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Windows
Analysis Report
Fi3ptS6O8D.exe
Overview
General Information
Sample name: | Fi3ptS6O8D.exerenamed because original name is a hash value |
Original sample name: | 5d64b7ceda882bda0e8c8384f2edb0668d84b6ddd79ca5d75ca280f761a7cbde.exe |
Analysis ID: | 1583668 |
MD5: | 37083b063fb068c71cc025f842d985a1 |
SHA1: | 47480faa3a194905f0d5ccd8e0dbe7f50e1884b8 |
SHA256: | 5d64b7ceda882bda0e8c8384f2edb0668d84b6ddd79ca5d75ca280f761a7cbde |
Tags: | Amadeyexeuser-zhuzhu0009 |
Infos: | |
Detection
Amadey
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Whitelisted: | false |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample
Antivirus detection for URL or domain
Detected unpacking (changes PE section rights)
Found malware configuration
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
Yara detected Amadey
Yara detected Amadeys stealer DLL
AI detected suspicious sample
C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration
Creates an undocumented autostart registry key
Found evasive API chain (may stop execution after reading information in the PEB, e.g. number of processors)
Found pyInstaller with non standard icon
Hides threads from debuggers
Machine Learning detection for sample
PE file contains section with special chars
Sample uses string decryption to hide its real strings
Tries to detect process monitoring tools (Task Manager, Process Explorer etc.)
Tries to detect sandboxes / dynamic malware analysis system (registry check)
Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (window names)
Tries to detect virtualization through RDTSC time measurements
Tries to evade debugger and weak emulator (self modifying code)
AV process strings found (often used to terminate AV products)
Binary contains a suspicious time stamp
Checks for debuggers (devices)
Checks if the current process is being debugged
Contains capabilities to detect virtual machines
Contains functionality for execution timing, often used to detect debuggers
Contains functionality to call native functions
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (IsDebuggerPresent)
Contains functionality to dynamically determine API calls
Contains functionality to open a port and listen for incoming connection (possibly a backdoor)
Contains functionality to query CPU information (cpuid)
Contains functionality to read the PEB
Contains functionality which may be used to detect a debugger (GetProcessHeap)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Creates files inside the system directory
Creates job files (autostart)
Detected potential crypto function
Downloads executable code via HTTP
Dropped file seen in connection with other malware
Drops PE files
Drops files with a non-matching file extension (content does not match file extension)
Enables debug privileges
Entry point lies outside standard sections
Extensive use of GetProcAddress (often used to hide API calls)
Found dropped PE file which has not been started or loaded
Found potential string decryption / allocating functions
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
IP address seen in connection with other malware
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
PE file contains an invalid checksum
PE file contains executable resources (Code or Archives)
PE file contains more sections than normal
PE file contains sections with non-standard names
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Sigma detected: CurrentVersion NT Autorun Keys Modification
Sigma detected: Use Short Name Path in Command Line
Suricata IDS alerts with low severity for network traffic
Uses 32bit PE files
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Uses taskkill to terminate processes
Classification
- System is w10x64
