	NTDS	System Network Configuration Discovery	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Protocol Impersonation	Traffic Duplication	Data Destruction

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
FpDGxxu5mz.exe	62%	Virustotal		Browse

Name	Source	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
https://cactusbloguuodvqjmnzlwetjlpj6aggc6iocwhuupb47laukux7ckid.onion/In	FpDGxxu5mz.exe	false		high

World Map of Contacted IPs

⊘No contacted IP infos

General Information

Joe Sandbox version:	42.0.0 Malachite
Analysis ID:	1670867
Start date and time:	2025-04-22 08:47:41 +02:00
Joe Sandbox product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 2m 7s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	full
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 x64 22H2 with Office Professional Plus 2019, Chrome 134, Firefox 118, Adobe Reader DC 23, Java 8 Update 381, 7zip 23.01
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	2
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Power Change
Sample name:	FpDGxxu5mz.exe renamed because original name is a hash value
Original Sample Name:	58ea56177cf0e8a863d6e9f11570a3e61239e21e1d0b5667537b7223d4131c42.exe
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal64.rans.evad.winEXE@2/0@0/0
EGA Information:	Failed
HCA Information:	Failed
Cookbook Comments:	Found application associated with file extension: .exe Stop behavior analysis, all processes terminated

Warnings

Execution Graph export aborted for target FpDGxxu5mz.exe, PID 7156 because it is empty
Not all processes where analyzed, report is missing behavior information

File type:	PE32+ executable (console) x86-64, for MS Windows
Entropy (8bit):	6.418322954960814
TrID:	Win64 Executable Console (202006/5) 92.65% Win64 Executable (generic) (12005/4) 5.51% Generic Win/DOS Executable (2004/3) 0.92% DOS Executable Generic (2002/1) 0.92% Autodesk FLIC Image File (extensions: flc, fli, cel) (7/3) 0.00%
File name:	FpDGxxu5mz.exe
File size:	9'222'221 bytes
MD5:	28103f745f58a2af71d327012846c022
SHA1:	a2aac68296750c9299123611e4801b3e91b0747d
SHA256:	58ea56177cf0e8a863d6e9f11570a3e61239e21e1d0b5667537b7223d4131c42
SHA512:	13cd94ca0f93ad8c256aad7e2420e1faa3a9b36e08a68eeab6a6541fedf479dd5c52b1ea27eeddeb1cac4b07b35386a9f672c53d3e9c7a3bd64083a4f26ef322
SSDEEP:	98304:+acgM8gcIKsM+eF+zBzYDrOm+rtqycR3oJtOUHu345hsMXWrGBbFF:vcKpW6vToJtOUHh
TLSH:	65965B5365AB0CEDDDDA67B492C76336A734FD218A796F3B6604C6302D139C06E6BB00
File Content Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$.......PE..d...55Se..d.......&....(.0@..&S..>.............@.............................Pi...........`... ............................

File Icon


Icon Hash:	90cececece8e8eb0

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint:	0x1400013f0
Entrypoint Section:	.text
Digitally signed:	false
Imagebase:	0x140000000
Subsystem:	windows cui
Image File Characteristics:	EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, LARGE_ADDRESS_AWARE
DLL Characteristics:	HIGH_ENTROPY_VA, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT
Time Stamp:	0x65533535 [Tue Nov 14 08:52:05 2023 UTC]
TLS Callbacks:	0x4032b450, 0x1, 0x4032b420, 0x1, 0x4033fa10, 0x1
CLR (.Net) Version:
OS Version Major:	4
OS Version Minor:	0
File Version Major:	4
File Version Minor:	0
Subsystem Version Major:	4
Subsystem Version Minor:	0
Import Hash:	420a466cfef422c9552b63a4268b7c26

