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Windows Analysis Report
OTRykEzo6o.exe

Overview

General Information

Sample name:	OTRykEzo6o.exe renamed because original name is a hash value
Original sample name:	2dc4dc33dde889c46cde552a1d3647be.exe
Analysis ID:	1581385
MD5:	2dc4dc33dde889c46cde552a1d3647be
SHA1:	a1b8e5889a9726232e68574b890aae6c228cc418
SHA256:	dcadbac2c5d356b2a7ee58c091642c767a8d9a4d35dadeaa1ca924ef140c596a
Tags:	exeuser-abuse_ch
Infos:

Detection

Score:	56
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

AI detected suspicious sample

Machine Learning detection for sample

Allocates memory with a write watch (potentially for evading sandboxes)

Contains functionality to call native functions

Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)

Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)

Enables debug privileges

May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis

PE file does not import any functions

Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device

Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)

Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info

Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)

Uses reg.exe to modify the Windows registry

Classification

Process Tree

System is w10x64

OTRykEzo6o.exe (PID: 1916 cmdline: "C:\Users\user\Desktop\OTRykEzo6o.exe" MD5: 2DC4DC33DDE889C46CDE552A1D3647BE)

cmd.exe (PID: 936 cmdline: "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /c sc delete "WinSvcs" & reg delete "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\WinSvcs" /f MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE)

conhost.exe (PID: 6536 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D)

sc.exe (PID: 5908 cmdline: sc delete "WinSvcs" MD5: 3FB5CF71F7E7EB49790CB0E663434D80)

reg.exe (PID: 2268 cmdline: reg delete "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\WinSvcs" /f MD5: 227F63E1D9008B36BDBCC4B397780BE4)

cleanup

Malware Configuration

⊘No configs have been found

Yara Signatures

⊘No yara matches

Sigma Signatures

⊘No Sigma rule has matched

Suricata Signatures

⊘No Suricata rule has matched

Joe Sandbox Signatures

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Source: OTRykEzo6o.exe

ReversingLabs: Detection: 34%

AI detected suspicious sample

Source: Submited Sample

Integrated Neural Analysis Model: Matched 99.3% probability

Machine Learning detection for sample

Source: OTRykEzo6o.exe

Joe Sandbox ML: detected

Source: OTRykEzo6o.exe

Static PE information: DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT, NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OTRykEzo6o.exe

Code function: 0_2_00007FFD348B0FD9 NtQuerySystemInformation,

0_2_00007FFD348B0FD9

Source: OTRykEzo6o.exe

Static PE information: No import functions for PE file found

Source: OTRykEzo6o.exe, 00000000.00000000.2123630795.0000000000262000.00000002.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamenew-uninstaller.exe4 vs OTRykEzo6o.exe
Source: OTRykEzo6o.exe	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamenew-uninstaller.exe4 vs OTRykEzo6o.exe

Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe

Process created: C:\Windows\System32\reg.exe reg delete "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\WinSvcs" /f

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal56.winEXE@8/1@0/0

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OTRykEzo6o.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\OTRykEzo6o.exe.log

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OTRykEzo6o.exe	Mutant created: NULL
Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe	Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Local\SM0:6536:120:WilError_03