- Fi3ptS6O8D.exe (PID: 644 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\Deskt op\Fi3ptS6 O8D.exe" MD5: 37083B063FB068C71CC025F842D985A1) - skotes.exe (PID: 5536 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\abc3bc 1985\skote s.exe" MD5: 37083B063FB068C71CC025F842D985A1)
- skotes.exe (PID: 5780 cmdline:
C:\Users\u ser\AppDat a\Local\Te mp\abc3bc1 985\skotes .exe MD5: 37083B063FB068C71CC025F842D985A1)
- skotes.exe (PID: 7116 cmdline:
C:\Users\u ser\AppDat a\Local\Te mp\abc3bc1 985\skotes .exe MD5: 37083B063FB068C71CC025F842D985A1) - rsn.exe (PID: 5156 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\102919 3001\rsn.e xe" MD5: 26F7294CA7A10C65B44057525A233636) - rsn.exe (PID: 6628 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\102919 3001\rsn.e xe" MD5: 26F7294CA7A10C65B44057525A233636) - cmd.exe (PID: 6740 cmdline:
cmd.exe /c taskkill. exe /F /IM "nvidia.e xe" MD5: D0FCE3AFA6AA1D58CE9FA336CC2B675B) - conhost.exe (PID: 3500 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - taskkill.exe (PID: 5672 cmdline:
taskkill.e xe /F /IM "nvidia.ex e" MD5: CA313FD7E6C2A778FFD21CFB5C1C56CD) - cmd.exe (PID: 6024 cmdline:
cmd.exe /c taskkill. exe /F /IM "svdhost. exe" MD5: D0FCE3AFA6AA1D58CE9FA336CC2B675B) - conhost.exe (PID: 5884 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - taskkill.exe (PID: 7120 cmdline:
taskkill.e xe /F /IM "svdhost.e xe" MD5: CA313FD7E6C2A778FFD21CFB5C1C56CD) - cmd.exe (PID: 1212 cmdline:
cmd.exe /c taskkill. exe /F /IM "csrr.exe " MD5: D0FCE3AFA6AA1D58CE9FA336CC2B675B) - conhost.exe (PID: 7024 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - taskkill.exe (PID: 1548 cmdline:
taskkill.e xe /F /IM "csrr.exe" MD5: CA313FD7E6C2A778FFD21CFB5C1C56CD) - cmd.exe (PID: 5892 cmdline:
cmd.exe /c taskkill. exe /F /IM "mnn.exe" MD5: D0FCE3AFA6AA1D58CE9FA336CC2B675B) - conhost.exe (PID: 5984 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - taskkill.exe (PID: 1424 cmdline:
taskkill.e xe /F /IM "mnn.exe" MD5: CA313FD7E6C2A778FFD21CFB5C1C56CD) - cmd.exe (PID: 1340 cmdline:
cmd.exe /c taskkill. exe /F /IM "mme.exe" MD5: D0FCE3AFA6AA1D58CE9FA336CC2B675B) - conhost.exe (PID: 5348 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - taskkill.exe (PID: 4540 cmdline:
taskkill.e xe /F /IM "mme.exe" MD5: CA313FD7E6C2A778FFD21CFB5C1C56CD) - cmd.exe (PID: 7080 cmdline:
cmd.exe /c taskkill. exe /F /IM "nnu.exe" MD5: D0FCE3AFA6AA1D58CE9FA336CC2B675B) - conhost.exe (PID: 940 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - taskkill.exe (PID: 5764 cmdline:
taskkill.e xe /F /IM "nnu.exe" MD5: CA313FD7E6C2A778FFD21CFB5C1C56CD) - cmd.exe (PID: 6128 cmdline:
cmd.exe /c taskkill. exe /F /IM "lss.exe" MD5: D0FCE3AFA6AA1D58CE9FA336CC2B675B) - conhost.exe (PID: 5176 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - taskkill.exe (PID: 4156 cmdline:
taskkill.e xe /F /IM "lss.exe" MD5: CA313FD7E6C2A778FFD21CFB5C1C56CD) - cmd.exe (PID: 4876 cmdline:
cmd.exe /c taskkill. exe /F /IM "onn.exe" MD5: D0FCE3AFA6AA1D58CE9FA336CC2B675B) - conhost.exe (PID: 728 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - taskkill.exe (PID: 972 cmdline:
taskkill.e xe /F /IM "onn.exe" MD5: CA313FD7E6C2A778FFD21CFB5C1C56CD) - cmd.exe (PID: 6896 cmdline:
cmd.exe /c taskkill. exe /F /IM "u-eng.ex e" MD5: D0FCE3AFA6AA1D58CE9FA336CC2B675B) - conhost.exe (PID: 5440 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - taskkill.exe (PID: 5552 cmdline:
taskkill.e xe /F /IM "u-eng.exe " MD5: CA313FD7E6C2A778FFD21CFB5C1C56CD) - cmd.exe (PID: 3776 cmdline:
cmd.exe /c copy /y " C:\Users\u ser\AppDat a\Local\Te mp\_MEI51~ 1\mpc\4167 8903251236 549780" "C :\Users\us er\AppData \Local\Tem p\_MEI51~1 \mpc\mpc.e xe" MD5: D0FCE3AFA6AA1D58CE9FA336CC2B675B) - conhost.exe (PID: 6940 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - wfhVWWv.exe (PID: 2784 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\102942 8001\wfhVW Wv.exe" MD5: E8A21B7C1DBF57E585F28C10631647CF)