Entrypoint Preview

Instruction
dec eax
sub esp, 28h
dec eax
mov eax, dword ptr [004BE4A5h]
mov dword ptr [eax], 00000000h
call 00007F75F0DE0BAFh
nop
nop
dec eax
add esp, 28h
ret
nop dword ptr [eax]
dec eax
sub esp, 28h
call 00007F75F111C604h
dec eax
cmp eax, 01h
sbb eax, eax
dec eax
add esp, 28h
ret
nop
nop
nop
nop
nop
nop
nop
nop
nop
nop
nop
nop
dec eax
lea ecx, dword ptr [00000009h]
jmp 00007F75F0DE0E09h
nop dword ptr [eax+00h]
ret
nop
nop
nop
nop
nop
nop
nop
nop
nop
nop
nop
nop
nop
nop
nop
push ebp
dec eax
mov ebp, esp
dec eax
sub esp, 00000090h
dec eax
mov eax, dword ptr [0056B7EEh]
call eax
dec eax
mov dword ptr [ebp-08h], eax
mov ecx, 00000008h
call 00007F75F111C763h
dec eax
mov dword ptr [ebp-10h], eax
mov edx, 00000028h
mov ecx, 00000040h
dec eax
mov eax, dword ptr [0056B931h]
call eax
dec eax
mov dword ptr [ebp-18h], eax
dec eax
mov eax, dword ptr [ebp-10h]
inc ecx
mov eax, 00000004h
mov edx, 00000008h
dec eax
mov ecx, eax
dec eax
mov eax, dword ptr [0056B66Ah]
call eax
mov dword ptr [ebp-26h], 00000000h
mov word ptr [ebp-22h], 0100h
dec eax
lea eax, dword ptr [ebp+00h]

Data Directories

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Is in Section
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT	0x56c000	0x2cc8	.idata
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE	0x571000	0x4e8	.rsrc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION	0x4d6000	0x27954	.pdata
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC	0x572000	0x9f24	.reloc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS	0x4bd9a0	0x28	.rdata
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BOUND_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESERVED	0x0	0x0

Sections

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	MD5	Xored PE	ZLIB Complexity	File Type	Entropy	Characteristics
.text	0x1000	0x402ea0	0x403000	a700c361bf7ff1f054258ad5859bd39f	unknown	unknown	unknown	unknown	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.data	0x404000	0x5120	0x5200	1e2068f38e1e5ae194417fca611a179a	False	0.13743330792682926	data	2.1653355379041606	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE
.rdata	0x40a000	0xcb020	0xcb200	8687c5e6e518238808aaaf28411d3776	False	0.2903569711538462	data	5.092681150806435	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.pdata	0x4d6000	0x27954	0x27a00	ff7fb169aa1eca4c0bcc0bf7757f8756	False	0.5123533615930599	data	6.27886994966621	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.xdata	0x4fe000	0x29fa4	0x2a000	73658f427523bb7f3687805d7ac4df69	False	0.17534528459821427	data	4.696488064345917	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.bss	0x528000	0x43c90	0x0	d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e	False	0	empty	0.0	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_UNINITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE
.idata	0x56c000	0x2cc8	0x2e00	69746e9a4bc654ad2d3879f76aef4067	False	0.23887567934782608	data	4.1612110610475375	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE
.CRT	0x56f000	0x68	0x200	21c93f2bcee1c688b9fe8b9ddec69da7	False	0.078125	data	0.40517793218226683	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE
.tls	0x570000	0x10	0x200	bf619eac0cdf3f68d496ea9344137e8b	False	0.02734375	data	0.0	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE
.rsrc	0x571000	0x4e8	0x600	7bb75ff0b08b50c6eac14449d8033074	False	0.333984375	data	4.7823913622889584	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE
.reloc	0x572000	0x9f24	0xa000	b40bdd14ef25f83c3b734dc8494f1af3	False	0.280615234375	data	5.447732730518641	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_DISCARDABLE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
/4	0x57c000	0x2320	0x2400	155d205b7768319fc16c6193547ced31	False	0.2290581597222222	data	2.4823784798357296	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_DISCARDABLE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
/19	0x57f000	0xc5491	0xc5600	9621ad865609ce01f20e476941f326e0	False	0.2964804167986067	data	5.99720512724903	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_DISCARDABLE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
/31	0x645000	0xc344	0xc400	d0dae32b904e99bb4130f2e43cd8fd71	False	0.23513233418367346	data	4.949853175205664	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_DISCARDABLE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
/45	0x652000	0x19938	0x19a00	dbaf734d802fe9954edfc2a126761d8b	False	0.43200266768292683	data	5.228436165097792	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_DISCARDABLE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
/57	0x66c000	0x7e28	0x8000	09f255d888f36f7d4c31f945010f3441	False	0.202728271484375	data	4.5543712468317326	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_DISCARDABLE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
/70	0x674000	0x2bca	0x2c00	97f29411b63f8b434953d3282e700b41	False	0.2785866477272727	data	4.556736428924381	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_DISCARDABLE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
/81	0x677000	0x6dad	0x6e00	4ed97bfeb189274bc8b5b75aea293de0	False	0.11484375	data	5.032229185084522	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_DISCARDABLE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
/97	0x67e000	0x14aab	0x14c00	1be73727f80219b15607329ef6e261e8	False	0.5041886295180723	data	5.96849766260411	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_DISCARDABLE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
/113	0x693000	0x1b33	0x1c00	1678cb88d45355fbfb5c65063ca38aa7	False	0.5418526785714286	data	5.468883146113603	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_DISCARDABLE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Resources