Source: OTRykEzo6o.exe

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OTRykEzo6o.exe

File read: C:\Users\user\Desktop\desktop.ini

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OTRykEzo6o.exe

Key opened: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Jump to behavior

Source: OTRykEzo6o.exe

ReversingLabs: Detection: 34%

Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OTRykEzo6o.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\OTRykEzo6o.exe"
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OTRykEzo6o.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /c sc delete "WinSvcs" & reg delete "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\WinSvcs" /f
Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\sc.exe sc delete "WinSvcs"
Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\reg.exe reg delete "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\WinSvcs" /f
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OTRykEzo6o.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /c sc delete "WinSvcs" & reg delete "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\WinSvcs" /f	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\sc.exe sc delete "WinSvcs"	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\reg.exe reg delete "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\WinSvcs" /f	Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OTRykEzo6o.exe	Section loaded: mscoree.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OTRykEzo6o.exe	Section loaded: apphelp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OTRykEzo6o.exe	Section loaded: kernel.appcore.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OTRykEzo6o.exe	Section loaded: version.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OTRykEzo6o.exe	Section loaded: vcruntime140_clr0400.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OTRykEzo6o.exe	Section loaded: ucrtbase_clr0400.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OTRykEzo6o.exe	Section loaded: uxtheme.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OTRykEzo6o.exe	Section loaded: windows.storage.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OTRykEzo6o.exe	Section loaded: wldp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OTRykEzo6o.exe	Section loaded: propsys.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OTRykEzo6o.exe	Section loaded: profapi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OTRykEzo6o.exe	Section loaded: edputil.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OTRykEzo6o.exe	Section loaded: urlmon.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OTRykEzo6o.exe	Section loaded: iertutil.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OTRykEzo6o.exe	Section loaded: srvcli.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OTRykEzo6o.exe	Section loaded: netutils.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OTRykEzo6o.exe	Section loaded: windows.staterepositoryps.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OTRykEzo6o.exe	Section loaded: sspicli.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OTRykEzo6o.exe	Section loaded: wintypes.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OTRykEzo6o.exe	Section loaded: appresolver.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OTRykEzo6o.exe	Section loaded: bcp47langs.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OTRykEzo6o.exe	Section loaded: slc.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OTRykEzo6o.exe	Section loaded: userenv.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OTRykEzo6o.exe	Section loaded: sppc.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OTRykEzo6o.exe	Section loaded: onecorecommonproxystub.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OTRykEzo6o.exe	Section loaded: onecoreuapcommonproxystub.dll	Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OTRykEzo6o.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{5E5F29CE-E0A8-49D3-AF32-7A7BDC173478}\InProcServer32

Jump to behavior

Source: OTRykEzo6o.exe

Static PE information: data directory type: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR

Source: OTRykEzo6o.exe

Static PE information: Image base 0x140000000 > 0x60000000

Source: OTRykEzo6o.exe

Static PE information: DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT, NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OTRykEzo6o.exe

Code function: 0_2_00007FFD348B00BD pushad ; iretd

0_2_00007FFD348B00C1

Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe

Process created: C:\Windows\System32\sc.exe sc delete "WinSvcs"

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OTRykEzo6o.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OTRykEzo6o.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OTRykEzo6o.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OTRykEzo6o.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OTRykEzo6o.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OTRykEzo6o.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OTRykEzo6o.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OTRykEzo6o.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OTRykEzo6o.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OTRykEzo6o.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OTRykEzo6o.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OTRykEzo6o.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OTRykEzo6o.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OTRykEzo6o.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OTRykEzo6o.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OTRykEzo6o.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OTRykEzo6o.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OTRykEzo6o.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OTRykEzo6o.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OTRykEzo6o.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OTRykEzo6o.exe	Memory allocated: A90000 memory reserve \| memory write watch			Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OTRykEzo6o.exe	Memory allocated: 1B280000 memory reserve \| memory write watch			Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OTRykEzo6o.exe

Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OTRykEzo6o.exe TID: 3428

Thread sleep time: -922337203685477s >= -30000s

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe

Last function: Thread delayed

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OTRykEzo6o.exe

Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OTRykEzo6o.exe

Process information queried: ProcessInformation

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OTRykEzo6o.exe

Process token adjusted: Debug

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OTRykEzo6o.exe

Memory allocated: page read and write | page guard

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OTRykEzo6o.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /c sc delete "WinSvcs" & reg delete "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\WinSvcs" /f	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\sc.exe sc delete "WinSvcs"	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\reg.exe reg delete "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\WinSvcs" /f	Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OTRykEzo6o.exe

Queries volume information: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OTRykEzo6o.exe VolumeInformation

