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Windows
Analysis Report
EiO4tqZ3o4.exe
Overview
General Information
Sample name: | EiO4tqZ3o4.exerenamed because original name is a hash value |
Original sample name: | 0731d232d0af12a5320238914de6bf4a.exe |
Analysis ID: | 1582052 |
MD5: | 0731d232d0af12a5320238914de6bf4a |
SHA1: | 41b1d57292fa942352373e587a638011893649ab |
SHA256: | adc6b85fbb55624cdd9a25d9634f08d3991ac60dce86c8f3ed520a88e36371fe |
Tags: | AsyncRATexeRATuser-abuse_ch |
Infos: | |
Detection
AsyncRAT
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Whitelisted: | false |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Antivirus detection for URL or domain
Found malware configuration
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
Yara detected AntiVM3
Yara detected AsyncRAT
Yara detected UAC Bypass using CMSTP
.NET source code contains potential unpacker
AI detected suspicious sample
Adds a directory exclusion to Windows Defender
Allocates memory in foreign processes
C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration
Contains functionality to log keystrokes (.Net Source)
Disables UAC (registry)
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Loading BitLocker PowerShell Module
Machine Learning detection for sample
Sigma detected: Powershell Base64 Encoded MpPreference Cmdlet
Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)
Writes to foreign memory regions
Yara detected Generic Downloader
AV process strings found (often used to terminate AV products)
Allocates memory with a write watch (potentially for evading sandboxes)
Checks if Antivirus/Antispyware/Firewall program is installed (via WMI)
Checks if the current process is being debugged
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Detected TCP or UDP traffic on non-standard ports
Detected potential crypto function
Enables debug privileges
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
One or more processes crash
PE file contains executable resources (Code or Archives)
PE file does not import any functions
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info
Sigma detected: Powershell Defender Exclusion
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Yara signature match
Classification
- System is w10x64
- EiO4tqZ3o4.exe (PID: 6836 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\Deskt op\EiO4tqZ 3o4.exe" MD5: 0731D232D0AF12A5320238914DE6BF4A) - powershell.exe (PID: 6168 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" Add-MpPref erence -Ex clusionPat h "C:\User s\user\Des ktop\EiO4t qZ3o4.exe" -Force MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - conhost.exe (PID: 796 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - WmiPrvSE.exe (PID: 2664 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ wbem\wmipr vse.exe -s ecured -Em bedding MD5: 60FF40CFD7FB8FE41EE4FE9AE5FE1C51) - RegSvcs.exe (PID: 5936 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework\v4.0 .30319\reg svcs.exe" MD5: 9D352BC46709F0CB5EC974633A0C3C94) - RegSvcs.exe (PID: 3332 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework\v4.0 .30319\reg svcs.exe" MD5: 9D352BC46709F0CB5EC974633A0C3C94) - WerFault.exe (PID: 3740 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ WerFault.e xe -u -p 6 836 -s 151 2 MD5: FD27D9F6D02763BDE32511B5DF7FF7A0)
- cleanup
Name | Description | Attribution | Blogpost URLs | Link |
---|---|---|---|---|
AsyncRAT | AsyncRAT is a Remote Access Tool (RAT) designed to remotely monitor and control other computers through a secure encrypted connection. It is an open source remote administration tool, however, it could also be used maliciously because it provides functionality such as keylogger, remote desktop control, and many other functions that may cause harm to the victims computer. In addition, AsyncRAT can be delivered via various methods such as spear-phishing, malvertising, exploit kit and other techniques. | No Attribution |
{"Server": "5sdf23d2sdf.ddnss.eu", "Port": "6606,7707,8808", "Version": "AWS | RxR ", "MutexName": "AsyncMutex_6SI8OkPnk", "Autorun": "false", "Group": "false"}
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
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JoeSecurity_UACBypassusingCMSTP | Yara detected UAC Bypass using CMSTP | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_AsyncRAT | Yara detected AsyncRAT | Joe Security | ||
INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_ASEP_REG_Reverse | Detects file containing reversed ASEP Autorun registry keys | ditekSHen |
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JoeSecurity_AsyncRAT | Yara detected AsyncRAT | Joe Security | ||
Windows_Trojan_Asyncrat_11a11ba1 | unknown | unknown |
| |
Click to see the 8 entries |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_AsyncRAT | Yara detected AsyncRAT | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_GenericDownloader_1 | Yara detected Generic Downloader | Joe Security | ||
Windows_Trojan_Asyncrat_11a11ba1 | unknown | unknown |
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rat_win_asyncrat | Detect AsyncRAT based on specific strings | Sekoia.io |
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JoeSecurity_AsyncRAT | Yara detected AsyncRAT | Joe Security | ||
Click to see the 18 entries |
System Summary |
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Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems): |
Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems): |
Source: | Author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g (rule), oscd.community (improvements): |
Timestamp | SID | Severity | Classtype | Source IP | Source Port | Destination IP | Destination Port | Protocol |
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2024-12-29T19:02:07.277772+0100 | 2035595 | 1 | Domain Observed Used for C2 Detected | 108.174.194.58 | 7707 | 192.168.2.4 | 49733 | TCP |
Timestamp | SID | Severity | Classtype | Source IP | Source Port | Destination IP | Destination Port | Protocol |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2024-12-29T19:02:07.277772+0100 | 2035607 | 1 | Domain Observed Used for C2 Detected | 108.174.194.58 | 7707 | 192.168.2.4 | 49733 | TCP |
Timestamp | SID | Severity | Classtype | Source IP | Source Port | Destination IP | Destination Port | Protocol |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2024-12-29T19:02:07.277772+0100 | 2842478 | 1 | Malware Command and Control Activity Detected | 108.174.194.58 | 7707 | 192.168.2.4 | 49733 | TCP |
Click to jump to signature section
Show All Signature Results
AV Detection |
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Source: | Virustotal: | Perma Link |
Source: | Integrated Neural Analysis Model: |
Source: | Joe Sandbox ML: |
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Key, Mouse, Clipboard, Microphone and Screen Capturing |
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System Summary |
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Source: | Code function: | 0_2_00007FFD9B800C48 | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_00007FFD9B803988 | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_00007FFD9B813F67 | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_00007FFD9B80AEA9 | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_00007FFD9B80DEC7 | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_00007FFD9B808650 | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_00007FFD9B80B47D | |
Source: | Code function: | 3_2_00E67038 | |
Source: | Code function: | 3_2_00E67908 | |
Source: | Code function: | 3_2_00E6D1F0 | |
Source: | Code function: | 3_2_00E66CF0 |
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