Name	RVA	Size	Type	Language	Country	ZLIB Complexity
RT_MANIFEST	0x571058	0x48f	XML 1.0 document, ASCII text			0.40102827763496146

Imports

DLL	Import
KERNEL32.DLL	AcquireSRWLockExclusive, AcquireSRWLockShared, AddVectoredExceptionHandler, CloseHandle, ConvertFiberToThread, ConvertThreadToFiberEx, CopyFileW, CreateDirectoryW, CreateEventA, CreateFiberEx, CreateFileW, CreateHardLinkW, CreateMutexW, CreateProcessW, CreateSemaphoreA, CreateToolhelp32Snapshot, DeleteCriticalSection, DeleteFiber, DeleteFileW, DuplicateHandle, EnterCriticalSection, FindClose, FindFirstFileW, FindFirstVolumeW, FindNextFileW, FindNextVolumeW, FindVolumeClose, FormatMessageA, FormatMessageW, FreeLibrary, GetACP, GetConsoleMode, GetConsoleWindow, GetCurrentProcess, GetCurrentProcessId, GetCurrentThread, GetCurrentThreadId, GetDiskFreeSpaceExW, GetDriveTypeW, GetEnvironmentVariableW, GetFileAttributesW, GetFileInformationByHandle, GetFileSizeEx, GetFileType, GetFullPathNameW, GetHandleInformation, GetLastError, GetLogicalDriveStringsW, GetModuleFileNameA, GetModuleFileNameW, GetModuleHandleExA, GetModuleHandleExW, GetModuleHandleW, GetProcAddress, GetProcessAffinityMask, GetProcessHeap, GetProcessId, GetStdHandle, GetSystemDirectoryA, GetSystemInfo, GetSystemTimeAsFileTime, GetTempPathW, GetThreadContext, GetThreadPriority, GetTickCount64, GetVersion, GetVolumeInformationW, HeapAlloc, HeapFree, InitializeCriticalSection, InitializeSRWLock, IsDBCSLeadByteEx, IsDebuggerPresent, IsProcessorFeaturePresent, K32GetProcessImageFileNameW, LeaveCriticalSection, LoadLibraryA, LoadLibraryW, LocalAlloc, LocalFree, MoveFileExW, MultiByteToWideChar, OpenProcess, OutputDebugStringA, Process32NextW, RaiseException, ReadConsoleA, ReadConsoleW, ReleaseSRWLockExclusive, ReleaseSRWLockShared, ReleaseSemaphore, RemoveDirectoryW, RemoveVectoredExceptionHandler, ResetEvent, ResumeThread, RtlCaptureContext, RtlLookupFunctionEntry, RtlUnwindEx, RtlVirtualUnwind, SetConsoleMode, SetEndOfFile, SetEvent, SetFileAttributesW, SetFilePointer, SetLastError, SetProcessAffinityMask, SetThreadContext, SetThreadPriority, SetUnhandledExceptionFilter, Sleep, SuspendThread, SwitchToFiber, TerminateProcess, TlsAlloc, TlsFree, TlsGetValue, TlsSetValue, TryEnterCriticalSection, VirtualAlloc, VirtualFree, VirtualLock, VirtualProtect, VirtualQuery, WaitForMultipleObjects, WaitForSingleObject, WideCharToMultiByte, WriteFile