Jump to behavior

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Reconnaissance	Resource Development	Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Command and Control	Exfiltration	Impact
Gather Victim Identity Information	Acquire Infrastructure	Valid Accounts	1 Service Execution	1 Windows Service	1 Windows Service	1 Masquerading	OS Credential Dumping	1 Process Discovery	Remote Services	Data from Local System	Data Obfuscation	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Abuse Accessibility Features
Credentials	Domains	Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	1 DLL Side-Loading	11 Process Injection	1 Modify Registry	LSASS Memory	31 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	Junk Data	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Network Denial of Service
Email Addresses	DNS Server	Domain Accounts	At	Logon Script (Windows)	1 DLL Side-Loading	1 Disable or Modify Tools	Security Account Manager	1 File and Directory Discovery	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	Steganography	Automated Exfiltration	Data Encrypted for Impact
Employee Names	Virtual Private Server	Local Accounts	Cron	Login Hook	Login Hook	31 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	NTDS	11 System Information Discovery	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Protocol Impersonation	Traffic Duplication	Data Destruction
Gather Victim Network Information	Server	Cloud Accounts	Launchd	Network Logon Script	Network Logon Script	11 Process Injection	LSA Secrets	Internet Connection Discovery	SSH	Keylogging	Fallback Channels	Scheduled Transfer	Data Encrypted for Impact
Domain Properties	Botnet	Replication Through Removable Media	Scheduled Task	RC Scripts	RC Scripts	1 DLL Side-Loading	Cached Domain Credentials	Wi-Fi Discovery	VNC	GUI Input Capture	Multiband Communication	Data Transfer Size Limits	Service Stop
DNS	Web Services	External Remote Services	Systemd Timers	Startup Items	Startup Items	1 Obfuscated Files or Information	DCSync	Remote System Discovery	Windows Remote Management	Web Portal Capture	Commonly Used Port	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	Inhibit System Recovery

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Screenshots

Thumbnails

This section contains all screenshots as thumbnails, including those not shown in the slideshow.

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
OTRykEzo6o.exe	34%	ReversingLabs	ByteCode-MSIL.Trojan.Jalapeno
OTRykEzo6o.exe	100%	Joe Sandbox ML

Dropped Files

⊘No Antivirus matches

Unpacked PE Files

⊘No Antivirus matches

Domains

⊘No Antivirus matches

URLs

⊘No Antivirus matches

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Name	IP	Active	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
s-part-0035.t-0009.t-msedge.net	13.107.246.63	true	false		high
fp2e7a.wpc.phicdn.net	192.229.221.95	true	false		high

World Map of Contacted IPs

⊘No contacted IP infos

General Information

Joe Sandbox version:	41.0.0 Charoite
Analysis ID:	1581385
Start date and time:	2024-12-27 14:50:09 +01:00
Joe Sandbox product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 2m 9s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	full
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 x64 22H2 with Office Professional Plus 2019, Chrome 117, Firefox 118, Adobe Reader DC 23, Java 8 Update 381, 7zip 23.01
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	6
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Sample name:	OTRykEzo6o.exe renamed because original name is a hash value
Original Sample Name:	2dc4dc33dde889c46cde552a1d3647be.exe
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal56.winEXE@8/1@0/0
EGA Information:	Successful, ratio: 100%
HCA Information:	Successful, ratio: 100% Number of executed functions: 7 Number of non-executed functions: 0
Cookbook Comments:	Found application associated with file extension: .exe Stop behavior analysis, all processes terminated

Warnings

Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): dllhost.exe
Excluded IPs from analysis (whitelisted): 20.42.73.29, 13.107.246.63
Excluded domains from analysis (whitelisted): client.wns.windows.com, ocsp.digicert.com, otelrules.azureedge.net, otelrules.afd.azureedge.net, ocsp.edge.digicert.com, ctldl.windowsupdate.com, azureedge-t-prod.trafficmanager.net, umwatson.events.data.microsoft.com
Not all processes where analyzed, report is missing behavior information
Report size getting too big, too many NtOpenKeyEx calls found.
Report size getting too big, too many NtQueryValueKey calls found.
VT rate limit hit for: OTRykEzo6o.exe