- cleanup
Name | Description | Attribution | Blogpost URLs | Link |
---|---|---|---|---|
Amadey | Amadey is a botnet that appeared around October 2018 and is being sold for about $500 on Russian-speaking hacking forums. It periodically sends information about the system and installed AV software to its C2 server and polls to receive orders from it. Its main functionality is that it can load other payloads (called "tasks") for all or specifically targeted computers compromised by the malware. | No Attribution |
{"C2 url": "185.215.113.43/Zu7JuNko/index.php", "Version": "4.42", "Install Folder": "abc3bc1985", "Install File": "skotes.exe"}
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_Amadey_2 | Yara detected Amadey\'s stealer DLL | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Amadey_2 | Yara detected Amadey\'s stealer DLL | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Amadey_2 | Yara detected Amadey\'s stealer DLL | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Amadey_2 | Yara detected Amadey\'s stealer DLL | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Amadey_4 | Yara detected Amadey | Joe Security |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_Amadey_2 | Yara detected Amadey\'s stealer DLL | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Amadey_2 | Yara detected Amadey\'s stealer DLL | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Amadey_2 | Yara detected Amadey\'s stealer DLL | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Amadey_2 | Yara detected Amadey\'s stealer DLL | Joe Security |
System Summary |
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Source: | Author: Victor Sergeev, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, Gleb Sukhodolskiy, Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community, Tim Shelton, frack113 (split): |
Source: | Author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali: |
Timestamp | SID | Severity | Classtype | Source IP | Source Port | Destination IP | Destination Port | Protocol |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2025-01-03T09:51:47.969855+0100 | 2044696 | 1 | A Network Trojan was detected | 192.168.2.6 | 49973 | 185.215.113.43 | 80 | TCP |
2025-01-03T09:52:01.934651+0100 | 2044696 | 1 | A Network Trojan was detected | 192.168.2.6 | 49976 | 185.215.113.43 | 80 | TCP |
Timestamp | SID | Severity | Classtype | Source IP | Source Port | Destination IP | Destination Port | Protocol |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2025-01-03T09:51:04.782274+0100 | 2856147 | 1 | A Network Trojan was detected | 192.168.2.6 | 49970 | 185.215.113.43 | 80 | TCP |
Timestamp | SID | Severity | Classtype | Source IP | Source Port | Destination IP | Destination Port | Protocol |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2025-01-03T09:51:47.237337+0100 | 2856122 | 1 | A Network Trojan was detected | 185.215.113.43 | 80 | 192.168.2.6 | 49971 | TCP |
Timestamp | SID | Severity | Classtype | Source IP | Source Port | Destination IP | Destination Port | Protocol |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2025-01-03T09:51:48.665384+0100 | 2803305 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.6 | 49974 | 31.41.244.11 | 80 | TCP |
Click to jump to signature section
Show All Signature Results
AV Detection |
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Source: | File opened: | Jump to behavior |
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Source: | Code function: | 8_2_0019753B | |
Source: | Code function: | 8_2_0018E679 |
Source: | File opened: | Jump to behavior | ||
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