ADVAPI32.dll	AddAccessDeniedAce, AllocateAndInitializeSid, CloseServiceHandle, ControlService, CryptAcquireContextW, CryptGenRandom, CryptReleaseContext, DeregisterEventSource, InitializeAcl, OpenSCManagerA, OpenServiceA, RegisterEventSourceW, ReportEventW, SetSecurityInfo
msvcrt.dll	__C_specific_handler, ___lc_codepage_func, ___mb_cur_max_func, __getmainargs, __initenv, __iob_func, __set_app_type, __setusermatherr, _amsg_exit, _beginthreadex, _cexit, _close, _commode, _endthreadex, _errno, _exit, _fdopen, _fileno, _findclose, _fileno, _fmode, _fstat64, _get_osfhandle, _gmtime64, _initterm, _localtime64, _lock, _lseeki64, _onexit, _read, _setjmp, _setmode, _stat64, _strdup, _strdup, _strtoi64, _strtoui64, _telli64, _time64, _ultoa, _unlock, _vsnprintf, _vsnwprintf, _wchdir, _wchmod, _wfindfirst64, _wfindnext64, _wfopen, _wfullpath, _wgetcwd, _wmkdir, _wopen, _wremove, _wrename, _write, _wstat64, _wsystem, _wutime64, abort, atoi, calloc, clock, exit, fclose, feof, ferror, fflush, fgets, fopen, fprintf, fputc, fputs, fputwc, fread, free, fwprintf, fseek, ftell, fwrite, getc, getenv, isspace, iswctype, isxdigit, localeconv, longjmp, malloc, memchr, memcmp, memcpy, memmove, memset, printf, qsort, raise, rand, realloc, remove, setlocale, setvbuf, signal, sprintf, srand, strcat, strchr, strcmp, strcoll, strcpy, strcspn, strerror, strftime, strlen, strncmp, strncpy, strrchr, strspn, strstr, strtol, strtoul, strxfrm, tolower, towlower, towupper, ungetc, vfprintf, wcscat, wcscmp, wcscoll, wcscpy, wcsftime, wcslen, wcsncmp, wcsstr, wcstol, wcstombs, wcsxfrm
RstrtMgr.DLL	RmEndSession, RmGetList, RmRegisterResources, RmShutdown, RmStartSession
SHELL32.dll	IsUserAnAdmin, StrStrIW
USER32.dll	GetProcessWindowStation, GetUserObjectInformationW, MessageBoxW, ShowWindow
WS2_32.dll	gethostbyaddr, getservbyname, getservbyport, htonl, htons, inet_addr, inet_ntoa
WSOCK32.dll	WSACleanup, WSAGetLastError, WSASetLastError, WSAStartup, accept, bind, closesocket, connect, gethostbyname, getsockname, getsockopt, ioctlsocket, listen, ntohs, recv, select, send, setsockopt, shutdown, socket