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

⊘No simulations

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

⊘No context

Domains

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Threat Name	Link	Context
s-part-0035.t-0009.t-msedge.net	wceaux.dll.dll	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	13.107.246.63
	wp.bat	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	13.107.246.63
	https://online-ops.mypasschange.com/landingPage/2/fbb0559ebe1911efb53c0242ac190102	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	13.107.246.63
	RDb082EApV.exe	Get hash	malicious	LummaC	Browse	13.107.246.63
	GnHq2ZaBUl.exe	Get hash	malicious	LummaC	Browse	13.107.246.63
	EwhnoHx0n5.exe	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	13.107.246.63
	onaUtwpiyq.exe	Get hash	malicious	LummaC	Browse	13.107.246.63
	CAo57G5Cio.exe	Get hash	malicious	LummaC	Browse	13.107.246.63
	wJtkC63Spw.exe	Get hash	malicious	LummaC	Browse	13.107.246.63
	qZA8AyGxiA.exe	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	13.107.246.63
fp2e7a.wpc.phicdn.net	ctfmon.exe	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	192.229.221.95
	wce.exe	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	192.229.221.95
	atw3.dll	Get hash	malicious	Gozi, Ursnif	Browse	192.229.221.95
	setup.msi	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	192.229.221.95
	ERTL09tA59.exe	Get hash	malicious	LummaC	Browse	192.229.221.95
	vJPhYDClT5.exe	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	192.229.221.95
	V2s8yjvIJw.exe	Get hash	malicious	Iris Stealer	Browse	192.229.221.95
	k6olCJyvIj.exe	Get hash	malicious	LummaC	Browse	192.229.221.95
	G6xnfES308.exe	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	192.229.221.95
	XM6cn2uNux.exe	Get hash	malicious	LummaC	Browse	192.229.221.95

ASNs

⊘No context

JA3 Fingerprints

⊘No context

Dropped Files

⊘No context

Created / dropped Files

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\OTRykEzo6o.exe.log

Download File

Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\OTRykEzo6o.exe
File Type:	CSV text
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	425
Entropy (8bit):	5.357964438493834
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	12:Q3La/KDLI4MWuPXcp1OKbbDLI4MWuPOKfSSI6Khav:ML9E4KQwKDE4KGKZI6Khk
MD5:	D8F8A79B5C09FCB6F44E8CFFF11BF7CA
SHA1:	669AFE705130C81BFEFECD7CC216E6E10E72CB81
SHA-256:	91B010B5C9F022F3449F161425F757B276021F63B024E8D8ED05476509A6D406
SHA-512:	C95CB5FC32843F555EFA7CCA5758B115ACFA365A6EEB3333633A61CA50A90FEFAB9B554C3776FFFEA860FEF4BF47A6103AFECF3654C780287158E2DBB8137767
Malicious:	true
Reputation:	moderate, very likely benign file
Preview:	1,"fusion","GAC",0..1,"WinRT","NotApp",1..3,"System, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_64\System\b187b7f31cee3e87b56c8edca55324e0\System.ni.dll",0..3,"System.Core, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_64\System.Core\31326613607f69254f3284ec964796c8\System.Core.ni.dll",0..

Static File Info

General

File type:	PE32+ executable (GUI) x86-64 Mono/.Net assembly, for MS Windows
Entropy (8bit):	4.940309328516339
TrID:	Win64 Executable GUI (202006/5) 91.78% Win64 Executable (generic) (12005/4) 5.45% Win16/32 Executable Delphi generic (2074/23) 0.94% Generic Win/DOS Executable (2004/3) 0.91% DOS Executable Generic (2002/1) 0.91%
File name:	OTRykEzo6o.exe
File size:	8'704 bytes
MD5:	2dc4dc33dde889c46cde552a1d3647be
SHA1:	a1b8e5889a9726232e68574b890aae6c228cc418
SHA256:	dcadbac2c5d356b2a7ee58c091642c767a8d9a4d35dadeaa1ca924ef140c596a
SHA512:	ad539d8271d6455294b438a67e29f021a81d2a450f0cf4b133abf846549391a23cb5137555d7ca9fac307bafa959a51cf7485e1a95b53e9f7a158915e4d30326
SSDEEP:	192:4UPhFusW6uvpQjY8Fb8p9/ijG/D9Hy5jKh+:rhEVpQZFop96IlyxKh+
TLSH:	9302E854F7EC8265E67F0F3829F2132647B0F6524627C7DF49C4918A1E25781CBA27E1
File Content Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$.......PE..d....<lg.........."...................... .....@..... .......................`............@...@......@............... .....