• FpDGxxu5mz.exe
• conhost.exe

Click to jump to process

Click to jump to process

Behavior

• FpDGxxu5mz.exe
• conhost.exe

Click to jump to process

Target ID:	0
Start time:	02:48:39
Start date:	22/04/2025
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\FpDGxxu5mz.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	"C:\Users\user\Desktop\FpDGxxu5mz.exe" dumpChromeCache
Imagebase:	0x7ff60e5a0000
File size:	9'222'221 bytes
MD5 hash:	28103F745F58A2AF71D327012846C022
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Yara matches:	Rule: JoeSecurity_babuk, Description: Yara detected Babuk Ransomware, Source: 00000000.00000002.914397519.00007FF60E9AA000.00000002.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: JoeSecurity_babuk, Description: Yara detected Babuk Ransomware, Source: 00000000.00000000.912235057.00007FF60E9AA000.00000002.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmp, Author: Joe Security
Reputation:	low
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Target ID:	1
Start time:	02:48:39
Start date:	22/04/2025
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Imagebase:	0x7ff642da0000
File size:	862'208 bytes
MD5 hash:	0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Function 00007FF60E5A13F0 Relevance: .0, Instructions: 4COMMON

Download Yara Rule

Memory Dump Source

Source File: 00000000.00000002.914098105.00007FF60E5A1000.00000020.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmp, Offset: 00007FF60E5A0000, based on PE: true

Associated: 00000000.00000002.914084643.00007FF60E5A0000.00000002.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.914365959.00007FF60E9A4000.00000008.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.914384314.00007FF60E9A7000.00000004.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.914397519.00007FF60E9AA000.00000002.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.914397519.00007FF60EA76000.00000002.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.914496077.00007FF60EAC8000.00000004.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.914496077.00007FF60EB0C000.00000004.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.914541915.00007FF60EB11000.00000008.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.914555220.00007FF60EB12000.00000002.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File

Joe Sandbox IDA Plugin

Snapshot File: hcaresult_0_2_7ff60e5a0000_FpDGxxu5mz.jbxd

Yara matches

Similarity

API ID:
String ID:
API String ID:
Opcode ID: 62029f7336a4ffebe64bb295d99f96a3d4e7c5830f5f8ef33d88c4184fc1ddb1
Instruction ID: 12eabab110daa05b0d573af01e1ff9ce3a1ee1c62950bda1a5f55a8a31a29166
Opcode Fuzzy Hash: 62029f7336a4ffebe64bb295d99f96a3d4e7c5830f5f8ef33d88c4184fc1ddb1
Instruction Fuzzy Hash: 40B01269A0961588E3013F05D8413182760AF28781FA04431E40C43351CF3C54008720

Source: FpDGxxu5mz.exe, 00000000.00000000.912235057.00007FF60E9AA000.00000002.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: Do not interrupt the encryption process, don't stop or reboot your machines until the encryption is complete. Otherwise the data may be corrupted.In addition to the encrypted infrastructure, we have downloaded a lot of confidential information from your systems. The publication of these documents may cause the termination of your commercial activities, contracts with your clients and partners, and multiple lawsuits.If you ignore this warning and do not contact us, your sensitive data will be posted on our blog: https://cactusbloguuodvqjmnzlwetjlpj6aggc6iocwhuupb47laukux7ckid.onion/In your best interest is to avoid contacting law enforcement and data recovery companies. They can't help you with the recovery, will cause more problems and expenses, and delay the return to normal work significantly.Besides, if you contact the police we will immediately publish your data.We offer the best solution to the problem, to receive our decryption software and prevent disclosure of your sensitive information contact us directly.A quick recovery is very important to keep your business running at full capacity and minimize losses. This is why you need to begin negotiations as soon as possible. By the way, if you don't contact us within 5 days, we will start publishing your data.
Source: FpDGxxu5mz.exe	String found in binary or memory: Do not interrupt the encryption process, don't stop or reboot your machines until the encryption is complete. Otherwise the data may be corrupted.In addition to the encrypted infrastructure, we have downloaded a lot of confidential information from your systems. The publication of these documents may cause the termination of your commercial activities, contracts with your clients and partners, and multiple lawsuits.If you ignore this warning and do not contact us, your sensitive data will be posted on our blog: https://cactusbloguuodvqjmnzlwetjlpj6aggc6iocwhuupb47laukux7ckid.onion/In your best interest is to avoid contacting law enforcement and data recovery companies. They can't help you with the recovery, will cause more problems and expenses, and delay the return to normal work significantly.Besides, if you contact the police we will immediately publish your data.We offer the best solution to the problem, to receive our decryption software and prevent disclosure of your sensitive information contact us directly.A quick recovery is very important to keep your business running at full capacity and minimize losses. This is why you need to begin negotiations as soon as possible. By the way, if you don't contact us within 5 days, we will start publishing your data.

Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.FpDGxxu5mz.exe.7ff60e5a0000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.0.FpDGxxu5mz.exe.7ff60e5a0000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.914397519.00007FF60E9AA000.00000002.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000000.912235057.00007FF60E9AA000.00000002.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: FpDGxxu5mz.exe PID: 7156, type: MEMORYSTR

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FpDGxxu5mz.exe	Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\fw5h-2ulg-0tgo-fai2cAcTuS
Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe	Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Local\SM0:2352:120:WilError_03

Source: FpDGxxu5mz.exe	String found in binary or memory: id-cmc-addExtensions
Source: FpDGxxu5mz.exe	String found in binary or memory: set-addPolicy

Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FpDGxxu5mz.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\FpDGxxu5mz.exe" dumpChromeCache
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FpDGxxu5mz.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FpDGxxu5mz.exe	Section loaded: rstrtmgr.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FpDGxxu5mz.exe	Section loaded: wsock32.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FpDGxxu5mz.exe	Section loaded: ncrypt.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FpDGxxu5mz.exe	Section loaded: ntasn1.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FpDGxxu5mz.exe	Section loaded: cryptbase.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FpDGxxu5mz.exe	Section loaded: ntmarta.dll	Jump to behavior

Source: FpDGxxu5mz.exe	Static PE information: section name: .xdata
Source: FpDGxxu5mz.exe	Static PE information: section name: /4
Source: FpDGxxu5mz.exe	Static PE information: section name: /19
Source: FpDGxxu5mz.exe	Static PE information: section name: /31
Source: FpDGxxu5mz.exe	Static PE information: section name: /45
Source: FpDGxxu5mz.exe	Static PE information: section name: /57
Source: FpDGxxu5mz.exe	Static PE information: section name: /70
Source: FpDGxxu5mz.exe	Static PE information: section name: /81
Source: FpDGxxu5mz.exe	Static PE information: section name: /97
Source: FpDGxxu5mz.exe	Static PE information: section name: /113

Description:	Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters to execute commands, scripts, or binaries. These interfaces and languages provide ways of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many different platforms. Most systems come with some built-in command-line interface and scripting capabilities, for example, macOS and Linux distributions include some flavor of Unix Shell while Windows installations include the Windows Command Shell and PowerShell .
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Module: Module Load, Process: Process Creation, Process: Process Metadata, Script: Script Execution
Platforms:	Azure AD, Google Workspace, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network, Office 365, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use bootkits to persist on systems. Bootkits reside at a layer below the operating system and may make it difficult to perform full remediation unless an organization suspects one was used and can act accordingly.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Persistence
Data Sources:	Drive: Drive Modification
Platforms:	Linux, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by side-loading DLLs. Similar to DLL Search Order Hijacking , side-loading involves hijacking which DLL a program loads. But rather than just planting the DLL within the search order of a program then waiting for the victim application to be invoked, adversaries may directly side-load their payloads by planting then invoking a legitimate application that executes their payload(s).
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File: File Creation, File: File Modification, Module: Module Load, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File: File Metadata, File: File Modification, Module: Module Load, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Access, Process: Process Metadata, Process: Process Modification
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may delete files left behind by the actions of their intrusion activity. Malware, tools, or other non-native files dropped or created on a system by an adversary (ex: Ingress Tool Transfer ) may leave traces to indicate to what was done within a network and how. Removal of these files can occur during an intrusion, or as part of a post-intrusion process to minimize the adversary's footprint.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, File: File Deletion
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use a connection proxy to direct network traffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network communications to a command and control server to avoid direct connections to their infrastructure. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including HTRAN , ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. Adversaries use these types of proxies to manage command and control communications, reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between victims to avoid suspicion. Adversaries may chain together multiple proxies to further disguise the source of malicious traffic.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

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Warning!

Windows Analysis Report FpDGxxu5mz.exe

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Process Tree

Malware Threat Intel

Malware Configuration

Yara Signatures

Memory Dumps

Unpacked PEs

Sigma Signatures

Suricata Signatures

Joe Sandbox Signatures

AV Detection

Compliance

Networking

Spam, unwanted Advertisements and Ransom Demands

System Summary

Data Obfuscation

Persistence and Installation Behavior

Malware Analysis System Evasion

Anti Debugging

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

URLs from Memory and Binaries

World Map of Contacted IPs

General Information

Warnings

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASNs

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint Preview

Data Directories

Sections

Resources

Imports

Network Behavior

Statistics

CPU Usage

Memory Usage

Behavior

System Behavior

Analysis Process: FpDGxxu5mz.exePID: 7156, Parent PID: 4088

General

File Activities

File Opened

File Created

File Attributes Queried

Volume Information Queried

Device IO

Windows Analysis Report
FpDGxxu5mz.exe