File Icon


Icon Hash:	00928e8e8686b000

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint:	0x140000000
Entrypoint Section:
Digitally signed:	false
Imagebase:	0x140000000
Subsystem:	windows gui
Image File Characteristics:	EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LARGE_ADDRESS_AWARE
DLL Characteristics:	DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT, NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE
Time Stamp:	0x676C3CE0 [Wed Dec 25 17:12:00 2024 UTC]
TLS Callbacks:
CLR (.Net) Version:
OS Version Major:	4
OS Version Minor:	0
File Version Major:	4
File Version Minor:	0
Subsystem Version Major:	4
Subsystem Version Minor:	0
Import Hash:

Entrypoint Preview

Instruction
dec ebp
pop edx
nop
add byte ptr [ebx], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax+eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al

Data Directories

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Is in Section
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE	0x4000	0x498	.rsrc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BOUND_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR	0x2000	0x48	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESERVED	0x0	0x0

Sections

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	MD5	Xored PE	ZLIB Complexity	File Type	Entropy	Characteristics
.text	0x2000	0x1834	0x1a00	d168ef3c13b8c5cd585761d586e7063b	False	0.5359074519230769	data	5.312819529419805	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.rsrc	0x4000	0x498	0x600	d6d6de5465f2984d4eca4dcac3e54a0c	False	0.3548177083333333	data	3.400374757497896	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Resources

Name	RVA	Size	Type	Language	Country	ZLIB Complexity
RT_VERSION	0x40a0	0x264	data			0.45098039215686275
RT_MANIFEST	0x4308	0x18d	XML 1.0 document, Unicode text, UTF-8 (with BOM) text			0.5818639798488665

Network Behavior

DNS Answers

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	Reply Code	Name	CName	Address	Type	Class	DNS over HTTPS
Dec 27, 2024 14:51:01.828541040 CET	1.1.1.1	192.168.2.6	0xb140	No error (0)	fp2e7a.wpc.2be4.phicdn.net	fp2e7a.wpc.phicdn.net		CNAME (Canonical name)	IN (0x0001)	false
Dec 27, 2024 14:51:01.828541040 CET	1.1.1.1	192.168.2.6	0xb140	No error (0)	fp2e7a.wpc.phicdn.net		192.229.221.95	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)	false
Dec 27, 2024 14:51:15.631614923 CET	1.1.1.1	192.168.2.6	0x4227	No error (0)	shed.dual-low.s-part-0035.t-0009.t-msedge.net	s-part-0035.t-0009.t-msedge.net		CNAME (Canonical name)	IN (0x0001)	false
Dec 27, 2024 14:51:15.631614923 CET	1.1.1.1	192.168.2.6	0x4227	No error (0)	s-part-0035.t-0009.t-msedge.net		13.107.246.63	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)	false

Statistics

CPU Usage

Click to jump to process

Memory Usage

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High Level Behavior Distribution

Click to dive into process behavior distribution

Behavior

Click to jump to process

System Behavior

Analysis Process: OTRykEzo6o.exePID: 1916, Parent PID: 4004

General

Target ID:	0
Start time:	08:51:04
Start date:	27/12/2024
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\OTRykEzo6o.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	"C:\Users\user\Desktop\OTRykEzo6o.exe"
Imagebase:	0x260000
File size:	8'704 bytes
MD5 hash:	2DC4DC33DDE889C46CDE552A1D3647BE
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	low
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Chronological Activities

Analysis Process: cmd.exePID: 936, Parent PID: 1916

General

Target ID:	2
Start time:	08:51:05
Start date:	27/12/2024
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	"C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /c sc delete "WinSvcs" & reg delete "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\WinSvcs" /f
Imagebase:	0x7ff67d1c0000
File size:	289'792 bytes
MD5 hash:	8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Chronological Activities

Analysis Process: conhost.exePID: 6536, Parent PID: 936

General

Target ID:	3
Start time:	08:51:05
Start date:	27/12/2024
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Imagebase:	0x7ff66e660000
File size:	862'208 bytes
MD5 hash:	0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Chronological Activities

Analysis Process: sc.exePID: 5908, Parent PID: 936

General

Target ID:	4
Start time:	08:51:05
Start date:	27/12/2024
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\sc.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	sc delete "WinSvcs"
Imagebase:	0x7ff74fcf0000
File size:	72'192 bytes
MD5 hash:	3FB5CF71F7E7EB49790CB0E663434D80
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Chronological Activities

Analysis Process: reg.exePID: 2268, Parent PID: 936

General

Target ID:	5
Start time:	08:51:05
Start date:	27/12/2024
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\reg.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	reg delete "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\WinSvcs" /f
Imagebase:	0x7ff6af880000
File size:	77'312 bytes
MD5 hash:	227F63E1D9008B36BDBCC4B397780BE4
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	moderate
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Chronological Activities

Disassembly

Reset < >

Analysis Process: OTRykEzo6o.exePID: 1916, Parent PID: 4004COMMON

Execution Graph

Execution Coverage:	34.2%
Dynamic/Decrypted Code Coverage:	100%
Signature Coverage:	2%
Total number of Nodes:	150
Total number of Limit Nodes:	11

Callgraph

Executed
Not Executed
Opacity -> Relevance
Disassembly available

Executed Functions

Function 00007FFD348B0FD9 Relevance: 1.6, APIs: 1, Instructions: 115
nativeCOMMON

Download Yara Rule

Control-flow Graph

Executed
Not Executed

APIs

NtQuerySystemInformation.NTDLL ref: 00007FFD348B1081

Memory Dump Source

Source File: 00000000.00000002.2166155525.00007FFD348B0000.00000040.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, Offset: 00007FFD348B0000, based on PE: false

Joe Sandbox IDA Plugin

Snapshot File: hcaresult_0_2_7ffd348b0000_OTRykEzo6o.jbxd

Similarity

API ID: InformationQuerySystem
String ID:
API String ID: 3562636166-0
Opcode ID: f135bbb011cfcda9a28dfba27fd9eed64b70ca8323eeda22753b5e21f148210e
Instruction ID: 44919ca7d8936eb15f9951fd942bb49e7600276b285e13564a4708cd2d9be272
Opcode Fuzzy Hash: f135bbb011cfcda9a28dfba27fd9eed64b70ca8323eeda22753b5e21f148210e
Instruction Fuzzy Hash: 2F31C131A0CB4C4FDB19DB9C98596E9BBF1EB66311F04426FD049D3292DB64A816CB81

Function 00007FFD348B06F8 Relevance: 9.1, APIs: 1, Strings: 4, Instructions: 376
COMMON

Download Yara Rule

Control-flow Graph

Executed
Not Executed

Strings

M_^, xrefs: 00007FFD348B071A
8[z4, xrefs: 00007FFD348B06F9
3CM_^, xrefs: 00007FFD348B08E6
M_^, xrefs: 00007FFD348B072A

Memory Dump Source

Source File: 00000000.00000002.2166155525.00007FFD348B0000.00000040.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, Offset: 00007FFD348B0000, based on PE: false

Joe Sandbox IDA Plugin

Snapshot File: hcaresult_0_2_7ffd348b0000_OTRykEzo6o.jbxd

Similarity

API ID:
String ID: 8[z4$M_^$M_^$3CM_^
API String ID: 0-2895658832
Opcode ID: 25e81fe6eeb48984488359af2ae7850812aa6065c9c1739abc70908b6f254bc0
Instruction ID: 1ff17432c26510c6a0b79b31af18e74b98e0e6b9418251371372a3ff9ed8593e
Opcode Fuzzy Hash: 25e81fe6eeb48984488359af2ae7850812aa6065c9c1739abc70908b6f254bc0
Instruction Fuzzy Hash: 0B916B71F0DA855FE759AB68886A6B87BE1FF53310F0442BED449C32D3DE68A805C781

Function 00007FFD348B0630 Relevance: 3.9, APIs: 1, Strings: 1, Instructions: 411
COMMON

Download Yara Rule

Control-flow Graph

Executed
Not Executed

Strings

3CM_^, xrefs: 00007FFD348B08E6

Memory Dump Source

Source File: 00000000.00000002.2166155525.00007FFD348B0000.00000040.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, Offset: 00007FFD348B0000, based on PE: false

Joe Sandbox IDA Plugin

Snapshot File: hcaresult_0_2_7ffd348b0000_OTRykEzo6o.jbxd

Similarity

API ID:
String ID: 3CM_^
API String ID: 0-3911827768
Opcode ID: 1c923517dea9f8c6d531456bc08af4c7b92492bb31de993dd317f2eb41430977
Instruction ID: 706255741e1679e9ecec558acb377f7dbda9af087af9d8ec89f9395593e3b83e
Opcode Fuzzy Hash: 1c923517dea9f8c6d531456bc08af4c7b92492bb31de993dd317f2eb41430977
Instruction Fuzzy Hash: 91B13631A0DA854FE755ABB888696B97BE1FF53310F0841BBD499C72D3CE6CA805C781

Function 00007FFD348B06A5 Relevance: 1.7, APIs: 1, Instructions: 151
COMMON

Download Yara Rule

Control-flow Graph

Executed
Not Executed

Memory Dump Source

Source File: 00000000.00000002.2166155525.00007FFD348B0000.00000040.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, Offset: 00007FFD348B0000, based on PE: false

Joe Sandbox IDA Plugin

Snapshot File: hcaresult_0_2_7ffd348b0000_OTRykEzo6o.jbxd

Similarity

API ID:
String ID:
API String ID:
Opcode ID: 00b025b241a3bc30732452a661fb27ca41319d489c9f7466fd6dd9d7408a702c
Instruction ID: c88ae35ab7f339f61a244430f1b5b33c974f5e9ae8a0eee95a310782137412cf
Opcode Fuzzy Hash: 00b025b241a3bc30732452a661fb27ca41319d489c9f7466fd6dd9d7408a702c
Instruction Fuzzy Hash: 01411531A0CB488FEB189B5C98596F97BE0EF5A311F04427FD449D3292DF78A8468B81

Function 00007FFD348B06B0 Relevance: 1.6, APIs: 1, Instructions: 147
COMMON

Download Yara Rule

Control-flow Graph

Executed
Not Executed

Memory Dump Source

Source File: 00000000.00000002.2166155525.00007FFD348B0000.00000040.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, Offset: 00007FFD348B0000, based on PE: false

Joe Sandbox IDA Plugin

Snapshot File: hcaresult_0_2_7ffd348b0000_OTRykEzo6o.jbxd

Similarity

API ID:
String ID:
API String ID:
Opcode ID: 5f3afb0d1b41232b2f826597ed39ccaab4a0ea04932d74eb7c8a18df4deb8112
Instruction ID: e8fece08b9e602f75fe4dcab3b01f43e1e8a6d47fa0481405cd3d7016fa7b0af
Opcode Fuzzy Hash: 5f3afb0d1b41232b2f826597ed39ccaab4a0ea04932d74eb7c8a18df4deb8112
Instruction Fuzzy Hash: 5941073190CB489FDB189B5C98456F97BE0EF5A311F04427FE449D3292DF74B8468B81

Function 00007FFD348B1428 Relevance: 1.6, APIs: 1, Instructions: 146
COMMON

Download Yara Rule

Control-flow Graph

Executed
Not Executed

APIs

DuplicateHandle.KERNELBASE ref: 00007FFD348B150E

Memory Dump Source

Source File: 00000000.00000002.2166155525.00007FFD348B0000.00000040.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, Offset: 00007FFD348B0000, based on PE: false

Joe Sandbox IDA Plugin

Snapshot File: hcaresult_0_2_7ffd348b0000_OTRykEzo6o.jbxd

Similarity

API ID: DuplicateHandle
String ID:
API String ID: 3793708945-0
Opcode ID: 20e88f8283458dfdb42918569dfc524e221a4a82c762960c66230debf2a66563
Instruction ID: 3c20ffb04316dd31b981f73dc571ab359e3f37a9e2b1e9057685331c4aca4d10
Opcode Fuzzy Hash: 20e88f8283458dfdb42918569dfc524e221a4a82c762960c66230debf2a66563
Instruction Fuzzy Hash: F541E43190CA488FDB18DF5C98466F9BBE1FB59321F04422EE449D3292DF74A8568BC1

Function 00007FFD348B16AC Relevance: 1.4, APIs: 1, Instructions: 106
COMMON

Download Yara Rule

Control-flow Graph

Executed
Not Executed

APIs

CloseHandle.KERNELBASE ref: 00007FFD348B1745

Memory Dump Source

Source File: 00000000.00000002.2166155525.00007FFD348B0000.00000040.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, Offset: 00007FFD348B0000, based on PE: false

Joe Sandbox IDA Plugin

Snapshot File: hcaresult_0_2_7ffd348b0000_OTRykEzo6o.jbxd

Similarity

API ID: CloseHandle
String ID:
API String ID: 2962429428-0
Opcode ID: cab61b83096da49305d3bc5f60c8c29672149e3afb387ad63caf98b6e1661ac1
Instruction ID: 1200711b30cf68a5eade70a17686defebdc1b5745e220afd29a3c0ff09f1285c
Opcode Fuzzy Hash: cab61b83096da49305d3bc5f60c8c29672149e3afb387ad63caf98b6e1661ac1
Instruction Fuzzy Hash: B431E431A0CA4C8FDB59DB6888467E9BBF0FB56320F04426FD049C3192CB74A856CB91

Description:	Adversaries may abuse the Windows service control manager to execute malicious commands or payloads. The Windows service control manager ( `services.exe` ) is an interface to manage and manipulate services.The service control manager is accessible to users via GUI components as well as system utilities such as `sc.exe` and Net .
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Process: Process Creation, Service: Service Creation, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions.Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable or recovery programs/commands, is stored in the Windows Registry.
Tactics:	Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Driver: Driver Load, File: File Metadata, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation, Service: Service Creation, Service: Service Modification, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by side-loading DLLs. Similar to DLL Search Order Hijacking , side-loading involves hijacking which DLL a program loads. But rather than just planting the DLL within the search order of a program then waiting for the victim application to be invoked, adversaries may directly side-load their payloads by planting then invoking a legitimate application that executes their payload(s).
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File: File Creation, File: File Modification, Module: Module Load, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File: File Metadata, File: File Modification, Module: Module Load, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Access, Process: Process Metadata, Process: Process Modification
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, File: File Metadata, File: File Modification, Image: Image Metadata, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation, Process: Process Metadata, Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Metadata, Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Modification, Service: Service Creation, Service: Service Metadata
Platforms:	Containers, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to hide configuration information within Registry keys, remove information as part of cleaning up, or as part of other techniques to aid in persistence and execution.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may modify and/or disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their malware/tools and activities. This may take many forms, such as killing security software processes or services, modifying / deleting Registry keys or configuration files so that tools do not operate properly, or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning or reporting information. Adversaries may also disable updates to prevent the latest security patches from reaching tools on victim systems.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Driver: Driver Load, Process: Process Creation, Process: Process Termination, Sensor Health: Host Status, Service: Service Metadata, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification
Platforms:	Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, File: File Creation, File: File Metadata, Module: Module Load, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation, Script: Script Execution, WMI: WMI Creation, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from File and Directory Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

Loading Joe Sandbox Report ...

Warning!

Windows Analysis Report OTRykEzo6o.exe

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Process Tree

Malware Configuration

Yara Signatures

Sigma Signatures

Suricata Signatures

Joe Sandbox Signatures

AV Detection

Compliance

System Summary

Data Obfuscation

Boot Survival

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection

Malware Analysis System Evasion

Anti Debugging

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion

Language, Device and Operating System Detection

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

World Map of Contacted IPs

General Information

Warnings

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASNs

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\OTRykEzo6o.exe.log

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint Preview

Data Directories

Sections

Resources

Network Behavior

DNS Answers

Statistics

CPU Usage

Memory Usage

High Level Behavior Distribution

back

Behavior

System Behavior

Analysis Process: OTRykEzo6o.exePID: 1916, Parent PID: 4004

General

Chronological Activities

Analysis Process: cmd.exePID: 936, Parent PID: 1916

General

Chronological Activities

Analysis Process: conhost.exePID: 6536, Parent PID: 936

General

Windows Analysis Report
OTRykEzo6o.exe

Function 00007FFD348B0FD9 Relevance: 1.6, APIs: 1, Instructions: 115
nativeCOMMON

Function 00007FFD348B06F8 Relevance: 9.1, APIs: 1, Strings: 4, Instructions: 376
COMMON

Function 00007FFD348B0630 Relevance: 3.9, APIs: 1, Strings: 1, Instructions: 411
COMMON

Function 00007FFD348B06A5 Relevance: 1.7, APIs: 1, Instructions: 151
COMMON

Function 00007FFD348B06B0 Relevance: 1.6, APIs: 1, Instructions: 147
COMMON

Function 00007FFD348B1428 Relevance: 1.6, APIs: 1, Instructions: 146
COMMON

Function 00007FFD348B16AC Relevance: 1.4, APIs: 1, Instructions: 106
COMMON